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by Michael Welton
(MA dissertation, School of Oriental and African
Studies, London, 1997.)
Introduction
1. State and civil society: Gramsci's
concept of hegemony in the Yemeni context
2. Historical foundations of
northern dominance
3. Separate paths to unity
4. Northern hegemony in the
unified state; democracy, and the eclipse of the southern elite
Conclusion
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
Bibliography
ABSTRACT: Since the unification of the People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen (PDRY) and the Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR) in 1990, the northern
political elite of the former YAR - led by President Ali Abdullah Salih and the General
People's Congress (GPC) - has come to dominate the united state. This dissertation seeks
the explanation for this outcome in the process of national reconciliation pursued by
President Salih and his Republican predecessors, in contrast to the intra-elite conflict
that characterised the southern political elite of the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP). The
origins of these developments are sought in a comparison between the traditions of
government by coalition developed in the north under the rule of the Imamate, and the
highly localised structure of political authority that has been the norm in the politics
of the south throughout its history. Drawing on the writing of Antonio Gramsci, it is
argued that implicit within the north's national reconciliation is a hegemonic strategy
combining consent with coercion, essential to the effective governance of a state such as
Yemen, surrounded by strong social forces that cannot be ruled by force alone. Through a
combination of a broad national-popular ideology and the development of a corporatist
military/commercial complex, Salih and the GPC have successfully constructed such a
hegemony bloc, able to incorporate diverse interests and sentiments such as tribe,
religious and conservative groups, modernist elements and nationalism.
Introduction
THE YEARS since the unification of the two Yemens have
witnessed the eclipse of the socialist ruling elite in former PDRY by the Northern
dominated 'General Peoples Congress' (GPC). Despite the two parties entering into unity
arrangements as technically equal partners, the GPC's unexpectedly large majority in the
parliamentary elections held in April this year represents the culmination of a process
through which it has successfully extended its hegemony over the country's political
system, and incorporated the leading political, tribal, social, and religious
constituencies into its broad nationalist, liberal-Islamic coalition.
The objective of this work is to analyse how this hegemony
has been achieved in the context of a weak state surrounded by strong and diverse social
forces exhibiting centrifugal tendencies. Here, the concept of hegemony is given its
Gramscian meaning, rather than its original Greek sense of the predominance of one nation
over another.1 It implies the leadership of one class or group over society
based on consent as well as coercion, a necessary combination where the state lacks the
physical means to impose its authority by force alone. Gramsci constructed his theory of
hegemony in the context of the socio-economically and politically developed countries of
Western Europe. However, it will be suggested here that that his concepts are also
applicable to Yemeni politics given that the state in both cases faces considerable
restrictions on its scope for action by the interests of powerful social forces who have
the power to undermine its authority.
In particular, Gramsci's concern with the relations of
forces in society and the need to build coalitions of support in order to achieve state
power appear highly relevant in the Yemeni context. Throughout its history Yemeni rulers
have enjoyed only a limited personal power base, and have often been threatened by the
existence of alternative structures of authority to the state.2 They have
therefore relied on the support of other groups in society (in particular the tribes) to
provide the military and economic resources necessary to maintain its authority, and
extend it through society. A consequence of this has been the development of a tradition
of consensual rule in the political culture of North Yemen, where political authority is
based on a combination of religious, nationalist, and tribal leadership, the distribution
of economic resources, and the role of mediator between different social groups. In the
south however, no such political traditions existed given its extremely localised division
of political authority, a factor that has important implications for the balance of power
in the united Yemen.
In the consensual political traditions of the north we
find the precedent for the complex strategy of coalition building combined with coercion
developed by President Salih in order to strengthen his regime's authority in first the
YAR, and subsequently in the united Yemeni state. Only by keeping as many forces in
society as possible 'on-side', has Salih been able to mobilise enough support to subdue
opposition by force when necessary. For example, in the early 1980s it was the support of
the northern tribes that helped Salih survive instability in the south instigated by the
NDF (National Democratic Front). Later on, it was his power base in the armed forces and
extensive popularity within northern society, which enabled him to inflict a crushing
defeat on a contrastingly divided southern elite in the internal war of 1994.
Salih has been careful to root his power in several
different areas. Firstly he has established an inner-circle controlling the key state
apparatus and party organisation (often from his own tribe, the Sanhan), and sought to
incorporate leaders and interest groups from all important areas of society into a
corporatist structure of political and economic patronage - what Renaud Detalle has
described as 'the military/commercial' complex' surrounding the Yemeni state. Secondly the
hegemony of the GPC over Yemeni political life has been achieved by presenting a very
broad ideological front covering traditional conservative, tribal and Islamic values,
nationalism, developmentalism, and a limited commitment to political and economic
liberalism. As such the GPC has been able to incorporate or form alliances with factions
from most parts of the political spectrum when necessary, and maximise the advantage of
the numerical superiority of the northern population at the ballot box.
The relationship between a regime's ideology and its
ability to achieve hegemony was of particular concern to Gramsci. He emphasised the role
of the political party as the organisation capable of transmitting the ideology of a
leading class through civil society, in a form capable of mobilising the support from the
mass of society necessary to gain and maintain control over the state3. Indeed,
the struggle between two parties - the GPC and YSP - has been fundamental to the recent
the politics of the new Yemeni Republic. Both parties and their predecessors have sought
to monopolise what Gramsci described as the 'national-popular' dimension to hegemony,
requiring "the unification of a variety of different social forces into a broad
alliance expressing a national popular collective will."4 Each sought to
legitimise their rule by presenting themselves as the true government of Yemen and
clothing their respective ideologies in nationalist rhetoric5. However, given
the ideological polarisation of the PDRY and YAR before and after unity, it will be
suggested that the GPC's implicit, inclusive ideological stance enabled it to present
itself as the 'national' party, a feat the explicitly secular, socialist ideology of the
YSP lacked the flexibility and mass appeal to achieve. This was a struggle the YSP finally
lost when it handed the GPC the mantle of national leadership by attempting succession
during the inter-elite war of 1994.
The possible applications of the Gramscian concept of
hegemony in the context of the politics of weak states and strong societies, and Yemen in
particular, is considered further in chapter one. The subsequent chapters seek to
demonstrate the role hegemony and coalition building have played in the evolution of the
political balance in the Republic of Yemen. Chapter two looks at the historical precedent
for northern hegemony in a united Yemeni state, and examines the way in which the
divergent paths of political and social development experienced by pre-revolutionary north
and south Yemen created the underlying conditions for southern weakness and the potential
for northern hegemony after unification. In particular, it contrasts the extensive
administrative autonomy and division of the south under British rule with the centralising
tendencies of the Imamate, and also the foundation of the Imam's power in a coalition of
social groups.
The rivalry between the PDRY and YAR, and their
often-conflicting attempts at nation building and development is the subject of chapter
three. Despite the apparent weakness of both of the new states, the increasing cohesion of
the north through its process of national reconciliation is contrasted with the
destructive intra-elite rivalry in the south. The impact of changes in the international
environment in the late 1980s are also considered regarding their role in revealing the
growing fragility of the elite of the YSP after the 1986 civil war, and the growing
cohesion of the GPC by comparison. Chapter four discusses the efforts of both the YSP and
GPC to extend their hegemony in the newly united state. It examines the failure of the YSP
to combat the bias towards the more populous GPC implicit within the democratic process,
and the progressive monopolisation of the nationalist ideology by President Salih and the
GPC elite, by means of the alienation of the southern leadership from the united political
apparatus. The final chapter asks whether - in the light of the GPC's recent election
success - its hegemony is sufficient to allow effective government, and whether it is such
that even in the south the GPC is regarded as the legitimate ruling party.
1. State and civil
society: Gramsci's concept of hegemony in the Yemeni context
THE CENTRAL RELEVANCE of
Gramsci's political thought to the politics of the Yemen is located in his concern with
civil society and its relationship to the state. He recognised that within civil society
lay forces with the potential to threaten or bolster the state, depending on the extent to
which they were organised and aware of their corporate interests. Where civil society was
weak and divided, he stressed that only 'a war of movement' -a military struggle - was
necessary to capture the state, because power was based on control of the state's coercive
apparatus alone. However, where a state's foundations were deeply embedded in the
institutions, ideology and practices of a strong, and complex civil society, political
power was instead founded on an evolving combination of force and consent. For Gramsci, this had great implications for the strategies to be
employed by movements attempting to seize or maintain state power in different political
environments. To illustrate this point, Gramsci compares the achievements of Lenin in the
Russian revolution with the more limited possibilities for a direct, violent seizure of
the state apparatus in the Western European states. His doubts about the model of
revolution presented by the Russian experience of 1917 were based on his appreciation of
the strength of the superstructure developed by the capitalist mode of production in
Western Europe. He saw that the institutions of state and civil society, which transmitted
the capitalist ideology, had a consensual basis, as well as the coercive power of the
state behind them. "In Russia the State was everything, civil society was primordial
and gelatinous; in the West ... when the State trembled a sturdy structure of civil
society was at once revealed. The state was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood
a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks."6 Thus in
Western Europe, unlike Russia, a direct revolutionary attack on the state would fail
because it had failed to disturb the hegemony of the ruling class in the institutions of
civil society, leaving the insurgents exposed to counter-revolution even if they had
succeeded in breaching the coercive defences of the state.
Instead, Gramsci believed that a more complex political
strategy was necessary for both the maintenance of power by the ruling elite, and the
strategy of revolutionary movements seeking their overthrow, based upon the establishment
of ideological hegemony in civil society. In order to achieve this, he suggested, a class
needs to develop an ideology which goes beyond a concern with its own narrow corporate
interests, to form a 'world view' to which other elements in society can subscribe. For
example, it may seek to incorporate popular political sentiments such as nationalism,
religion, demands for civil liberties and popular representation, or a return to
'culturally authentic' customs and practices within its class based ideology, to the point
where they appear contiguous. In so doing, Gramsci writes that, "the development and
expansion of the particular group are conceived of, and presented, as being the motor
force of a universal expansion, of a development of all the 'national' energies."7
However, if hegemony is a strategy fundamental to the
politics of states surrounded by an 'advanced' civil society, it must be questioned
whether the concept has relevance in societies where the associations and identities
associated with capitalist development are less well formed8. In
Yemen, in parallel with many less developed countries, society is often said to be
dominated by "parochial cultures ... where citizens are not concerned about national
government ... [and] ... see themselves as neither contributing to, nor being affected by,
central decisions9. The result is assumed to be a state with
shallow roots in civil society, and a national politics that forms the arena for zero-sum
conflict between praetorian political elites10. Therefore, if
Gramsci's logic is to be followed, the principle means of transferring political power in
Yemen can be expected to be violent. Indeed, revolutions, coup d'etat, civil wars, and
intra-elite conflict have characterised the politics of the YAR, PDRY, and unified state,
suggesting that the element of coercive power is the over-riding factor in the
organisation of political authority in the country, rather than the expression of consent
from its society.
However, to infer from the absence of a 'modern' civil
society and the continuation of 'pre-modern' forms of identity and association, the
existence of a weak society with a limited role in national politics, is to underestimate
the complexity of Yemeni politics and the role of social forces within it. Despite the
limited development of 'formal' civil institutions and practices, it can still be argued
that the state in Yemen is as dependent on society as it is in the West. Pre-modern
institutions such as the tribe and religious organisation can themselves form an intricate
and politically important associational life, which those seeking political authority must
take into account11. The extent of the dependence of the state
on society rests on the military, economic, and political resources held by the groups and
structures that comprise it. Where these resources are concentrated in the hands of the
state elite and otherwise scattered thinly through society, the state will have a large
degree of autonomy. However, if as in Yemen, the reverse is true, then the state must be
responsive to the demands articulated by the powerful interests within civil society.
The principle limitation to the power of any central
authority in Yemen throughout its history has been its military weakness in comparison to
the armed strength of the tribes. Yemeni leaders have traditionally relied on the tribes
to provide them with the forces required to impose and maintain their authority over the
country. As a consequence, the process of mobilising military support has necessitated the
development of an important element of consent in the relationship between tribe and
state. This reflects Gramsci's concern with the dual nature of political authority when
significant power is held within society, and also has a clear parallel in Ibn Khaldun's
concepts of 'asabiyya and iltiham.
Khaldun, like Gramsci recognised that political authority
has two inter-related components. Firstly the actual capabilities of the state based on
the strength of its 'asabiyya'12, and secondly the extent to
which other groups recognise the superiority of that 'asabiyya, and accept it, obey it,
and shift their political loyalty to its possessors. Khaldun describes this process of
coalition building as 'iltiham', noted by Salame as "the ultimate form of hegemony in
its insistence on social integration by and around the ideology professed by the ruling
'asabiyya."13 Nevertheless, he also recognised the
particular difficulties facing a state seeking to extend its hegemony in a land of many
different tribes and groups,14 where there existed no
significant unifying factor capable of generating a higher loyalty. For example, he
regarded the call of a religious movement as vital to the da'wa of Muhammad ibn 'Abd
al-Wahhab in 18th century Saudi Arabia.
In the Yemeni context there is no single ideology or
identity that can play this role. Almost all Yemenis are Muslim, however the divisions
between the Zaydi and Shaf'i sects would make almost it impossible to form hegemony around
a shared religious ideology. Meanwhile, many other fractures exist in society between town
and tribe, traditionalist and modernist organisations, and occupational interests and
classes (such as industry/labour unions and agriculture). These serve to inhibit the
development of mass movements based on shared socio-economic and class interests, or
political ideology. A belief in Yemeni nationalism appears to be the one value with
mobilising potential shared throughout society. It combines a historical perception of
Yemenis as one people with modern conceptions of the nation-state, and the right of a
nation to self-rule. Nevertheless, its organising power is also limited, primarily by the
strength of regionalism and loyalties to kinship groups, as well as divergent ideas about
the shape that the nationalist project should take.
Presented with these difficulties, how can hegemony
capable of supporting a stable and legitimate government be achieved over a society such
as Yemen's? Hudson identifies three possible strategies to be pursued by regimes searching
for legitimacy. Firstly the transformationist model, similar to that pursued in the PDRY,
which takes the form of a fundamental system change from the starting point of a violent
seizure of the state apparatus. The revolutionary regime seeks to extend its hegemony by
replacing loyalty to kinship group and religion, with a commitment to a political ideology
and new mechanisms of representation and mobilisation, such as the party, workers
organisations, and popular committees. However, as the socialists in the PDRY found,
"it is not certain whether the revolutionary legitimacy formula can sweep away
traditional values and become deeply rooted". This is especially the case where the
state faces severe economic constraints. If the transformation of society is partial and
pre-existing identities continue to hold political weight, there is the possibility that
the new political institutions will be subverted by these interests, or face their
opposition from outside the state.
Hudson's second model envisages a society undergoing a
gradual evolution into a pluralist political culture, with legitimate political authority
achieved through increasingly institutionalised economic and political competition between
interest groups. This assumes that economic development, urbanisation, increasing literacy
and education, and an expanding media will bring increasing demands for participation in
national affairs from the politicised masses15. Indeed, the forces of
modernisation in Yemen have generated strong modernist political movements, on both
socialist and liberal wings. However, as Hudson himself predicts, there is no guarantee
that this will lead to a more cohesive political environment. Improved communications and
greater access to economic resources may be appropriated by particularist groups to
reinforce their own identities. Meanwhile, the effects and benefits of modernisation are
not necessarily shared evenly through society, and may therefore increase conflict within
and between traditional and new groups over access to resources and the direction of
change.
It is Hudson's third, 'mosaic', model which appears to
present the strategy best suited to achieving legitimacy in the Yemeni context. It
requires the state to recognise the relative permanence of parochial and traditional
orientations in society, and follow a strategy of accommodating them within the structures
of the state and national politics. This formula is advocated by Illiya Harik, who writes,
"the new states of the Middle East are in need of accommodating particularistic
tendencies, and by a constructive policy channeling them in the service of civic order
with patience and endurance."16 Such a task has
similarities to Gramsci's concept hegemony. It requires an inclusive national-popular
ideology, capable of coalescing as many elements of society as possible into a hegemonic
bloc. For example, to win the support of conservative forces it must respect religious
authority and tribal autonomy, while maintaining a commitment to rapid economic
development, a fair distribution of income, and political liberalisation in order to
appease radical and modernist groups, often powerfully concentrated in urban areas.
The mosaic model bears a significant resemblance to the
process of national reconciliation undertaken by the YAR after the impasse between
modernist and traditional forces in the civil war, and goes some way to explaining its
growing cohesion in the twenty years that followed before unity. It is a strategy that
allows a greater diffusion of political authority throughout society, and therefore an
apparently weaker state than the transformative model. However, its principle benefit is
an emphasis on political stability and the dangers of alienating powerful elements of
society. A settled political environment allows the state to progressively extend its
hegemony over society, and conversely over time increases the likelihood of potentially
divisive forces developing a vested interest in the status quo. In stark contrast is the
political upheaval implicit in a revolutionary strategy such as that pursued in the PDRY.
The immediate seizure of the state is likely to be followed by a long period of
instability while the traditional structures of authority are progressively disabled, but
not yet effectively replaced by the new revolutionary state. The socialists in South Yemen
particularly suffered from violent intra-elite conflict, suggesting that the
constitutional mechanisms for allocating and transferring authority were ineffective. In
contrast to the growing cohesion of Salih's regime in the north, the civil war of 1986
left the Southern State a weakened entity in the pre-unification period.
In 1984, John Peterson wrote, "It may be only
realistic to assume that the mosaic model provides the most likely avenue for future
changes in the Yemens." It is also the conclusion of this discussion that a
consensual or hegemonic strategy is most likely to be successful in view of the powerful
but heterogeneous nature of Yemen's civil society. The next chapters will suggest that
such a strategy was elemental in ensuring the dominance of the northern political elite in
the united Yemeni state, and seek to locate its origins in the political traditions of the
north and the environment in which YAR developed. By way of contrast the source of
southern weakness is traced from the south's localised political culture, through the
factionalism of the revolutionary period, and into the united Yemeni State.
2. Historical foundations of
northern dominance
THE HISTORY of Yemen is often
characterised as one of social and political division between tribe and tribe, town and
tribe, Zaydi and Sha'fi Islam, north and south, and traditionalist and modernist. In the
face of these multiple cleavages, the leaders who sought to unite the country over the
centuries faced insurmountable obstacles if their base of support rested on too narrow a
constituency, and failed to incorporate the multiple other centres of power and authority
into their sphere of influence. In other words, the achievement of unity required the
establishment of hegemony over society, the gaining of a vital element of consent from
potentially hostile groups. As a result, Yemeni leaders have achieved lasting success only
by practising a consensual style of rule. It will be argued here that this tradition was
reflected in the strategy of national reconciliation and coalition building followed by
the GPC in the 1970s and 80s, and an important explanation of its greater coherence and
unity in the struggle with the YSP for control of the unified state. In spite of the efforts of many rulers in its history and with the
exception of short periods subdued by overwhelming forces from the outside world, the
unity of Yemen has been impossible to achieve by force alone. The major explanation for
this is that military strength in Yemen has traditionally rested in society, and
especially with the tribes, rather than with any 'centralised' authority. A ruler had
therefore to achieve the support of the tribes if he was to command significant military
power17. This required one or more unifying factor with the
strength to overcome tribal, religious, and political divisions and form a Khaldunian
'Iltiham', legitimating the ruler's authority. Such factors included religious, kinship
and tribal ties, a reputation for justice and good government, the successful leadership
of campaigns of conquest and bounty, and movements against oppression from outside or
within. However, in the face of an absence or decline of these bonds, crisis was
inevitable when a leader proved to be unable firmly to dominate other group feelings and
draw them to accept its domination formalised into state power18.
Over the past centuries the tribes of the Zaydi 'state' of
north Yemen have been particularly autonomous, given their isolated and strategically
defensible mountain locations, and their strong tribal organisation. Having endured
"numerous changes of fortune for over a thousand years."19,
but remaining unconquered by the likes of the Rasulids and Ottomans, it may be possible to
say that the first rule of Yemeni politics is that in order to control a united Yemen, a
leader must incorporate the northern tribes into his coalition of support. Indeed, the
only periods of unity in Yemen since the Middle Ages have been achieved under the
leadership of an expansionist Zaydi Imamate, drawing its military power from the northern
tribes and its authority from an 'asabiyya' based on religious leadership, tribal
affiliation, and the leadership of a campaign against the Ottoman's which "took on
the character of a genuine national rising against corrupt and unjust foreign rule."20
This combination of military strength and moral and national leadership enabled the Zaydi
state to add many Shaf'i areas to its dominion. However, while the Imams succeeded in
nominally reuniting Yemen within the old Himyarite borders as far as Dhofar21,
tribal unrest and civil war prevented the their authority being fully recognised in
provinces such as Lahaj, Asir, Hadhramawt and the Yafai mountains.22 This
illustrates the problem of legitimacy faced by the Imams who sought to establish hegemony
over largely Shaf'i areas when their authority was based on religious leadership of the
Zaydi faithful, and tribal organisations not represented in the south of Yemen.
The precedent set by Zaydi rule has been carried over into
the politics of Yemen in the modern period in three important ways. Firstly, it
demonstrated that the ruler of a united Yemen would have to accept the existence and power
of the tribes, and secondly seek to incorporate them into a supporting coalition of
important social groups. The GPC was successful in attempting this in the form of its
program of national reconciliation, aided by its lack of explicit ideology, the tribal
links of its leaders, the incorporation of tribal elites into government, and its courting
of Islah in the period after unity23. Meanwhile the YSP sought to eradicate
tribalism and replace it with alternative forms of socio-economic identity. For example,
high ranking party member Jarallah 'Umar said that "The tribe in Yemen is no longer a
social and economic institution ... our party rejects the use of tribal concepts to impede
development or oppose law and order."24 Although this
policy was intended to reduce the divisions in Yemeni society, it also served to alienate
important tribal constituencies in the south in the post-revolutionary period, and then
again in the north after unity.
Thirdly, the Imamate gave the north the longest tradition
of continuous central authority in Yemen, and a precedent for leadership of campaigns for
national unification. Despite the fluctuating scope of the its power, its continuous
existence for a millennia can be contrasted with the more localised "parallel
structures of social and political power in uneasy relation with one another"25
which characterised the south. The southern provinces were often the first to break away
from the Zaydi attempts at unification and were never themselves the base for efforts to
control the whole of Yemen, leaving the PDRY a fractured legacy on which to build.
The different political legacies faced by north and south
were accentuated by the period of colonial and monarchical rule in the 19th and first half
of this century. The north experienced the centralising efforts of Ottoman rule, which
failed to subdue the Zaydi tribes, but did succeed in creating an
administrative/bureaucratic apparatus that could form the basis of a viable state. This
process continued under the Imamate's of Yahya and Ahmad who sought to combine the
development of a modern state apparatus with traditional forms of legitimation. They
relied principally on their religious authority and the support of the northern tribes,
but also sought to use nationalism and limited liberalisation in the attempt to legitimise
their rule over Shaf'i areas. Indeed Bidwell writes Yahya, "was so successful that in
1933 the delegates from Aden travelling up to the capital for negotiations ... expressed
astonishment at the security and order which prevailed, in striking contrast to the
anarchy of most of the Aden Protectorate."26 The Imamate
was a weak state, facing opposition from modernists, who sought more rapid economic and
political development, and traditionalists disapproving of the Imams centralising
tendencies. In other words it faced similar contradictions to those confronted later by
the YAR. But in the longevity of the Imamate - achieved through the necessities of
coalition building and multiple legitimacy - lay the basis for the success of the
inclusive strategy pursued later by the GPC, which enabled it to achieve hegemony over the
north and extend it to the south after unification.
In contrast to the centralisation occurring under the
Ottomans and then the Imams in the north, British rule tended to accentuate divisions in
the south. Apart from the colony at Aden, Britain employed a policy of indirect rule in
the rest of the Protectorate, trusting administrative authority to the sultanates, which
appeared -in the eyes of the colonial administrators - to rule in a patchwork of fiefdoms.
Therefore the divisions in south Yemeni society, so vague in practice, were legitimated on
paper and formed interests for the different ruing elites to protect27.
Meanwhile, Aden was developing into a modern town with an ideologised political culture
and level of development far in advance of the rest of the country. Although the British
sponsored the creation of the Federation of South Arabia in an effort to give Yemen an
integrated political system, it was by then too late. The Sultans and chiefs were
unwilling to give up their autonomy, and the new structures appeared a continuance of
colonial and traditional rule to the Adeni radicals. South Yemeni politics at the end of
British rule was therefore violently divisive, with important consequences for later
southern weakness after unification.
Firstly, the south was left with no history of
'legitimate' centralised rule, and only the most basic institutions and structures for
government outside Aden. Particularly vital was the lack of a tradition of authority based
on consensus building such as that existing in the north, which could have brought
together a moderate coalition of reforming and conservative forces28.
Secondly, there was a fear of division in the new revolutionary state. Rather than
attempting to develop a coalition of existing social forces in support of its rule, it
attempted to create new social identities and roles through ideology and coercion.
Successive socialist regimes were therefore unable to put down roots in the repressed
traditional political culture, limiting the YSP's mobilisational potential as the
socialist ideology lost its power in the late 1980's. As the next chapter will show the
party was thus left in a very weak position to maintain its hegemony over the south, and
extend it to the north, after unity.
3. Separate paths to unity
THE 1960s were a period of
immense political upheaval for both North and South Yemen. By the end of the decade the
two countries had clearly embarked on the different strategies of nation building whose
evolution would see a weakened and divided southern political elite eclipsed by that of
the north in the process of unification. In the south the prevalent dynamic was
intra-elite conflict, and the progressive emiseration of the Socialist's hegemony.
Meanwhile, the north was undergoing a process of national reconciliation through which the
leaderships of powerful social forces were incorporated into the ruling coalition,
enabling the state to progressively extend its authority into society. This process was
interspersed with periods of reaction and instability when the objectives of particular
regimes became removed from those of powerful social groups, until a formula could be
found enabling a further rapprochement between state and society. However, during the decade of revolution and independence such an
outcome was by no means evident, indeed the reverse appeared to be the case. It was the
leading southern nationalist group, the NLF, which seemed most effective in coalescing
several groups within a broad ideology committed to nationalism and social justice,
drawing on a number of bases of support ranging from urban workers to rural and tribal
populations29. As Adams writes, "Directed against a
foreign, colonialist enemy rather than a native tyranny, it had had a far more coherent
national following" than the republicans in the north30.
The latter were proving unable to defeat the Royalists by force, and were reliant on a
massive Egyptian intervention of questionable popularity, with increasing autonomy being
achieved by tribes on both sides during the conflict31.
Only with the end of foreign influence in the form of the
British withdrawal from South Yemen and the Egyptian retreat from the YAR did the
distinctive political dynamics of the two states truly begin to reassert themselves. In
the south, despite the popularity of the nationalist movement in society, divisions
existed from the outset reflecting the regionalism and class stratification that dominated
its political culture. Differences over the extent and direction of change were the
explicit cause of division. The more conservative South Arabian League attempted to rally
rural and urban populations behind its call for a united state, but was willing to work in
coalition with the aristocracy and rural notables to preserve the traditional pattern of
Yemeni politics. However, its elitist politics were soon challenged by more radical groups
influenced by the labour movement and the rising ideologies of Arab nationalism,
socialism, and communism, in particular the National Front.
These divisions were brought to a head by Egyptian
attempts to impose unity on the competing nationalist movements by incorporating them into
the united body FLOSY. According to Ismael and Ismael, the National Front presented
"strong ideological opposition to the programme and composition of FLOSY, and in
particular to the participation in it of Sultans, Princes, Sheikhs and members of the
Adeni elite."32 At the root of this dissent was the
left-wing of the NF, the increasingly dominant force in the party which eventually
succeeded in forcing a break-away in November 1966.
During the civil war which followed, a large scale purge
of the nationalist leadership occurred, causing the alienation of conservative or liberal
leaders such as al-Jifri and al-Habashi, and the exclusion of more moderate National Front
members from party membership, or positions of leadership. Over the following years of
National Front rule such a shrinkage of the ruling elite was to become the principle
dynamic of southern politics, a pattern that had its roots in the South's lack of a
tradition of central authority able to bind different social groups into its hegemony. No
social or institutional mechanisms for the peaceful sharing of power between regions and
social groups had developed, leaving the state vulnerable to seizure by a well-armed
minority group such as the NLF. Power was therefore zero-sum game, with the achievement of
power by one faction meaning the absolute loss of power by another, often meaning exile or
loss of livelihood and even life unless the state could be recaptured by force.
During the 1970s and 80s the divisions in the leadership
of the NLF exhibited themselves in several forms, severely inhibiting the regime's efforts
to extend its socialist hegemony throughout society and into neighbouring states. The most
explicit splits were on matters relating to foreign and domestic policy. However,
personal, class, tribal and regional divisions often lay behind these differences33,
despite efforts to build new identities based on the socialist ideology in order to
overcome these cleavages. Already in June 1969 a leftist coup had removed Qahtan al-Shabi
and the moderate Arab Nationalist leadership of the party, who had enjoyed support in the
Lahej. However rivalries soon revealed themselves between Muscovite scientific socialists
such as Abd al-Fattah Ismail, and the more pragmatic Ali Nasir Muhammad and Salim Rubay,
despite attempts to resolve divisions in the party congress. As Fred Halliday writes
"The conflict of policy and personality that characterised the YSP leadership...were
not to be contained by the apparently stabilising resolutions of the early 1980s. As in
some other Third World revolutionary regimes, most notably Afghanistan, the dynamic of
factionalism seemed to reproduce itself, however dire the consequences of such indulgence
by the leadership might be, for themselves and the people they were supposed to
lead."34
Each purge of the nationalist leadership reduced the
NLF/YSP's ability to achieve hegemony over society. This was compounded by the leftward
movement of the party towards a doctrine of uncompromising scientific socialism. The state
had committed itself to a complete reconstruction of the southern political culture on
Marxist principles: including an end to tribal forms of organisation and identity, the
subordination of religion to secular ideology, the complete removal of traditional
structures of authority such as the sultanates, the shift to a command economy, and the
creation of new structures of representation, such as the party, and organisations for
workers, women, and youth. In the context of the Italian Communist party, Gramsci believed
that the ideological inflexibility of such a stance prevented the party from placing
itself at the head of a national-popular movement.35 In the
words of Anne Showstack Sassoon, "The party, by refusing to take part in a whole
range of struggles [for fear of ideological contamination] had remained an isolated sect,
detached from the masses."36 In South Yemen this was also
the case, despite the party being in power and not opposition. The Communists were to a
large extent successful in removing the pre-existing forms of political authority and
legitimation. However, they failed to inspire a great ideological commitment in the new
ones from a people for whom "traditional goals and institutions...persistently
retained the primary allegiance of most of the people."37
Power remained concentrated in the hands of a small elite and based on control of the
security apparatus and party, despite the existence of institutions of popular
representation. Meanwhile, especially during periods of hard-line dominance, the regime's
rigid adherence to the Marxist left it regionally isolated, and committed to an inflexible
economic strategy unsuited to Yemen's needs, and more concerned with the allocation of
resources than their production.
As the international hegemony of the USSR declined, the
PDRY's principle pillar of economic and political support was no longer willing to support
the its unproductive economy and factionalised regime. Under these circumstances the
failure of socialist party to build its hegemony around the socialist ideology was
revealed. Its authority had been founded on its security apparatus, and the distribution
of economic patronage, rather than the genuine commitment of society to the communist
cause. Like other communist regimes in this period the YSP was forced to seek alternative
forms of legitimation, such as nationalism, economic liberalisation and democratisation,
or face extinction. However, the party's ability to expand it's coalition of support had
been severely hindered by the civil war of 1986 which saw the more pragmatic wing of the
party under Ali Nasir Muhammad ousted from the country by hard-liners supporting Ismail
and al-Bayd. This was a conflict which saw many high-ranking leaders killed or exiled and
which revealed the extent of divisions between party factions, popular militias, tribal
groups and civilians.38
Given the political and economic crisis that followed it
is unsurprising that, as Brian Whitaker indicates, "the new government failed to
provide and clear direction or evidence of strong leadership"39.
The government was constrained by its attachment to the hard-line ideology for which it
had fought, and was unwilling to undergo a process of national reconciliation with the
thirty thousand supporters of Ali Nasir Muhammad estimated to have fled abroad. Elements
of the new leadership, particularly al-Bayd, therefore turned to unification as a solution
to the regime's lack of legitimacy, and the economy's stagnation. However, as members of
the ruling elite who opposed this move feared, the YSP was moving into unity as a severely
weakened force, especially in comparison to the growing hegemony of President Salih's
regime over the YAR and the Yemeni nationalist movement in general.
In the north the Republican movement was also divided from
the start on social, ideological, and religious grounds. Robin Bidwell categorises its
principle bases of support as: Merchants disputing government monopolies, Shafi's seeking
an end to religious persecution, Qadis railing against the pretensions of the Sayyids,
conservatives who objected to the pace of reform and the election of al-Badr as Imam, and
intellectuals reacting to the Imam's break with nationalism. However, as he stresses, the
most important element of support required by the Republicans was the military power of
the army and the Zaydi tribes, in particular the Hashid40.
Such a coalition of anti-royalist forces could not be
could not be achieved while the state was in the hands of the Egyptian backed regime of
Sallal, and following strictly Nasirist policies. The commitment to a radical
transformation of society along Egyptian lines was at odds with the values of conservative
tribal forces, and lacked roots in Yemeni political culture. As Hudson writes,
"tribalism and religiosity were so deeply rooted in Yemeni society that no mere
change of government, even if supported by a large external military force could replace
them easily with a civic culture and loyalty to a modernising central government."41
The withdrawal of Egyptian troops following its war with
Israel in 1967, and the following demise of Sallal's regime enabled the new government
under President Iryani to embark on a more moderate strategy of state building and
national reconciliation. Tribal conferences at Amran in 1963, and Khamir in 1965 had
previously allowed contact between elements on both sides who sought a compromise solution
as it became increasingly obvious that neither side was strong enough to defeat the other
by simple military means42. These initiatives had been inhibited
up until this point by the ideological and strategic rigidity of Sallal's regime and the
Egyptian government. However, the new regime under Iryani presented a much less radical
front, enabling it to successfully pursue a strategy of co-opting those tribes which had
supported the Royalist cause, but had no fundamental attachment to the institution of the
Imamate. With their principle objections to the republican state removed, and the end of
substantial Egyptian and Saudi intervention, support for the Royalist cause drained away43.
Several tribal leaders went over to the republicans in the remainder of the war, such as
Qasem Monasser of the Beni Husheich, while other Sheikhs and royalist politicians, such as
Abdullah al-Ahmar and Ahmad Mohammed ash-Shani were incorporated into the post-settlement
Republican Council.
Iryani's accomodationist strategy became the blueprint for
future northern regimes to pursue. Indeed, the GPC's own version of the history of Yemen
praises Iryani for winning "the trust of all Yemeni's", and enabling the
achievement of "peace with honour" for those involved. As both Peterson and
Hudson note, his style of rule had its roots in the Yemeni tradition of state as
intermediary between competing factions, which had also been a principle legitimating
factor for the Imamate's influence in the country for many centuries. As such "His
authority ... resided in his capacity to act as an honest broker between the two real
centres of power, the army, which controlled the main towns, and the relatively autonomous
tribes of the north and east."44 In order to achieve this
balance Iryani sought a broad ideological hegemony, combining respect for the tribal and
religious values held strongly in the Zaydi north, with a developmentalist attitude
towards the economy and the consolidation of state power, representing the wishes of the
largely Shai'fi urban intelligentsia and the progressive elements of the armed forces. The
new constitution of the Republic sought to institutionalise this balance of power, in what
Bidwell describes as "a real attempt to find a political system appropriate to the
country."45 However, despite his efforts, Iryani found it
impossible run an effective administration at the same time as holding together such a
disparate coalition in the context of an extremely weak state, and social forces which had
enjoyed a decade of near autonomy. In particular, as a 'neutral' he lacked a significant
power base in society, or Khaldunian 'assabiyya, such as the links to tribe and the
military which were later to provide a greater degree of stability to the rule of
President Ali Abdullah Salih.
Colonel Ibrahim Hamdi's rule in the YAR was in many ways a
reaction to the problems of weak institutional capacity and highly autonomous social
forces that had defeated his predecessor. His priority was to strengthen the State's
institutional capacity and extend its reach into society, entailing new limits to tribal
power including the abolition of the Sheikh dominated consultative council. Unlike Iryani,
Hamdi had a more powerful base of support in the army from which to draw support, however
he also sought to pursue a similar consociational path where possible. For example, he had
support from influential Zaydi tribal leaders, and also tried to incorporate the Shaf'i
community and leftist groups into the political system46.
"He realised the necessity of broadening his appeal to all sectors of the population
through such methods as ... leadership of the co-ops and anti-corruption movement, and by
maintaining close personal relations with figures from all parts of the political spectrum47.
Nevertheless, the extension of state power and the more
rapid economic development which occurred during Hamdi's regime could not be achieved
without an increasing encroachment upon tribal autonomy which would put it at odds with
leaders such as Sheikh al-Ahmar. According to Bidwell, Hamdi "came to realise that
his dream of a "modern civilised state" was impossible while much of the country
was dominated by implacably conservative Sheikhs supported by masses of armed
followers."48 He sought to break their restrictions on
state action by moving towards are more pluralistic political system49,
making overtures to the PDRY about unity, and eventually in the summer of 1977 fighting in
the Zaydi strongholds. However, his efforts were cut short by his assassination in October
of that year.
The foundation of President Ali Abdullah Salih's success
over the following twenty years was a return to the basic elements of political power in
Yemen -the support of the northern tribes, in particular the Hashid confederacy50
and the military. As Bidwell notes, "Salih's first move was to attempt to conciliate
the northern tribes...al-Ahmar and other shaykhs were brought into the Assembly...[He]
appeared to have little option but to try and revert to the old Imamic policy of using the
Hashid and Bakil, if he could command their loyalty, to coerce the rest of the
country."51 The ability to mobilise the armed forces and
tribes was vital at this time due to the increasing threat from the National Democratic
Front based in the south of the country and supported by the PDRY. Indeed, according to
the GPC's own history, in the border war of 1979 the YAR was almost defeated, save for the
intervention of fighters from the tribal confederacies52.
However, as the regimes of Hamdi and Iryani had shown, an
effective administration could not be developed merely by pacifying the tribes. Salih
sought to strengthen his hegemony over the state in two further ways. Firstly he set about
building what Kostiner describes as "a network of power", and Detalle as a
"military/commercial complex." Vital to this structure were high ranking
military appointments from within Salih's extended family and clan, and leading members of
important tribes, through whom the regime could "operate a broad network of clients
in the army and appointed officials in the public administration and government
offices."53 Over time this network was effective in linking
the interests of the state to those of powerful interests in society. For example Dunbar
writes of the changing position of tribal leaders that, "from being the predominant
sources of power and patronage they found themselves increasingly in the position of vying
for favours that the government could increasingly give, and so they were co-opted into
the emerging Yemeni establishment."54
Secondly Salih sought to acquire political legitimacy for
his regime, and mobilise popular support through the formulation of a new national
charter, and political organisation - the General People's Congress. For this purpose a
working group was formed comprising representatives from a wide range of political
movements in the country, assigned with the task of formulating a document acceptable to
all. Local plebiscites were held to allow citizens to debate the proposed national accord,
and elect 1,000 members of the new Congress with power to amend the charter. According to
Brian Whitaker, the charter was "described by the President as a guide to national
life to which all national elements could subscribe...[and] allowed much scope for
publicity, ceremony, and popular participation."55 Like the
President himself, the GPC professed to adhere to no specific ideology, and was therefore
able to present itself as representing all political interests in the country56.
Made up largely of local notables from the different regions, it reflected this diversity
in its combination of economic liberalism, respect for tribal and regional interests,
religious conservatism, and political populism and nationalism. An additional advantage
for the regime was that the GPC contained political disputes within a single organisation,
and limited the scope for organised opposition outside it57.
The culmination of Salih's search for popular legitimacy
came in 1988 when he was asked continue in the presidency by a legislative assembly that
for the first time was largely a popularly elected body. Despite the absence of official
party competition, the factions within the GPC fought these elections keenly, giving some
indication of the broad popularity of Salih's regime across the ideological spectrum.
Behind this support lay the success of a regime which had been able to extend it hegemony
over state and society during a decade of good economic growth and infrastructural
development, combined with increasing political stability, state capacity, and
institutional reform. In particular, as Dunbar writes, "by degrees...the government
gradually extended its control into tribal strongholds in the northern and eastern areas,
for example by constructing schools and hospitals in tribal areas, enabling Sana'a to
dispense services and jobs to tribal members and thus obtain their acquiescence to a
growing official presence."58 While tribes retained an
often high degree of military and administrative autonomy, they were coming to desire a
part in the national system and the resources it could provide, and were therefore to see
themselves in relation to that system, rather than separate from it.
The growing authority of Salih and the GPC in the north
was especially marked in comparison to the economic disintegration and discontent
developing in the PDRY, and the divisions in communist regime on regional and ideological
lines. Since the civil war the YAR had developed a flexible system for incorporating the
diverse interests in its society. However, the Southern regime had relied on coercion to
suppress the divisions within and outside the regime with negative consequences for
political stability and legitimacy. The greater coherence and flexibility of the GPC was
to enable it to extend its hegemony over the idea of Yemeni nationalism, the process of
unification, and eventually the united Yemeni state itself in the years that followed.
4. Northern hegemony in the
unified state; democracy, and the eclipse of the southern elite
"In a unified state there can be only one ultimate
centre of power. Whoever has power controls the army, the security forces and the whole
state apparatus. When two states are unified, there has to be a mechanism for determining
where ultimate power lies, for turning two centres of power into one."59
DESPITE its formal unification, hegemony over the new
Yemeni State remained divided between the GPC and YSP, given the extremely limited extent
to which the institutions of the PDRY and YAR had been merged. As unity proceeded the
divisions between the two systems were to be eradicated by administrative reform and
elections. Both political elite's were threatened with the prospect of losing the powers
they had enjoyed as separate states, and sought to preserve their interests by engaging in
a struggle for hegemony within the new state60. However, as the
previous chapter showed, in reality the process of determining where the balance of power
lay in Yemen had begun years before. The two regimes were entering into unity arrangements
with markedly different economic and political records and levels of popular support in
their respective territories. As Fred Halliday has written, the resulting northern
dominance "has in effect, turned Yemeni unity into that experienced in Germany - a
formal fusion on equal terms concealing a take-over by the stronger partner in the
process."
President Salih was able to use his relatively stable
position, and the comparative weakness of the southern regime after the 1986 civil war, to
take the initiative in pressing unification on an uncertain and divided YSP, and received
acclaim in much of the north and south for doing so. The argument of this chapter is that
once gained, the northern elite never lost its hegemony over the nationalist movement, and
was able to progressively assert its hegemony over the developing political process of the
united state. Vital to this process were three factors:
-
The GPC's establishment of national-popular hegemony
through its leadership of the nationalist movement.
-
The democratic, and non-federal structure of the new state
which allowed the GPC to turn the political support of the more populous north into
political power.
-
The GPC's ideological flexibility, which enabled the party
to pursue the northern political tradition of incorporating key political and social
groups into the ruling coalition, a task it achieved more effectively than a Southern
elite burdened by its communist past.
At various points in their history, the regimes of the two
Yemen's used nationalist rhetoric to enhance their legitimacy in the eyes of their
citizens, acknowledging that the idea of 'the Yemen' and of being 'Yemeni' give the
prospect of unity popular appeal and mobilising power61.
However, they had only been willing to consider it on their own terms, given that
"Unity would have signified that one or the other side was prepared to sacrifice its
political value system for the sake of a higher goal."62
Therefore when President Salih's unity initiative appeared for the first time to put the
goal of Yemeni nationalism above narrow issues of regime stability, he enabled his
government to present itself as the expression of what Gramsci described as the
'national-popular' interest. The northern government was able harvest its reward for this
bold step in the form of popular support. "Sana'a decided to bypass [the southern
leaders] by appealing directly to the people...the huge crowds that greeted Salih in Aden
were not the staged demonstrations sometimes organised by the YSP and reflected genuine
popular enthusiasm for unity."63
The extent to which the YAR had embraced the aspiration
for unity put (probably calculated) pressure on the southern leadership. "Well aware
of the south's current weakness, it had identified a window of opportunity which, if
missed, might not occur again for many years."64 As a
consequence of its economic and political difficulties, the YSP faced a unenviable choice:
To enter into a unity in which it was the weaker force, but which held out the prospect of
greater legitimacy for the regime, or to remain independent and confront mounting popular
discontent. The southern leaders were therefore understandably cautious about the pace and
direction of arrangements, favouring "a transitional federal formula as a step along
the road towards a subsequent merger between the two parts."65
However, this enabled Salih's regime to portray the YSP as reluctant partners who were not
fully committed to the cause of unity. As Dunbar has written "the government in
Sana'a tended to devise unity strategies...creating the impression that the YAR was all
for unity and that the PDRY, viewed with almost universal suspicion in the north, was the
obstacle to achieving this goal."66
This was a tactic that Salih pursued successfully after
unification as well. Southern leaders such as Vice-president al-Bayd, unhappy with many
political developments in the first years of unity,67 registered
their unhappiness by leaving Sana'a and returning to the south calling for "a federal
regime which would grant more autonomy to the south."68
Salih was thus able to portray the YSP as creating a de-facto separation, in preparation
for eventual secession, undermining the nationalist project. When war eventually broke out
between the two elites, the failure of many elements of southern society to rally to their
former leaders illustrated the strength of support for the nationalist project in the
south, if not yet direct support for the northern regime69.
Al-Bayd may have demonstrated an implicit recognition of this fact by only declaring
secession after two weeks of fighting, by which time Aden was already almost cut off by
northern troops. "He knew it would be unpopular with the Yemeni public; it cost him
what support he had among disaffected northerners; and it risked splitting his own
party"70
The progressive extension of the northern elite's hegemony
over the nationalist movement was matched by its increasing command of the political
process and institutions of the united state. It was aided in this by the adoption of a
non-federal system in which power would be shared, rather than formally distributed,
between the two parties71. In such a system, where a member of
one of the two former regimes held a position in the new government, one member from the
other was out of a job, causing a surplus of leadership and encouraging competition
between parties for positions of authority. The GPC held the advantage in this kind of
struggle, given that the government was based in Sana'a, the numerical superiority of its
officials, the organisational strength of the party, and the well established northern
patrimonial network. According to Hudson, "YSP ministers found that the real
decisions in their ministries were being taken by the GPC directors-general. There were
not enough YSP or Southern civil servants at lower levels in the ministries in Sana'a to
prevent the more numerous northern bureaucrats from dominating them."72
This feeling of powerlessness within the new order was one of the major factors pushing
the YSP towards secession, and it was intensified after the 1993 election with the
incorporation of Islah into the government. Where it wished the GPC could now easily
over-ride southern opposition by appealing to the support of this strongly anti-socialist
party, whose leader Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar had close links to the president.
Democracy was another important mechanism for the
articulation of northern hegemony, given that it's far larger population was guaranteed to
given it a decisive majority in the elections. The YSP faced an impossible struggle to
undermine the GPC's support in the north, and indeed for a while it looked as if its best
course was to merge with its rival. Antipathy towards socialism was widespread among the
strongly conservative elements of northern society, and in particular towards a regime
known for its economic mismanagement and factionalism. "North Yemeni visitors to the
PDRY returned with the impression that whatever its faults, the YAR system had produced
obvious progress whereas Aden's brand of Marxism had transformed the PDRY into an economic
backwater with limited prospects for advancement."73
The different parties did campaign to increase their
popularity in constituencies where they had not previously been represented. However, the
results of the 1993 elections demonstrated that the political allegiance of the two
communities remained regionally divided. In theory this represented a continuation of the
status quo, with the YSP continuing as a partner in government. Nevertheless, with the
inclusion of Islah into the ruling coalition the government "ultimately resembled the
coexistence of conservative and socialist elements that had prevailed in the YAR under the
GPC umbrella"74, in which the GPC could dominate by playing
its partners off against each other.
The GPC was set up as an 'Egyptian' style political
organisation to represent a multitude of opinions and interests within one body. Within
the YAR it had played this role virtually unchallenged, and now in the united Yemen the
GPC continued to function in a similar way, using its hegemony over the political process
to mould the pliable form of the new political system into one similar to its northern
predecessor. The tactic of co-opting leaders from different sections of the community has
been extended to the south, for example a number of supporters of the formerly exiled
southern leader, Ali Nasir Muhammad, ran for the party. As Detalle writes "In putting
together their State, the GPC looked for persons well rooted in their communities, with
party affiliation taking second place."75 This strategy did
not bear great electoral fruit in 1993 principally because, up until a short time before
the polls, it seemed likely that the YSP might actually merge with the GPC. Certainly,
with both parties still at least nominally in power together, a vote for the YSP was a
vote for the unity government, rather than a vote against the GPC as such. However, the
GPC benefited from its strategy to a far greater extent after the YSP boycott in the 1997
parliamentary elections, with several former members of the YSP successfully elected under
the GPC banner76.
President Salih has also sought to bring southerners into
leading governmental positions. At present there is a southern Prime Minister - Dr Faraj
bin Ghanem, Vice President, Minister for Legal Affairs, Minister for Planning, and
Interior Minister. Sheikh Tariq Abdullah, founder of the 'Local Government Party', argues
that although the men appointed to these positions do not have a real power base in
southern society, their selection by the president is an attempt to overcome the lack of a
genuinely representative southern leadership with whom to work, after the final failure
and dispersion of the YSP old guard during the war of 1994.77 It
may also be a manoeuvre aimed at reducing the influence of the less progressive members of
the northern elite, although Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar was re-elected parliamentary
speaker, and Sheikh Tariq al-Fadli the leader of the 'Afghan' guerrillas - a
fundamentalist group - was a surprising appointment to the consultative council78.
As Dr S Abd al-Aziz al-Saqqaf, editor of the 'The Yemen
Times', and himself a co-optee onto the Consultative Council, said in interview "The
President's ideology is to stay in power. He is a very clever man and successfully co-opts
all the elders in society, from the tribes, heads of newspapers, military, to business men
and the senior families."79 However, at the same time
Saqqaf also believes that "This enables the President to neglect the population and
hold on to the leaders." In moving to the conclusion that Salih's regime has achieved
hegemony over the Yemeni State, it must be asked whether the sacrifices that a strategy of
broad coalition building entails for the weaker elements of society are sustainable, or
whether at the height of the President's political hegemony, the limits to this strategy
are being revealed.
Conclusion
BEFORE POLLING in this year's
elections, Fred Halliday posted this bleak view of the future of Yemeni politics:
"The North won the war and reunited Yemen under one regime for the first time in two
centuries. But economic and social difficulties have worsened, tension between the
political parties continues, and few believe that any government that emerges from the
election will be able to tackle the severe difficulties Yemen now faces."80
Fears of escalating conflict between political parties appear to have been ruled out by
the extent of the GPC's electoral victory, and the divisions within the two main
opposition parties81. However, although the GPC can now stand
alone in government, there are doubts about whether the extent of its hegemony is such
that it permits effective government, or merely the maintenance of power. The construction and holding together of a hegemonic bloc such as
that created by President Salih and the GPC is not without costs. For each interest group
it incorporates, the government must be prepared to re-distribute economic or political
resources in the other direction. Whether in the form of direct patronage or implicit
understandings on policy, such bargains put considerable restrictions of the government's
freedom of action and its ability to govern effectively. This is particularly the case
with regards to the President's inner network of relatives and placemen in the military,
bureaucracy, and party. As Dr Saqqaf comments, "entrenched people become a security
threat. The President has increasingly limited room for manoeuvre, but finds it difficult
to allow changes to his entourage."82 Meanwhile, despite
outwardly impressive statistical signs of an upsurge in economic activity in the country,
the standard of living for many has stagnated or fallen over the period of unification,
the Gulf crisis, the war of 1994 and the adoption of a far reaching programme of
structural adjustment measures. Salih's regime may as a result find itself facing the
conflicting priorities of distributing resources through its patronage network, and the
need for a welfarist response to mounting poverty in rural and urban areas.
The GPC also still faces challenges to its hegemony in
wider society, although perhaps presently not enough to seriously threaten the regime. The
south, lacking in leadership as it was, failed to convincingly throw in its lot with the
GPC at the election. With the YSP not standing, the turnouts in al-Mahrah (44%), Lahaj
(44.9%), and Hadhramawt (45%) in the south were the lowest in the country. In Hadhramawt
itself, the GPC won fewer seats than Islah, and won a lower percentage of the vote (29%)
in the province than in the country as a whole (43%). Certainly, much of the South does
not yet look to Sana'a to express its political demands, and particularly in Hadhramawt
"its history of migration still makes it more likely its people will look outside the
country to pursue their interests."83 Therefore the
government needs to continue with its long-term strategy of winning "acceptance by
ensuring that southern interests are well represented in government and by smothering
discontent with investment."84 However, spending a
disproportionate share of its revenues in the south is likely to stimulate discontent
among both urban and rural populations in the north. In particular recent kidnappings of
tourists have demonstrated that the tribes still have the ability to inconvenience the
government, even if they seem unprepared to take joint action against the government at
present. According to both Paul Dresch, tribal concern is centred around the dominance of
Hamdan Sana'a and Sanhan in the military and administration, and the separation of major
sheikhs - such as Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar - from their followers as they become
increasingly men of parties and of government. As a result, "Wide-spread popular
frustration with the behaviour of those in power has continued to find expression in
sporadic outbreaks of violence, usually with strong tribal overtones"85.
If the government finds itself unable to meet its
obligations, it may abandon its hegemonic strategy and operate a more repressive strategy
towards dissident groups with the aid of an increasingly all encompassing security
apparatus. While certainly still more liberal than most Arab States, the scope of
political freedom has noticeably reduced from its remarkable flowering in the period after
unification. Amnesty International believes that political prisoners are more commonly
being held, and meanwhile the Ministry of Information, already in control of the TV and
Radio has been exerting increasing influence on newspapers through a combination of
harassment and subsidy86. According to Eric Watkins,
"through the control of the media the Yemeni government undermines the very
democratic processes it claims to promote."87
However, despite such caveats, the extent of the hegemony
of the present political establishment is unprecedented in Yemen's history. While many
elements of society may not articulate support for the personnel within the regime or the
direction of their government, for the first time in Yemen's history no powerful group or
rival authority appears to be attempting to undermine the authority of the state and
extend its own hegemony. This is particularly the case with the tribes, who had the
opportunity to rise against the northern establishment in the 1994 conflict, but preferred
to remain neutral and call for peace, unity and a "more tolerant and fairer
state"88 from the safety of their tribal conferences.
Meanwhile, with the vested interests of the old southern elite vanquished, the failure of
a new regionally based opposition and leadership to develop suggests an implicit
acceptance of the status quo on the part of the communities of the former PDRY89.
Indeed, rather than indicating its weakness, the repression of political dissent in the
south may indicate that the government now feels strong enough to make its power felt in
southern society given the unlikelihood of a serious backlash by opposition groups90.
By pursuing a hegemonic strategy, based on a combination
of consent and coercion, President Salih has not only survived in power for twenty years,
but been able to build substantially on the state's capacity to govern. In so doing he has
largely filled Gramsci's two criteria for the building and maintenance of hegemony.
Firstly he has built a broad social and ideological coalition in support for the state,
and secondly he has done so without compromising the economic and political interests of
his own 'class' - in the Yemeni case the military/commercial complex and patrimonial
network surrounding the state. In Gramscian terminology, he successfully fought a long and
on-going 'war of position', one which put the northern elite in position for victory in
the final 'war of manoeuvre' of 1994 against a southern elite whose hegemony over state
and society had already been progressively undermined in the preceding years. Meanwhile,
the flexible nature of the State's coalition and ideology has enabled it to adapt quickly
to the changing ideological and political climate, seizing on the opportunity to make
Yemeni nationalism a political reality, and meeting demands for a democratic opening. In
so doing it has successfully enacted what Gramsci described as a 'passive revolution',
heading off possible opposition through reform from above, enabling the ruling elite to
renew its hegemony.
Such a strategy is likely to remain the optimal course for
the governing of Yemen, as it has been through its history, although the electoral success
and increased institutional capacity of Salih's regime have given it a degree of autonomy
from the direct intervention of social forces that was absent in the 1970s. As Brian
Whitaker says "the fractious make-up of Yemen means that even now ... [the GPC] ...
cannot afford to be perceived as domineering."91 Consent
and legitimacy will therefore be a continuing priority for the government, whether
expressed through modern means such as democratic elections, or more traditional linkages
of tribal 'asabiyya, and the patrimonial system. President Salih has certainly become
expert in the survival strategy of a weak state faced by a strong society. What remains to
be achieved however is the political mechanism for passing on of political leadership over
his coalition without sparking the factional conflict that could prove its undoing.
Copyright © Michael Welton 1997
Footnotes
1. Simon R: Gramsci's Political Thought, an
introduction. (Lawrence and Wishart, London 1991) p.22
2. For example, Peterson JE: Yemen,
the search for a modern state, (Croom Helm, London, 1982) p.170, or Michael
Adams: One Yemen or Two?, in: Ed. Ian Richard Netton, Arabia and the Gulf,
form traditional society to modern states, (Croom Helm, London, 1990) p.121
3. Showstack Sassoon, Anne: Gramsci's
Politics, (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2nd Ed. 1987) p.63
4. Simon R: op.cit. p.25
5. For example, the change of South
Yemens name from 'People's Republic of South Yemen', to the 'People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen' in what Ursula Braun described as "an
open claim to the whole of Yemen under the banner of socialism." From
'Prospects for Yemeni Unity', in: Ed. Pridham B.R: (Contemporary Yemen,
politics and historical background, Croom Helm, 1984) p.263
6 Gramsci, A: Selections from the Prison
Notebooks: (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1971) p.238
7 Gramsci, A: Op. Cit. P.181-2
8 For example, organisations such as
business associations, trade unions, political interest groups and parties,
schools and universities, church and community organisations, the media and
identities such as economic class and national, rather than regional
affiliations.
9 Hague, Harrop and Breslin: Comparative
Government and Politics, an introduction. (Macmillan, 1992) p.145
10 Peterson J: Yemen: The Search for a
Modern State, (Croom Helm, London) p.177. "The problem of consolidating
or extending the states authority is compounded by the fragmentation of
Yemeni politicians into competing factions or cliques."
11 Hague, Harrop, and Breslin: Op.cit.
p.147.
12 Ghassan Salame defines Khaldun's concept
of 'asabiyya as a group whose strength lies in their blood ties, and the
extent to which they are a closely-knit group with common interests. In
'Strong' and 'Weak' States: A Qualified Return to the Muqaddimah. Chp. 2 in
Luciani G, The Arab State, (Routledge, 1990) P.31
13 Salame, G: Op. Cit.
14 Khaldun, Ibn: "A dynasty rarely
establishes itself firmly in lands with many different tribes and groups.
This is because of differences in opinions and desires. Behind each opinion
and desire there is group feeling defending it" From: The Muqaddimah,
(translated from Arabic by Franz Rosenthal), (Princeton Uni. Press,
Princeton) 1967, P.130
15 Hudson, Michael C: Arab Politics, The
Search for Legitimacy, (Yale University Press, New Haven and London 1977)
p.12
16 Harik, I: The Ethnic Revolution and
Political Integration in the Middle East. International Journal of Middle
East Studies 3:3 (July 1972) P.303-23, P.312. Quoted in Hudson, Michael C:
Arab Politics, The Search for Legitimacy, (Yale University Press, New Haven
and London 1977) p.11
17 Dresch, Paul: Tribal relations and
political history in upper Yemen. In, Pridham B.R. Contemporary Yemen:
Politics and Historical Background. (Croom Helm, London 1984) p.154
18 Salame Ghassan: op.cit. p.31
19 Bidwell Robin: The Two Yemens. (Longman
Westview Press 1983) p.9
20 Bidwell Robin: Ibid. p.22-23. Also, see
John Peterson who suggests that legitimacy and effectiveness of the Imamate
was restricted by 1) The need for tribal co-operation 2) The fact that over
half Yemen's population was Sunni. Therefore, he argues that for the Imamate
to become a 'national' institution', it had to a) Ensure the stability of
the Zaydi coalition of tribes and Sheikhs b) Maintain order justly and
impartially throughout the community. In: Nation Building and Political
Development in the two Yemens, in: Pridham BR, Contemporary Yemen: Political
and historical background, (Croom Helm, London, 1984). p.86
21 The borders of the old Himyarite state
which existed from around 110BC to 525 AD set the precedent for the unifying
aspirations of rulers who followed, including the Imams of this century who
"still dwelt with pride upon their asserted Himyaritic descent."
according to Bidwell Robin. Op.cit. p.4
22 Bidwell Robin: Op cit. p.25
23 Kostiner J: Yemen, the tortuous quest
for unity 1990-94, (Chatham House Papers, Royal Institute of International
Affairs, 1996) p.44
24 Hudson, 'Bipolarity'; Interview with
'Umar, in al-Majalla, 9th March 1993; al-Hayat, 11th January 1993; al-Quds,
London, 5th January. Quote found in Kostiner J: Yemen, the tortuous quest
for unity 1990-94, (Chatham House Papers, Royal Institute of International
Affairs, 1996) p.45
25 Tareq Y Ismael and Jacqueline S Ismael
suggest several reasons for the heterogeneity of South Yemeni society. 1.
The weakness of Ottoman Turkish rule in the South, preventing significant
social change taking place as a result of the homogenising effect of Ottoman
administration (particularly the Ottoman land reforms of the mid-19th
century), which had affected much of the rest of the Middle East. 2. The
resulting continued existence in many areas of the south of near autonomous,
localised semi-feudal or slave/retainer-based social structures. 3. The
complexity of South Yemen's tribal composition, with an estimated 1300 to
1400 tribal units in Hadhramawt, and a tendency to form a greater number of
smaller confederacies than those such as the Hashid and Bakil in the north.
(Statistical source: Foreign Area Studies, 1971. Area handbook for the
peripheral states of the Arabian Peninsula. Washington, DC, US Govt.
Printing Office.) In, Ismael and Ismael: PDR Yemen, politics, economics and
society. (Frances Pinter Ltd London, 1986) p.5-6.
26 Bidwell Op.cit. p.106
27 Ismael and Ismael: op.cit p.9. Also see
Peterson J, who wrote, "The consequence of the largely indirect British
presence in the Protectorate was to fossilise the existing patchwork of
fragmented political authority." : Nation Building and Political
Development in the two Yemens, in: Pridham BR, Contemporary Yemen: Political
and historical background (Croom Helm, London, 1984) p.89
28 Ismael and Ismael: Op.cit. p.9 refer to
the shared economic, political and social ties which town and tribe shared
in the South, and the involvement of both in the selection of a Sultan, to
whom they owed allegiance as mediator, co-ordinator between tribal leaders,
and as local head of state. Therefore, a consensual tradition did exist in
the south in that "the power of the Sultan was thus contingent upon the
support given him by the tribes and townspeople." However, unlike the
North, this was not reproduced on a 'national' scale. No Imamate style
institution existed which could inspire the loyalty of the Southern sultans
and tribes through force, necessity, or religious/nationalist movement.
29 Ismael and Ismael: Op.cit. p.25
30 Adams Michael, One Yemen or Two?, in:
Ed. Ian Richard Netton, Arabia and the Gulf, form traditional society to
modern states, (Croom Helm, London, 1990) p.126
31 Mansfield Peter: The Arabs, (Penguin,
1988) p.364
32 Ismael and Ismael: Op.cit p.27
33 Kostiner J: South Yemen's Revolutionary
Strategy 1970-85. (Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv, Westview
Press 1990) p.14. Peterson, J: Nation building and Political Development in
the two Yemens. in: Pridham BR, Contemporary Yemen: Political and historical
background (Croom Helm, London, 1984) p.94
34 Halliday, F: Revolution and Foreign
Policy. (Vintage Books, 1990) p.36
35 Gramsci: Op.cit. p.181-2
36 Anne Showstack Sassoon: Gramsci's
Politics, (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2nd Ed., 1987) p.82
37 Peterson J: Nation building and
Political Development in the two Yemens. in: Pridham BR, Contemporary Yemen:
Political and historical background (Croom Helm, London, 1984) p.97
38 Whitaker, B: Unity, Democracy and the
struggle for power in Yemen 1990-94. (Draft Ph.D. thesis) p.15
39 Whitaker, B: Ibid. p.18-19
40 Bidwell Robin: op.cit. p.195/6
41 Hudson, Michael C: Arab Politics, The
Search for Legitimacy, (Yale University Press, New Haven and London 1977)
p.243
42 Dresch, Paul: Tribal relations and
political history in upper Yemen. In Pridham, BR: Contemporary Yemen:
Political and historical background (Croom Helm, London, 1984) p.167. He
writes that "an axis of tribal leaders and the forms of tribalism had
provided the basis for an attempt to solve national problems which was
suppressed by the supposedly national government", suggesting that
within the traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution between tribes lay
the opportunity and will for the national reconciliation that later
occurred. Despite the royalist/republican division of loyalties, Dresch says
that inter tribal truces and means of containment survived the excesses
foreign intervention, supplies of arms and extremes of rhetoric on each
side, limiting most of the fighting to non-tribal areas, and leaving both
royalist and republican tribes undefeated in their own territories. Given
the smaller and weaker nature of the tribal system in South Yemen, such
natural limitations to factional conflict did not exist, with the victory of
one side leading to the complete purge or exile of its defeated opponents
who were unable to maintain any power base within the country, illustrating
the zero-sum nature of the southern system and its consequently greater
instability.
43 Mansfield, Peter: op.cit. p.364
44 Hudson M: Arab Politics - the search for
legitimacy. 1977, Yale University Press, New Haven and London p.346. See
also Peterson J: Yemen, the search for a modern state, (Croom Helm, London,
1982) p.174. He suggests that "the YAR found itself managing the tribes
rather than governing them, in a manner not far removed from the policies of
Imams Yahya and Ahmad."
45 Bidwell R: Op.cit. p.229. The
constitution contained elements aimed at passifying all sides, including 1.
Adherence to Shari'a law sought by religious leaders 2. A conservative,
tribal dominated parliament 3. A Consultative Council requiring a 2/3rds
majority to approve legislation, with 1/5 of its members appointed to allow
modernising intelligentsia a substantial voice.
46 According to Bidwell: Op.cit. p.271-72
Zaydi's close to Hamdi included Chief of Staff, Colonel Ahmad Hussein
Ghashmi from the Hashid, and two sons of Bakil chief Abu Luhum who were also
members of the military command council. Prime Minister al-Ayni also tribal
links, but also had Ba'thist leanings and support among Iryani's followers.
Shaf'is appointed included leftist Commander of the Parachute Brigade Major
Abdullah Abd al-Alim
47 Peterson J: Yemen, the search for a
modern state, (Croom Helm, London, 1982) p.181 See also Hudson M: Arab
Politics - the search for legitimacy. (1977, Yale University Press, New
Haven and London) p.348. He writes, "In theory, therefore, it appeared
that the objective of the coup had been to strengthen the authority of the
national government without fundamentally departing from the accomodationist
strategy of the former regime."
48 Bidwell: Op.cit p.274
49 In seeking to create a democratic
assembly Hamdi may well have seeking a replacement for the former tribal
dominated Consultative Council, which could enable his position through the
expression of popular support for his regime
50 Of whom he was a member.
51 Bidwell: Op.cit. p.281/2. See also
Mansfield Peter: Op.cit. p.366
52 Aleriani, Abdulkarim: Hist. of Yemen,
GPC homepage, http://www.gpc.org.ye/history2.htm
53 Kostiner, Joseph: Yemen, the tortuous
quest for unity, (Chatham House Papers, Pinter, 1996) p.18. Also - Detalle,
Renaud: Interview, 18/8/97
54 Dunbar, Charles: The Unification of
Yemen: Process, Politics and Prospects (Middle East Journal, 46, 1992. No.3,
p.456-76) p.468
55 Whitaker, B: Unity, Democracy and the
struggle for power in Yemen 1990-94. Draft PhD thesis, P.32
56 Dr Saqqaf: Editor of 'The Yemen Times'
newspaper. Interview 20/8/97
57 Whitaker, B: Unity, Democracy and the
struggle for power in Yemen 1990-94. Draft PhD thesis, P.33
58 Dunbar, Charles: Op.cit. p.467
59 Whitaker, Brian: National unity and
democracy in Yemen: a marriage of inconvenience. (SOAS conference paper,
25th November 1995)
60 Kostiner, J: Yemen, the tortuous Quest
for Unity, (Pinter, 1996) p.18. He suggests that "Both Yemen's
leaders...[hoped] to exploit unity to outmanoeuvre the other and take
advantage of the assets of unity so as to weaken the other."
61 Burrowes R: Historical dictionary of
Yemen. (Scarecrow Press Inc., Maryland, USA, 1995) p.2. See also Halliday,
F: Yemen's uneasy elections, The World Today, (Vol. 53 No3 March 97) p.74
62 Braun, Ursula: Prospects for Yemeni
Unity, In: Pridham, B R: Contemporary Yemen, political and historical
background, (Croom Helm, London and Sidney, 1984) p.263
63 Whitaker, Brian: Unity, democracy and
the struggle for power in Yemen 1990-94. (Draft PhD thesis) p.25
64 Whitaker, Brian: Unity, democracy and
the struggle for power in Yemen 1990-94. Draft PhD thesis) p.23
65 al-Bayd, Ali Salim: PDRY Radio, Aden
2030 GMT 10 November 1989 (BBC Monitoring Service). First quoted in -
Whitaker, Brian: Unity, democracy and the struggle for power in Yemen
1990-94. (Draft PhD thesis) p.25
66 Dunbar, C: Op.cit. p.456
67 Southern grievances included northern
domination of the state apparatus and the military, the pace of
administrative reform, economic stagnation in the south, and political
violence directed southern politicians.
68 Interview with Salim Salih (Deputy
leader of YSP), al-Wasat, 7th March 1994. Originally quoted in: Kostiner J:
Yemen, the tortuous quest for unity 1990-94, (Chatham House Papers, Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 1996) p.74
69 For example the Yafi'i and 'Awlaqi
tribes, seven southern brigades from Abyan and Shabwa exiled in 1986, and
three members of the YSP Central Committee who condemned the declaration of
secession of Sana'a radio. See Kostiner J: Yemen, the tortuous quest for
unity 1990-94, (Chatham House Papers, Royal Institute of International
Affairs, 1996) p.89, and Whitaker, Brian: Unity, democracy and the struggle
for power in Yemen 1990-94. (Draft PhD thesis) p.198 and 201. See also
Mackintosh-Smith, Tim: Yemen - Travels in Dictionary Land, (John Murray,
London. 1997). He writes, "such public support as al-Bayd had enjoyed
plummeted with the declaration to secede...Brigade after brigade
deserted." P.251
70 Whitaker, Brian: National Unity and
Democracy in Yemen: a marriage of inconvenience, (SOAS conference paper,
25th November 1995). He suggests that secession was declared mainly for
external reasons, to be able to openly secure arms from sympathetic states
such as Saudi Arabia.
71 That the southern leadership was rushed
into a non-federal system by a combination of the force of events and
pressure from the north is a vivid illustration of its lack of control over
the nationalist project and its own destiny by the end of 1980s, unless the
southern leadership grossly over-estimated its capacity to compete for power
with the GPC in the unified system.
72 Hudson, Michael C: Bipolarity, Rational
Calculation and War in Yemen. Chapter 1. In: al-Suwaidi, Jamal S. Ed.: The
Yemeni War of 1994 (Saqi Books. 1995) p.24-25
73 Dunbar, C: Op.cit p.460
74 Kostiner J: Yemen, the tortuous quest
for unity 1990-94, (Chatham House Papers, Royal Institute of International
Affairs, 1996) p.23
75 Detalle, Renaud: The Yemeni elections up
close, (Middle East Report, Nov-Dec 1993, Vol 23(6), No185) p.8
76 Abdullah, Sheikh Tariq: Founder of 'The
Local Government Party' and Adeni Lawyer'. Interview 26/8/97.
77 Abdullah, Sheikh Tariq: Founder of 'The
Local Government Party' and Adeni Lawyer'. Interview 26/8/97. See also
Whitaker, Brian: 'Surprise Prime Minister' (Middle East International, 30th
May 1997)
78 Whitaker, Brian: 'Surprise Prime
Minister', (Middle East International, 30th May 1997)
79 Dr Saqqaf: Editor of 'The Yemen Times'
newspaper. Interview 20/8/97
80 Halliday, Fred: Yemen's Uneasy
Elections, (The World Today, Vol 53, No 3, March 1997, p.73-76) p.73
81 Islah is divided between conservative
tribal elements and its religious wing, leaving great potential for
conflicts over the alternative pre-eminence of tribal law and customs or
Islamic rules and obligations.
82 Dr Saqqaf: Editor of 'The Yemen Times'
newspaper. Interview 20/8/97
83 Cameroon, Silvin: French anthropologist
studying the social divisions of a town in Hadhramawt. Interview 19/8/97
84 Whitaker, Brian: Salih's Election
Knockout.(Middle East International. No 550 16th May 1997)
85 The Economist Intelligence Unit: Yemen,
(3rd Quarter, 1996) p.23. See also: Dresch, Paul: The Tribal Factor in the
Yemeni Crisis. In: al-Suwaidi, Jamal S. Ed.: The Yemeni War of 1994, (Saqi
Books, 1995) p.55
86 Dr Saqqaf claims to have been imprisoned
six times since the Civil War. Ahmad al-Sofi, former head of the National
Institute for Democratic Development (NIDD) attests to being arrested with
fifteen Yemeni's and three Americans whilst attempting to set up a new Human
Rights group in Aden. Interview: 19/8/97
87 Watkins, Eric: Yemen, a Thin Veil of
Democracy. (The Middle East, April 97, No: 266) p.7. See also: The Economist
Intelligence Unit: Yemen, (3rd Quarter, 1996), p.23 which claims that
"The government is using its monopoly of the state controlled media,
state funds, and the security forces, and support of their campaign."
88 Dresch, Paul: The Tribal Factor in the
Yemeni Crisis. In: al-Suwaidi, Jamal S. Ed.: The Yemeni War of 1994, (Saqi
Books. 1995) p.54
89 Such neutrality is resonant of Gramsci's
concept of passive revolution, in which the non-involvement of social groups
in bringing about political change allows the leading class to reform its
social and economic basis from above through state action, with the effect
of disorganising and dampening down opposition.
90 The Economist Intelligence Unit: Yemen,
(3rd Quarter, 1996) "Opposition parties ... suffer from a lack of any
apparent sense of unity of a platform of coherently focused politics."
P.23
91 Whitaker, Brian: 'Salih's election
knockout', (Middle East International, 16th May 1997)
Acknowledgements
Several people deserve thanks for their
help in the research and writing of this dissertation. Anwar, Salah, and Dr
Saqqaf at the Yemen Times, Christine Welch and the staff of the Sultan
Palace Hotel in Sana'a, Wim, Eric Watkins, Renaud Detalle, and my tutor Ziba
Moshaver. Most of all I must express my appreciation of Brian Whitaker for
all his helpful advice and information, and the valuable preview of his
draft PhD dissertation. As ever I have been grateful for the support of my
dad, John, and particularly my girlfriend Emma.
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Studies
-
Journal of Refugee Studies
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Middle East Economic Digest
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Middle
East International
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Middle East Journal
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Middle East Magazine
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Middle East Report
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Middle East Studies
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Revue de Monde MusulmanWorld Today
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Yemen Times
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