Ibn
Rushd's criticisms of the theologians’ arguments for the
existence of God
Dr. Ibrahim Y. Najjar,
University of Sharjah
May 2001
THIS
PAPER deals with Ibn Rushd's criticisms of the
theologians' arguments for the existence of God in his book al-Kashf
'an Manahij al-Adilla. In this book, Ibn Rushd argues that the
theologians, in general, and the Ash’arites, in particular, used
the presumed superiority of their arguments for the existence of
God to exercise unjustified power over the lives of the Muslim
community. Ibn Rushd directed his criticisms against the
theologians' proofs for the existence of God in a dual effort to
expose the fallacies and difficulties involved in such proofs and
undermine their political weight in the Muslim community, thereby
clearing the grounds for his own arguments for the existence of
God. Furthermore, I will discuss the alternative arguments that
Ibn Rushd provides for explaining the way we come to know of God’s
existence without being subject to the objections that he raised
against the Ash'arites. In the final part of the paper, I will
briefly evaluate Ibn Rushd’s project.
In his famous book Fasl
al-Maqal, which he published after his impassioned defense of
philosophy in Tahafut al-Tahafut [1] against the vigorous
attack on it by Abu Hamid al-Ghazali in Tahafut al-Falasifa,
[2] Ibn Rushd advocates the harmony between religion and
philosophy in a dispassionate and conciliatory manner, aiming to
allay the fears of the theologians who believed that philosophy
leaves pernicious and injurious effects on religious people.[3] He
maintains that philosophy and religion are milk sisters who are in
need of each other's support in seeking the same truth.
Al-Kashf ‘an Manahij
al-Adilla fi ‘Aqaid al-Milla or the Exposition of
the Methods of Proof Concerning the Beliefs of the Community,[4]
is a sequel to al-Fasl and the two constitute along
with the Damima or Attachment Ibn Rushd’s trilogy.
Al-Kashf remains unavailable in English and English readers
know little about it. In it, Ibn Rushd takes on the sensitive
issue of criticizing all schools of theology prevalent in his
days. He does so in the name of reason, maintaining that any
position or interpretation of Qur'anic verses that cannot
withstand the scrutiny of reason is not worth holding; it is even
dangerous to accept. Worse still, it is not worth imposing on the
unsuspecting ordinary people by force, albeit in the name of God
and the law. According to Ibn Rushd, the theologians or al-Mutakallimun
have interpreted the Scripture in a way that gave them sway over
the believers’ minds and lives. The Mutakallimun defined
true belief and heresy, thereby setting the ground for defining
the true Muslim and exercising a tremendous influence on the
political life of the Muslim community. They monopolized the
access to the true faith and ostracized "whoever disagrees
with them as heretics and unbelievers whose blood and property are
free for all".[5] This uncompromising stand was cause, in Ibn
Rushd's view, of much of the bloodletting and infighting that
befell the religious community. By criticizing the theologians'
positions and challenging their monopoly in setting the religious,
moral and political standards of the Muslim community, Ibn Rushd
hopes to undercut their political influence and absolve the common
people from the obligation to follow them. However, despite his
best intentions and reassuring phrases in al-Kashf, Ibn
Rushd's criticisms were bound to raise dust and led instead to
undermining his own standing in the community. His books were
publicly burnt, the teaching of his philosophy was banned
throughout the realm of the Western Arab Caliphate and he himself
was banished from his hometown in Cordova.[6]
Ibn Rushd identifies four schools,
sects or groups in Muslim theology or ‘Ilm al-Kalam,[7]
writing that "the most famous of these sects in our time are
four: (1) The sect called the Ash'arite, which is believed by most
people of our day to be the orthodox, (2) that which is called the
Mu'atazilite, (3) the group which is known as the Batini[8] and
(4) the one called the literalist."[9] He dismisses the
literalists because they suspend altogether the role of reason and
adhere blindly to the apparent meaning of religion; their
"method of knowing the existence of God Almighty, is by way
of report not reason."[10] According to Ibn Rushd, reason
cannot be excluded from the methods of knowing God, because this
is the most universal and common way open for mankind. All human
beings are capable of knowing God through reason, and the
Qur'an cites numerous arguments to this effect. However, if
due to certain natural or physical impediments or misfortunes,
some people could not understand the religious arguments, they
would constitute a rare exception and "they would be required
to believe in God by way of report."[11] The majority of
people or al-Jumhur, however, are capable of reasoning and
understanding rational arguments, provided such arguments are
presented to them in simple and straightforward way. Once
arguments become complicated and longwinded, only those schooled
in logic and philosophy are able to follow them.
Ibn Rushd's criticisms of the
positions of the Mu'tazilites and the Batinites or the Sufis will
not be discussed in this paper, which focuses on his criticisms of
the Ash'arites' position. Contrary to the Literalists, the
Ash'arites have appealed to reason in defending our knowledge of
God and Ibn Rushd lauds them for their rational perspective. But
he faults them because "they were led to this position via
arguments that are not the religious ones that God has drawn
attention to and through which He called upon all men to believe
in Him."[12] Nor are they demonstrable.
The Ash’arites maintain that the
world is created and that it must "necessarily have a Maker
who created it."[13] Ibn Rushd objects to them, because they
cannot answer the mode of the existence of the Maker of the world
whether He is eternal or created, yet they want to show that the
world is created in time, whereas God is eternal.[14] They cannot
maintain that God is created, because this would mean that He is
in need of a creator, and this creator of another one, and the
matter would continue ad infinitum. Nor can they maintain
that God is eternal, because this would lead to an outcome
opposite to the one advocated by the Ash’arites. If the Maker is
eternal, then His actions must be eternal. Consequently,
the world that is produced by an act of God must be eternal.
The Ash’arites, argues Ibn
Rushd, would reject this outcome by trying to refine their
position, claiming that God is eternal, but his actions are
created by an eternal will. However, this maneuver would
not help them, but rather entangles them in further difficulties
from which they cannot extricate themselves. The Ash’arites’
view that God’s created actions result from an eternal will is
untenable, because the relationship between the will and the
actions is a conditional one. "The will is the pre-condition
of the action, rather than the action itself."[15] Ibn Rushd
argues that the will, which is actual, exists alongside the act
that produces the object. The action and the will are two
correlates. If "one of the two correlates existed in
actuality, the other would have to exist in actuality as well,
like father and son, but if one of them existed potentially, the
other would also. Should the will that is actual be created, then
the willed action must necessarily be created [in actuality].
Furthermore, should the will, which is actual, be eternal, then
what is willed, which is equally actual, will be
eternal."[16] The relation between the will and action is
symmetrical and the attribute that describes one must describe the
other. If the action is created, the will that produced it must be
created and vice versa. By supposing the existence of an eternal
will, the Ash'arites still would be unable to explain how the
action can be created from an eternal pre-condition.
Furthermore, this supposition adds
difficulties of its own. The eternal will must be related to what
is created before and after its creation, that is, during the
endless time when the product did not exist yet. From an
Aristotelian perspective, when an object does not exist in
actuality, it must exist in potentiality. Accordingly, what is
created must have been non-existent during an infinite period of
time before coming into existence. From this Ibn Rushd concludes
that the will "cannot be related to what is willed at the
time in which it necessitated its coming-to-be, except after a
lapse of an endless time, and what has no end, does not cease.
Thus, what is willed must not become actual, unless an endless
time has elapsed, which is an evident absurdity."[17] The
will precedes both the action and the willed object produced by
it. However, when the action takes place, a specific active
element is required to account for it. This active element, Ibn
Rushd maintains, is an effort, ‘azm, that occurs in the
will in order to produce the action. For, if such an extra state
does not affect the willing agent at the time of action, the
occurrence of the action at that time will remain
inexplicable.[18] The Ash’arites, however, would not accept this
implication, because it would introduce change to God and
compromise His eternality.
The outcome of Ibn Rushd’s
criticisms of the Ash’arites’ supposition that what is created
necessarily requires an Agent is that it involves logical
difficulties that not only the Ash’arite theologians cannot
answer, but the craft of dialectics itself cannot resolve
adequately. Having shown that the supposition that the world is
necessarily created by God is untenable on the Ash'arites'
premises, he argues that the ordinary people are not equipped to
understand their reasoning, which is also furthest from the
methods used by the Scripture. When, for example the Qur’an
refers to God creating the world, it does not state whether He
creates it with an eternal will or a created one. The Almighty
says: ‘Indeed, when We want a thing to be, We just say to it:
"Be", and it comes to be.’"[19] Religion
approaches the understanding of the common people in a simple and
straightforward way. It does not resort to complicated and
abstruse arguments that they cannot understand.[20] Both the
ordinary people in the Muslim community and the philosophers are
justified in rejecting the Ash'arites' abstruse arguments for the
existence of God.
As for their position regarding
the creation of the world, the Ash’arites offered two main
arguments. One very famous and is adopted by most Ash’arites,
and the other special to Abu al-Ma’ali al Juwayni, al Ghazali’s
illustrious teacher and the director of the Nizamiah school
in Niasapur.[21] The first argument is based on three premises
"which act like first principles from which they hoped to
deduce the creation of the world. The first [premise] states that
substances never exist apart from accidents, i.e., they never
exist without them, the second states that accidents are created,
and the third states that what cannot exist apart from accidents
is created, i.e., what cannot exist without accidents is
created."[22] Only the second premise of the Ash’arites’
argument for the creation of the world will be examined here, both
because of its centrality in this argument and because Ibn Rushd’s
objections to it might be used against his own view of our
knowledge of God.[23]
The major difficulty with the
second premise, which states that accidents are created, is that
it makes an unwarranted inductive leap from the visible world of
sense or experience to an unseen or unexperienced world. But the
Ash’arites fail to appreciate the seriousness of this
difficulty. When we confine our attention to the relations among
objects in the visible world, it might be possible to make
inferences from past experience to similar objects not experienced
yet. But when such inferences are carried to a realm not known to
be similar to the experienced one, then they do not carry the
weight of necessity. Instead of proving directly that all bodies
are created, the Ash’arites tried to establish first that all
accidents are created, and then prove that all bodies that cannot
exist without accidents are created, because of the creation of
the accidents. But this does not help them because the difficulty
of extending the inferential leap from the past to the future
applies equally to accidents and substances. The difficulty
revolves around the validity of the inductive inference carried
from the visible world to the unseen or inexperienced world to
begin with.
Ibn Rushd has dealt with induction
and the nature of inductive inference elsewhere,[24] and he builds
his view of induction on a well-established legacy that goes back
to Ibn Sina, al-Farabi and Aristotle.[25] Like other Aristotelian
philosophers, Ibn Rushd distinguishes between complete and
incomplete induction. In the former, all the individuals on the
basis of which an inference is made are enumerated,[26] but this
is not the case with the latter. The inference in complete
induction is deduced from the enumerated individuals, but the
inference in incomplete induction is made to unexperienced cases
in the future. However, such an inference could become deductive,
like in complete induction, if one were to assume a principle of
the uniformity of nature or in Ibn Rushd’s terminology, if the
nature of the visible world were to be supposed equal to the
nature of the unseen world.[27] But the Ash’arites cannot make
such an assumption. They assumed that all accidents are created,
when they should have assumed that all bodies are created. But on
what basis could they make this assumption? Certainly not on the
basis of the world of experience, because the heavenly body which
is under consideration is not part of the world of experience. In
fact, argues Ibn Rushd, with regard to this body it is equally
doubtful whether it is created or its accidents are created
"since neither its creation nor that of its accidents is
sensed."[28] It is obvious, then, that the Ash’arites’
second premise fails to withstand Ibn Rushd’s assault. It is
equally difficult to prove that all accidents are created or that
all bodies are created, without assuming first a principle of the
uniformity of nature. But if the Ash’arites were to venture and
accept such a principle, they would undermine both their
occasionalist view of causation[29] and their atomistic view of
the world.
Ibn Rushd moves next to attack
this premise frontally denying that all accidents are created.
Take for example space and time.[30] He maintains that time is an
accident, yet it is difficult to imagine it created. He argues
that every created substance must be preceded by non-being in
time, because one cannot understand the meaning of
"preceding" except through time. The same applies to
space. He argues that if every object exists in a place that
precedes it, then it is difficult to imagine space created. One
can define space as a void or the limit of the spacealized body.
If it is the void, as maintained by those who believe in the void,
then the present void must be preceded by another void, as a place
for it, and this void by another one and the series goes on to
infinity. But if it is assumed as the limit of the body that is in
space, then this body needs a place to be in it, and this requires
another body and the series continues to infinity as well. But all
these are complications that are not addressed by the Ash’arites
or resolvable by the art of dialectics, as Ibn Rushd sees it.
The second argument for the
creation of the world that Ibn Rushd addresses is that of Abu
al-Ma’ali. This argument is founded on two premises: one
claiming the contingency of the world that "it is possible
for the world, with all that is in it, to be other than what it
is" and the other is the creation of what is contingent, that
is, "what is contingent is created and has a Creator, i.e.,
an Agent who made it more susceptible of one of the two
possibilities rather than the other."[31] Ibn Rushd marshals
his objections against the first premise, hoping to reveal its
weaknesses and thus undercut its conclusion. He admits that this
premise holds much rhetorical appeal to the majority of people,
despite its falsity, which appears from the fact that if it were
possible for everything to be intrinsically other than it is, one
would not know for sure what would happen in that world, nor would
it be possible to say that it is the same world as
the one we have For example, if the western wind became eastern
and the eastern western or the stone moved upwards rather than
downwards and fire downwards rather than upwards, our knowledge of
the world would have to be different, and it would not be
of the same world. Besides, the supposition that it
is possible for everything to be in actuality other than it is,
contends Ibn Rushd, would destroy the wisdom in the creation of
the world, because it destroys altogether the notion of causality.
"It negates wisdom, since wisdom is nothing over and above
the knowledge of the causes of the thing. And if there be no
necessary causes to the thing accounting for its existence, in the
manner appropriate to that type of existence, then there is no
knowledge here that distinguishes the wise Creator from any
other."[32] Being a thorough Aristotelian, Ibn Rushd asks
"what wisdom would there have been in man, if all his actions
and activities were to result from any organ whatsoever, or even
without any organ, such that seeing could result, for example,
from the ear just as it results from the eye, and the smell from
the eye exactly as it results from the nose? All this negates
wisdom and destroys the meaning by means of which He called
Himself wise."[33]
Ibn Rushd implies that Abu al-Ma’ali
is committed to the Ash’ari occasionalist view of causality,
according to which one is unable to predict the result of two
causally connected events. For example when a cotton ball meets
the fire or when the knife cuts the throat of a human being, we
cannot assert or predict that the burning of the cotton will
result or that the death of the person will occur necessarily.[34]
Ibn Rushd considers this Ash’ari occasionalistic view of
causation untenable and doubts whether it could be taken as a
serious philosophical position.[35] Unlike the Ash’arites, he
maintains that real knowledge consists in discovering the causes
underlying a given process. Thus, by denying efficient causation,
Abu al-Ma’ali has undermined his own rational approach. To Ibn
Rushd, the irony with the Ash’arites’ position, including Abu
al-Ma’ali’s, is that they appear rational verbally when in
fact they avoid to pursue vigorously a sufficiently rational
course of explanation. The end result is that they espouse
positions on the creation of the world and our knowledge of God’s
existence, based on assumptions that lead to the repudiation of
reason, God’s prized gift to humanity. Accordingly, the Ash’arites’
methods for knowing God are not reliable and the common people
should not follow them, because in following them they all go
astray.
After examining the arguments of
the four different theological groups regarding the creation of
the world and our knowledge of God’s existence, Ibn Rushd
concludes that those arguments are very far from being conclusive
and authoritative for legitimizing their doctrinal hegemony over
the common people and setting the grounds for orthodoxy. To set
the record straight, he proceeds to offer his own arguments for
the creation of the world and our knowledge of God’s existence.
According to him, our knowledge of the world leads us to know the
existence of God. The arguments that convince people of God’s
existence are universal and simple and are two in number:
the argument from design or providence (Dalil al-'Inaya)
and the argument from invention or creation (Dalil al-Ikhtira').[36]
The argument from design states that everything exists for a
purpose, while the argument from invention states that things are
invented or created, like the invention of life from matter. In
defending the first argument, Ibn Rushd points to two principles:
one stating that all things or existing beings are conducive to
man's existence and the other that this "conduciveness is
necessarily predicated on an Agent intending and willing it [Fa’ilun
qasid wa murid], because it is not possible that this
conduciveness results from coincidence."[37] Ibn Rushd cites
many examples to prove that what exists is conducive to man's
existence beginning with the cycles of nature to the presence of
natural phenomena and animal and plant species necessary for man’s
well-being. The argument from invention is based on the
observation of life issuing from material bodies and leading us to
"know for certain that there is here a producer of life and a
provider of it and that is God the Almighty."[38]
According to Ibn Rushd,
philosophers and common people alike arrive at the knowledge of
God through these two arguments. "The difference between the
two ways lies in the details, that is, the common people know of
the design and invention of what can be known through primitive
knowledge that is based on sense perception. But the scientists go
further to know what can be perceived rationally on the basis of
proofs ... and the scientists do not reveal a greater
understanding of these two arguments except in the manner of
greater detail and more depth in the knowledge of the selfsame
thing."[39] The philosophers and the common people alike,
then, know of God's existence through the created beings, but the
knowledge of the philosophers is more sophisticated and complex,
and the full extent of it remains beyond the comprehension of the
ordinary people.
However, there are some
philosophers who do not believe in the existence of God and
dismiss any form of argument that purports to prove the existence
of God. Ibn Rushd concedes that some pre-socratic naturalists, who
are known in Arab philosophy as al-Dahriyun, did not
believe in God and they would reject his two arguments for the
existence of God. However, this concession does not undermine the
validity of these arguments because he did not claim that they
constitute a demonstrative proof for the existence of God. The
arguments from invention and design do not lead us to necessarily
infer the existence of God from the creation of the world. Given
his view of human beings and their rational capacities as thinking
beings and the limitations of inductive inference, Ibn Rushd
believes that it is not unreasonable to infer from the existence
of design and invention in the world the existence of an Inventor
or Creator for it who is God. Ibn Rushd maintains that this is the
utmost that we, as thinking beings, can reach. This line of
argument is not demonstrable in the sense that it is logically
necessary, but it is based on the knowledge of ourselves as
rational beings and the principles of induction that we employ in
knowing the world.
Ibn Rushd offers a rationale for
his position. He accepts the existence of two worlds: the world of
nature or sense, which is based on experience and is finite, and
the unseen world, which is infinite and is unlike anything we know,
it is sui generis.[40] Any proof that can be offered regarding
the latter world, based on the knowledge of the former, ought to
be accepted guardedly: that is, those who accept the existence of
God as Artisan, Creator or Originator of the world cannot do so
with deductive certainty. Accordingly, we ought to be tolerant of
those who, on philosophical grounds, disagree with us, since the
proofs that apply to this world do not necessarily apply to the
other.[41] Given this position, Ibn Rushd denies the naturalists'
conclusion that attributes design in the world of sense to
coincidence, arguing that, based on our knowledge, as rational
beings, experience justifies us in attributing the design we find
in it to God. He writes: "if a person were to see a stone
somewhere on earth and find it conducive to being sat on, in a
certain position, and of a certain size too, he would realize that
this [stone] must have been made in such a form and size by a
maker who put it in that place. But when [that person] does not
see it conducive to being sat upon, he would realize that its
being in that place with a certain quality is due to coincidence
and would not attribute a maker to it."[42]
According to Ibn Rushd, the world
constitutes an organic unity and the organization of its parts and
details could not have resulted from coincidence, but rather from
an intentional Agent or Artisan, who is God. Ibn Rushd buttresses
his position by adding a principle of corruptibility, namely, that
if any basic part were missing from this organic whole, life on
earth would be seriously affected or jeopardized, the earth itself
might even be destroyed altogether. For example, if the sun were
closer to, or farther away from the earth than it actually is,
then life would not be possible. So, since the world is an organic
whole which is conducive to human life and since any substantial
change in its organic constitution might lead to the corruption or
destruction of the whole, then the world does not result from
coincidence but from an intending and willing Agent.
The lessons that we learn from Ibn
Rushd’s criticisms of the theologians' arguments for the
existence of God are numerous. Most importantly, philosophers need
not shy away from conducting a critical examination of the
theologians’ positions in the interests of truth and harmony in
the community. This dictum is particularly telling in our own days
where the revival of fundamentalist discourse is acquiring a
hegemonic bent. However, one should not take Ibn Rushd’s answers
as final, because the issues he dealt with cannot be easily
settled. For example, he gives the impression that al-Ghazali’s
Ash’ari position on causation is untenable, when his arguments
against it do not demonstrate its falsity. Hume's and Popper's
discussions of causality show that no position on causality is
final and the debate around it is continuous. However, Ibn Rushd's
principle of tolerance has become an established fact in modern
discourse without which neither modern science nor modern
civilization can survive.
In this paper, I presented the
thesis that Ibn Rushd criticized the theologians’ arguments for
the existence of God in order to expose the logical defects
involved in such arguments and deprive the theologians from the
theoretical and religious justifications for their political
influence in the Muslim community. I dealt first with Ibn Rushd’s
objections to the Ash’arites’ supposition that the world
necessarily needs a Maker, on the ground that the Ash’arites
would be unable to say whether God is eternal or created. The
supposition that God is created leads to an infinite regress,
while the supposition that God is eternal leads to the view that
God’s actions are eternal. To counter this objection, the Ash’arites
made a distinction between God’s actions and God’s will,
maintaining that the former are created, but the latter is
eternal. However, this distinction fails to get the Ash’arites
out of their predicament because the will is the necessary
pre-condition of the action, and the two are correlates. If one is
eternal, the other must be eternal and vice versa.
Second, I discussed the two
arguments offered by the Ash’arites to support their view that
the world is created: one argument followed by the majority of the
Ash’arites and the other by Abu al-Ma'ali. The former is based
on three premises: that substances do not exist without accidents,
that accidents are created, and that what cannot exist without
accidents is created. I discussed only the second premise the
difficulty with which is that it makes an unwarranted inductive
leap from the world of experience or the visible world to the
unseen world that we cannot experience. Furthermore, the assertion
that all accidents are created is not self evident, because both
space and time are accidents, yet one cannot imagine them to be
other than eternal. Abu Al Ma'ali’s argument asserts that the
world is created because everything in it is contingent and may be
other than what it is. Ibn Rushd denies this assertion on the
ground that when something changes, it no longer remains the same
thing, and when the world changes, it no longer remains the same
world. Moreover, according to Ibn Rushd, existing things in
the world are interconnected and are related to each other by
causal laws. The argument from contingency denies causal
necessity, and whoever denies causality denies the wisdom in the
creation and the Creator.
Third, I discussed Ibn Rushd’s
two arguments for the existence of God, namely, Dalil al-‘Inaya
or argument from design and Dalil al-Ikhtira’ or argument
from invention. The common people and philosophers can understand
these arguments and believe in God, even though the knowledge of
the latter is more complete in matters of scientific details and
logical complexity. Fourth, I dealt with an objection that might
be raised against Ibn Rushd's concession that his two arguments
for the existence of God do not prove demonstrably the existence
of God. I argued that this concession does not undermine his
position, but it reveals the limits of human rationality. The
validity of his two arguments are based on human rationality and
the principle of corruptibility that implies that any substantial
change in the organic unity of the universe is likely to disrupt
life as we know it. Fifth, I drew some lessons from Ibn Rushd’s
venture to criticize the theologians' arguments for the existence
of God. Ibn Rushd’s answers are not final and do not constitute
the last word on the subject. The appealing audacity of Ibn Rushd
lies in the fact that he made such a venture in the name of reason
and remained committed to the highest standards of rational
discourse in discussing some of the most sensitive issues that
faced the Muslim community.
Ibrahim Najjar
University of Sharjah
May 2001
FOOTNOTES
-
Tahafut Al-Tahafut
(the Incoherence of the Incoherence). Translated with
introduction and notes by Simon Von Den Bergh. Oxford: Messrs.
Luzac & Co., 1954.
-
Al-Ghazali, Tahafut
al-Falasifa, Edited by Sulayman Dunya. Cairo: Dar al-Ma’arif
Bi-Masr, 1955.
-
See Averroes, On the Harmony
of Religion and Philosophy. A translation with
introduction and notes of Ibn Rushd’s Kitab fasl al-maqal,
with its appendix (Damima) and an extraction from Kitab
al-kashf an manahij al-adilla, by George
Hourani. Printed for the Trustees of the "E.J.W. Gibb
Memorial". London: Messrs. Luzac & Co., 1961. Hourani
gives an alternative translation to the Arabic title on page
44: "The Decisive Treatise, Determining the Nature of
the Connection Between Religion and Philosophy." See
footnote 1, p. 83.
-
Ibn Rushd. Manahij al-Adilla
fi Aqaid al-Milla. Edited with an Introduction by Mahmud
Qasim. (Cairo: Maktabat al-Anglo-Misriyya, 1964), p. 133.
Henceforth Al-Kashf and all translations here are mine.
-
Al-Kashf ,
p. 133.
-
Majid Fakhry. Ibn Rushd:
Faylasufu Qurtuba [The Philosopher of Cordoba]. (Beirut:
Dar al-Mashriq, 1982). P. 10. See also Farah Antun’s book: Ibn
Rushd wa Falsafatuhu. (Beirut: Dar al-Tali’a,
1981), p. 222.
-
See al-Ghazali’s concise
discussion of ‘Ilm al-Kalam or the science of Kalam
in Deliverance from Error (al-Munqidh min al-Dalal,
translated by Richard McCarthy, S.J. as Freedom and
Fulfillment. Boston: Twayne, 1980, section 21. The Muslim
theologians who are engaged in this practice are called Mutakallimun,
and sometimes they are referred to as dialecticians or
dialectic theologians.
-
Ibn Rushd identifies the Batinis
with the sufis, while Al-Ghazali identifies the Batinis
with the Ta’limites or the Servile Conformists
who believe in an infallible Imam or teacher. See
Al-Gahzali’s Deliverance from Error, sections: 20,
61-80. Majid Fakhry takes al-Ghazali to be referring to the
esoteric Ism’ilis who believed in an infallible Iman
or teacher. See Fakhry, History of Western Philosophy,
p. 220.
-
Ibn Rushd. Al-Kashf. P.
133.
-
Ibid., P.
133. Ibn Rushd uses the word al-Sama’, which may be
translated as "by hearing" or "report",
where one relies on the authority of a transmitted position
rather than on the rational justification of it.
-
Ibn Rushd. Al-Kashf. P.
135.
-
Ibid.
-
Ibid.
Fa’ilun Muhdith.
-
Al-Kashf, p.
135.
-
Ibid.
-
Ibid.
-
Ibid.,
p. 137.
-
Ibid.
-
Ibid.
p. 138. The Qur’an: A Modern English Version.
Translated by Majid Fakhry. (London: Garnet, 1997), 16, 40.
-
Ibid.,
p. 148.
-
Abu al-Ma’ali al Juwayni
(1028-85), Ash’arite theologian, known as Imam al-Haramayn.
He taught al-Ghazali at Nishapur.
-
Ibid.,
p. 148.
-
The main objection to the first
premise of the Ash’arites argument for the creation of the
world is that its truth is confined to objects in the world of
experience. It becomes doubtful when it is carried to the
indivisible atoms that the Ash’arites posit.
-
See Ibn Rushd, Talkhis
Mantiq Aristu, volume I: al-Qiyas. (Beirut:
Lebanese University Press, 1982), p. 352. Also, Averroes’
Three Short Commentaries on Aristotle’s "Topics,"
"Rhetoric," and "Poetics", edited and
translated by Charles E. Butterworth. (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1977), p. 49.
-
Ibrahim Najjar "A new
perspective on Ibn Rushd’s View of Induction". A paper
presented at MESA ’98 in San Francisco and currently under
review for publication.
-
Aristotle gives an illustration
that has become proverbial: "Man, the horse, the mule (c)
are long-lived (A). Man, the horse, the mule (c) are gall-less
(B). Therefore, (if B is no wider than C) all gall-less
animals (B) must be long-lived (A)." Sir David Ross, Aristotle.
(London: Methuen & Co., 1968), p. 38.
-
Ibn Rushd, Al-Kashf, p.
141. "after asserting the equality of the natures of both
the seen and the unseen."
-
Al-Kashf ,
p. 140.
-
The direction that Ibn Rushd’s
assault on the Ash’arites view of induction takes
anticipates Hume and Popper, but this point cannot be
elaborated here. The reader is referred to my paper on Ibn
Rushd’ view of induction, cited above.
-
One should remember that Ibn
Rushd’s views of space and time were Aristotelian and not
Einstinian.
-
Ibid.,
p. 144. I have benefited greatly from the insightful work of
William Lane Craig The Kalam Cosmological Argument,(New
York: Barnes & Noble, 1979), on the Ash’arites’ and
al-Ghazali’s views on causation from work by Richard M. Frank
especially his monograph, Creation and the Cosmic System:
al-Ghazali and Avicenna, (Heidelberg: Winter 1992), and from
Michael Marmura’s review of it "Ghazalian Causes and
Intermediaries" in Journal of the American
Oriental Society, 115 (1995), 89-100.
-
Ibid.,
p. 145.
-
Ibid.
-
See al-Ghazali, Tahafut
al-Falasifa, Edited by Sulayman Dunya, (Cairo: Dar al-Ma’arif
Bi-Masr, 1955), p. 225. Mi’yar al Ilm, (Beirut: Dar
a-Andalus, 1978) p. 139. Ibn Rushd, Tahafut al-Tahafut,
translated by Van Den Bergh, p. 316. Also Majid Fakhry, Islamic
Occasionalism and its Critique by Averoes and
Aquinas. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958),
particularly chapter two.
-
Oddly enough one finds
al-Ghazali in Mi’yar al Ilm, p. 140 abandoning his
earlier occasionalist view of causation on the same grounds,
but very few scholars have noticed this change in al-Ghazali’s
position, including Ibn Rushd himself.
-
I follow Fakhry’s translation
of this argument. See his History of Islamic Philosophy,
p. 281. Some may find this translation too literal, but it
seems to preserve as well Ibn Rushd’s meaning, which
involves the bringing forth of something out of something
else, say, life out of dead matter.
-
Ibid.,
p. 150.
-
Ibid.,
p. 151.
-
Ibid.,
p. 155.
-
Ibid.,
p. 204.
-
Notice that this philosophical
principle of tolerance is more general than the principle of
religious toleration. Although Ibn Rushd personally favors
Islam and thinks that it is the best among religions, he feels
that others may not agree with his assessment. Religion is a
food necessary for the nourishment of people, even some may
not be nourished by it. Al-Kashf, p. 220. However, it
would be interesting to investigate how consistent he was in
applying his principles. See Tahafut al-Tahafut, ed.
Bouyges, p. 527, 1. 11 and Fasl
al-Maqal, sections 17 and 18.
-
Ibid.,
p. 194.
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