(also available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/17300.htm,
with accompanying slides
and video clips.)
SECRETARY POWELL: Thank
you, Mr. President. Mr. President and Mr. Secretary General,
distinguished colleagues, I would like to begin by expressing my
thanks for the special effort that each of you made to be here
today. This is an important day for us all as we review the
situation with respect to Iraq and its disarmament obligations
under UN Security Council Resolution 1441.
Last November 8, this Council
passed Resolution 1441 by a unanimous vote. The purpose of that
resolution was to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction.
Iraq had already been found guilty of material breach of its
obligations stretching back over 16 previous resolutions and 12
[SLIDE: Iraq failing to disarm]
Resolution 1441 was not dealing
with an innocent party, but a regime this Council has repeatedly
convicted over the years.
Resolution 1441 gave Iraq one last
chance, one last chance to come into compliance or to face serious
consequences. No Council member present and voting on that day had
any illusions about the nature and intent of the resolution or
what serious consequences meant if Iraq did not comply.
And to assist in its disarmament,
we called on Iraq to cooperate with returning inspectors from
UNMOVIC and IAEA. We laid down tough standards for Iraq to meet to
allow the inspectors to do their job.
[SLIDE: Iraq failing to disarm:
denial and deception] http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/pix/events/secretary/2003/17265.htm
This Council placed the burden on
Iraq to comply and disarm, and not on the inspectors to find that
which Iraq has gone out of its way to conceal for so long.
Inspectors are inspectors; they are not detectives.
I asked for this session today for
two purposes. First, to support the core assessments made by Dr.
Blix and Dr. ElBaradei. As Dr. Blix reported to this Council on
January 27, "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine
acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded
And as Dr. ElBaradei reported,
Iraq's declaration of December 7 "did not provide any new
information relevant to certain questions that have been
outstanding since 1998."
My second purpose today is to
provide you with additional information, to share with you what
the United States knows about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction,
as well as Iraq's involvement in terrorism, which is also the
subject of Resolution 1441 and other earlier resolutions.
I might add at this point that we
are providing all relevant information we can to the inspection
teams for them to do their work.
The material I will present to you
comes from a variety of sources. Some are U.S. sources and some
are those of other countries. Some are the sources are technical,
such as intercepted telephone conversations and photos taken by
satellites. Other sources are people who have risked their lives
to let the world know what Saddam Hussein is really up to.
I cannot tell you everything that
we know, but what I can share with you, when combined with what
all of us have learned over the years, is deeply troubling. What
you will see is an accumulation of facts and disturbing patterns
of behavior. The facts and Iraqis' behavior, Iraq's behavior,
demonstrate that Saddam Hussein and his regime have made no
effort, no effort, to disarm, as required by the international
Indeed, the facts and Iraq's
behavior show that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing
their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction.
Let me begin by playing a tape for
you. What youâ€™re about to hear is a conversation that my
government monitored. It takes place on November 26 of last year,
on the day before United Nations teams resumed inspections in
Iraq. The conversation involves two senior officers, a colonel and
a brigadier general from Iraq's elite military unit, the
[The tape is played.]
Let me pause and review some of the key elements of this
conversation that you just heard between these two officers.
First, they acknowledge that our
colleague, Mohammed ElBaradei is coming, and they know what he's
coming for and they know he's coming the next day. He's coming to
look for things that are prohibited. He is expecting these
gentlemen to cooperate with him and not hide things.
But they're worried. We have this
modified vehicle. What do we say if one of them
sees it? What is their concern?
Their concern is that it's something they should not have,
something that should not be seen.
The general was incredulous:
"You didn't get it modified. You don't have one of those, do
"I have one."
"Which? From where?"
"From the workshop. From the
"I'll come to see you in the
morning. I'm worried you all have something left."
"We evacuated everything. We
don't have anything left."
Note what he says: "We
evacuated everything." We didn't destroy it. We didn't line
it up for inspection. We didn't turn it into the inspectors. We
evacuated it to make sure it was not around when the inspectors
showed up. "I will come to you tomorrow."
The Al-Kindi Company. This is a
company that is well known to have been involved in prohibited
weapons systems activity.
Let me play another tape for you.
As you will recall, the inspectors found 12 empty chemical
warheads on January 16th. On January 20, 4 days later, Iraq
promised the inspectors it would search for more. You will now
hear an officer from Republican Guard headquarters issuing an
instruction to an officer in the field. Their conversation took
place just last week, on January 30.
[The tape was played.]
Let me pause again and review the elements of this message.
"They are inspecting the
ammunition you have, yes?"
"Yes. For the possibility
there are forbidden ammo."
"For the possibility there
is, by chance, forbidden ammo?"
"And we sent you a message
yesterday to clean out all the areas, the scrap areas, the
abandoned areas. Make sure there is nothing there. Remember the
first message: evacuate it."
This is all part of a system of
hiding things and moving things out of the way and making sure
they have left nothing behind.
You go a little further into this
message and you see the specific instructions from headquarters:
"After you have carried out what is contained in this
message, destroy the message because I don't want anyone to see
Why? Why? This message would have
verified to the inspectors that they have been trying to turn over
things. They were looking for things, but they don't want that
message seen because they were trying to clean up the area, to
leave no evidence behind of the presence of weapons of mass
destruction. And they can claim that nothing was there and the
inspectors can look all they want and they will find nothing.
This effort to hide things from
the inspectors is not one or two isolated events. Quite the
contrary, this is part and parcel of a policy of evasion and
deception that goes back 12 years, a policy set at the highest
levels of the Iraqi regime.
We know that Saddam Hussein has
what is called "a Higher Committee for Monitoring the
Inspection Teams." Think about that. Iraq has a high-level
committee to monitor the inspectors who were sent in to monitor
Iraq's disarmament -- not to cooperate with them, not to assist
them, but to spy on them and keep them from doing their jobs.
The committee reports directly to
Saddam Hussein. It is headed by Iraq's Vice President, Taha Yasin
Ramadan. Its members include Saddam Hussein's son, Qusay.
This committee also includes
Lieutenant General Amir al-Sadi, an advisor to Saddam. In case
that name isn't immediately familiar to you, General Sadi has been
the Iraqi regime's primary point of contact for Dr. Blix and Dr.
ElBaradei. It was General Sadi who last fall publicly pledged that
Iraq was prepared to cooperate unconditionally with inspectors.
Quite the contrary, Sadi's job is not to cooperate; it is to
deceive, not to disarm, but to undermine the inspectors; not to
support them, but to frustrate them and to make sure they learn
We have learned a lot about the
work of this special committee. We learned that just prior to the
return of inspectors last November, the regime had decided to
resume what we heard called "the old game of
For example, let me focus on the
now famous declaration that Iraq submitted to this
[SLIDE 10: Iraq documents on a
Council on December 7. Iraq never
had any intention of complying with this Council's mandate.
Instead, Iraq planned to use the declaration to overwhelm us and
to overwhelm the inspectors with useless information about Iraq's
permitted weapons so that we would not have time to pursue Iraq's
prohibited weapons. Iraq's goal was to give us in this room, to
give those of us on this Council, the false impression that the
inspection process was working.
You saw the result. Dr. Blix
pronounced the 12,200-page declaration rich in volume but poor in
information and practically devoid of new evidence. Could any
member of this Council honestly rise in defense of this false
Everything we have seen and heard
indicates that instead of cooperating actively with the inspectors
to ensure the success of their mission, Saddam Hussein and his
regime are busy doing all they possibly can to ensure that
inspectors succeed in finding absolutely nothing.
My colleagues, every statement I
make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not
assertions. What we are giving you are facts and conclusions based
on solid intelligence. I will cite some examples, and these are
from human sources.
Orders were issued to Iraq's
security organizations, as well as to Saddam Hussein's own office,
to hide all correspondence with the Organization of Military
Industrialization. This is the organization that oversees Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction activities. Make sure there are no
documents left which would connect you to the OMI.
We know that Saddam's son, Qusay,
ordered the removal of all prohibited weapons from Saddam's
numerous palace complexes. We know that Iraqi government
officials, members of the ruling Baath Party and scientists have
hidden prohibited items in their homes. Other key files from
military and scientific establishments have been placed in cars
that are being driven around the countryside by Iraqi intelligence
agents to avoid detection.
[SLIDE 11: documents found in
Thanks to intelligence they were
provided, the inspectors recently found dramatic confirmation of
these reports. When they searched the homes of an Iraqi nuclear
scientist, they uncovered roughly 2,000 pages of documents. You
see them here being brought out of the home and placed in UN
hands. Some of the material is classified and related to Iraq's
Tell me, answer me: Are the
inspectors to search the house of every government official, every
Baath Party member and every scientist in the country to find the
truth, to get the information they need, to satisfy the demands of
Our sources tell us that in some
cases the hard drives of computers at Iraqi weapons facilities
were replaced. Who took the hard drives? Where did they go? What
is being hidden? Why?
There is only one answer to the
why: to deceive, to hide, to keep from the inspectors.
Numerous human sources tell us
that the Iraqis are moving not just documents and hard drives, but
weapons of mass destruction, to keep them from being found by
inspectors. While we were here in this Council chamber debating
Resolution 1441 last fall, we know, we know from sources that a
missile brigade outside Baghdad was dispersing rocket launchers
and warheads containing biological warfare agent to various
locations, distributing them to various locations in western Iraq.
Most of the launchers and warheads
had been hidden in large groves of palm trees and were to be moved
every one to four weeks to escape detection.
We also have satellite photos that
indicate that banned materials have recently been moved from a
number of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction facilities.
Let me say a word about satellite
images before I show a couple. The photos that I am about to show
you are sometimes hard for the average person to interpret, hard
for me. The painstaking work of photo analysis takes experts with
years and years of experience, pouring for hours and hours over
light tables. But as I show you these images, I will try to
capture and explain what they mean, what they indicate, to our
Let's look at one. This one is
about a weapons munition facility, a facility that holds
ammunition at a place called Taji. This is one of about 65 such
facilities in Iraq. We know that this one has housed chemical
munitions. In fact, this is where the Iraqis recently came up with
the additional four chemical weapons shells.
Here you see 15 munitions bunkers in yellow and red outlines. The
four that are in red squares represent active chemical munitions
How do I know that? How can I say
that? Let me give you a closer look. Look at the image on the
left. On the left is a close-up of one of the four chemical
bunkers. The two arrows indicate the presence of sure signs that
the bunkers are storing chemical munitions. The arrow at the top
that says "security" points to a facility that is a
signature item for this kind of bunker. Inside that facility are
special guards and special equipment to monitor any leakage that
might come out of the bunker. The truck you also see is a
signature item. It's a decontamination vehicle in case something
goes wrong. This is characteristic of those four bunkers. The
special security facility and the decontamination vehicle will be
in the area, if not at any one of them or one of the other, it is
moving around those four and it moves as needed to move as people
are working in the different bunkers.
Now look at the picture on the
right. You are now looking at two of those sanitized bunkers. The
signature vehicles are gone, the tents are gone. It's been cleaned
up. And it was done on the 22nd of December as the UN inspection
team is arriving, and you can see the inspection vehicles arriving
in the lower portion of the picture on the right.
The bunkers are clean when the
inspectors get there. They found nothing.
This sequence of events raises the
worrisome suspicion that Iraq had been tipped off to the
forthcoming inspections at Taji. As it did throughout the 1990s,
we know that Iraq today is actively using its considerable
intelligence capabilities to hide its illicit activities. From our
sources, we know that inspectors are under constant surveillance
by an army of Iraqi intelligence operatives. Iraq is relentlessly
attempting to tap all of their communications, both voice and
electronics. I would call my colleagues' attention to the fine
paper that the United Kingdom distributed yesterday which
describes in exquisite detail Iraqi deception activities.
In this next example, you will see
the type of concealment activity Iraq has undertaken in response
to the resumption of inspections. Indeed, in November of 2002,
just when the inspections were about to resume, this type of
activity spiked. Here are three examples.
At this ballistic missile site on
November 10, we saw a cargo truck preparing to move ballistic
At this biological weapons-related
facility on November 25, just 2 days before inspections resumed,
this truck caravan appeared -- something we almost never see at
this facility and we monitor it carefully and regularly.
At this ballistic missile
facility, again, 2 days before inspections began, five large cargo
trucks appeared, along with a truck-mounted crane, to move
We saw this kind of housecleaning
at close to 30 sites. Days after this activity, the vehicles and
the equipment that I've just highlighted disappear and the site
returns to patterns of normalcy. We don't know precisely what Iraq
was moving, but the inspectors already knew about these sites so
Iraq knew that they would be coming.
We must ask ourselves: Why would
Iraq suddenly move equipment of this nature before inspections if
they were anxious to demonstrate what they had or did not have?
Remember the first intercept in
which two Iraqis talked about the need to hide a modified vehicle
from the inspectors. Where did Iraq take all of this equipment?
Why wasn't it presented to the inspectors?
[SLIDE 17: Iraq denies UN
Iraq also has refused to permit
any U-2 reconnaissance flights that would give the inspectors a
better sense of what's being moved before, during and after
inspectors. This refusal to allow this kind of reconnaissance is
in direct, specific violation of operative paragraph seven of our
[SLIDE 18: Text of item 4 of
Security Council resolution 1441]
Saddam Hussein and his regime are
not just trying to conceal weapons; they are also trying to hide
people. You know the basic facts. Iraq has not complied with its
obligation to allow immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted and private
access to all officials and other persons, as required by
Resolution 1441. The regime only allows interviews with inspectors
in the presence of an Iraqi official, a minder. The official Iraqi
organization charged with facilitating inspections announced
publicly and announced ominously, that, "Nobody is ready to
leave Iraq to be interviewed."
Iraqi Vice President Ramadan
accused the inspectors of conducting espionage, a veiled threat
that anyone cooperating with UN inspectors was committing treason.
Iraq did not meet its obligations
under 1441 to provide a comprehensive list of scientists
associated with its weapons of mass destruction programs. Iraq's
list was out of date and contained only about 500 names despite
the fact that UNSCOM had earlier put together a list of about
Let me just tell you what a number
of human sources have told us. Saddam Hussein has directly
participated in the effort to prevent interviews. In early
December, Saddam Hussein had all Iraqi scientists warned of the
serious consequences that they and their families would face if
they revealed any sensitive information to the inspectors. They
were forced to sign documents acknowledging that divulging
information is punishable by death.
Saddam Hussein also said that
scientists should be told not to agree to leave Iraq; anyone who
agreed to be interviewed outside Iraq would be treated as a spy.
This violates 1441.
In mid-November, just before the
inspectors returned, Iraqi experts were ordered to report to the
headquarters of the Special Security Organization to receive
counter-intelligence training. The training focused on evasion
methods, interrogation resistance techniques, and how to mislead
Ladies and gentlemen, these are
not assertions. These are facts corroborated by many sources, some
of them sources of the intelligence services of other countries.
For example, in mid-December,
weapons experts at one facility were replaced by Iraqi
intelligence agents who were to deceive inspectors about the work
that was being done there. On orders from Saddam Hussein, Iraqi
officials issued a false death certificate for one scientist and
he was sent into hiding.
In the middle of January, experts
at one facility that was related to weapons of mass destruction,
those experts had been ordered to stay home from work to avoid the
inspectors. Workers from other Iraqi military facilities not
engaged in illicit weapons projects were to replace the workers
who had been sent home. A dozen experts have been placed under
house arrest -- not in their own houses, but as a group at one of
Saddam Hussein's guest houses.
It goes on and on and on. As the
examples I have just presented show, the information and
intelligence we have gathered point to an active and systematic
effort on the part of the Iraqi regime to keep key materials and
people from the inspectors, in direct violation of Resolution
The pattern is not just one of
reluctant cooperation, nor is it merely a lack of cooperation.
What we see is a deliberate campaign to prevent any meaningful
My colleagues, operative paragraph
four of UN Resolution 1441, which we lingered over so long last
fall, clearly states that false statements and omissions in the
declaration and a failure by Iraq at any time to comply with and
cooperate fully in the implementation of this resolution shall
constitute -- the facts speak for themselves -- shall constitute a
further material breach of its obligation.
We wrote it this way to give Iraq
an early test, to give an Iraq an early test. Would they give an
honest declaration and would they, early on, indicate a
willingness to cooperate with the inspectors? It was designed to
be an early test. They failed that test.
By this standard, the standard of
this Operative Paragraph, I believe that Iraq is now in further
material breach of its obligations. I believe this conclusion is
irrefutable and undeniable.
Iraq has now placed itself in
danger of the serious consequences called for in UN Resolution
1441. And this body places itself in danger of irrelevance if it
allows Iraq to continue to defy its will without responding
effectively and immediately.
This issue before us is not how
much time we are willing to give the inspectors to be frustrated
by Iraqi obstruction. But how much longer are we willing to put up
with Iraq's non-compliance before we, as a Council, we as the
United Nations say, "Enough. Enough."
The gravity of this moment is
matched by the gravity of the threat that Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction pose to the world. Let me now turn to those deadly
weapons programs and describe why they are real and present
dangers to the region and to the world.
First, biological weapons. We have
talked frequently here about biological weapons. By way of
introduction in history, I think there are just three quick points
I need to make. First, you will recall that it took UNSCOM four
long and frustrating years to pry, to pry an admission out of Iraq
that it had biological weapons. Second, when Iraq finally admitted
having these weapons in 1995, the quantities were vast. Less than
a teaspoon of dry anthrax, a little bit -- about this amount. This
is just about the amount of a teaspoon. Less than a teaspoon full
of dry anthrax in an envelope shut down the United States Senate
in the fall of 2001.
This forced several hundred people
to undergo emergency medical treatment and killed two postal
workers just from an amount, just about this quantity that was
inside of an envelope.
Iraq declared 8500 liters of
anthrax. But UNSCOM estimates that Saddam Hussein could have
produced 25,000 liters. If concentrated into this dry form, this
amount would be enough to fill tens upon tens upon tens of
thousands of teaspoons. And Saddam Hussein has not verifiably
accounted for even one teaspoonful of this deadly material. And
that is my third point. And it is key. The Iraqis have never
accounted for all of the biological weapons they admitted they had
and we know they had.
They have never accounted for all
the organic material used to make them. And they have not
accounted for many of the weapons filled with these agents such as
there are 400 bombs. This is evidence, not conjecture. This is
true. This is all well documented.
Dr. Blix told this Council that
Iraq has provided little evidence to verify anthrax production and
no convincing evidence of its destruction. It should come as no
shock then that since Saddam Hussein forced out the last
inspectors in 1998, we have amassed much intelligence indicating
that Iraq is continuing to make these weapons.
One of the most worrisome things
that emerges from the thick intelligence file we have on Iraq's
biological weapons is the existence of mobile production
facilities used to make biological agents.
Let me take you inside that
intelligence file and share with you what we know from eyewitness
accounts. We have first-hand descriptions of biological weapons
factories on wheels and on rails.
The trucks and train cars are
easily moved and are designed to evade detection by inspectors. In
a matter of months, they can produce a quantity of biological
poison equal to the entire amount that Iraq claimed to have
produced in the years prior to the Gulf War.
Although Iraq's mobile production
program began in the mid-1990s, UN inspectors at the time only had
vague hints of such programs. Confirmation came later, in the year
2000. The source was an eyewitness, an Iraqi chemical engineer who
supervised one of these facilities. He actually was present during
biological agent production runs. He was also at the site when an
accident occurred in 1998. Twelve technicians died from exposure
to biological agents.
He reported that when UNSCOM was
in country and inspecting, the biological weapons agent production
always began on Thursdays at midnight, because Iraq thought UNSCOM
would not inspect on the Muslim holy day, Thursday night through
He added that this was important
because the units could not be broken down in the middle of a
production run, which had to be completed by Friday evening before
the inspectors might arrive again.
This defector is currently hiding
in another country with the certain knowledge that Saddam Hussein
will kill him if he finds him. His eyewitness account of these
mobile production facilities has been corroborated by other
A second source. An Iraqi civil
engineer in a position to know the details of the program
confirmed the existence of transportable facilities moving on
A third source, also in a position
to know, reported in summer, 2002, that Iraq had manufactured
mobile production systems mounted on road-trailer units and on
Finally, a fourth source. An Iraqi
major who defected confirmed that Iraq has mobile biological
research laboratories in addition to the production facilities I
We have diagrammed what our
sources reported about these mobile facilities. Here you see both
truck and rail-car mounted mobile factories. The description our
sources gave us of the technical features required by such
facilities is highly detailed and extremely accurate.
As these drawings, based on their
description show, we know what the fermenters look like. We know
what the tanks, pumps, compressors and other parts look like. We
know they fit together, we know how they work, and we know a great
deal about the platforms on which they are mounted.
As shown in this diagram, these
factories can be concealed easily -- either by moving ordinary
looking trucks and rail-cars along Iraq's thousands of miles of
highway or track or by parking them in a garage or a warehouse or
somewhere in Iraq's extensive system of underground tunnels and
[SLIDE 22: Mobile production
facilities for biological weapons]
We know that Iraq has at least
seven of these mobile, biological agent factories. The
truck-mounted ones have at least two or three trucks each. That
means that the mobile production facilities are very few --
perhaps 18 trucks that we know of. There may be more. But perhaps
18 that we know of. Just imagine trying to find 18 trucks among
the thousands and thousands of trucks that travel the roads of
Iraq every single day.
It took the inspectors 4 years to
find out that Iraq was making biological agents. How long do you
think it will take the inspectors to find even one of these 18
trucks without Iraq coming forward as they are supposed to with
the information about these kinds of capabilities.
Ladies and gentlemen, these are
sophisticated facilities. For example, they can produce anthrax
and botulinum toxin. In fact, they can produce enough dry,
biological agent in a single month to kill thousands upon
thousands of people. A dry agent of this type is the most lethal
form for human beings.
By 1998, UN experts agreed that
the Iraqis had perfected drying techniques for their biological
weapons programs. Now Iraq has incorporated this drying expertise
into these mobile production facilities.
We know from Iraq's past
admissions that it has successfully weaponized not only anthrax,
but also other biological agents including botulinum toxin,
aflatoxin and ricin. But Iraq's research efforts did not stop
Saddam Hussein has investigated
dozens of biological agents causing diseases such as gas-gangrene,
plague, typhus, tetanus, cholera, camelpox, and hemorrhagic fever.
And he also has the wherewithal to develop smallpox.
[SLIDE 23: Photo of Iraqi test
flight spraying simulated anthrax]
The Iraqi regime has also
developed ways to disperse lethal biological agents widely,
indiscriminately into the water supply, into the air. For example,
Iraq had a program to modify aerial fuel tanks for Mirage jets.
This video of an Iraqi test flight obtained by UNSCOM some years
ago shows an Iraqi F-1 Mirage jet aircraft. Note the spray coming
from beneath the Mirage. That is 2,000 liters of simulated anthrax
that a jet is spraying.
In 1995, an Iraqi military
officer, Mujahid Salleh Abdul Latif told inspectors that Iraq
intended the spray tanks to be mounted onto a MiG-21 that had been
converted into an unmanned aerial vehicle, or UAV. UAVs outfitted
with spray tanks constitute an ideal method for launching a
terrorist attack using biological weapons.
Iraq admitted to producing four
spray tanks, but to this day, it has provided no credible evidence
that they were destroyed, evidence that was required by the
There can be no doubt that Saddam
Hussein has biological weapons and the capability to rapidly
produce more, many more. And he has the ability to dispense these
lethal poisons and diseases in ways that can cause massive death
[SLIDE 24: Iraq: failing to disarm
- chemical weapons]
If biological weapons seem too
terrible to contemplate, chemical weapons are equally chilling.
UNMOVIC already laid out much of this and it is documented for all
of us to read in UNSCOM's 1999 report on the subject. Let me set
the stage with three key points that all of us need to keep in
mind. First, Saddam Hussein has used these horrific weapons on
another country and on his own people. In fact, in the history of
chemical warfare, no country has had more battlefield experience
with chemical weapons since World War I than Saddam Hussein's
Iraq. Second, as with biological weapons, Saddam Hussein has never
accounted for vast amounts of chemical weaponry: 550 artillery
shells with mustard, 30,000 empty munitions and enough precursors
to increase his stockpile to as much as 500 tons of chemical
If we consider just one category
of missing weaponry, 6500 bombs from the Iran-Iraq War, UNMOVIC
says the amount of chemical agent in them would be on the order of
a thousand tons.
These quantities of chemical
weapons are now unaccounted for. Dr. Blix has quipped that,
"Mustard gas is not marmalade. You are supposed to know what
you did with it." We believe Saddam Hussein knows what he did
with it and he has not come clean with the international
We have evidence these weapons
existed. What we don't have is evidence from Iraq that they have
been destroyed or where they are. That is what we are still
Third point, Iraq's record on
chemical weapons is replete with lies. It took years for Iraq to
finally admit that it had produced four tons of the deadly nerve
agent VX. A single drop of VX on the skin will kill in minutes.
Four tons. The admission only came out after inspectors collected
documentation as a result of the defection of Hussein Kamel,
Saddam Hussein's late son-in-law.
UNSCOM also gained forensic
evidence that Iraq had produced VX and put it into weapons for
delivery, yet to this day Iraq denies it had ever weaponized VX.
And on January 27, UNMOVIC told this Council that it has
information that conflicts with the Iraqi account of its VX
We know that Iraq has embedded key
portions of its illicit chemical weapons infrastructure within its
legitimate civilian industry. To all outward appearances, even to
experts, the infrastructure looks like an ordinary civilian
operation. Illicit and legitimate production can go on
simultaneously or on a dime. This dual-use infrastructure can turn
from clandestine to commercial and then back again.
These inspections would be
unlikely, any inspections at such facilities, would be unlikely to
turn up anything prohibited, especially if there is any warning
that the inspections are coming. Call it ingenious or evil genius,
but the Iraqis deliberately designed their chemical weapons
programs to be inspected. It is infrastructure with a built in
Under the guise of dual-use
infrastructure, Iraq has undertaken an effort to reconstitute
facilities that were closely associated with its past program to
develop and produce chemical weapons. For example, Iraq has
rebuilt key portions of the Tariq State Establishment. Tariq
includes facilities designed specifically for Iraq's chemical
weapons program and employs key figures from past programs.
That's the production end of
Saddam's chemical weapons business. What about the delivery end?
I'm going to show you a small part of a chemical complex called
"Al Musayyib", a site that Iraq has used for at least 3
years to transship chemical weapons from production facilities out
to the field. In May 2002, our satellites photographed the unusual
activity in this picture.
[SLIDE 25: Chemical weapons
Here we see cargo vehicles are
again at this transshipment point, and we can see that they are
accompanied by a decontamination vehicle associated with
biological or chemical weapons activity. What makes this picture
significant is that we have a human source who has corroborated
that movement of chemical weapons occurred at this site at that
time. So it's not just the photo and it's not an individual seeing
the photo. It's the photo and then the knowledge of an individual
being brought together to make the case.
This photograph of the site taken
2 months later, in July, shows not only the previous site which is
the figure in the middle at the top with the bulldozer sign near
it, it shows that this previous site, as well as all of the other
sites around the site have been fully bulldozed and graded. The
topsoil has been removed. The Iraqis literally removed the crust
of the earth from large portions of this site in order to conceal
chemical weapons evidence that would be there from years of
chemical weapons activity.
To support its deadly biological
and chemical weapons programs, Iraq procures needed items from
around the world using an extensive clandestine network. What we
know comes largely from intercepted communications and human
sources who are in a position to know the facts.
Iraq's procurement efforts include
equipment that can filter and separate microorganisms and toxins
involved in biological weapons, equipment that can be used to
concentrate the agent, growth media that can be used to continue
producing anthrax and botulinum toxin, sterilization equipment for
laboratories, glass-lined reactors and specialty pumps that can
handle corrosive chemical weapons agents and precursors. Large
amts of Thionyl Chloride, a precursor for nerve and blister agents
and other chemicals such as sodium sulfide, an important mustard
Now, of course, Iraq will argue
that these items can also be used for legitimate purposes. But if
that is true, why do we have to learn about them by intercepting
communications and risking the lives of human agents?
With Iraq's well-documented
history on biological and chemical weapons, why should any of us
give Iraq the benefit of the doubt? I don't. And I don't think you
will either after you hear this next intercept.
Just a few weeks ago we
intercepted communications between two commanders in Iraq's Second
Republican Guard Corps. One commander is going to be giving an
instruction to the other. You will hear as this unfolds that what
he wants to communicate to the other guy, he wants to make sure
the other guy hears clearly to the point of repeating it so that
it gets written down and completely understood. Listen.
Let's review a few selected items
of this conversation. Two officers talking to each other on the
radio want to make sure that nothing is misunderstood.
"Remove, remove." "The expression, the expression,
I got it."
"Nerve agents, nerve
agents." "Wherever it comes up." "Got
it." "Wherever it comes up." "In the wireless
instructions." "In the instructions."
"Correction. No, in the wireless instructions"
"Wireless, I got it."
Why does he repeat it that way?
Why is he so forceful in making sure this is understood? And why
did he focus on wireless instructions? Because the senior officer
is concerned that somebody might be listening. Well, somebody was.
"Stop talking about it." "They are listening to us.
Don't give any evidence that we have these horrible agents."
But we know that they do and this kind of conversation confirms
Our conservative estimate is that
Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical
weapons agent. That is enough agent to fill 16,000 battlefield
rockets. Even the low end of 100 tons of agent would enable Saddam
Hussein to cause mass casualties across more than 100 square miles
of territory, an area nearly five times the size of Manhattan.
[SLIDE 29: UN-found 122mm chemical
Let me remind you that of the 122
mm chemical warheads that the UN inspectors found recently, this
discovery could very well be, as has been noted, the tip of a
The question before us all, my
friends, is when will we see the rest of the submerged iceberg?
Saddam Hussein has chemical
weapons. Saddam Hussein has used such weapons. And Saddam Hussein
has no compunction about using them again -- against his neighbors
and against his own people. And we have sources who tell us that
he recently has authorized his field commanders to use them. He
wouldn't be passing out the orders if he didn't have the weapons
or the intent to use them.
We also have sources who tell us
that since the 1980s, Saddam's regime has been experimenting on
human beings to perfect its biological or chemical weapons. A
source said that 1600 death-row prisoners were transferred in 1995
to a special unit for such experiments.
An eyewitness saw prisoners tied
down to beds, experiments conducted on them, blood oozing around
the victims' mouths, and autopsies performed to confirm the
effects on the prisoners.
Saddam Hussein's humanity,
inhumanity, has no limits.
Let me turn now to nuclear
weapons. We have no indication that Saddam Hussein has ever
abandoned his nuclear weapons program. On the contrary, we have
more than a decade of proof that he remains determined to acquire
To fully appreciate the challenge
that we face today, remember that in 1991 the inspectors searched
Iraq's primary nuclear weapons facilities for the first time, and
they found nothing to conclude that Iraq had a nuclear weapons
program. But, based on defector information, in May of 1991,
Saddam Hussein's lie was exposed. In truth, Saddam Hussein had a
massive clandestine nuclear weapons program that covered several
different techniques to enrich uranium, including electromagnetic
isotope separation, gas centrifuge and gas diffusion.
We estimate that this illicit
program costs the Iraqis several billion dollars. Nonetheless,
Iraq continued to tell the IAEA that it had no nuclear weapons
program. If Saddam had not been stopped, Iraq could have produced
a nuclear bomb by 1993, years earlier than most worst case
assessments that had been made before the war.
In 1995, as a result of another
defector, we find out that, after his invasion of Kuwait, Saddam
Hussein had initiated a crash program to build a crude nuclear
weapon, in violation of Iraq's UN obligations. Saddam Hussein
already possesses two out of the three key components needed to
build a nuclear bomb. He has a cadre of nuclear scientists with
the expertise and he has a bomb design.
Since 1998, his efforts to
reconstitute his nuclear program have been focused on acquiring
the third and last component: sufficient fissile material to
produce a nuclear explosion. To make the fissile material, he
needs to develop an ability to enrich uranium. Saddam Hussein is
determined to get his hands on a nuclear bomb.
[SLIDE 31: Aluminium tube for
He is so determined that has made
repeated covert attempts to acquire high-specification aluminum
tubes from 11 different countries, even after inspections resumed.
These tubes are controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group
precisely because they can be used as centrifuges for enriching
By now, just about everyone has
heard of these tubes and we all know that there are differences of
opinion. There is controversy about what these tubes are for. Most
U.S. experts think they are intended to serve as rotors in
centrifuges used to enrich uranium. Other experts, and the Iraqis
themselves, argue that they are really to produce the rocket
bodies for a conventional weapon, a multiple rocket launcher.
Let me tell you what is not
controversial about these tubes. First, all the experts who have
analyzed the tubes in our possession agree that they can be
adapted for centrifuge use.
Second, Iraq had no business
buying them for any purpose. They are banned for Iraq. I am no
expert on centrifuge tubes, but this is an old army trooper. I can
tell you a couple things.
First, it strikes me as quite odd
that these tubes are manufactured to a tolerance that far exceeds
U.S. requirements for comparable rockets. Maybe Iraqis just
manufacture their conventional weapons to a higher standard than
we do, but I don't think so.
[SLIDE 32: Intercepted aluminium
Second, we actually have examined
tubes from several different batches that were seized
clandestinely before they reached Baghdad. What we notice in these
different batches is a progression to higher and higher levels of
specification, including in the latest batch an anodized coating
on extremely smooth inner and outer surfaces.
Why would they continue refining
the specifications? Why would they continuing refining the
specification, go to all that trouble for something that, if it
was a rocket, would soon be blown into shrapnel when it went off?
The high-tolerance aluminum tubes
are only part of the story. We also have intelligence from
multiple sources that Iraq is attempting to acquire magnets and
high-speed balancing machines. Both items can be used in a gas
centrifuge program to enrich uranium.
In 1999 and 2000, Iraqi officials
negotiated with firms in Romania, India, Russia and Slovenia for
the purchase of a magnet production plant. Iraq wanted the plant
to produce magnets weighing 20 to 30 grams. That's the same weight
as the magnets used in Iraq's gas centrifuge program before the
This incident, linked with the
tubes, is another indicator of Iraq's attempt to reconstitute its
nuclear weapons program.
Intercepted communications from
mid-2000 through last summer showed that Iraq front companies
sought to buy machines that can be used to balance gas centrifuge
rotors. One of these companies also had been involved in a failed
effort in 2001 to smuggle aluminum tubes into Iraq.
People will continue to debate
this issue, but there is no doubt in my mind. These illicit
procurement efforts show that Saddam Hussein is very much focused
on putting in place the key missing piece from his nuclear weapons
program, the ability to produce fissile material.
He also has been busy trying to
maintain the other key parts of his nuclear program, particularly
his cadre of key nuclear scientists. It is noteworthy that over
the last 18 months Saddam Hussein has paid increasing personal
attention to Iraqis' top nuclear scientists, a group that the
government-controlled press calls openly his "nuclear
mujaheddin." He regularly exhorts them and praises their
progress. Progress toward what end?
[SLIDE 33: Begin section on Iraq's
Long ago, the Security Council,
this Council, required Iraq to halt all nuclear activities of any
Let me talk now about the systems
Iraq is developing to deliver weapons of mass destruction, in
particular Iraq's ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles,
First, missiles. We all remember
that before the Gulf War Saddam Hussein's goal was missiles that
flew not just hundreds, but thousands, of kilometers. He wanted to
strike not only his neighbors, but also nations far beyond his
While inspectors destroyed most of
the prohibited ballistic missiles, numerous intelligence reports
over the past decade from sources inside Iraq indicate that Saddam
Hussein retains a covert force of up to a few dozen scud-variant
ballistic missiles. These are missiles with a range of 650 to 900
We know from intelligence and
Iraq's own admissions that Iraq's alleged permitted ballistic
missiles, the Al-Samud II and the Al-Fatah, violate the
150-kilometer limit established by this Council in Resolution 687.
These are prohibited systems.
UNMOVIC has also reported that
Iraq has illegally imported 350 SA-2 rocket engines. These are
likely for use in the Al-Samud II. Their import was illegal on
three counts: Resolution 687 prohibited all military shipments
into Iraq; UNSCOM specifically prohibited use of these engines in
surface-to-surface missile; and finally, as we have just noted,
they are for a system that exceeds the 150-kilometer range limit.
Worst of all, some of these engines were acquired as late as
December, after this Council passed Resolution 1441.
What I want you to know today is
that Iraq has programs that are intended to produce ballistic
missiles that fly over 1,000 kilometers. One program is pursuing a
liquid fuel missile that would be able to fly more than 1,200
kilometers. And you can see from this map, as well as I can, who
will be in danger of these missiles.
[SLIDE 35: Liquid engine test
facility in Iraq]
As part of this effort, another
little piece of evidence, Iraq has built an engine test stand that
is larger than anything it has ever had. Notice the dramatic
difference in size between the test stand on the left, the old
one, and the new one on the right. Note the large exhaust vent.
This is where the flame from the engine comes out. The exhaust
vent on the right test stand is five times longer than the one on
the left. The one of the left is used for short-range missiles.
The one on the right is clearly intended for long-range missiles
that can fly 1,200 kilometers.
This photograph was taken in April
of 2002. Since then, the test stand has been finished and a roof
has been put over it so it will be harder for satellites to see
what's going on underneath the test stand.
Saddam Hussein's intentions have
never changed. He is not developing the missiles for self-defense.
These are missiles that Iraq wants in order to project power, to
threaten and to deliver chemical, biological -- and if we let him
-- nuclear warheads.
[SLIDE 36: Unscom
Now, unmanned aerial vehicles,
UAVs. Iraq has been working on a variety of UAVs for more than a
decade. This is just illustrative of what a UAV would look like.
This effort has included attempts to modify for unmanned flight
the MIG-21 and, with greater success, an aircraft called the L-29.
However, Iraq is now concentrating
not on these airplanes but on developing and testing smaller UAVs
such as this. UAVs are well suited for dispensing chemical and
biological weapons. There is ample evidence that Iraq has
dedicated much effort to developing and testing spray devices that
could be adapted for UAVs.
And in the little that Saddam
Hussein told us about UAVs, he has not told the truth. One of
these lies is graphically and indisputably demonstrated by
intelligence we collected on June 27th last year.
[SLIDE 37: Iraqi UAV exceeding UN
According to Iraq's December 7
declaration, its UAVs have a range of only 80 kilometers. But we
detected one of Iraq's newest UAVs in a test flight that went 500
kilometers nonstop on autopilot in the racetrack pattern depicted
Not only is this test well in
excess of the 150 kilometers that the United Nations permits, the
test was left out of Iraqâ€™s December 7 declaration. The UAV
was flown around and around and around in this circle and so that
its 80-kilometer limit really was 500 kilometers, unrefueled and
on autopilot -- violative of all of its obligations under 1441.
The linkages over the past ten
years between Iraq's UAV program and biologic and chemical warfare
agents are of deep concern to us. Iraq could use these small UAVs
which have a wingspan of only a few meters to deliver biological
agents to its neighbors or if transported to other countries,
including the United States.
My friends, the information I have
presented to you about these terrible weapons and about Iraq's
continued flaunting of its obligations under Security Council
Resolution 1441 links to a subject I now want to spend a little
bit of time on, and that has to do with terrorism.
Our concern is not just about
these illicit weapons; it's the way that these illicit weapons can
be connected to terrorists and terrorist organizations that have
no compunction about using such devices against innocent people
around the world.
Iraq and terrorism go back
decades. Baghdad trains Palestine Liberation Front members in
small arms and explosives. Saddam uses the Arab Liberation Front
to funnel money to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers in
order to prolong the Intifadah. And it's no secret that Saddam's
own intelligence service was involved in dozens of attacks or
attempted assassinations in the 1990s.
But what I want to bring to your
attention today is the potentially much more sinister nexus
between Iraq and the al-Qaida terrorist network, a nexus that
combines classic terrorist organizations and modern methods of
murder. Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network headed by
Abu Massad Al-Zarqawi an associate and collaborator of Usama bin
Laden and his al-Qaida lieutenants.
Zarqawi, Palestinian born in
Jordan, fought in the Afghan war more than a decade ago. Returning
to Afghanistan in 2000, he oversaw a terrorist training camp. One
of his specialties, and one of the specialties of this camp, is
When our coalition ousted the
Taliban, the Zarqawi network helped establish another poison and
explosive training center camp, and this camp is located in
northeastern Iraq. You see a picture of this camp.
The network is teaching its
operatives how to produce ricin and other poisons. Let me remind
you how ricin works. Less than a pinch -- imagine a pinch of salt
-- less than a pinch of ricin, eating just this amount in your
food, would cause shock, followed by circulatory failure. Death
comes within 72 hours and there is no antidote. There is no cure.
It is fatal.
Those helping to run this camp are
Zarqawi lieutenants operating in northern Kurdish areas outside
Saddam Hussein's controlled Iraq. But Baghdad has an agent in the
most senior levels of the radical organization Ansar al-Islam that
controls this corner of Iraq. In 2000, this agent offered al-Qaida
safe haven in the region.
After we swept al-Qaida from
Afghanistan, some of those members accepted this safe haven. They
remain there today.
Zarqawi's activities are not
confined to this small corner of northeast Iraq. He traveled to
Baghdad in May of 2002 for medical treatment, staying in the
capital of Iraq for two months while he recuperated to fight
During his stay, nearly two dozen
extremists converged on Baghdad and established a base of
operations there. These al-Qaida affiliates based in Baghdad now
coordinate the movement of people, money and supplies into and
throughout Iraq for his network, and they have now been operating
freely in the capital for more than eight months.
Iraqi officials deny accusations
of ties with al-Qaida. These denials are simply not credible. Last
year, an al-Qaida associate bragged that the situation in Iraq was
"good," that Baghdad could be transited quickly.
We know these affiliates are
connected to Zarqawi because they remain, even today, in regular
contact with his direct subordinates, include the poison cell
plotters. And they are involved in moving more than money and
materiel. Last year, two suspected al-Qaida operatives were
arrested crossing from Iraq into Saudi Arabia. They were linked to
associates of the Baghdad cell and one of them received training
in Afghanistan on how to use cyanide.
From his terrorist network in
Iraq, Zarqawi can direct his network in the Middle East and
beyond. We in the United States, all of us, the State Department
and the Agency for International Development, we all lost a dear
friend with the cold-blooded murder of Mr. Lawrence Foley in
Amman, Jordan, last October. A despicable act was committed that
day, the assassination of an individual whose sole mission was to
assist the people of Jordan. The captured assassin says his cell
received money and weapons from Zarqawi for that murder. After the
attack, an associate of the assassin left Jordan to go to Iraq to
obtain weapons and explosives for further operations. Iraqi
officials protest that they are not aware of the whereabouts of
Zarqawi or of any of his associates. Again, these protests are not
credible. We know of Zarqawi's activities in Baghdad. I described
Now let me add one other fact. We
asked a friendly security service to approach Baghdad about
extraditing Zarqawi and providing information about him and his
close associates. This service contacted Iraqi officials twice and
we passed details that should have made it easy to find Zarqawi.
The network remains in Baghdad. Zarqawi still remains at large, to
come and go.
As my colleagues around this table
and as the citizens they represent in Europe know, Zarqawi's
terrorism is not confined to the Middle East. Zarqawi and his
network have plotted terrorist actions against countries including
France, Britain, Spain, Italy, Germany and Russia. According to
detainees Abu Atia, who graduated from Zarqawi's terrorist camp in
Afghanistan, tasked at least nine North African extremists in 2001
to travel to Europe to conduct poison and explosive attacks.
Since last year, members of this
network have been apprehended in France, Britain, Spain and Italy.
By our last count, 116 operatives connected to this global web
have been arrested. The chart you are seeing shows the network in
We know about this European
network and we know about its links to Zarqawi because the
detainees who provided the information about the targets also
provided the names of members of the network. Three of those he
identified by name were arrested in France last December. In the
apartments of the terrorists, authorities found circuits for
explosive devices and a list of ingredients to make toxins.
The detainee who helped piece this
together says the plot also targeted Britain. Later evidence again
proved him right. When the British unearthed the cell there just
last month, one British police officer was murdered during the
destruction of the cell.
[SLIDE 43: Terrorist Anu Hafs,
Russia, - ties to al-Zarqawi]
We also know that Zarqawi's
colleagues have been active in the Pankisi Gorge, Georgia, and in
Chechnya, Russia. The plotting to which they are linked is not
mere chatter. Members of Zarqawi's network say their goal was to
kill Russians with toxins.
We are not surprised that Iraq is
harboring Zarqawi and his subordinates. This understanding builds
on decades long experience with respect to ties between Iraq and
al-Qaida. Going back to the early and mid-1990s when bin Laden was
based in Sudan, an al-Qaida source tells us that Saddam and bin
Laden reached an understanding that al-Qaida would no longer
support activities against Baghdad. Early al-Qaida ties were
forged by secret high-level intelligence service contacts with
al-Qaida, secret Iraqi intelligence high-level contacts with
We know members of both
organizations met repeatedly and have met at least eight times at
very senior levels since the early 1990s. In 1996, a foreign
security service tells us that bin Laden met with a senior Iraqi
intelligence official in Khartoum and later met the director of
the Iraqi intelligence service.
Saddam became more interested as
he saw al-Qaida's appalling attacks. A detained al-Qaida members
tells us that Saddam was more willing to assist al-Qaida after the
1998 bombings of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Saddam was
also impressed by al-Qaida's attacks on the USS Cole in
Yemen in October 2000.
Iraqis continue to visit bin Laden
in his new home in Afghanistan. A senior defector, one of Saddam's
former intelligence chiefs in Europe, says Saddam sent his agents
to Afghanistan sometime in the mid-1990s to provide training to
al-Qaida members on document forgery.
From the late 1990s until 2001,
the Iraqi Embassy in Pakistan played the role of liaison to the
Some believe, some claim, these
contacts do not amount to much. They say Saddam Hussein's secular
tyranny and al-Qaida's religious tyranny do not mix. I am not
comforted by this thought. Ambition and hatred are enough to bring
Iraq and al-Qaida together, enough so al-Qaida could learn how to
build more sophisticated bombs and learn how to forge documents,
and enough so that al-Qaida could turn to Iraq for help in
acquiring expertise on weapons of mass destruction.
And the record of Saddam Hussein's
cooperation with other Islamist terrorist organizations is clear.
Hamas, for example, opened an office in Baghdad in 1999 and Iraq
has hosted conferences attended by Palestine Islamic Jihad. These
groups are at the forefront of sponsoring suicide attacks against
Al-Qaida continues to have a deep
interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction. As with the
story of Zarqawi and his network, I can trace the story of a
senior terrorist operative telling how Iraq provided training in
these weapons to al-Qaida. Fortunately, this operative is now
detained and he has told his story. I will relate it to you now as
he, himself, described it.
This senior al-Qaida terrorist was
responsible for one of al-Qaida's training camps in Afghanistan.
His information comes firsthand from his personal involvement at
senior levels of al-Qaida. He says bin Laden and his top deputy in
Afghanistan, deceased al-Qaida leader Mohammed Atef, did not
believe that al-Qaida labs in Afghanistan were capable enough to
manufacture these chemical or biological agents. They needed to go
somewhere else. They had to look outside of Afghanistan for help.
Where did they go? Where did they
look? They went to Iraq. The support that the describes included
Iraq offering chemical or biological weapons training for two
al-Qaida associates beginning in December 2000. He says that a
militant known as Abdullah al-Araqi had been sent to Iraq several
times between 1997 and 2000 for help in acquiring poisons and
gasses. Abdullah al-Araqi characterized the relationship he forged
with Iraqi officials as successful.
As I said at the outset, none of
this should come as a surprise to any of us. Terrorism has been a
tool used by Saddam for decades. Saddam was a supporter of
terrorism long before these terrorist networks had a name, and
this support continues. The nexus of poisons and terror is new.
The nexus of Iraq and terror is old. The combination is lethal.
With this track record, Iraqi
denials of supporting terrorism take their place alongside the
other Iraqi denials of weapons of mass destruction. It is all a
web of lies.
When we confront a regime that
harbors ambitions for regional domination, hides weapons of mass
destruction, and provides haven and active support for terrorists,
we are not confronting the past; we are confronting the present.
And unless we act, we are confronting an even more frightening
[SLIDE 44: Iraqi human rights
And, friends, this has been a long
and a detailed presentation and I thank you for your patience, but
there is one more subject that I would like to touch on briefly,
and it should be a subject of deep and continuing concern to this
Council: Saddam Hussein's violations of human rights.
Underlying all that I have said,
underlying all the facts and the patterns of behavior that I have
identified, is Saddam Hussein's contempt for the will of this
Council, his contempt for the truth, and, most damning of all, his
utter contempt for human life. Saddam Hussein's use of mustard and
nerve gas against the Kurds in 1988 was one of the 20th century's
most horrible atrocities. Five thousand men, women and children
died. His campaign against the Kurds from 1987 to '89 included
mass summary executions, disappearances, arbitrary jail and ethnic
cleansing, and the destruction of some 2,000 villages.
He has also conducted ethnic
cleansing against the Shia Iraqis and the Marsh Arabs whose
culture has flourished for more than a millennium. Saddam
Hussein's police state ruthlessly eliminates anyone who dares to
dissent. Iraq has more forced disappearance cases than any other
country -- tens of thousands of people reported missing in the
Nothing points more clearly to
Saddam Hussein's dangerous intentions and the threat he poses to
all of us than his calculated cruelty to his own citizens and to
his neighbors. Clearly, Saddam Hussein and his regime will stop at
nothing until something stops him.
[SLIDE 45: Denotes end of
For more than 20 years, by word
and by deed, Saddam Hussein has pursued his ambition to dominate
Iraq and the broader Middle East using the only means he knows:
intimidation, coercion and annihilation of all those who might
stand in his way. For Saddam Hussein, possession of the world's
most deadly weapons is the ultimate trump card, the one he must
hold to fulfill his ambition.
We know that Saddam Hussein is
determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction, is determined
to make more. Given Saddam Hussein's history of aggression, given
what we know of his grandiose plans, given what we know of his
terrorist associations, and given his determination to exact
revenge on those who oppose him, should we take the risk that he
will not someday use these weapons at a time and a place and in a
manner of his choosing, at a time when the world is in a much
weaker position to respond?
The United States will not and
cannot run that risk for the American people. Leaving Saddam
Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few
more months or years is not an option, not in a post-September 11
My colleagues, over three months
ago, this Council recognized that Iraq continued to pose a threat
to international peace and security, and that Iraq had been and
remained in material breach of its disarmament obligations.
Today, Iraq still poses a threat
and Iraq still remains in material breach. Indeed, by its failure
to seize on its one last opportunity to come clean and disarm,
Iraq has put itself in deeper material breach and closer to the
day when it will face serious consequences for its continue
defiance of this Council.
My colleagues, we have an
obligation to our citizens. We have an obligation to this body to
see that our resolutions are complied with. We wrote 1441 not in
order to go to war. We wrote 1441 to try to preserve the peace. We
wrote 1441 to give Iraq one last chance.
Iraq is not, so far, taking that
one last chance.
We must not shrink from whatever
is ahead of us. We must not fail in our duty and our
responsibility to the citizens of the countries that are
represented by this body.
Thank you, Mr. President.