The Security Council, in resolution 1644 (2005) of 15 December 2005, requested
the United Nations International Investigation Commission to report to the
Council on its progress, including on the cooperation received from the Syrian
authorities, every three months.
The attached report summarizes the progress made by the Commission in its
investigative activities since the last report to the Council on 12 December
2006. During the reporting period, the Commission has remained focused on its
primary objective in the investigation of the Hariri case and has provided
technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities in 16 other cases including
the assassination of Minister Pierre Gemayel and, most recently, the Ain Alaq
bombings of February 2007.
In the Hariri case, the Commission has made progress in collecting new
evidence and in expanding the forms of evidence collected. This has enabled
the Commission to narrow its focus in a number of areas during the reporting
period, particularly in relation to establishing the motive behind the
execution of the crime.
The Commission continues to maintain a close working relationship with
Lebanese authorities on all matters relevant to its mandate. The Commission
also continues to receive responses to its requests to other Member States,
including the Syrian Arab Republic. This cooperation remains an important
component of the Commission’s work.
Since the last report, the political and security environment in and around
Lebanon has remained unstable. The Commission continues to monitor the
political situation in the region and its potential impact on its
investigations and requirements for its security.
In light of the current and planned investigative activities, it is unlikely
that the Commission will complete its work before its current mandate expires
in June 2007. The Commission therefore welcomes the request for an extension
of its mandate beyond this date.
I. Introduction
1. This report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1644
(2005) of 15 December 2005, in which the Council requested the United Nations
International Independent Investigation Commission (‘the Commission”) to
report every three months to the Council on the progress of its inquiry, and
on international cooperation including the cooperation received from the
Syrian authorities.
2. This report, the seventh report of the Commission and the first in 2007,
provides an update of issues covered in previous reports to the Council and
notes progress in the work of the Commission since the last report of 12
December 2006 (S/2006/962). As outlined in earlier reports, the Commission
remains mindful of its obligation to protect the confidentiality of its
investigations in order to ensure the integrity of the legal process and to
protect those who have cooperated with the Commission. This approach is taken
in full agreement with the Lebanese judicial authorities. Hence the present
report provides an overview of activities undertaken in the reporting period
rather than a detailed account of ongoing investigations.
3. Since the last report, the security environment in and around Lebanon has
remained unstable, as illustrated by the bombings of two buses in the village
of Ain Alaq, near Beirut, which resulted in the death of three people and
injuries to 20 others on 13 February 2007. Also, discussions about the
creation of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon remain at the top of the political
agenda in Lebanon and in the region. The Commission therefore continues to
monitor these issues for potential impact on its investigation activities and
requirements for its security.
4. As in the past, the Commission maintains a close working relationship with
Lebanese authorities on all matters relevant to its mandate. During the
reporting period, the Commission also received extensive and timely assistance
from a number of other States in a wide range of substantive areas. The
Commission also continues to receive responses from the Syrian Arab Republic
which provides information and facilitates interviews with individuals located
on Syrian territory. This cooperation remains an important component of the
Commission’s work.
5. The Commission has remained focused on its primary objective: the
investigation of the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and
22 others. It has made progress in collecting new evidence and in expanding
the forms of evidence collected. This is done to enhance case knowledge and
corroborate existing information, and this approach has enabled the Commission
to narrow its focus in a number of areas, in particular in relation to
developing its understanding of the motive behind the execution of the crime.
6. Following requests from the Security Council, the Commission has been
providing technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities for the 14 other
cases, the case of the assassination of Minister Pierre Gemayel and, more
recently, the Ain Alaq bombings. In doing so, the Commission has sought to
identify areas of work where it can add value to the investigations, while
expending appropriate resources to achieve the required results. The objective
remains to assist in each individual case, while identify possible linkages
between them.
7. The forensic program of the Commission continues to form a particularly
important component of the investigative work in support of all cases. Further
corroboration of findings through forensic work has been achieved during the
reporting period, and a number of new tasks have been undertaken. With this in
mind, the Commission has introduced internal and external capacity building
measures to manage its complex and inter-linked forensic projects.
8. The Commission intends to compare selected DNA profiles and fingerprints
with relevant databases, access to which will be facilitated by an
international law enforcement organization. The Commission is also developing
its own database of relevant DNA samples and will continue to work with
Lebanese authorities and foreign experts to gain access to materials and
conduct further analyses as appropriate.
II. Progress in the investigations
9. During this reporting period, the Commission’s investigation of the
Hariri assassination has concentrated on its main objectives and has expanded
the scope of information and evidence being collected. In support of these
objectives, and in addition to other operational work it has undertaken, the
Commission has conducted 42 interviews linked to the Hariri case during this
reporting period.
10. The provision of technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities has
continued in the 16 other cases, including the Pierre Gemayel case and the Ain
Alaq bombings. The Commission has conducted 27 interviews, carried out
forensic investigations on the crime scenes, undertaken the collection and
examination of crime scene exhibits, conducted portrait sketch activities with
witnesses, and collected closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage in support
of these other cases. The over-arching objective remains to develop each case
individually, while seeking evidence of possible linkages between the cases.
Linkages may include the characteristics of the victims targeted, motive,
purpose of the attacks, the modus operandi employed, and perpetrators of the
attacks.
11. In this reporting period, the Commission has developed and implemented a
broader plan for collection of evidence in relation to all cases currently
under investigation to enhance the evidential base for the cases in
conjunction with conventional interview processes. This has been done to
corroborate and substantiate the provision of witness statements. This is
possible through the acquisition of documentary information such as government
and national agency records; the management of forensic collection, research
and analysis projects, including the development of inventories and databases,
coordination of external analysis by forensic experts of exhibits provided by
the Lebanese authorities, systematic exploitation of communications intercept
material, further development of communications traffic analysis, further
analysis of considerable electronic data holdings and the development of
confidential witnesses and contacts.
12. By applying this methodology, the Commission believes it can establish a
more detailed picture of events around the crime, elicit new leads, and
corroborate witness statements. This is especially important when
investigating the linkage and knowledge aspects of the cases, where the
establishment of the facts can sometimes be clouded by individual
subjectivity.
13. The Commission devotes the majority of its time and resources to the
Hariri case by developing crime scene leads and collecting evidence relating
to the perpetrators, linkage and context aspects of the case. It is mindful of
the balance that needs to be struck between the Hariri case, the provision of
support in the 14 other cases, and the Gemayel and Ain Alaq cases. This is a
changing equation over time, but the Commission’s strives to take advantage
of methodologies that add the most value to all the cases white making the
best use of available resources.
A. Hariri investigation
1. Crime scene and associated topics
a) Properties of the blast – seismological analysis
14. The analysis of seismological data registered on 14 February 2005 by the
National Center of Geophysics in Lebanon is ongoing and aims to establish the
properties of the blast that killed Hariri. The preliminary report which has
been received from external experts corroborates the Commission’s earlier
assessments that only one blast occurred and that the precise time of the
blast was 12:55:05.
15. The phenomenon of more than one sound being heard by a number of witnesses
is now satisfactorily scientifically and experimentally explained. In fact,
three distinct phases of the blast can be observed on the seismograms, due to
the different propagation speeds of three different waves: the primary and
secondary volume waves, the surface waves and the sound waves. At a sufficient
distance from the explosion, these waves can be mistaken for the signature of
more than one explosion. The sound recordings performed during the scaling
explosion experiments confirm these theoretical explanations.
16. The final report on the characteristics of the explosion, which will be
provided to the Commission in the next reporting period, will include an
assessment of the power of the explosion, and a comparative analysis of other
explosions that have occurred in Lebanon.
b) Properties of the blast – scaling explosion experiments
17. The analysis of scaling explosion experiments confirms previous
conclusions that the physical phenomena observed at the crime scene are fully
compatible with an above-ground explosion. For example, the fireball, deposit
of carbon residues on the facades of the hotels, and damage sustained to the
buildings and the surroundings, due to the blast effects, are not compatible
with an underground explosion.
18. In addition, a full analysis of the autopsy and injuries records and
associated photographs of the victims will be undertaken to examine the wound
phenomena for the primary blast (for example: the presence of pulmonary
lesions and lesions of the eardrums) and secondary blast (projections of
debris) associated with an above- ground explosion. A preliminary assessment
of the data corroborates that the explosion occurred above the ground. These
findings are being confirmed by numerical simulations.
c) Aerial delivery theory
19. The validity of the hypothesis of an aerial delivery of the explosive
device, put forward to the Commission in August 2006, is being examined. The
Commission is conducting a scientific, technical and investigative analysis of
the possibilities of the bomb being delivered in this way. Preliminary
technical findings indicate that this theory is unlikely. The Commission
intends to conduct a fact-finding mission, to include interviews and meetings
with relevant experts, in order to develop its understanding of this
possibility, and will draw some conclusions during the next reporting period.
d) Forensic examination of exhibits recovered on the crime scene
20. As previously reported to the Council, the Commission has been able to
make a preliminary association between certain vehicle parts found in the
crater at the crime scene and those of a Mitsubishi van. This has been done
using documentation and technical information received by the Commission from
Japan, as well as by the Commission’s own-sourced manuals and documents. The
process of creating a complete inventory of these exhibits is ongoing, in
conformity with international standards, and once complete, the alleged parts
of the vehicle will be submitted for formal identification in cooperation with
external technical experts.
e) Visualization projects
21. Three digital visualization projects have been completed and a new one is
ongoing to enable evidence and case facts to be presented in a way that will
facilitate the identification of further investigative steps to be taken. The
first two projects are the visualization of the city and the crime scene at
various points along the route taken by the Hariri convoy on 14 February 2005,
using panoramic and three-dimensional (3D) satellite imagery. The third
project is the visualization of a time line reconstruction of Hariri’s last
day, including the alleged communications traffic activity of the bomb team as
the convoy proceeded along its route. A fourth project entails the creation of
a model which will allow users to “walk through” the crime scene showing
the exact locations where various exhibits were found.
22. Themes being placed into the model include the plotting of trajectories
and final locations of physical and biological evidence; the reconstruction of
events; animations of the Mitsubishi van and the convoy vehicles as they
arrived at the crime scene; the damage caused by the explosion; witness
information; video recordings from the CCTV system of a nearby branch of the
HSBC bank; and test explosions data.
f) Geographic origin of the alleged bomber
23. The project to attempt to determine the geographic origin of the bomber is
being developed through two approaches. One method uses a team of experts
which is conducting a statistical analysis on allele frequencies based on the
nuclear DNA profile of the 33 human parts collected from the crime scene.
These human parts belong to the man likely to have detonated the device, and
are compared with the allele frequencies of profiles provided by several
countries. This work should provide a probability-based assessment on the
possible place of origin of the alleged bomber.
24. The second method focuses on the study of isotope data. In the
Commission’s previous report, the results of the first phase of analysis
showed that the individual did not spend his youth in Lebanon, but was likely
situated there in the two to three months before his death. The Commission can
now also add that the man had significant exposure to lead pollution in an
urban environment up to the age of about 12, and that such exposure was low
during the last ten years of his life, possibly indicating that he lived in a
more rural environment during this period.
25. In order to advance this line of inquiry, the Commission has collected a
total of 112 samples from 28 locations in Syria and Lebanon. Over the coming
weeks, it will collect samples in three other countries in the region, and
further countries are identified for another series of sampling missions.
26. As stated in the previous report, the Commission is mindful that results
should be carefully interpreted and the limitations clearly understood. The
Commission will treat future results as forensic information to be used
primarily for lead purposes in the investigation.
g) On-going crime scene investigations
27. The preliminary results of examinations of the personal effects of a
victim discovered at the crime scene in June 2006 have resolved outstanding
questions, but further investigative work will be undertaken to finalize the
matter in the near future.
28. The issue of a victim who was killed at the crime scene, found in a
location where normally he should have been protected from the blast,
continues to be investigated. Documentary information in relation to this
matter is being translated and will be analyzed before a decision is taken on
the relevance of this individual to the investigation.
29. The issue of alleged tampering with the crime scene and obstruction of the
investigation as a result of removal of artifacts remains under investigation.
The Commission is conducting analyses and will undertake further investigative
steps to clarify if there was deliberate intent in this matter.
30. A number of interviews were conducted in the reporting period to clarify
issues relating to the crime scene prior to the blast, new leads arising from
the analysis of witness statements and communications traffic, and the
acquisition of artifacts as possible evidence. A minimum of 15 further crime
scene witness interviews are planned in the next reporting period in support
of these objectives.
31. Investigations are on-going into the acquisition and storage of the
Mitsubishi van, and its preparation with explosives. The Commission has
received a body of new information relating to this topic, and over 500 pages
of data are being prioritized for translation and analysis. The Commission is
developing recent leads concerning the van, investigating the history of the
vehicle from the most recent time it was known to be in Lebanon, and working
backwards in time from that point.
32. The Commission continues to work on establishing the route of the
Mitsubishi van as it was brought to the area prior to the attack, then towards
the St Georges hotel area, and then on its final path on 14 February 2005.
33. The Commission has largely resolved the allegation that a red car was
parked outside the St Georges hotel, apparently reserving a space for the
Mitsubishi van before its arrival on the crime scene. It was suggested that
the vehicle had driven off to make way for the van to park in its place. It
has been established by witness interviews and examination of photographs of
the scene immediately after the explosion that the position of the red car was
some 15 meters before the place where the crater was created. The conclusion
at this stage, subject to further information coming to light, is that there
is no direct connection between this vehicle and the arrival of the Mitsubishi
van.
2. Individuals involved in the commission of the crime
a) Communications
34. The Commission’s analysis of communications traffic continues in order
to support and validate different points arising from the investigations. Much
work has been done to support the interviews conducted, in order that
respective communications contact with other persons of interest to the case
can be discussed with witnesses. Patterns of communications traffic, including
frequencies and timings of calls, and linkages and clear associations to
others, are all developed and elicit investigation leads.
35. In relation to the six mobile cellular telephone SIM cards allegedly used
by the team that executed the operation on the day of 14 February 2005, the
Commission has developed further information of interest relating to
associated earlier operations, including possible surveillance and
reconnaissance activity, possible practice-runs or earlier attempts to kill
Rafik Hariri, and other actions undertaken by the team. New areas of interest
have emerged from this analysis and are currently being examined.
36. The Commission has also undertaken an investigative, project examining the
role of the persons using the six SIM cards and activities which can be
inferred from their use. This exercise is supported by the Commission’s
existing communications traffic analysis projects in relation to the cards.
The objective is fourfold: first, to reaffirm the validity of the hypothesis
that the cards could indeed have been used by the bomb team to execute its
task; second, to establish whether other modes of communication must have been
used between the members of the team, and also perhaps with other individuals,
in order for the attack to take place; third, to allow the Commission to
establish a better understanding of how the crime was committed on 14
February; and finally, to understand further what other activity the bomb
learn undertook, and what locations it traveled to and why, in the days
leading up to the attack.
37. Such extensive analysis enables the Commission to reach a better
understanding of the bomb team, its role in the crime, and its other
activities. This in turn creates further investigative leads geographically
and temporally, and pointing to the activities of individuals outside the
immediate bombing team the Commission believes were using the six SIM cards.
38. This detailed examination of the activities of the six SIM cards has
resulted in a number of significant elements for ongoing investigation. These
include, but are not limited to: potential identification of the role of each
participant in the preparation, planning, surveillance and actual attack; the
bombing team’s anticipation of Hariri’s activities and movements; and
possible earlier attempts on Hariri’s life.
39. One working hypothesis is that the bomb team had to ensure that Hariri was
indeed dead after the explosion in order for the video claim of responsibility
to be delivered and to have resonance with its intended audience. It is
possible that the team, and those commissioning the crime, could not afford to
deliver a claim of responsibility to the global media if Hariri had survived
the attack. Thus, the Commission is exploring the hypothesis that one member
of the team, or an associate, was tasked with confirming the death of the
principal target as soon as possible and may have contacted someone waiting
for the news. Based on existing information, the timeframe for this activity
would have been within approximately 45 minutes of the explosion.
40. This in turn led to the series of events related to the taped claim of
responsibility and the subsequent telephone calls made to media outlets. The
Commission is examining the hypothesis that one or more members of the bomb
learn was responsible for delivering the tape, and making the subsequent
telephone calls to the media. Other variations on this hypothesis are being
explored to establish the numbers of perpetrators who may have been involved
on the day of the attack.
b) Ahmad Abu Adass
41. In this reporting period, the investigation has developed its
understanding of how Ahmad Abu Adass was identified and chosen to be the
person to make the video claim of responsibility, who involved him in this
activity and where and when this occurred. A working hypothesis is that he was
identified because of his personality and other specific characteristics. It
is possible that his association and relationship with one or more individuals
whom he met at his place of worship led him to depart his home on 16 January
2005, for reasons that are currently unknown.
42. The Commission is aware that Ahmad Abu Adass was acquainted with
individuals associated with extremist groups, at least because they attended
the same place of worship which he frequented regularly, and where he
occasionally conducted prayers. The Commission has also conducted extensive
analysis of communications traffic records associated with Ahmad Abu Adass,
including analysis of the telephone communication at his home and place of
work and on lines belonging to his alleged associates.
43. A working hypothesis is that Ahmad Abu Adass was either coerced or duped
into making the video-taped claim of responsibility. The claim he read out on
tape was made on behalf of a group, and Ahmad Abu Adass himself did not state
he would be the one who would carry out the attack. In relation to the
tape’s production, it is of note that relatives and persons who knew him
before his disappearance have stated that his appearance on the video tape was
physically different from that before 16 January 2005. To some, he appeared
even thinner than previously; his beard had markedly grown, indicating that he
may have made the tape towards the end of the approximately four week period
between his disappearance and 14 February 2005. His clothing was also
different from his usual style in that he had headwear and clothing that his
close friends and family had not seen him wearing before.
44. It is of interest to the investigation that a note was included with the
video on 14 February 2005 which stated that the bomber was indeed Ahmad Abu
Adass. From its forensic findings, the Commission believes this to be highly
unlikely. One working hypothesis is that the video and the accompanying note
could have been designed to deceive. Another working hypothesis is that while
an extremist group may have been involved in part in committing the crime as
outlined in the tape and note, this group was actually manipulated by others
for another objective not related to its own organizational aspirations.
45. Thus, the Commission continues to investigate the various possibilities
concerning the group that executed the crime. The Commission has received
information in relation to individuals who operated in Lebanon and beyond who
may have been involved in the production of the Ahmad Abu Adass tape, and also
may have participated in the attack on Rafik Hariri in more than one context.
In connection with this information, the Commission has undertaken a number of
missions outside Lebanon, conducted 23 interviews to date, researched over two
hundred gigabytes of data from numerous computers, USB devices, CD-ROMs,
mobile telephones and SIM cards, and has analyzed large volumes of
communications traffic.
46. A working hypothesis is that a small number of individuals belonging to a
larger group may have come together to undertake the filming of the claim of
responsibility, acquire the Mitsubishi van and have it prepared with
explosives. They may also have participated in the acquisition of an
individual who was to detonate the bomb, and may also have assisted in
delivering him and the bomb to the scene of the crime.
47. The Commission has a number of investigative leads to follow up, further
interviews to conduct, and further communications traffic analysis and
forensic collection missions to perform. It also awaits the final forensic
analysis of various artifacts that are possibly associated with this working
hypothesis, including video cameras and related equipment, cassette tapes,
computer hardware and other items. These artifacts were submitted for
DNA/fingerprint research and forensic digital analysis during the last
reporting period. To date, 118 samples have been taken and will be analyzed
for nuclear and mitochondrial DNA profiling, and 127 fingerprints have been
collected.
c) Individuals with prior knowledge of the attack
48. The Commission believes that beyond those directly involved in the crime
and those who decided it should take place, certain other individuals may have
had prior knowledge of the attack. Some of those individuals possibly only had
partial information, for example knowing about the bomb, but not for whom it
was intended, or knowing that Hariri was to be killed, but not knowing
precisely when. The Commission is also exploring hypotheses that some knew
both the target and the timing of the attack, and were informed for specific
reasons.
49. The Commission is developing a hypothesis whereby the final phase of the
operation to assassinate Hariri took shape by early February 2005, at which
point all necessary components for the operation were assembled. These include
the van, acquired and prepared with explosives and ready for use; the bomber,
prepared, briefed and ready to be deployed; the minimum necessary information
acquired, and surveillance and reconnaissance conducted, to be able to
undertake the operation; the bomb team undiscovered and able to execute the
operation; the video-taped message of Ahmad Abu Adass completed and ready to
be delivered upon the success of the operation; and most importantly, the
intent still present in the minds of those who ordered the crime to go ahead
with the operation.
50. A working hypothesis is that the bomb team was working within a
“window” of opportunity to deliver the attack on Hariri rather than one
specific day, given the significance of the target and the time which would
have been spent in overall preparation of the attack. That preparation time
was most likely measured in weeks rather than days.
51. The activities of some potentially relevant individuals were noticeably
altered during this period, as the bombing team began what became the final
activities prior to the attack. The Commission is investigating such issues,
and is finding that attitudes, behavioral patterns and comments made by
certain persons in the period before the killing could have relevance.
3. Motive to assassinate Hariri
a) Rafik Hariri timeline
52. As indicated in earlier reports to the Council the Commission had
collected a significant amount of evidence and information related to Rafik
Hariri during the last 15 months of his life. The picture assembled is complex
and multi-layered, and provides part of the backdrop for the motive behind the
decision to assassinate him. This aspect of the Commission’s investigation
is ongoing, and is unlikely to be completed in the next reporting period given
the significant amount of work required.
53. The following issues shaped Hariri’s environment in this period: the
inception of UN Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004) and the political
implications of its implementation; the extension of the term of Lebanese
President Emile Lahoud; the personal and political dynamics which existed
between Hariri and other political parties and leaders in Lebanon, Syria and
other countries; preparation and maneuvering ahead of the parliamentary
elections due to be held in May 2005, as well as other business matters in
which he was involved. All of these factors came together and were handled by
Hariri, sometimes proactively, and sometimes in reaction to events around him.
The Commission believes it is likely that a combination of these factors may
have created the environment in which the motive and intent to kill him arose.
54. Whereas the Commission had previously adopted a broad focus in the
investigation of possible motive, the current reporting period saw these
significantly narrowed down to the group of inquiries linked to Hariri’s
political activities. The Commission is developing a detailed picture of the
factual reality that is substantially beyond its earlier understanding of
events.
55. From this understanding of the dominating themes, it has become more
evident that Hariri was perceived to be in a position of vulnerability from a
security perspective. There are indications nevertheless that he received
assurances that he would not be the focus of an attack, and that even up to
his last few days, he remained confident, at least for external consumption,
that he would not be the subject of an attack.
56. The Commission continues to develop the hypothesis that Hariri’s threat
environment was sufficiently serious for measures to have been taken in
attempts to ameliorate the underlying situation, both in the Lebanese
political establishment and in the international community.
57. In the last months of Hariri’s life, he was very focused on the
forthcoming 2005 elections. The nature of his intentions for the planned
elections and his perceived likelihood of success, as well as his political
and personal relationships with other parties and their leaders, are
particularly significant aspects of the Commission’s work in this area,
particularly given the rivalries existing between certain political figures at
the time.
58. Negotiations unfolded during that period between Hariri and other
individuals, including potential candidates, and intense interest was focused
upon the draft electoral law, including the drawing of electoral district
boundaries in Lebanon and in particular, in Beirut Throughout this period,
Hariri was also adjusting his political stance, and on the day of his murder
had made public that position.
59. It is of some note that Hariri was killed on the day that Parliament was
scheduled to debate the electoral law to be applied in the forthcoming
elections. Another working hypothesis for the Commission is that those who
decided upon the assassination saw it as beneficial to kill him before he
formally began his election campaign, especially given the perception in the
media at the time that he was likely to win.
60. The Commission has established that Hariri worked on differing political
and professional levels, and this was reflected in the nature and extent of
information, views and positions he discussed with those he interacted with.
This is evident from the information the Commission has collected from some of
his friends, acquaintances political interlocutors and apparent rivals.
61. It is therefore critical that the Commission continues to have access to
those political and diplomatic interlocutors with whom Hariri dealt, and those
individuals involved in the relevant political and diplomatic dynamics at all
levels. The Commission looks forward to continuing cooperation with such
individuals including, where appropriate, government officials, in order to
ensure the completeness of its investigations.
62. The Commission is developing a working hypothesis that in the period
immediately prior to his death, Hariri and others in the national and
international political arena were taking steps to defuse the tensions that
had arisen between him and others on the political stage. These initiatives
apparently included the development of diplomatic and political dialogue
between Syrian and Lebanese individuals and Hariri. This dialogue had
previously been managed through other Syrian and Lebanese channels, which had
apparently fuelled misperceptions and aggravated the already tense political
environment.
63. A working hypothesis is that the initial decision to kill Hariri was taken
before the later attempts at rapprochement got underway and most likely before
early January 2005. This leads to a possible situation in the last weeks
before his murder in which two tracks, not necessarily linked, were running in
parallel. On one track, Hariri was engaged in rapprochement initiatives and on
the other, preparations for his assassination were underway.
b) Other investigative areas of interest
64. In a wider context, the Commission continues to seek information that
broadens and deepens its knowledge of the political and security environment
in Lebanon at the time leading up to and beyond Hariri’s assassination. To
that end, the Commission has received significant documentary information from
certain Lebanese agencies, and continues to seek more, based upon strictly
focused requirements. It will continue to request documents of relevance, and
anticipates expanding the concept to incorporate other agencies and other
forms of data as necessary.
65. Similarly in this context, the Commission conducted three interviews with
Syrian officials in relation to the location of parts of the archive brought
back from Lebanon at the time of the Syrian withdrawal in 2005. Following
these interviews, two document exploitation missions to those archives at two
locations in Syria were undertaken, in order to acquire those historical
documents created within a strict time period that were of relevance to the
broader contextual knowledge objective. These missions were undertaken in
conjunction with Syrian authorities, and have elicited useful results with the
selection and provision of documentary information. It is anticipated that
further Requests For Assistance (RFAs) will be forthcoming in this regard
throughout the next reporting period.
66. The Commission continues to clarify issues surrounding individuals alleged
to have engaged in financial transactions with Rafik Hariri, especially during
the period immediately leading up to 14 February 2005. This area of the
investigation is complex, and the Commission is ensuring it is pursued only to
the extent that it is linked to its invest objectives.
B. Technical assistance in the other cases
1. The 14 other cases
67. The Commission’s focus in the provision of technical assistance to the
Lebanese authorities during this reporting period continued with work aimed at
interlinking a number of investigative projects. These will continue to
develop in the same manner for the next period. A seismological analysis of
the 14 cases is also being conducted by external experts, and the Commission
anticipates that it will receive the results before the end of the next
reporting period.
a) Six targeted attacks
68. The Commission has conducted 17 interviews relating to the six targeted
attacks in this reporting period, and in doing so it has almost concluded its
interviews with the surviving victims of the six attacks, as well as with the
victims’ families and close associates. The primary purpose of these
interviews has been to establish the victims’ movements on their last days;
determine possible motive for the attacks; understand the victims’ security
arrangements, if any; identify whether they were under surveillance; and
determine any threats or assurances they received. Various leads have emerged
from these interviews and these will be followed up in the coming weeks and
months.
69. The Commission has also completed a number of internal analytical reports
relating to the Lebanese authorities’ case files of the six attacks, and has
submitted 12 related RFAs. It has also conducted communications traffic
analysis in support of other interviews related to a number of the cases, and
continues to examine potential communications linkages in the modus operandi
of the attacks, and potential commonalities between cases. This work will
continue for the next reporting period, and the Commission will also undertake
an analysis of exhibits found at each crime scene, including the possible
remains of the Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), and other associated items
as deemed relevant. In conjunction with this analysis, an assessment of the
modus operandi used by those placing the bombs will be undertaken, to develop
further the Commission’s understanding of commonalities between each attack.
70. The Commission is in the process of prioritizing and translating a number
of forensic and crime scene reports provided by the Lebanese authorities,
which will be sent for further analysis to an external team of forensic
experts. It will also examine all remaining relevant forensic documents and
materials in the possession of the Lebanese authorities and will develop an
exhibits and documents inventory and conduct further forensic examinations on
the information and exhibits.
71. The Commission also requested that the Lebanese authorities facilitate an
examination of the victims’ vehicles and other cars containing the IEDs that
were used in the attacks. The Commission conducted a preliminary examination
of the available vehicles. These cars have been examined by a visiting
forensic expert team in order to develop leads regarding the modus operandi of
these attacks and potentially, to establish horizontal and vertical linkage to
other attacks. A number of additional exhibits and residues were taken by the
experts for further forensic examinations.
72. The Commission has also recently received a draft report from visiting
forensic experts who examined the scene where Gebran Tueni was killed. In
addition to 32 exhibits previously recovered by the Lebanese authorities,
these experts collected and examined an additional 190 exhibits.
73. The experts confirmed that an amount of high explosives was used in the
attack on Tueni, and that the IED in this case was contained in a Renault
Rapid vehicle. The bomb was activated when Tueni’s Range Rover drove by. The
Commission believes that the IED was most likely triggered by a remote control
device. A lime delay activation mechanism is unlikely to have been used
because it was not known in advance precisely when Tueni would drive by the
location of the IED. It is also very unlikely that the IED was triggered by a
suicide bomber, as there were no human remains found at the site arising from
any individuals other than the three victims who were killed in the attack.
74. The experts also found that the attack on Tueni occurred at a location
which was conducive to a bomb attack. It took place on a narrow road, along a
mountain ridge which could be viewed clearly from the area surrounding and
opposite the crime scene. This location chosen provided for a clear
unobstructed view of the vehicle-borne IED and as such allowed for an
effective position to trigger the device remotely.
75. In the El-Murr case, the Commission arranged for an international law
enforcement sketch artist to develop the image of two individuals seen acting
suspiciously, one of whom was seen the night before the crime, and another who
fled the scene at the lime of the attack. At this stage, the Commission does
not believe the sketches identify the man as being the same person.
b) Eight bomb attacks
76. The Commission continues to implement the plan for the provision of
technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities in the eight bomb attacks
where no specific individuals appear to have been targeted, by reviewing and
analyzing the files as received from the Prosecutor General and the
Investigating Judges.
77. The Commission has sent seven RFAs to the Lebanese authorities, requesting
inter alia additional witness and suspect statements, CCTV footage relevant to
the cases, intercepted communications if available and information relating to
vehicles of interest.
78. The preliminary objective in this exercise is to conduct individual case
analyses for each of the eight cases and make some suggestions as to further
investigative steps that may be taken by the Lebanese authorities. Through
that exercise, the next aim is to continue to develop horizontal analysis in
relation to perpetrator identification, motive, intent and modus operandi.
79. In support of these objectives, and as in the six targeted attacks, the
Commission will also undertake a preliminary analysis of exhibits found at
each crime scene, and will study each location with relevant experts to
conduct a first assessment of the modus operandi used by the perpetrators.
2. Gemayel case
80. The Commission continues to provide technical investigative support to the
Lebanese authorities by conducting interviews, analyzing witness statements,
collecting CCTV imagery, performing forensic work, conducting communications
analysis and reconstructing the crime scene events. In support of this work,
the Commission has submitted 10 RFAs to the Lebanese authorities.
81. Following the Commission’s investigations conducted at the crime scene
in November 2006, three days after the assassination, 240 exhibits, including
DNA samples, fingerprints, mobile phones, and ballistic and transfer traces,
were submitted to forensic examination and analysis.
82. Preliminary results show that there was no global positioning system in
the victim’s car, which may have given useful tracking information. The
specific make and model of at least one vehicle used by the perpetrators has
been established. Also, 22 DNA samples taken from a number of places on the
vehicle used by Gemayel have been analyzed. The DNA profiles of the two
victims were found at many locations, and eight DNA samples taken from the
doors gave the profile not only of Gemayel but also of more than one unknown
individual.
83. The Commission has conducted a detailed ballistics analysis on the 49
cartridge cases and 55 bullets or parts of bullets found at the crime scene.
It can now be concluded that a minimum of five different weapons were used. In
addition, the Commission has prepared weapons photo-boards and has acquired
recordings of the sounds of different weapons used in order to assist in the
interview process. Statements collected from witnesses are compatible with the
scientific findings and have allowed the Commission to refine its
understanding of the weapons used in this crime.
84. Sketches of the alleged assassins of Pierre Gemayel provided by the
Commission to the Lebanese authorities were recently released and publicized,
and they will form part of a broader sketch database that will be developed
during the next reporting period.
85. The Commission has developed further investigative leads including those
arising from additional CCTV footage discovered in the proximity of the scene
of the crime. This footage has been sent to a technical laboratory for
enhancement of the images. This work is on-going, as is a 3D-reconstruction
and forensic examination of items, both relating to the crime scene, and other
items of potential interest that may have association with the crime. The
Commission will continue to provide technical assistance to the Lebanese
authorities on this case for the foreseeable future.
3. Ain Alaq bombings
86. The Commission has taken a series of investigative and forensic steps to
support the Lebanese authorities in their investigations into these bombings,
in which three people were killed and a number of individuals were injured on
13 February 2007. A team of forensic experts was provided to conduct forensic
examinations on the crime scene, including examining the Mitsubishi and Kia
buses that were bombed, a process which look five days to complete between 20
and 24 February 2007.
87. The team recovered 127 relevant exhibits, as well as 242 steel
ball-bearings associated with the explosions. The team provided a preliminary
analysis of their findings and will submit a full report during the next
reporting period. The findings indicate that there had been one IED inside
each bus, and that the explosive in each, possibly TNT, was approximately 15kg
in weight. There were approximately 750 grams-1 kg of steel ball-bearings of
the same diameter. Ballistic examinations confirmed that the ball-bearings
were placed around the explosive.
88. The devices were placed in each bus in a similar position, towards the
rear and under a seat on the left-hand side. At the time of explosion, the IED
in the Mitsubishi bus was approximately 0.75m above the ground, and in the Kia
bus approximately 1.1m above the ground. A small number of exhibits were
collected that may have come from the initiation system of the IED, and it was
assessed that the devices were likely detonated by a time delay device or
possibly by remote control. Several fragments of bags which could have been
used to carry the bombs have been recovered and submitted for forensic
examination.
89. The final report on these crime scene investigations as well as the
results of the forensic examinations conducted on exhibits (DNA, fingerprints,
and explosives) will be received during the next reporting period.
90. It remains unclear at this stage what the motive was in executing these
attacks, in the place, on the date and at the time they occurred. In terms of
modus operandi, the use of ball-bearings may be indicative of the intent to
injure as many people as possible with the relatively small amount of
explosive used. It is unclear at present whether the bombs were placed by one
or two persons, and whether more individuals were involved in the attacks. The
Commission is working upon a number of hypotheses in this regard in support of
the Lebanese authorities.
III. External Cooperation
A. Interaction with the Lebanese authorities
91. During the reporting period, the Commission has continued to work closely
with the Lebanese authorities in the Hariri investigation and the 16 other
cases. This close interaction has taken the form of regular meetings between
the Commission and the Prosecutor General and senior members of his office as
well as communication with the investigative judges assigned to the various
cases and with the senior representative appointed by the Internal Security
Forces.
92. The Commission has also exchanged a significant amount of information,
including documents, reports and other materials, with Lebanese authorities.
Specifically, the Commission continues to share with the appropriate
institutions the substance of relevant information that it obtains in the
course of its investigations in a manner that does not compromise the interest
of the source of this information. This continues to include information that
may be relevant to individuals who are detained by the Lebanese authorities.
93. During this reporting period the Commission has also continued to rely on
the cooperation and assistance of the Lebanese authorities, especially as its
caseload has increased and its investigations into the Hariri assassination,
the 14 cases, the Gemayel murder and the Ain Alaq attacks have advanced and
necessitated a broader range of investigative actions.
94. Thus, during the reporting period, the Commission addressed 57 formal RFAs
to the Prosecutor General seeking inter alia his help in obtaining documents
and other information as well as in facilitating interviews and other missions
on Lebanese territory. The Lebanese authorities have responded fully and
expeditiously to these requests.
B. Cooperation with the Syrian Arab Republic
95. Pursuant to the Syrian Arab Republic’s obligations under Security
Council resolutions 1636 (2005) and 1644 (2005), and the common understanding
reached between the Commission and the Syrian Arab Republic in 2006, the
cooperation of Syria with the Commission remains generally satisfactory.
96. During the reporting period, the Commission submitted four formal RFAs to
the Syrian Arab Republic seeking information regarding individuals, groups and
issues of interest to the Commission and requesting the facilitation of
interviews and other missions on Syrian territory.
97. Following the transmission of its RFAs, the Commission has, since
December, undertaken a number of investigative activities in the Syrian Arab
Republic. This includes conducting interviews, where once again responses by
individuals can be characterized as variable in quality on occasion; the
holding of meetings with relevant Syrian officials; the collection of samples
from locations in Syria to support the geographic origin forensic project; and
the collection of documents from two archive storage sites. The last three
missions in particular were arranged and facilitated in a professional and
timely manner by the Syrian authorities.
98. The Syrian Arab Republic has continued to provide the Commission with
assistance in response to its requests within the appropriate timescales, and
the Commission is grateful for the logistical and security arrangements
provided by Syrian authorities for its activities in Syria. The Commission
will continue to request Syria’s full cooperation, which remains crucial to
the swift and successful completion of the Commission’s mandate.
C. Cooperation with other States
99. The Commission continues to rely on the willingness of States to provide
information and expertise and facilitate its work on their territories when
required. During the reporting period, a total of 40 new formal RFAs were sent
to 23 different States, in addition to the RFAs addressed to the Syrian and
Lebanese authorities.
100. The Commission has greatly benefited from the responses of States to its
requests where the full and prompt cooperation has been forthcoming. The
Commission is very grateful for this cooperation.
101. As the Commission noted in its last report to the Council, a lack of
responsiveness by certain States to the Commission’s requests could have
serious consequences for the Commission’s work, in areas such as arranging
interviews, providing information on the whereabouts of certain individuals,
and technical assistance.
102. In its last report, the Commission noted that responses to requests from
10 Member States were overdue. In view of the importance of the assistance
requested and the time frame in which it aims to complete its investigative
activities, the Commission concentrated on following upon all outstanding
RFAs. The Commission held a series of meetings with relevant Ambassadors to
discuss past requests. As a result of these meetings, almost all outstanding
matters were resolved to the Commission’s satisfaction, with responses
received, and where appropriate, mechanisms introduced to facilitate the
resolution of pending issues.
IV. Organizational support
A. Recruitment
103. During the past three months, the Commission undertook a series of
management measures to streamline its internal processes in operational
support activities and maintain its recruitment initiative to fill its
outstanding positions. in this period, the Commission recruited 35
international and 5 national staff with the assistance of the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). As of March, a further 30 candidates are under
active recruitment. These efforts will be maintained until the Commission has
reached a satisfactory level of staffing.
104. The investigation division has 41 staff and consultants in March 2007,
compared to 29 in December 2006. Additional analysts, investigators, legal
officers, forensic experts and a database administrator are currently being
recruited.
105. The Commission has been working closely with DPKO to afford the
Commission the operational flexibility it needs to carry out its mandate,
particularly regarding staffing issues. The Commission has formally approached
several Member States to assist it in the identification of much-needed
database information management specialists. Positive responses from Member
States to this request would be invaluable to the Commission’s work in this
important area.
106. All additional posts requested for 2007 were approved in the budget
bringing the total number of international posts in the Commission to 188. The
additional posts will assist the Commission to execute its mandate more
expeditiously by allowing more concurrent investigative activity to take
place, as well as improving the efficiency of the operational support aspects
of its work. Out of the 188 budgeted posts, 104 have so far been filled. Of
the 51 posts approved for national staff, 41 have been filled with the
remaining 10 under active recruitment.
107. Problems remain regarding the recruitment and retention of international
language staff such as Arabic language interpreters, translators and
transcribers. The Commission is experiencing serious difficulties in finding
suitable candidates for recruitment. So far, only 3 of 27 such posts have been
filled. This creates significant bottlenecks resulting in delays in
investigative activities. The Commission is undertaking varied recruitment
initiatives in order to acquire resources in this critical area.
B. Security
108. Since the Commission’s last report, the security situation in Lebanon
and in the region has remained uncertain and unpredictable. The bombing of the
two buses in Ain Alaq, together with numerous discoveries of explosives and
IEDs around Beirut and beyond, contribute to this unstable security
environment. The Commission continues to enjoy excellent coordination and
cooperation with the Lebanese security forces who have spared no effort in
meeting the safety and security needs of the Commission in carrying out its
mandate. The Commission is very grateful for this support.
109. Security concerns and restrictions impact the work of the Commission and
its investigative activities, and as a result a number of steps to mitigate
anticipated risks have been taken to maintain a safe and secure environment
within which all Commission personnel can function effectively.
110. Emerging security trends are continually being analyzed and integrated
into the operational context of the Commission’s work. Crisis management
measures, evacuation procedures and business continuity planning are
maintained based on the variables in the security environment surrounding the
Commission’s work.
V. Conclusions
111. The Commission’s primary strategic objective remains the continued
investigation into the killing of Rafik Hariri and 22 others, as well as the
provision of technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities in the other
cases. In pursuit of the goals in the Hariri case, the Commission aims to
further establish the facts and to continue to seek links between the other
cases and the Hariri case. In so doing, the Commission seeks to conduct its
work in the most expeditious investigative timescale, while respecting a
framework of appropriate legal standards.
112. During the next reporting period, the Commission will maintain the
investigative focus discussed in this report. A total of around 250
individuals have been identified for interview and the Commission will seek to
interview approximately 50 of these in the next three months. The Commission
also plans to acquire further documentary information, additional electronic
material and communications data for analysis.
113. The Commission is grateful for the full support of the Prosecutor General
of Lebanon in conducting its work, in particular as it relates to sensitive
and complicated investigative steps that have been undertaken and that are
being planned. Both the Commission and the Prosecutor General will continue to
create a secure and confidential working environment for witnesses and for the
Commission’s staff.
114. The Commission recognizes the complexities of the Hariri case as it
develops. During this reporting period, the Commission has narrowed down
possible motives to those linked with Hariri’s political activities. The
Commission’s understanding of the facts has advanced substantially,
producing valuable links within and between the main components of the case.
In the next reporting period, and potentially beyond that, the Commission
believes it will be able to develop further a unifying factual theory built
upon newly-identified linking evidence. The aim remains to link together the
most responsible perpetrators with others who knew about the crime, those who
participated in the execution of it, and those who assisted in the preparation
of the necessary components for its execution.
115. The Commission’s work on the other cases remains focused upon the
provision of technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities by identifying
and applying investigative support that adds value to each case without
putting excessive strain on the Commission’s resources. The Commission also
continues to identify horizontal links between each case, and with the Hariri
case, where possible. The Commission believes that in the next reporting
phase, the depth of knowledge of each case will be further enhanced to allow
such potential linkages to emerge.
116. The Commission notes that requests for assistance it has addressed to
Lebanon, Syria and other States have received mostly positive and timely
responses. Assistance from all these States remains essential to allow the
Commission to carry out its investigative work effectively
117. The Commission also notes that the volatile political and security
environment in Lebanon and the ability to recruit and retain qualified staff
have an impact on the Commission’s ability to fulfill its mandate in a
timely fashion. The Commission will continue to concentrate its efforts on
managing these factors as it works towards its objectives.
118. Finally, the Commission continues its work in anticipation of the
creation of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon. In light of the current and
planned investigative activities outlined in this report, it is unlikely that
the Commission will complete its work before its current mandate expires in
June 2007. The Commission therefore welcomes the request for an extension of
its mandate beyond this date.