Report of the
Fact-Finding Mission to Lebanon inquiring into the causes,
circumstances and consequences of the assassination of former
Prime Minister Rafik Hariri
25 February – 24
March 2005
Executive Summary
On 14 February 2005, an explosion
in downtown Beirut killed twenty persons, among them the former
Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri. The United Nations’
Secretary-General dispatched a Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut to
inquire into the causes, the circumstances and the consequences of
this assassination. Since it arrived in Beirut on 25 February, the
Mission met with a large number of Lebanese officials and
representatives of different political groups, performed a
thorough review of the Lebanese investigation and legal
proceedings, examined the crime scene and the evidence collected
by the local police, collected and analyzed samples from the crime
scene, and interviewed some witnesses in relation to the crime.
The specific ‘causes’ for the
assassination of Mr. Hariri cannot be reliably asserted until
after the perpetrators of this crime are brought to justice.
However, it is clear that the assassination took place in a
political and security context marked by an acute polarization
around the Syrian influence in Lebanon and a failure of the
Lebanese State to provide adequate protection for its citizens.
Regarding the circumstances, the
Mission is of the view that the explosion was caused by a TNT
charge of about 1000 KG placed most likely above the ground. The
review of the investigation indicates that there was a distinct
lack of commitment on the part of the Lebanese authorities to
investigate the crime effectively, and that this investigation was
not carried out in accordance with acceptable international
standards. The Mission is also of the view that the Lebanese
investigation lacks the confidence of the population necessary for
its results to be accepted.
The consequences of the
assassination could be far-reaching. It seems to have unlocked the
gates of political upheavals that were simmering throughout the
last year. Accusations and counter-accusations are rife and
aggravate the ongoing political polarization. Some accuse the
Syrian security services and leadership of assassinating Mr.
Hariri because he became an insurmountable obstacle to their
influence in Lebanon. Syrian supporters maintain that he was
assassinated by "the enemies of Syria"; those who wanted
to create international pressure on the Syrian leadership in order
to accelerate the demise of its influence in Lebanon and/or start
a chain of reactions that would eventually force a ‘regime
change’ inside Syria itself. Lebanese politicians from different
backgrounds expressed to the Mission their fear that Lebanon could
be caught in a possible showdown between Syria and the
international community, with devastating consequences for
Lebanese peace and security.
After gathering the available
facts, the Mission concluded that the Lebanese security services
and the Syrian Military Intelligence bear the primary
responsibility for the lack of security, protection, law and order
in Lebanon. The Lebanese security services have demonstrated
serious and systematic negligence in carrying out the duties
usually performed by a professional national security apparatus.
In doing so, they have severely failed to provide the citizens of
Lebanon with an acceptable level of security and, therefore, have
contributed to the propagation of a culture of intimidation and
impunity. The Syrian Military Intelligence shares this
responsibility to the extent of its involvement in running the
security services in Lebanon.
It is also the Mission’s
conclusion that the Government of Syria bears primary
responsibility for the political tension that preceded the
assassination of former Prime Minister Mr. Hariri. The Government
of Syria clearly exerted influence that goes beyond the reasonable
exercise of cooperative or neighborly relations. It interfered
with the details of governance in Lebanon in a heavy-handed and
inflexible manner that was the primary reason for the political
polarization that ensued. Without prejudice to the results of the
investigation, it is obvious that this atmosphere provided the
backdrop for the assassination of Mr. Hariri.
It became clear to the Mission
that the Lebanese investigation process suffers from serious flaws
and has neither the capacity nor the commitment to reach a
satisfactory and credible conclusion. To find the truth, it would
be necessary to entrust the investigation to an international
independent commission, comprising the different fields of
expertise that are usually involved in carrying out similarly
large investigations in national systems, with the necessary
executive authority to carry out interrogations, searches, and
other relevant tasks. Furthermore, it is more than doubtful that
such an international commission could carry out its tasks
satisfactorily - and receives the necessary active cooperation
from local authorities - while the current leadership of the
Lebanese security services remains in office.
It is the Mission’s conclusion
that the restoration of the integrity and credibility of the
Lebanese security apparatus is of vital importance to the security
and stability of the country. A sustained effort to restructure,
reform and retrain the Lebanese security services will be
necessary to achieve this end, and will certainly require
assistance and active engagement on the part of the international
community.
Finally, it is the Mission’s
view that international and regional political support will be
necessary to safeguard Lebanon’s national unity and to shield
its fragile polity from unwarranted pressure. Improving the
prospects of peace and security in the region would offer a more
solid ground for restoring normalcy in Lebanon.
I. Introduction
1. On 14 February 2005, an
explosion in downtown Beirut killed twenty persons, among them the
former Prime Minister, Rafik Bahaa-Edine Hariri. Also killed in
the explosion were Yahya Mustafa Al-Arab, Mohammad Ben Saad-Eddine
Darwish, Talal Nabeeh Nasser, Ziad Mohammad Tarraf, Omar Ahmad
Al-Masri, Mohammad Riad Hussein Ghalayeeni, Mazen Adnan Al-Dahabi,
Yamama Kamel Dhamen, Haitham Khaled Osman, Alaa Hasan Osfur, Zahi
Haleem Abu Rujayli, Joseph Emile Aoun, Rima Mohammad Ra’ef Bezi,
Ruad Hussein Haidar, Sobhi Mohammad Al-Khedhr, Abdu Tawfik Bu
Farah, Abdel-Hameed Mohammad Ghalayeeni, Mahmud Saleh Al-Khalaf,
Mohammad Saleh Al-Hamad Al-Mohammad. In addition to the killed,
Farhan Ahmad Al-Isa is still missing and believed to be among the
victims. Another 220 persons were injured.
2. On 15 February, the President
of the Security Council issued a statement on behalf of the
Council requesting the Secretary-General to "follow
closely the situation in Lebanon and to report urgently on the
circumstances, causes and consequences of this terrorist act".
The Secretary-General announced on 18 February that he was sending
a Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut to gather such information as
necessary for him to report to the Council in a timely manner.
After an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the
President of Lebanon, a mission headed by Peter FitzGerald, a
Deputy Commissioner of the Irish Police, Garda Siochána, and
comprised of two police investigators, a legal advisor and a
political advisor, was sent to Lebanon to gather facts about the
causes, circumstances and consequences of the assassination.
Additional experts in explosives, ballistics, DNA and crime scene
examination were brought in on 6 March, in agreement with the
Lebanese authorities, to examine the crime scene and the samples
collected from it.
3. Since its arrival in Beirut on
25 February, the members of the Fact-Finding Mission (hereafter
referred to as ‘the Mission’) met with a large number of
Lebanese officials and representatives of different political
groups, performed a thorough review of the Lebanese investigation
and legal proceedings, examined the crime scene and the evidence
collected by the local police, collected and analyzed samples from
the crime scene, and interviewed some witnesses in relation to the
crime. Since some of the persons interviewed by the Mission
requested anonymity, this report does not include a full list of
the interviewees. The Mission concluded its inquiry in Lebanon on
16 March 2005. The present report includes its findings and
recommendations.
II. Findings
4. The findings of the Mission
fall within three categories as defined by the Security Council:
the causes, circumstances, and consequences.
A. Causes
5. The specific ‘causes’ for
the assassination of Mr. Hariri cannot be reliably asserted until
after the perpetrators of this crime are brought to justice.
However, it is clear that the assassination took place in a
political and security context marked by an acute polarization
around the Syrian influence in Lebanon and a failure of the
Lebanese State to provide adequate protection for its citizens.
The political context
6. Lebanon has repeatedly served
as a battleground for the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict,
with devastating impact on its national unity and independence, as
demonstrated by its tragic civil war (1975-1990) and by various
military campaigns on its soil. Syria had maintained a military
presence in Lebanon since May 1976 with the consent of the
Lebanese government. It also exerted political influence in
Lebanese affairs, an influence that has significantly increased
since 1990 and was sanctioned in 1991 by a treaty of
"Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination".
7. The Syrian presence in Lebanon
remained generally unchallenged until Israel withdrew its forces
from South Lebanon in 2000. Political figures started to voice
their opposition to the continued Syrian influence and called for
the implementation of the remaining provisions of the Taif
Agreement (of 1989), which, if implemented, would have
substantially reduced the Syrian presence in Lebanon to a possible
complete pullout. Although Mr. Hariri carefully avoided this
debate, his relations with President Emil Lahoud, who is generally
described as Syria’s favorite, were strained. As a prominent
security official close to Syria put it to the Mission; the two
men had repeated conflicts during Mr. Hariri’s term (2000-2004)
to a point that required "external intervention and mediation
on a daily basis". The conflict between Mr. Lahoud and Mr.
Hariri affected the latter’s ability to run the government and
to carry out his policies, sometimes to a point of paralysis. Mr.
Hariri’s difficulties with Mr. Lahoud were widely interpreted as
a sign of Syria’s mistrust in the former.
8. Mr. Lahoud’s term in office
should have ended in 2004, with no possibility of renewal
according to the Constitution. Mr. Hariri was clearly hoping that
the end of Mr. Lahoud’s term would enable him to regain control
over his government. However, during 2004, certain voices in
Lebanon suggested amending the constitution in order to extend the
term of Mr. Lahoud. This possibility became part of the debate
over the Syrian presence in Lebanon and fueled it further. Given
the distribution of seats in the parliament, a constitutional
amendment required the support of Mr. Hariri’s bloc, a support
he was unprepared to lend. Moreover, were informed by reliable
sources that Mr. Hariri had managed to obtain a commitment from
the Syrian leadership not to extend Mr. Lahoud’s term.
9. However, the Syrian leadership
later decided to support an extension of the presidential term,
albeit for three instead of six years. The pressure for the
extension was considerable, divisive and with far reaching
consequences. As a Lebanese official close to the Syrian
leadership told the Mission, the Syrian decision sent a clear
message to Mr. Hariri that he had to go: "there was no way
the two of them could work together". Mr. Hariri met with
President Assad in Damascus in a last attempt to convince him not
to support the extension. The Mission has received accounts of
this meeting from various sources inside and outside Lebanon, all
of which claim to have heard the account of the meeting from Mr.
Hariri himself shortly after the meeting took place. The Mission
has no account of the meeting from Mr. Assad’s side: the Syrian
authorities declined the Mission’s request to meet with him. The
received testimonies corroborated each other almost verbatim.
10. According to these
testimonies, Mr. Hariri reminded Mr. Assad of his pledge not to
seek an extension for Mr. Lahoud’s term, and Mr. Assad replied
that there was a policy shift and that the decision was already
taken. He added that Mr. Lahoud should be viewed as his personal
representative in Lebanon and that "opposing him is
tantamount to opposing Assad himself". He then added that he
(Mr. Assad) "would rather break Lebanon over the heads of
[Mr.] Hariri and [Druze leader Walid] Jonblatt than see his word
in Lebanon broken". According to the testimonies, Mr. Assad
then threatened both Mr. Hariri and Mr. Jonblatt with physical
harm if they opposed the extension for Mr. Lahoud. The meeting
reportedly lasted for ten minutes, and was the last time Mr.
Hariri met with Mr. Assad. After that meeting, Mr. Hariri told his
supporters that they had no other option but to support the
extension for Mr. Lahoud. The Mission has also received accounts
of further threats made to Mr. Hariri by security officials in
case he abstained from voting in favor of the extension or
"even thought of leaving the country".
11. On 2 September 2004, the
Security Council adopted its resolution 1559, which, among other
provisions, called upon "all remaining foreign forces to
withdraw from Lebanon, and declared its support for a free
and fair electoral process in Lebanon’s upcoming presidential
elections conducted according to Lebanese constitutional rules
devised without foreign interference or influence". It is
widely believed, inside and outside Lebanon, that Mr. Hariri lent
active support to this resolution. Numerous sources in Lebanon
informed the Mission that the Syrian leadership held Mr. Hariri
personally responsible for the adoption of the resolution, and
that this resolution marked the end of whatever trust existed
between the two sides. On 3 September, the vote on the extension
was brought to the Parliament. Mr. Hariri and his parliamentarian
bloc voted in its favor. Three ministers voted against it, among
them Marwan Hemadeh, a close associate of both Mr. Hariri and Mr.
Jonblatt. The amendment was passed, and Mr. Lahoud’s term was
extended for three years. On 9 September, Mr. Hariri announced his
resignation.
12. Political tension reached a
new height with that resignation. Additional number of political
figures joined what later became labeled the ‘opposition’,
which mainly called for a review of the Syrian-Lebanese relations.
Some of the opposition leaders preferred to review these relations
in line with SCR 1559, while others preferred to review them under
the banner of the Taif Agreement. The upcoming legislative
elections were widely seen as a turning point and it became
apparent to all that the parties were preparing for a final
showdown. Until the extension for Mr. Lahoud, the opposition was
mainly composed of Christian politicians and groups. The decision
by Mr. Jonblatt’s bloc to join forces with them was a major
development in so far as it expanded the opposition coalition
beyond the sectarian dividing lines, especially in light of Mr.
Jonblatt’s traditional alliance with Syria. Mr. Hariri’s
resignation added more strength to the opposition by bringing in
the large and influential Sunni community.
13. On 2 October, former minister
Marwan Hemadeh narrowly escaped death when a bomb exploded next to
his car. His guard was killed in the explosion. The attempt on Mr.
Hemadeh’s life sent shock waves throughout Lebanon and added to
the ongoing polarization. The perpetrators of the assassination
attempt were not identified, and a general feeling prevailed that
they would not be. A loaded atmosphere dominated the Lebanese
scene in which "everyone was under threat", as many
security officials told the Mission. A wide range of people,
inside and outside Lebanon, told the Mission that Mr. Hariri and
Mr. Jonblatt feared for their lives and saw the attempt on Mr.
Hemadeh’s life as a part of the ongoing power struggle with the
Syrian leadership.
14. Amidst the heightened tension,
the consolidation of the opposition coalition continued, as well
as the preparations for the upcoming legislative elections.
Contacts and negotiations took place between Mr. Jonblatt and Mr.
Hariri and with the exiled Maronite leader Mr. Michel Aoun. By the
end of January 2005, there was a formidable power bloc emerging in
Lebanon bringing together, for the first time, representatives of
almost all political and religious communities, with the noted
exception of the Shiite groups Amal and Hezbollah. This power bloc
was independent from, if not hostile to, the Syrian influence and
seemed confident of winning a clear majority in the upcoming
elections. It also enjoyed the support of key players in the
international community and seemed confident of its ability to
force Syria to implement its outstanding commitment under the Taif
Agreement and/or the SCR 1559. At the center of this power bloc
one man stood as the perceived architect: the former Prime
Minister Rafik Hariri. On 14 February, he was assassinated.
15. Clearly, Mr. Hariri’s
assassination took place on the backdrop of his power struggle
with Syria, regardless of who carried out the assassination and
with what aim. It is nonetheless important to keep in mind that
only a proper investigation – not political analysis – could
lead to the identification of those who ordered, planned and
carried out this heinous crime. It would be a violation of the
basic principles of justice to jump to conclusions about the
perpetrators of the assassination without proper investigation,
convincing evidence and a proper trial.
The security background
16. Mr. Hariri was unanimously
described to the Mission as the "most important figure in
Lebanese public life". His assassination, therefore, begs the
question about the level of protection provided to him by the
Lebanese security apparatus. The Lebanese security system is
composed of multiple agencies. The Military Intelligence occupies
a primary position in this setup; it covers areas of national
security, counter-espionage, counter-terrorism and a strike force.
It also includes a department for communications interception.
"General Security" covers areas related to foreigners,
passports and borders, in addition to politically-based security
issues. An ‘Internal Security Force’ includes both a police
force and an information-gathering department. "State
Security" is nominally responsible for politically-based
security issues. The Republican Guard is mandated with protecting
the President, under the overall authority of the commander of the
Army. The Syrian Military Intelligence maintains a branch in
Syria, with offices in various places including Beirut. Contrary
to the affirmations made to the Mission by its chief, evidence and
concurrent testimonies lead us to believe beyond reasonable doubt
that this branch played a key role in Lebanese political life and
had an active involvement with, if not direct supervision of, the
management of security affairs in Lebanon.
17. According to rules and
regulations in place, these different agencies coordinate with
each other and are all members of a Central Security Council that
meets once a month under the Chairpersonship of the Minister of
Interior. However, numerous sources, including security officials,
ministers and former presidents told the Mission that the practice
follows a different pattern. First, coordination among agencies is
almost nonexistent: the said Council is more a formality than a
coordinating mechanism. Second, reporting lines follow personal
and political loyalties rather than constitutional arrangements.
Heads of security agencies report the substantive information to
"those who appointed them, to whom they have loyalty",
keeping only formalities and trivial issues to the Central
Security Council. In addition, there is a severe lack of oversight
and/or judicial review of the work of security agencies. For
instance, the ‘communication interception’ department in
Military Intelligence has ‘standing authorization’ to
intercept whatever communication is deemed relevant by the
department, with the sole endorsement of the head of the agency
without any kind of external oversight or review. Similarly, it is
apparent that there is very little, if any, accountability other
than that of informal and extra-constitutional loyalties.
18. This setup partly explains the
lack of trust the Lebanese people seem to have in their security
agencies. Almost without exception, all those who spoke to the
Mission, including some security officials, expressed doubts about
the capacity and/or the will of the security agencies to provide
security to political figures under threats. While some accused
the security apparatus of outright involvement in threatening
politicians, others said that the dominant culture is that
politicians should protect themselves by their own means or, at
best, that the security agencies did not have enough clout to
protect the threatened. Many pointed to the fact that Lebanon had
witnessed a great number of political assassinations over the last
thirty years and that most of them remained unsolved to date.
19. After discussions with many
security officials, including the heads of Military Intelligence,
the ‘Special Forces and Counter-Terrorism’ department of the
Military Intelligence, the ‘communication interception’
department of the Military Intelligence, the General Security, the
Internal Security Forces, and the Republican Guard, the Mission
came to the conclusion that there was a serious failure on the
part of the Lebanese security apparatus to predict and prevent the
assassination of Mr. Hariri. Despite widespread rumors of threats
of physical harm against Mr. Hariri and/or Mr. Jonblatt, including
the possibility of attempts on their lives and/or the life of
members of their families, and despite the attempt on the life of
former Minister Marwan Hemadeh, none of the security services had
taken additional measure to protect any of them.
20. All of the security services
deny having received information of a threat or a possible threat
to Mr. Hariri, Mr. Jonblatt, or any of their families. However,
everyone else outside the security services who talked to the
Mission seemed aware of these threats. In addition, despite the
acknowledged heightened tension, none of the security agencies had
prepared an ‘assessment profile’ regarding the security of Mr.
Hariri, "the most important political figure in
Lebanon". None of the security agencies suggested, advised,
or attempted to raise the level of protection provided to Mr.
Hariri. Quiet the contrary, the close protection team provided to
Mr. Hariri by the Internal Security Forces was reduced from
approximately forty to eight persons shortly after he left office.
Although this reduction was in line with the regulations, yet it
constituted a stark negligence of the special circumstances at
hand. At the moment of his assassination, Mr. Hariri’s
protection was ensured almost entirely by his private security
team.
21. When the Mission discussed
this aspect with Lebanese security officials, many of them argued
that ‘prevention’ was an alien concept to the security
management in Lebanon. This argument is inadmissible: prevention
is an integral and important part of any functioning security
system. In addition, this argument is also untrue: the Republican
Guard informed us that they maintained periodic ‘assessment
profile’ regarding the security of the President, including
evaluating the level of threat and risk he is subject to based on
their reading of the political situation, rumors, and the overall
security situation. A functioning, credible, and professional
security apparatus should have prepared, maintained, and updated a
similar assessment profile in regards to the security of the ‘most
important political figure in Lebanon’.
22. Based on the above, it is the
view of the Mission that the Lebanese security apparatus failed to
provide proper protection for Mr. Hariri and therefore provided a
convenient context for his assassination.
B. Circumstances
23. In gathering the facts related
to the circumstances, the Mission identified the last movements of
Mr. Hariri immediately before the assassination took place,
determined the origin of the explosion and the type and weight of
explosive used and reviewed the main avenues of the investigation
undertaken by the Lebanese authorities based on accepted
international standards. The review of the investigation includes
the critical areas of; the management of the crime scene; the
preservation of evidence; the investigation of the televisions
network Al-Jazeera broadcast claiming responsibility of the
attack; the investigation of the suspect bomber; the investigation
of the suspect vehicle, and; general remarks on the investigation
integrity.
The last movements of Mr. Hariri
24. On Monday the 14th
of February 2005 at approximately 1230hrs, Mr. Hariri left the
Parliament building in central Beirut and walked approximately
seventy metres to a café (Place de l’étoile) in Nejmeh Square
where he met with a number of people. At approximately 1250hrs he
left the café accompanied by former Minister and member of
Parliament Bassil Fuleihan. His security convoy consisted of six
vehicles; 1st, a jeep with four local policemen (the
lead vehicle); 2nd, black Mercedes with three private
security guards; 3rd, black armour plated Mercedes
being driven by Hariri accompanied by Mr. Fuleihan; 4th,
black Mercedes with three private security guards; 5th,
black Mercedes with three private security guards, and; 6th,
black Jeep (an ambulance) bringing up the rear with three private
security guards. Three of the Mercedes were equipped with high
powered, signal jamming devices (4 GHz), which were operating at
the time of the final journey. All of the vehicles were equipped
with firearms and all of the security detail were trained.
25. The chosen route was
communicated to the lead car only as Mr. Hariri was leaving the
café. The convoy Left Nejmeh Square and drove along Ahdab Street
and on to Fosh Street. At the junction of Fosh Street and Seaport
Street the convoy turned left and took the coast road towards Ain
M’reisa and the St Georges Hotel.
26. At exactly 12:56:26 pm, Mr.
Hariri’s convoy was passing directly outside the St. Georges
Hotel, a route that it had taken only six times in the preceding
three months. A large explosion occurred and resulted in the death
of Mr. Hariri, seven of his security detail and twelve other
civilians in the immediate vicinity. Mr. Hariri was brought to the
American University Hospital where his body was identified by his
personal physician and by the legal physician appointed by the
Government. Identification was made possible by body marks, X-ray
and dental records. The cause of death was immediate brain injury
resulting in cardiac arrest.
The explosion
27. The Mission has examined,
analysed and carried out tests at the scene of the explosion over
a seven-day period. Its view on the nature and type of the
explosion is based on its experts’ interpretation of four main
elements: a) the dispersion, size and shape of fragments resulting
from the explosion; b) the size and shape of the crater created by
the explosion; c) ballistics interpretations, and; d)
interpretations of the damage to the buildings in and around the
area of the explosion.
28. The analysis of the fragments
caused by the explosion and of the shape and form of the crater
gives indicators equally supporting hypotheses of a surface and of
a subterranean explosion. However, the analysis of the damage
caused to the buildings in and around the crime scene suggests a
surface explosion. The evidence of heat wash on several metal
fragments is a clear indicator of a high explosive charge; the
fact that the Mission’s experts found evidence of heat wash on
fragments of vehicles and on fragments of metal shield holders
placed in front of the St. George hotel supports the hypothesis of
a surface explosion. Metal fragments found sticking in the side of
cars indicate an explosion of a heavy vehicle and the dispersion
of such fragments in this direction.
29. Many of the indicators
pointing to a subterranean explosion, such as the fragments of the
road asphalt, manhole and others found in upper floors of the St.
George hotel, the impact on the vehicle roofs, and the damage to
upper floors in the adjacent buildings, are not inconsistent with
a surface large explosion.
30. After having conducted all the
analysis and discussions of the samples collected, the Mission’s
experts came to the conclusion that it was most likely an
explosion above the ground, that the explosive used was
Trinitrotoluene (TNT) and of an approximate weight of 1000kg.
The Crime scene
31. The crime scene is located at
Ain M’reisa, City of Beirut, outside the Hotel St. Georges. The
immediate aftermath of the explosion was a scene of chaos, with
multi-agency emergency services, media personnel and hundreds of
passers-by and residents of Beirut arriving at the scene to help
and observe. Removal of the deceased and injured began almost
immediately. Much of the initial service was provided informally
by persons who arrived at the scene prior to the arrival of the
emergency services.
32. In the immediate aftermath of
the explosion, on the 14th of February, the
investigation of the crime fell within the jurisdiction of the
Military Court and Judge Rasheed Mezhar of that Court undertook
overall responsibility for the management and investigation of the
crime, including crime scene management and preservation and
collection of evidence by those competent local authorities. As an
act involving the security of the state, the case was referred to
the Judicial Council in implementation of the relevant national
legislation and on the 21st February Judge Michel Abu
Araj, Chief Judge of the Criminal Court, was appointed as the
investigating Judge replacing Judge Rasheed Meshar.
33. Failure to carry out the most
fundamental tasks associated with this responsibility became
evident from the very outset when the following was revealed:
-
The body of a person recovered
on the 15th of February was deemed to have survived
for approximately twelve hours after the blast,
-
A body was located by accident
and recovered on the 22nd of February 2005,
-
A body was located by family
members and recovered on the 1st of March 2005,
-
One person has been reported
missing and believed to be still at the scene of the
explosion.
Preservation of evidence
34. Preservation of evidence,
while vital to the success of any investigation, is secondary to
the preservation of life and to the recovery of bodies. In this
case as in any major emergency, the preservation of the scene was
not the primary focus of those emergency service personnel who
arrived to render assistance. However, after the initial chaos and
the removal of the dead and injured, the security services under
the direction and control of the investigating Judge, Rasheed
Mezhar, should have cleared the area of people and prevented any
other unauthorised access to the site. Having completed a detailed
search of the area to ensure that all the dead and injured had
been recovered, the site should have been sufficiently secured to
preserve all available evidence. The authorities in charge failed
to do this.
35. The Mission also identified
the following shortcomings:
-
On the 14th of
February shortly before midnight, the six vehicles forming Mr.
Hariri’s convoy and one BMW (not connected with the convoy)
were removed from the scene of the explosion and were taken to
the Helou Police Barracks in the city of Beirut. Although the
vehicles were covered after they had been removed, they were
still now absent from their respective resting places on the
site of the explosion, thereby preventing any ballistic
analysis, explosive analysis and evidence gathering at the
scene.
-
Lebanese military, police and
intelligence personnel, including explosives experts
interfered with and removed items of possible evidential value
without properly documenting, reporting or collating their
activities.
-
Apart from the initial media
access to the site in the immediate aftermath of the
explosion, the media were given official access to the site on
the 15th of February by Judge Mezhar after the
scene had been secured by the security services.
-
The seat of the explosion (the
resulting crater) was flooded with water in the days following
the explosion after the local authorities/Police failed to
prevent water from being turned on and released into the
crater through the fractured pipes at the scene, thereby
damaging or even eliminating vital evidence.
-
Parts of a pickup truck were
brought to the scene by members of the security services, some
time after the incident, and were placed in the crater and
were subsequently photographed and labelled as evidence.
-
Up until the 6th of
March 2005 the Mission observed large numbers of uniformed
personnel and persons in civilian attire wandering around the
scene, there was no record of persons entering or leaving the
scene and no control over removal of or placing of
items/samples at the scene.
-
At a meeting with the local
investigation’ senior management team on the 8th
of March 2005 members of the Mission requested a chronological
report relating to the crime scene, i.e. access by personnel,
evidence gathered, exhibits taken, tests carried out and
general crime scene management. On the 15th of
March 2005, the Mission was informed that such a report did
not exist and could not be provided.
-
There is strong evidence to
suggest that the investigating judges were not in control of
the investigation.
-
Intelligence/Government
agencies intruded on the site seemingly without judicial
authority and subsequently failed to coordinate findings.
36 It is therefore the Mission’s
view that the crime scene was not properly managed or preserved
and as a result important evidence was either removed or destroyed
without record. Those responsible for the mismanagement should be
held accountable.
Television network Al-Jazeera
broadcast
37. At approximately 13:30hrs on
the 14th of February 2005 the director and senior
presenter at Al-Jazeera TV, Beirut, received a telephone call from
a man whom he describes as having, poor Arabic, or just pretending
to have poor Arabic. The caller stated that "The Nasra
& Jihad Group in Greater Syria claims responsibility for the
execution of the agent Rafik Hariri, in the name of the oppressed,
the Nasra and the Jihad". Al-Jazeera broadcast
this statement at approximately 14:00hrs. At 14:19:25 another
male person called Al-Jazeera TV and speaking in "very good
Arabic" said that a tape could be found in a tree near the
United Nations, headquarters building, in Beirut. A member of
Al-Jazeera staff was instructed to go to the location but failed
to retrieve the videotape. A second Al-Jazeera staff member was
sent to retrieve the videotape at which point a videotape was
retrieved and subsequently handed to the director. At 15:27:37 a
third call was made to Al-Jazeera TV at which time another male
voice asked why the tape had not been broadcast. The director
informed the caller that the tape could not be broadcast until a
decision had been made at Al-Jazeera headquarters in Qatar. The
caller who was by this time shouting loudly threatened the
director that he would regret not showing the tape. At 17:04:35 a
final call was made to Al-Jazeera TV at which time the same male
voice, very angry, asked the director if the tape would be
broadcast or not. The director put the caller on hold and
subsequently determined that the decision had been made to
broadcast the tape, the caller was then told that he should watch
the Television. The tape recording, which was broadcast by the
Al-Jazeera network, showed a young bearded man claiming
responsibility for the killing of Mr. Hariri on behalf of the
group ‘Nasra and Jihad Group of Greater Syria’. The person who
appears on the recording has been identified as Ahmad Abu Adas, a
resident of Beirut, aged 22 years.
38. On the same date, 14th
February 2005 at 14:11:25 a consultant with Reuters news agency
received a call from a male caller whom she describes as not
having a Lebanese accent but "using a false Palestinian
accent". She states that the caller who was shouting in an
authoritative voice told her to "Write down, write
down and don’t talk", "we are the Nasra & Jihad
group in greater Syria, on this day have given due punishment to
the infidel Rafik Hariri so that may be an example to others of
his sort". On the instruction of an employee
(Reuters) the contents of this call were not released because the
call could not be authenticated.
39. Of the five calls made to
Al-Jazeera and Reuters, the location/origin has been established
for four of those calls. All locations identified by police were
public telephones in the city of Beirut. The placing of the video
tape by a person or persons associated with the killing of Mr.
Hariri provided the security forces with an important avenue of
investigation. However, the investigation authorities did little
to investigate this aspect. CCTV in two critical locations
established by members of the Mission was never investigated,
witnesses working in the area, identified by the Mission were not
interviewed and the most basic investigations were not carried
out. Those responsible for this element of the investigation
displayed gross negligence.
The suspect
40. Ahmad Abu Adas, a male of
Palestinian origin was born in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) on the 29th
of August 1982 and came to Lebanon with his family in 1991. He is
the son of Taysir Abu Adas and Nehad Moussa Nafeh. He has two
sisters, both living in Beirut, and one brother, who is presently
residing in Germany. He was unemployed. Investigations show that
at approximately 0700hrs on the 16th of January 2005
Ahmad Abu Adas left his home at Iskandarani Building 6, first
floor, Arab University District in the city of Beirut and was
officially reported missing on the 19th of January
2005.
41. Enquiries carried out by the
Mission established that approximately three years ago Ahmad Abu
Adas changed from being a carefree teenager to becoming a
religious fundamentalist. Approximately one month prior to going
missing Ahmad Abu Adas informed his family that he had met a new
friend at the Al-Huri mosque, where he sometimes led the prayers.
Information from Abu Adas’ mother suggests that at approximately
2100hrs on the 15th of January 2005 the ‘new friend’
made a telephone call to the Abu Adas home and told him that he
would be calling for him at 0700hrs on the 16th of
January saying that he had a surprise for Ahmad. The mother claims
that at approximately 0700hrs on the 16th of January
someone called for Ahmad alerting him by blowing on a car horn
outside the apartment, she further states that Ahmad who had
already been up for prayer called to ask her for some money and
that he took only 2000 Lebanese Lires (approximately one dollar
and 33 cents) and said that he would only be a few hours. She also
states that Ahmad asked her to apologise to another friend that he
had made an appointment with on that date.
42. On the 14th of
February 2005 The Abu Adas family were watching TV when Al-Jazeera
broadcast the video tape showing Ahmad claiming responsibility for
the killing of Mr. Hariri on behalf of the group "Nasra and
Jihad in Greater Syria". At approximately 2030hrs on the 14th
of February, the father, mother and younger sister surrendered
themselves to the police at which time all three were arrested.
The parents were detained for approximately seven days but the
sister was released after the second day. The investigation into
Ahmad Abu Adas included the arrest and interviewing of the family,
interviewing of friends, examination of telephone records and a
search of the home of his parents where Ahmad also lived.
Information from the investigation shows that Ahmad Abu Adas had a
computer at his home which was seized as part of the
investigation. The seized items included 11 video tapes, 55 CDs, 1
floppy disc and a computer hard drive. Other than subversive
information/data allegedly found on the hard drive there is very
little indication that Ahmad Abu Adas had subversive or violent
tendencies.
43. The investigation into this
aspect of the crime showed the following flaws:
-
The officers leading the
investigation assured the Mission that Ahmad Abu Adas had
internet access from his home and that the information
contained on the hard drive of the computer had been
downloaded directly onto the computer at the home of Ahmad Abu
Adas. Enquiries carried out by the Mission have established
that Ahmad Abu Adas did not have internet access from his home
and could not have accessed the suggested sites from his
personal computer. Enquiries carried out by the Mission
indicate that the investigating security forces did not
canvass or carryout enquiries at local cyber cafes with a view
to determining the origin of the alleged data located on the
computer of Ahmad Abu Adas.
-
There is little evidence to
support the theory that Ahmad Abu Adas had militant/extremist
tendencies.
-
There is no evidence that Ahmad
Abu Adas had planned his departure or that he would not be
returning at the time that he left home on the 16th
of January 2005.
-
There is no intelligence
available on the existence of the group "Nasra and Jihad
in Greater Syria" before or after the explosion.
-
This assassination would have
required access to considerable finance, military precision in
its execution, substantial logistical support and would have
been beyond the capacity of any single individual or small
terrorist group. There is no evidence suggesting that Ahmad
Abu could have the capacity to plan and execute this
assassination on his own, nor did he have the financial
capability.
The suspect vehicle
44. A branch of HSBC bank is
located close to the scene of the explosion. The bank operates its
own CCTV security system which recorded the movements of the
Hariri convoy immediately prior to the explosion but did not
record the scene of the explosion itself. Copies of the recordings
of this CCTV system were taken by a number of Lebanese security
agencies some time after the investigation was initiated. On close
scrutiny the recorded footage shows a white pickup truck entering
the area of the explosion shortly before Mr. Hariri’s convoy.
The recording clearly shows that this white pickup truck is moving
approximately six times slower than all other vehicles traversing
the same stretch of roadway. A time series analysis shows that,
for the 50 to 60 meters of road covered by the camera, a normal
car takes 3 to 4 seconds to cover the distance while a large truck
takes 5 to 6 seconds to travel the distance. The suspect white
pickup truck takes approximately 22 seconds to travel the distance
and enters the area of the explosion 1 minute and 49 seconds
before the Hariri convoy. It is estimated that if the pickup truck
continued at the same speed it would be exactly at the centre of
the explosion approximately 1 minute and 9 seconds before the
Hariri convoy. It is estimated that if the pickup truck had
continued its journey at the same speed without stopping it would
still have been affected by the force of the blast and would most
probably have remained at the scene after the explosion. In order
to have avoided the explosion this pickup truck would have had to
speed up considerably, immediately after going out of view of the
HSBC CCTV camera. There is no evidence to support this.
45. The Lebanese investigating
officers have identified the existence of this pickup truck and
its suspicious behaviour as an issue that gives rise to a
major/critical avenue of investigation. They have identified the
make and model of the suspect vehicle as a Mitsubishi Canter
pickup truck (possibly 1995-1996 model). The investigations
carried out by the Lebanese security forces have focused
predominantly on determining the actual ownership of the truck by
attempting to trace its ownership history through vehicle
licensing records, border controls and manufacturing or dealership
records. During searches for evidence at the site of the explosion
the security forces have allegedly discovered parts of a pickup
truck which match the suspect vehicle and which bear evidence of
having been involved in an explosion. The police have allegedly
discovered in excess of 21 parts of this suspect vehicle in and
around the area of the explosion. The main thrust of the security
force investigation is focused on this one avenue of
investigation. The Mission has determined that this truck, as
viewed on the CCTV of the HSBC bank, actually existed and was at
the scene as stated, immediately before the explosion, which
claimed the life of Mr. Hariri. The Mission also accepts that the
theory of this truck having been involved in of the assassination
is a credible theory, requiring full and extensive investigation.
The Lebanese security forces have recovered small parts of a
Mitsubishi truck from the crater, and from the surrounding area of
the explosion. They have recovered parts of a Mitsubishi truck
from the sea adjacent to the explosion. The Mission recovered a
piece of metal from the crater consistent with metal used in truck
parts and bearing evidence which supports the theory of a
surface/over-ground explosion.
46. However, the investigation
into this aspect of the case has not been full or extensive, and
in the opinion of the Mission, has been critically and
fundamentally damaged due to the actions and inactions of the
security forces on the ground, as follows:
-
Up to approximately one month
after the assassination, little or no attempt had been made by
the security forces to determine the movements of this suspect
truck immediately prior to, or immediately after the
explosion. This aspect of the investigation could have
uncovered vital evidence including; the possible identity of
the perpetrator or perpetrators, where the truck was parked
immediately before the explosion and of critical importance,
whether the truck continued on its journey and had no
involvement in the assassination at all.
-
The Mission determined that
little or no effort was made to determine whether the suspect
pickup truck continued its journey and that there was little
or no effort made to locate CCTV footage or witnesses on the
route after the explosion.
-
The Mission can say with
certainty that parts of a truck were brought to the scene of
the explosion by a member of the security forces some time
after the assassination and were placed in the crater and
subsequently photographed in the crater by members of the
security forces, thus creating serious suspicion and doubt
about the actual involvement of this truck in the
assassination and seriously damaging the credibility of the
main line of investigation. This line of enquiry is now
fundamentally damaged, with credibility issues and scope for
legal challenge.
47. In sum, the manner in which
this element of the investigation was carried out displays, at
least gross negligence, possibly accompanied by criminal actions
for which those responsible should be made accountable.
General assessment of
investigation:
48. Apart from the deficiencies
already indicated above, the Mission has noted the following flaws
in the Lebanese investigation process:
-
There was a serious disconnect
between the senior members of the local security force
investigation team.
-
There was a lack of
coordination between the security force investigation team and
the investigating Judges.
-
There was a lack of focus and
control by the senior management responsible for the overall
investigation of the crime.
-
There was a lack of
professionalism in the overall crime investigation techniques
employed.
-
There was a total absence of
intelligence information and there was little or no exchange
of information between the various agencies engaged in the
investigation.
-
There was an absence of both
technical capability and equipment necessary for such an
investigation.
49. Based on all the above, it is
the Mission’s conclusion that there was a distinct lack of
commitment to investigate the crime effectively, and that this
investigation was not carried out in accordance with acceptable
international standards. The Mission is also of the view that the
local investigation has neither the capacity, nor the commitment
to succeed. It also lacks the confidence of the population
necessary for its results to be accepted.
C. Consequences
50. The assassination of Mr.
Hariri had an earthquake-like impact on Lebanon. Shock, disbelief,
and anxiety were the most common reactions among the people with
whom we spoke. Shock that what many thought to be practices of the
past seem to be coming back. Disbelief at the murder of a man who
people regarded as a ‘larger than life’ figure. And anxiety
that Lebanon may be sliding back to chaos and civil strife as a
result of that "earthquake". These feelings quickly
melted together in a strong and unified outcry for ‘the truth’.
All those who talked to the Mission indicated that finding the
truth about the assassination of Mr. Hariri comes as their utmost
priority and that peace and tranquility in Lebanon cannot be
restored without bringing this crime to an acceptable closure.
Many reminded the Mission of previous political assassinations
that were either not investigated properly or did not lead to
convincing results. All of our interlocutors emphasized that this
assassination was one too many, that what they described as
"the culture of intimidation and brutal use of force"
has to come to an end, and that the Lebanese people and their
political leaders deserve to live free from fear, intimidation and
the risk of physical harm.
51. The families of the victims
were understandably still in shock when the Mission met with them.
Mr. Hariri’s family still cannot believe that a man who devoted
his life to the service of his country could be simply eliminated
while the truth about his murder hangs on an investigation the
credibility of which is very much in doubt. The families of the
other victims - the guards, the workers at the scene, the
passers-by, and all those who lost their lives accidentally –
are unable to comprehend yet what has happened or why. For all
these people the talk about the capabilities of the security
services, the coordination among them, or the political
speculations of the populace only increase their pain. All they
yearn for now is the truth, a way to bring this to closure and
allow them to mourn their loved ones.
52. The families of the victims as
well as political leaders from different political and communal
backgrounds, including officials and members of the government,
have all indicated that the formation of an international and
independent investigation commission is the only way to find the
truth about the assassination of Mr. Hariri. Some of our
interlocutors accused the Lebanese and Syrian security services of
involvement in the assassination, of willfully derailing the
Lebanese investigation in order to cover up for the crime. Others,
from the government side, indicated that an international
investigation would be needed specifically to prove the innocence
of the Lebanese security services, which cannot happen without
external help given the diminished credibility of the Lebanese
security services and investigators.
53. During our stay in Lebanon,
ordinary people stopped us in the streets of Beirut and thanked us
for our efforts to find ‘the truth’, urged us not to leave
this matter unresolved, and reminded us of the importance of
bringing the culprits to justice "for the sake of
Lebanon". Posters in the streets of Beirut carry one word, in
two languages: the truth, al-haqiqa. Politicians, officials
in the government at all levels, and even some security officials,
told us that finding the truth "this time" is crucial
for restoring civil peace in the country, reducing the tension and
allowing Lebanon to move toward normality.
54. In addition, the assassination
of Mr. Hariri seems to have unlocked the gates of political
upheavals that were simmering throughout the last year.
Accusations and counter-accusations are rife and fuel a strongly
polarized political debate. Some accuse the Syrian security
services and leadership of assassinating Mr. Hariri because he
became an insurmountable obstacle to their influence in Lebanon.
They argue that his removal became necessary for Syria to retain
control over the Lebanese political polity, especially if Syria
was forced to withdraw its forces. The adherents of this theory
affirm that the Syrian leadership would not mind being the ‘obvious
suspect’ and that it has used similar tactics in the past with
little or no concern about leaving traces. According to these
sources, this attitude is part of Syria’s pattern of coercive
management of Lebanese affairs. Others claim that the Syrian
leadership did not anticipate such strong reactions from the
Lebanese people and the international community. In their view the
decision to eliminate Mr. Hariri was "a strategic
miscalculation", not dissimilar to other miscalculations made
by the Syrian government.
55. Syrian supporters counter by
claiming that Mr. Hariri was assassinated by "the enemies of
Syria"; those who wanted to create international pressure on
the Syrian leadership in order to accelerate the demise of Syrian
influence in Lebanon and/or start a chain of reactions that would
eventually force a ‘regime change’ inside Syria itself.
According to the adherents of this theory, the assassination of
Mr. Hariri would be too gross a mistake for the Syrian leadership
to make. Not only would Syria be the ‘obvious suspect’, but it
would also be the obvious loser. Those who maintain this theory
reminded the Mission that political assassinations are carried out
not in revenge, but in order to lead to certain consequences. The
consequences of Mr. Hariri’s assassination are, in their view,
obviously unfavorable to Syria.
56. The assassination quickly
widened the gap between the Lebanese political factions and
further polarized the political scene to a threatening level.
Immediately after the assassination, the political spectrum was
divided between ‘opposition’ and ‘loyalty’ camps,
crystallizing around the position towards the current Lebanese
government/president and the existing Syrian/Lebanese
relationship. Two weeks after the assassination, large numbers of
Lebanese took to the streets to express a combination of grief,
anger, anxiety and political opposition to the Syrian involvement
in Lebanese affairs. The protesters and the opposition leaders
accused the Lebanese and security services of involvement in the
assassination and called for the government to resign and for the
Syrian troops and security assets to leave Lebanon. Although PM
Karami had a majority in the parliament and was confident of
winning a confidence vote, he listened to the voice of the street
and announced his government’s resignation while the
demonstrators were still gathered not far from the Parliament.
57. The protestors and opposition
leaders continued their campaign, calling for the dismissal of all
the heads of security agencies, a Syrian withdrawal of its army
and security assets, the formation of a ‘neutral’ government
that would focus on preparing the upcoming legislative elections,
and the establishment of an independent international
investigation. The ‘loyalty’ quickly responded by taking to
the streets on 8 March when at least half-a-million people
demonstrated in support of the government and of Syria.
Immediately afterwards, the Syrian President declared his
government’s intention to withdraw its forces to the Beqa’a
valley in implementation of the Taif Agreement of 1989, and as
well as further withdrawals up to the Syrian border. However, this
announcement did not bring the debate over the Syrian presence to
an end. Opposition leaders continued to show skepticism regarding
Syrian intentions and required a timetable for the full pullout,
with some calling for it’s completion before the legislative
elections.
58. On 14 March, according to
available estimates, more than a million people gathered in the
main square of Beirut and chanted for the ‘independence’ of
Lebanon, the creation of an independent, international
investigation commission, the removal of the heads of security
agencies, and the formation of a ‘neutral’ government to
prepare for the upcoming elections. Fears of a constitutional void
were voiced to the Mission, as well as fears of the inability to
vote in an electoral law in time or to prepare adequately for the
May legislative elections. Many suggested that international
supervision of the elections would be necessary to ensure its
fairness. They pointed out that a credible election would
contribute to stabilizing the political situation. There are also
fears of civil strife as the opposition and loyalty divide is
worryingly loaded with inter-communal significance. These
political upheavals carry threats to the peace and security of
Lebanon, with obvious implications for stability in the region as
a whole.
59. Moreover, Lebanese politicians
from different backgrounds and allegiances expressed to the
Mission their fears that Lebanon will become, once again, a battle
ground for external forces. Many pointed to the long and tragic
civil war as an example of external powers struggling for power
through Lebanese actors. They underlined the fragility of the
Lebanese polity and its limited ability to sustain pressure. Many
political figures emphasized their worry that Lebanon will be
caught in a possible showdown between Syria and the international
community, with possibly devastating consequences for Lebanese
peace and security. Lebanese political leaders across the board
implored the Mission to call on the international community not to
use Lebanon as a tool of pressure. As one interlocutor told the
Mission; "the tool is too fragile, and would easily
break".
III. Concluding remarks and
recommendations
60. It is the Mission’s view
that the Lebanese security services and the Syrian Military
Intelligence bear the primary responsibility for the lack of
security, protection, law and order in Lebanon. The Lebanese
security services have demonstrated serious and systematic
negligence in carrying out the duties usually performed by a
professional national security apparatus. In doing so, they have
severely failed to provide the citizens of Lebanon with an
acceptable level of security and, therefore, have contributed to
the propagation of a culture of intimidation and impunity. The
Syrian Military Intelligence shares this responsibility to the
extent of its involvement in running the security services in
Lebanon.
61. Secondly, it is also the
Mission’s view that the Government of Syria bears primary
responsibility for the political tension that preceded the
assassination of former Prime Minister Mr. Hariri. The Government
of Syria clearly exerted influence that goes beyond the reasonable
exercise of cooperative or neighborly relations. It interfered
with the details of governance in Lebanon in a heavy-handed and
inflexible manner that was the primary reason for the political
polarization that ensued. Without prejudice to the results of the
investigation, it is obvious that this atmosphere provided the
backdrop for the assassination of Mr. Hariri.
62. Thirdly, it became clear to
the Mission that the Lebanese investigation process suffers from
serious flaws. Whether caused by lack of capabilities or
commitment, this process is unlikely to reach a satisfactory
conclusion. In addition, the credibility of the Lebanese
authorities handling the investigation is questioned by a great
number of Lebanese, in the opposition as well as in government. It
is therefore the Mission’s view that an international
independent investigation would be necessary to find the truth. To
carry out such an investigation, there would be need for a
self-sufficient team, comprising the different fields of expertise
that are usually involved in carrying out similarly large
investigations in national systems, with the necessary support
staff and resources, and knowledge of the legal and other systems
involved. Such a team would need an executive authority to carry
out interrogations, searches, and other relevant tasks. The team
could be assisted and advised by Lebanese legal resources without
prejudice to its independence. It is, however, more than doubtful
that such an investigation team could carry out its tasks
satisfactorily - and receives the necessary active cooperation
from local authorities - while the current leadership of the
Lebanese security services remains in office.
63. Fourthly, it is the Mission’s
conclusion that the restoration of the integrity and credibility
of the Lebanese security apparatus is of vital importance to the
security and stability of the country. A sustained effort to
restructure, reform and retrain the Lebanese security services
will be necessary to achieve this end, and will certainly require
assistance and active engagement on the part of the international
community. Based on the Mission’s review of the current setup of
the Lebanese security apparatus, six main areas have been
identified as priorities for security reform; a) decoupling
security from politics and establishing a professional service; b)
nationalizing the security apparatus by disentangling it from
external influence and by raising it above sectarianism; c)
establishing a democratic police service, with special attention
to the rule of law and human rights; d) establishing clear lines
of reporting; e) capacity-building, and; f) introducing clear
mechanisms for accountability and judicial oversight.
64. Finally, it is also the
Mission’s view that international and regional political support
will be necessary to safeguard Lebanon’s national unity and to
shield its fragile polity from unwarranted pressure. Improving the
prospects of peace and security in the region would offer a more
solid ground for restoring normalcy in Lebanon.
Peter FitzGerald
Head of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission in Lebanon
New York
24 March 2005 |