Summary of
recommendations
The Government of Israel (GOI) and
the Palestinian Authority (PA) must act swiftly and decisively to
halt the violence. Their immediate objectives then should be to
rebuild confidence and resume negotiations.
During this mission our aim has
been to fulfil the mandate agreed at Sharm el-Sheikh. We value the
support given our work by the participants at the summit, and we
commend the parties for their cooperation. Our principal
recommendation is that they recommit themselves to the Sharm
el-Sheikh spirit and that they implement the decisions made there
in 1999 and 2000. We believe that the summit participants will
support bold action by the parties to achieve these objectives.
The restoration of trust is
essential, and the parties should take affirmative steps to this
end. Given the high level of hostility and mistrust, the timing
and sequence of these steps are obviously crucial. This can be
decided only by the parties. We urge them to begin the process of
decision immediately.
Accordingly, we recommend that
steps be taken to:
END THE VIOLENCE
· The GOI and the PA should
reaffirm their commitment to existing agreements and undertakings
and should immediately implement an unconditional cessation of
violence.
· The GOI and PA should
immediately resume security cooperation.
REBUILD CONFIDENCE
· The PA and GOI should work
together to establish a meaningful "cooling off period"
and implement additional confidence building measures, some of
which were detailed in the October 2000 Sharm el-Sheikh Statement
and some of which were offered by the U.S. on January 7, 2001 in
Cairo (see Recommendations section for further description).
· The PA and GOI should resume
their efforts to identify, condemn and discourage incitement in
all its forms.
· The PA should make clear
through concrete action to Palestinians and Israelis alike that
terrorism is reprehensible and unacceptable, and that the PA will
make a 100 percent effort to prevent terrorist operations and to
punish perpetrators. This effort should include immediate steps to
apprehend and incarcerate terrorists operating within the PA’s
jurisdiction.
· The GOI should freeze all
settlement activity, including the "natural growth" of
existing settlements.
· The GOI should ensure that the
IDF adopt and enforce policies and procedures encouraging
non-lethal responses to unarmed demonstrators, with a view to
minimizing casualties and friction between the two communities.
· The PA should prevent gunmen
from using Palestinian populated areas to fire upon Israeli
populated areas and IDF positions. This tactic places civilians on
both sides at unnecessary risk.
· The GOI should lift closures,
transfer to the PA all tax revenues owed, and permit Palestinians
who had been employed in Israel to return to their jobs; and
should ensure that security forces and settlers refrain from the
destruction of homes and roads, as well as trees and other
agricultural property in Palestinian areas. We acknowledge the GOI’s
position that actions of this nature have been taken for security
reasons. Nevertheless, the economic effects will persist for
years.
· The PA should renew cooperation
with Israeli security agencies to ensure, to the maximum extent
possible, that Palestinian workers employed within Israel are
fully vetted and free of connections to organizations and
individuals engaged in terrorism.
· The PA and GOT should consider
a joint undertaking to preserve and protect holy places sacred to
the traditions of Jews, Muslims, and Christians.
· The GOT and PA should jointly
endorse and support the work of Palestinian and Israeli
non-governmental organizations involved in cross-community
initiatives linking the two peoples.
RESUME NEGOTIATIONS
· In the spirit of the Sharm
el-Sheikh agreements and understandings of 1999 and 2000, we
recommend that the parties meet to reaffirm their commitment to
signed agreements and mutual understandings, and take
corresponding action. This should be the basis for resuming full
and meaningful negotiations.
Introduction
On October 17, 2000, at the
conclusion of the Middle East Peace Summit at Sharm el-Sheikh,
Egypt, the President of the United States spoke on behalf of the
participants (the Government of Israel, the Palestinian Authority,
the Governments of Egypt, Jordan, and the United States, the
United Nations, and the European Union). Among other things, the
President stated that:
The United States will develop
with the Israelis and Palestinians, as well as in consultation
with the United Nations Secretary General, a committee of
fact-finding on the events of the past several weeks and how to
prevent their recurrence. The committee’s report will be
shared by the U.S. President with the U.N. Secretary General and
the parties prior to publication. A final report shall be
submitted under the auspices of the U.S. President for
publication.[1]
On November 7, 2000,
following consultations with the other participants, the President
asked us to serve on what has come to be known as the Sharm
el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee. In a letter to us on December 6,
2000, the President stated that:
The purpose of the Summit, and
of the agreement that ensued, was to end the violence, to
prevent its recurrence, and to find a path back to the peace
process. In its actions and mode of operation, therefore, the
Committee should be guided by these overriding goals.. . [T]he
Committee should strive to steer clear of any step that will
intensify mutual blame and finger-pointing between the parties.
As I noted in my previous letter, "the Committee should not
become a divisive force or a focal point for blame and
recrimination but rather should serve to forestall violence and
confrontation and provide lessons for the future." This
should not be a tribunal whose purpose is to determine the guilt
or innocence of individuals or of the parties; rather, it should
be a fact-finding committee whose purpose is to determine what
happened and how to avoid it recurring in the future.[2]
After our first meeting, held
before we visited the region, we urged an end to all violence. Our
meetings and our observations during our subsequent visits to the
region have intensified our convictions in this regard. Whatever
the source, violence will not solve the problems of the region. It
will only make them worse. Death and destruction will not bring
peace, but will deepen the hatred and harden the resolve on both
sides. There is only one way to peace, justice, and security in
the Middle East, and that is through negotiation.
Despite their long history and
close proximity, some Israelis and Palestinians seem not to fully
appreciate each other’s problems and concerns. Some Israelis
appear not to comprehend the humiliation and frustration that
Palestinians must endure every day as a result of living with the
continuing effects of occupation, sustained by the presence of
Israeli military forces and settlements in their midst, or the
determination of the Palestinians to achieve independence and
genuine self-determination. Some Palestinians appear not to
comprehend the extent to which terrorism creates fear among the
Israeli people and undermines their belief in the possibility of
co-existence, or the determination of the GOI to do whatever is
necessary to protect its people.
Fear, hate, anger, and frustration
have risen on both sides. The greatest danger of all is that the
culture of peace, nurtured over the previous decade, is being
shattered. In its place there is a growing sense of futility and
despair, and a growing resort to violence.
Political leaders on both sides
must act and speak decisively to reverse these dangerous trends;
they must rekindle the desire and the drive for peace. That will
be difficult. But it can be done and it must be done, for the
alternative is unacceptable and should be unthinkable.
Two proud peoples share a land and
a destiny. Their competing claims and religious differences have
led to a grinding, demoralizing, dehumanizing conflict. They can
continue in conflict or they can negotiate to find a way to live
side-by-side in peace.
There is a record of achievement.
In 1991 the first peace conference with Israelis and Palestinians
took place in Madrid to achieve peace based on UN Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338. In 1993, the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) and Israel met in Oslo for
the first face-to-face
negotiations; they led to mutual recognition and the Declaration
of Principles (signed by the parties in Washington, D.C. on
September 13, 1993), which provided a road map to reach the
destination agreed in Madrid. Since then, important steps have
been taken in Cairo, in Washington, and elsewhere. Last year the
parties came very close to a permanent settlement.
So much has been achieved. So much
is at risk. If the parties are to succeed in completing their
journey to their common destination, agreed commitments must be
implemented, international law respected, and human rights
protected. We encourage them to return to negotiations, however
difficult. It is the only path to peace, justice and security.
Discussion
It is clear from their statements
that the participants in the summit of last October hoped and
intended that the outbreak of violence, then less than a month
old, would soon end. The U.S. President’s letters to us, asking
that we make recommendations on how to prevent a recurrence of
violence, reflect that intention.
Yet the violence has not ended. It
has worsened. Thus the overriding concern of those in the region
with whom we spoke is to end the violence and to return to the
process of shaping a sustainable peace. That is what we were told,
and were asked to address, by Israelis and Palestinians alike. It
was the message conveyed to us as well by President Mubarak of
Egypt, King Abdullah of Jordan, and UN Secretary General Annan.
Their concern must be ours. If our
report is to have effect, it must deal with the situation that
exists, which is different from that envisaged by the summit
participants. In this report, we will try to answer the questions
assigned to us by the Sharm el-Sheikh summit: What happened? Why
did it happen?
In light of the current situation,
however, we must elaborate on the third part of our mandate: How
can the recurrence of violence be prevented? The relevance and
impact of our work, in the end, will be measured by the
recommendations we make concerning the following:
· Ending the Violence.
· Rebuilding Confidence.
· Resuming Negotiations.
What
happened?
We are not a tribunal. We complied
with the request that we not determine the guilt or innocence of
individuals or of the parties. We did not have the power to compel
the testimony of witnesses or the production of documents. Most of
the information we received came from the parties and,
understandably, it largely tended to support their arguments.
in this part of our report, we do
not attempt to chronicle all of the events from late September
2000 onward. Rather, we discuss only those that shed light on the
underlying causes of violence.
In late September 2000, Israeli,
Palestinian, and other officials received reports that Member of
the Knesset (now Prime Minister) Ariel Sharon was planning a visit
to the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Palestinian and
U.S. officials urged then Prime Minister Ehud Barak to prohibit
the visit.[3] Mr. Barak told us that he believed the visit was
intended to be an internal political act directed against him by a
political opponent, and he declined to prohibit it.
Mr. Sharon made the visit on
September28 accompanied by over 1,000 Israeli police officers.
Although Israelis viewed the visit in an internal political
context, Palestinians saw it as highly provocative to them. On the
following day, in the same place, a large number of unarmed
Palestinian demonstrators and a large Israeli police contingent
confronted each other. According to the U.S. Department of State,
"Palestinians held large demonstrations and threw stones at
police in the vicinity of the Western Wall. Police used
rubber-coated metal bullets and live ammunition to disperse the
demonstrators, killing 4 persons and injuring about 200."[4]
According to the GOI, 14 Israeli policemen were injured.[5]
Similar demonstrations took place
over the following several days.[6] Thus began what has become
known as the "Al-Aqsa Intifada" (Al-Aqsa being a mosque
at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount).
The GOI asserts that the immediate
catalyst for the violence was the breakdown of the Camp David
negotiations on July 25, 2000 and the "widespread
appreciation in the international community of Palestinian
responsibility for the impasse. In this view, Palestinian violence
was planned by the PA leadership, and was aimed at "provoking
and incurring Palestinian casualties as a means of regaining the
diplomatic initiative."[8]
The Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) denies the allegation that the intifada was
planned. it claims, however, that "Camp David represented
nothing less than an attempt by Israel to extend the force it
exercises on the ground to negotiations,"[9] and
that "the failure of the summit, and the attempts to allocate
blame on the Palestinian side only added to the tension on the
ground ...[10]
From the perspective of the PLO,
Israel responded to the disturbances with excessive and illegal
use of deadly force against demonstrators; behavior which, in the
PLO’s view, reflected Israel’s contempt for the lives and
safety of Palestinians. For Palestinians, the widely seen images
of the killing of 12-year-old Muhammad al Durra in Gaza on
September 30, shot as he huddled behind his father, reinforced
that perception.
From the perspective of the GOI,
the demonstrations were organized and directed by the Palestinian
leadership to create sympathy for their cause around the world by
provoking Israeli security forces to fire upon demonstrators,
especially young people. For Israelis, the lynching of two
military reservists, First Sgt. Vadim Novesche and First Cpl.
Yosef Avrahami, in Ramallah on October 12, reflected a deep-seated
Palestinian hatred of Israel and Jews.
What began as a series of
confrontations between Palestinian demonstrators and Israeli
security forces, which resulted in the GOI’s initial
restrictions on the movement of people and goods in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip (closures), has since evolved into a wider array of
violent actions and responses. There have been exchanges of fire
between built-up areas, sniping incidents and clashes between
Israeli settlers and Palestinians. There have also been terrorist
acts and Israeli reactions thereto (characterized by the GOI as
counter-terrorism). including killings, further destruction of
property and economic measures. Most recently, there have been
mortar attacks on Israeli locations and IDF ground incursions into
Palestinian areas.
From the Palestinian perspective,
the decision of Israel to characterize the current crisis as
"an armed conflict short of war"[11] is simply a means
"to justify its assassination policy, its collective
punishment policy, and its use of lethal force."[12] From the
Israeli perspective, "The Palestinian leadership have
instigated, orchestrated and directed the violence. It has used,
and continues to use, terror and attrition as strategic
tools."[13]
In their submissions, the parties
traded allegations about the motivation and degree of control
exercised by the other. However, we were provided with no
persuasive evidence that the Sharon visit was anything other than
an internal political act; neither were we provided with
persuasive evidence that the PA planned the uprising.
Accordingly, we have no basis on
which to conclude that there was a deliberate plan by the PA to
initiate a campaign of violence at the first opportunity; or to
conclude that there was a deliberate plan by the GOI to respond
with lethal force.
However, there is also no evidence
on which to conclude that the PA made a consistent effort to
contain the demonstrations and control the violence once it began;
or that the GOI made a consistent effort to use non-lethal means
to control demonstrations of unarmed Palestinians. Amid rising
anger, fear, and mistrust, each side assumed the worst about the
other and acted accordingly.
The Sharon visit did not cause the
"Al-Aqsa Initifada." But it was poorly timed and the
provocative effect should have been foreseen; indeed it was
foreseen by those who urged that the visit be prohibited. More
significant were the events that followed: the decision of the
Israeli police on September 29 to use lethal means against the
Palestinian demonstrators; and the subsequent failure, as noted
above, of either party to exercise restraint.
Why did it
happen?
The roots of the current violence
extend much deeper than an inconclusive summit conference. Both
sides have made clear a profound disillusionment with the behavior
of the other in failing to meet the expectations arising from the
peace process launched in Madrid in 1991 and then in Oslo in 1993.
Each side has accused the other of violating specific undertakings
and undermining the spirit of their commitment to resolving their
political differences peacefully.
Divergent Expectations: We
are struck by the divergent expectations expressed by the parties
relating to the implementation of the Oslo process. Results
achieved from this process were unthinkable less than 10 years
ago. During the latest round of negotiations, the parties were
closer to a permanent settlement than ever before.
Nonetheless, Palestinians and
Israelis alike told us that the premise on which the Oslo process
is based-- that tackling the hard "permanent status"
issues be deferred to the end of the process has gradually come
under serious pressure. The step-by-step process agreed to by the
parties was based on the assumption that each step in the
negotiating process would lead to enhanced trust and confidence.
To achieve this, each party would have to implement agreed-upon
commitments and abstain from actions that would be seen by the
other as attempts to abuse the process in order to predetermine
the shape of the final outcome. If this requirement is not met,
the Oslo road map cannot successfully lead to its agreed
destination. Today, each side blames the other for having ignored
this fundamental aspect, resulting in a crisis in confidence. This
problem became even more pressing with the opening of permanent
status talks.
The GOI has placed primacy on
moving toward a Permanent Status Agreement in a nonviolent
atmosphere, consistent with commitments contained in the
agreements between the parties. "Even if slower than was
initially envisaged, there has, since the start of the peace
process in Madrid in 1991, been steady progress towards the goal
of a Permanent Status
Agreement without the resort to
violence on a scale that has characterized recent weeks."[14]
The "goal" is the Permanent Status Agreement, the terms
of which must be negotiated by the parties.
The PLO view is that delays in the
process have been the result of an Israeli attempt to prolong and
solidify the occupation. Palestinians "believed that the Oslo
process would yield an end to Israeli occupation in five
years,"[15] the timeframe for the transitional period
specified in the Declaration of Principles. Instead there have
been, in the PLO’s view, repeated Israeli delays culminating in
the Camp David summit, where, "Israel proposed to annex about
11.2% of the West Bank (excluding Jerusalem) ..." and offered
unacceptable proposals concerning Jerusalem, security and
refugees. "In sum, Israel’s proposals at Camp David
provided for Israel’s annexation of the best Palestinian lands,
the perpetuation of Israeli control over East Jerusalem. a
continued Israeli military presence on Palestinian territory,
Israeli control over Palestinian natural resources, airspace and
borders, and the return of fewer than 1% of refugees to their
homes."[16]
Both sides see the lack of full
compliance with agreements reached since the opening of the peace
process as evidence of a lack of good faith. This conclusion led
to an erosion of trust even before the permanent status
negotiations began.
Divergent Perspectives:
During the last seven months, these views have hardened into
divergent realities. Each side views the other as having acted in
bad faith; as having turned the optimism of Oslo into the
suffering and grief of victims and their loved ones. In their
statements and actions, each side demonstrates a perspective that
fails to recognize any truth in the perspective of the other.
The Palestinian Perspective:
For the Palestinian side, "Madrid" and "Oslo"
heralded the prospect of a State, and guaranteed an end to the
occupation and a resolution of outstanding matters within an
agreed time frame. Palestinians are genuinely angry at the
continued growth of settlements and at their daily experiences of
humiliation and disruption as a result of Israel’s presence in
the Palestinian territories. Palestinians see settlers and
settlements in their midst not only as violating the spirit of the
Oslo process, but also as an application of force in the form of
Israel’s overwhelming military superiority, which sustains and
protects the settlements.
The Interim Agreement provides
that "the two parties view the West Bank and Gaza as a
single territorial unit, the integrity and status of which will
be preserved during the interim period." Coupled with this,
the Interim Agreement’s prohibition on taking steps which may
prejudice permanent status negotiations denies Israel the right
to continue its illegal expansionist settlement policy. In
addition to the Interim Agreement, customary international law,
including the Fourth Geneva Convention, prohibits Israel (as an
occupying power) from establishing settlements in occupied
territory pending an end to the conflict.[17]
The PLO alleges that Israeli
political leaders "have made no secret of the fact that the
Israeli interpretation of Oslo was designed to segregate the
Palestinians in non-contiguous enclaves, surrounded by Israeli
military-controlled borders, with settlements and settlement roads
violating the territories’ integrity."[18] According to the
PLO, "In the seven years since the (Declaration of
Principles], the settler population in the West Bank, excluding
East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, has doubled to 200,000, and the
settler population in East Jerusalem has risen to 170,000. Israel
has constructed approximately 30 new settlements, and expanded a
number of existing ones to house these new settlers."[19]
The PLO also claims that the GOI
has failed to comply with other commitments such as the further
withdrawal from the West Bank and the release of Palestinian
prisoners. In addition, Palestinians expressed frustration with
the impasse over refugees and the deteriorating economic
circumstances in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The Israeli Perspective: From
the GOI perspective, the expansion of settlement activity and the
taking of measures to facilitate the convenience and safety of
settlers do not prejudice the outcome of permanent status
negotiations.
Israel understands that the
Palestinian side objects to the settlements in the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip. Without prejudice to the formal status of the
settlements, Israel accepts that the settlements are an
outstanding issue on which there will have to be agreement as
part of any permanent status resolution between the sides. This
point was acknowledged and agreed upon in the Declaration of
Principles of 13 September 1993 as well as mother agreements
between the two sides. There has in fact been a good deal of
discussion on the question of settlements between the two sides
in the various negotiations toward a permanent status
agreement.[20]
Indeed, Israelis point out that at
the Camp David summit and during subsequent talks the GOI offered
to make significant concessions with respect to settlements in the
context of an overall agreement.
Security, however, is the key GOI
concern. The GOI maintains that the PLO has breached its solemn
commitments by continuing the use of violence in the pursuit of
political objectives. "Israel’s principal concern in the
peace process has been security. This issue is of overriding
importance.. . [S]ecurity is not something on which Israel will
bargain or compromise. The failure of the Palestinian side to
comply with both the letter and spirit of the security provisions
in the various agreements has long been a source of disturbance in
Israel."[21]
According to the GOL, the
Palestinian failure takes several forms: institutionalized
anti-Israel. anti-Jewish incitement; the release from detention of
terrorists; the failure to control illegal weapons; and the actual
conduct of violent operations, ranging from the insertion of
riflemen into demonstrations to terrorist attacks on Israeli
civilians. The GOI maintains that the
PLO has explicitly violated its
renunciation of terrorism and other acts of violence,[22] thereby
significantly eroding trust between the parties. The GOI perceives
"a thread, implied but nonetheless clear, that runs
throughout the Palestinian submissions. It is that Palestinian
violence against Israel and Israelis is somehow explicable,
understandable, legitimate."[23]
End the
violence
For Israelis and Palestinians
alike the experience of the past several months has been intensely
personal. Through relationships of kinship, friendship,
religion, community and profession, virtually everyone in both
societies has a link to someone who has been killed or seriously
injured in the recent violence. We were touched by their stories.
During our last visit to the region, we met with the families of
Palestinian and Israeli victims. These individual accounts of
grief were heart-rending and indescribably sad. Israeli and
Palestinian families used virtually the same words to describe
their grief.
When the widow of a murdered
Israeli physician - a man of peace whose practice included the
treatment of Arab patients - tells us that it seems that
Palestinians are interested in killing Jews for the sake of
killing Jews, Palestinians should take notice. When the parents of
a Palestinian child killed while in his bed by an errant .50
caliber bullet draw similar conclusions about the respect accorded
by Israelis to Palestinian lives, Israelis need to listen. When we
see the shattered bodies of children we know it is time for adults
to stop the violence.
With widespread violence, both
sides have resorted to portrayals of the other in hostile
stereotypes. This cycle cannot be easily broken. Without
considerable determination and readiness to compromise, the
rebuilding of trust will be impossible.
Cessation of Violence:
Since 1991, the parties have consistently committed themselves, in
all their agreements, to the path of nonviolence. They did so most
recently in the two Sharm el-Sheikh summits of September 1999 and
October 2000. To stop the violence now, the PA and GOI need not
"reinvent the wheel." Rather, they should take immediate
steps to end the violence, reaffirm their mutual commitments, and
resume negotiations.
Resumption of Security
Cooperation: Palestinian security officials told us that it
would take some time - perhaps several weeks - for the PA to
reassert full control over armed elements nominally under its
command and to exert decisive influence over other armed elements
operating in Palestinian areas. Israeli security officials have
not disputed these assertions. What is important is that the PA
make an all-out effort to enforce a complete cessation of violence
and that it be clearly seen by the GOI as doing so. The GOI must
likewise exercise a 100 percent effort to ensure that potential
friction points, where Palestinians come into contact with armed
Israelis. do not become stages for renewed hostilities.
The collapse of security
cooperation in early October reflected the belief by each party
that the other had committed itself to a violent course of action.
If the parties wish to attain the standard of 100 percent effort
to prevent violence, the immediate resumption of security
cooperation is mandatory.
We acknowledge the reluctance of
the PA to be seen as facilitating the work of Israeli security
services absent an explicit political context (i.e., meaningful
negotiations) and under the threat of Israeli settlement
expansion. Indeed, security cooperation cannot be sustained
without such negotiations and with ongoing actions seen as
prejudicing the outcome of negotiations. However, violence is much
more likely to continue without security cooperation. Moreover,
without effective security cooperation, the parties will continue
to regard all acts of violence as officially sanctioned.
In order to overcome the current
deadlock, the parties should consider how best to revitalize
security cooperation. We commend current efforts to that end.
Effective cooperation depends on recreating and sustaining an
atmosphere of confidence and good personal relations.
It is for the parties themselves
to undertake the main burden of day-to-day cooperation, but they
should remain open to engaging the assistance of others in
facilitating that work. Such outside assistance should be by
mutual consent, should not threaten good bilateral working
arrangements, and should not act as a tribunal or interpose
between the parties. There was good security cooperation until
last year that benefited from the good offices of the U.S.
(acknowledged by both sides as useful), and was also supported
indirectly by security projects and assistance from the European
Union. The role of outside assistance should be that of creating
the appropriate framework, sustaining goodwill on both sides, and
removing friction where possible. That framework must be seen to
be contributing to the safety and welfare of both communities if
there is to be acceptance by those communities of these efforts.
Rebuild
confidence
The historic handshake between
Chairman Arafat and the late Prime Minister Rabin at the White
House in September 1993 symbolized the expectation of both parties
that the door to the peaceful resolution of differences had been
opened. Despite the current violence and mutual loss of trust,
both communities have repeatedly expressed a desire for peace.
Channeling this desire into substantive progress has proved
difficult. The restoration of trust is essential, and the parties
should take affirmative steps to this end. Given the high level of
hostility and mistrust, the timing and sequence of these steps are
obviously crucial. This can be decided only by the parties. We
urge them to begin the process of decision immediately.
Terrorism: In the September 1999
Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, the parties pledged to take action
against "any threat or act of terrorism, violence or
incitement." Although all three categories of hostilities are
reprehensible, it was no accident that "terrorism" was
placed at the top of the list.
Terrorism involves the deliberate
killing and injuring of randomly selected noncombatants for
political ends. It seeks to promote a political outcome by
spreading terror and
demoralization throughout a
population. It is immoral and ultimately self defeating. We
condemn it and we urge that the parties coordinate their security
efforts to eliminate it.
In its official submissions and
briefings, the GOI has accused the PA of supporting terrorism by
releasing incarcerated terrorists, by allowing PA security
personnel to abet, and in some cases to conduct terrorist
operations, and by terminating security cooperation with the GOI.
The PA vigorously denies the accusations. But Israelis hold the
view that the PA’s leadership has made no real effort over the
past seven months to prevent anti-Israeli terrorism. The belief
is, in and of itself, a major obstacle to the rebuilding of
confidence.
We believe that the PA has a
responsibility to help rebuild confidence by making clear to both
communities that terrorism is reprehensible and unacceptable, and
by taking all measures to prevent terrorist operations and to
punish perpetrators. This effort should include immediate steps to
apprehend and incarcerate terrorists operating within the PA’s
jurisdiction.
Settlements: The GOI also has a
responsibility to help rebuild confidence. A cessation of
Palestinian-Israeli violence will be particularly hard to sustain
unless the GOI freezes all settlement construction activity. The
GOI should also give careful consideration to whether settlements
that are focal points for substantial friction are valuable
bargaining chips for future negotiations or provocations likely to
preclude the onset of productive talks.
The issue is, of course,
controversial. Many Israelis will regard our recommendation as a
statement of the obvious, and will support it. Many will oppose
it. But settlement activities must not be allowed to undermine the
restoration of calm and the resumption of negotiations.
During the half-century of its
existence, Israel has had the strong support of the United States.
In international forums, the US. has at times cast the only vote
on Israel’s behalf. Yet, even in such a close relationship there
are some differences. Prominent among those differences
is the U.S. Government’s
long-standing opposition to the GOI’s policies and practices
regarding settlements. As the then-Secretary of State, James A.
Baker, III, commented on May 22, 1991:
Every time I have gone to Israel
in connection with the peace process, on each of my four trips,
I have been met with the announcement of new settlement
activity. This does violate United States policy. It’s the
first thing that Arabs - Arab Governments, the first thing that
the Palestinians in the territories - whose situation is really
quite desperate - the first thing they raise when we talk to
them. I don’t think there is any bigger obstacle to peace than
the settlement activity that continues not only unabated but at
an enhanced pace.[24]
The policy described by Secretary
Baker, on behalf of the Administration of President George H. W.
Bush. has been, in essence, the policy of every American
administration over the past quarter century.[25]
Most other countries, including
Turkey, Norway, and those of the European Union, have also been
critical of Israeli settlement activity, in accordance with their
views that such settlements are illegal under international law
and not in compliance with previous agreements.
On each of our two visits to the
region there were Israeli announcements regarding expansion of
settlements, and it was almost always the first issue raised by
Palestinians with whom we met. During our last visit, we observed
the impact of 6,400 settlers on 140,000 Palestinians in Hebron
[26] and 6,500 settlers on over 1,100,000 Palestinians in the Gaza
Strip.[27] The GOI describes its policy as prohibiting new
settlements but permitting expansion of existing settlements to
accommodate "natural growth." Palestinians contend that
there is no distinction between new’ and "expanded"
settlements; and that, except for a brief freeze during the tenure
of Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin, there has been a continuing,
aggressive effort by Israel to increase the number and size of
settlements.
The subject has been widely
discussed within Israel. The Ha'aretz English Language
Edition editorial of April 10, 2001 stated:
A government which seeks to
argue that its goal is to reach a solution to the conflict with
the Palestinians through peaceful means, and is trying at this
stage to bring an end to the violence and terrorism, must
announce an end to construction in the settlements.[28]
The circumstances in the region
are much changed from those which existed nearly 20 years ago.
Yet, President Reagan’s words remain relevant: "The
immediate adoption of a settlements freeze by Israel, more than
any other action, could create the confidence needed
Beyond the obvious
confidence-building qualities of a settlement freeze, we note that
many of the confrontations during this conflict have occurred at
points where Palestinians, settlers, and security forces
protecting the settlers, meet. Keeping both the peace and these
friction points will be very difficult.
Reducing Tension: We were
told by both Palestinians and Israelis that emotions generated by
the many recent deaths and funerals have fueled additional
confrontations, and. in effect, maintained the cycle of violence.
We cannot urge one side or the other to refrain from
demonstrations. But both sides must make clear that violent
demonstrations will not be tolerated. We can and do urge that both
sides exhibit a greater respect for human life when demonstrators
confront security personnel. In addition, a renewed effort to stop
the violence might feature, for a limited time, a "cooling
off’ period during which public demonstrations at or near
friction points will be discouraged in order to break the cycle of
violence. To the extent that demonstrations. continue, we urge
that demonstrators and security personnel keep their distance from
one another to reduce the potential for lethal confrontation.
Actions and Responses: Members
of the Committee staff witnessed an incident involving stone
throwing in Ramallah from the perspectives, on the ground, of both
sides. The people confronting one another were mostly young men.
The absence of senior leadership on the IDF side was striking.
Likewise, the absence of responsible security and other officials
counseling restraint on the Palestinian side was obvious.
Concerning such confrontations,
the GOI takes the position that "Israel is engaged in an
armed conflict short of war. This is not a civilian disturbance or
a demonstration or a riot. It is characterized by live-fire
attacks on a significant scale [emphasis added] . . . [T]he
attacks are carried out by a well-armed and organized
militia..."[29] Yet, the GOI acknowledges that of some 9,000
"attacks" by Palestinians against Israelis, "some
2,700 [about 30 percent] involved the use of automatic weapons,
rifles, hand guns, grenades, [and] explosives of other
kinds."[30]
Thus, for the first three months
of the current uprising, most incidents did not involve
Palestinian use of firearms and explosives. B’Tselem reported
that, "according to IDF figures, 73 percent of the incidents
[from September 29 to December 2, 2000] did not include
Palestinian gunfire. Despite this, it was in these incidents that
most of the Palestinians [were] killed and wounded ..."[31]
Altogether, nearly 500 people were killed and over 10,000 injured
over the past seven months; the overwhelming majority in both
categories were Palestinian. Many of these deaths were avoidable,
as were many Israeli deaths.
Israel’s characterization of the
conflict, as noted above, is overly broad, for it does not
adequately describe the variety of incidents reported since late
September 2000. Moreover, by thus defining the conflict, the IDF
has suspended its policy of mandating investigations by the
Department of Military Police Investigations whenever a
Palestinian in the territories dies at the hands of an IDF soldier
in an incident not involving terrorism. In the words of the GOI,
"Where Israel considers that there is reason to investigate
particular incidents, it does so, although, given the
circumstances of armed conflict, it does not do so
routinely."[32] We believe, however, that by abandoning the
blanket "armed conflict short of war" characterization
and by re-instituting mandatory military police investigations,
the GOI could help mitigate deadly violence and help rebuild
mutual confidence. Notwithstanding the danger posed by
stone-throwers, an effort should be made to differentiate between
terrorism and protests.
Controversy has arisen between the
parties over what Israel calls the "targeting of individual
enemy combatants."[33] The PLO describes these actions as
"extra-judicial executions,"[34] and
claims that Israel has engaged in an "assassination
policy" that is "in clear violation of Article 32 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention ..."[35] The GOI states that,
"whatever action Israel has taken has been taken firmly
within the bounds of the relevant and accepted principles relating
to the conduct of hostilities."[36]
With respect to demonstrations,
the GOI has acknowledged "that individual instances of
excessive response may have occurred. To a soldier or a unit
coming under Palestinian attack, the equation is not that of the
Israeli army versus some stone throwing Palestinian protesters. It
is a personal equation."[37]
We understand this concern,
particularly since rocks can maim or even kill. It is no easy
matter for a few young soldiers, confronted by large numbers of
hostile demonstrators, to make fine legal distinctions on the
spot. Still, this "personal equation" must fit within an
organizational ethic; in this case, "The Ethical Code of
the Israel Defense Forces, which states, in part:
The sanctity of human life in
the eyes of the IDF servicemen will find expression in all of
their actions, in deliberate and meticulous planning, in safe
and intelligent training and in proper execution of their
mission. In evaluating the risk to self and others, they will
use the appropriate standards and will exercise constant care to
limit injury to life to the extent required to accomplish the
mission.[38]
Those required to respect the IDF
ethical code are largely draftees, as the IDF is a conscript
force. Active duty enlisted personnel, noncommissioned officers
and junior officers - the categories most likely to be present at
friction points - are young, often teenagers. Unless more senior
career personnel or reservists are stationed at friction points,
no IDF personnel present in these sensitive areas have experience
to draw upon from previous violent Israeli-Palestinian
confrontations. We think it is essential, especially in the
context of restoring confidence by minimizing deadly
confrontations, that the IDF deploy more senior, experienced
soldiers to these sensitive points.
There were incidents where IDF
soldiers have used lethal force, including live ammunition and
modified metal-cored rubber rounds, against unarmed demonstrators
throwing stones. [39] The IDF should adopt crowd-control tactics
that minimize the potential for deaths and casualties, withdrawing
metal-cored rubber rounds from general use and using instead
rubber baton rounds without metal cores.
We are deeply concerned about the
public safety implications of exchanges of fire between populated
areas, in particular between Israeli settlements and neighboring
Palestinian villages. Palestinian gunmen have directed small arms
fire at Israeli settlements and at nearby IDF positions from
within or adjacent to civilian dwellings in Palestinian areas,
thus endangering innocent Israeli. and Palestinian civilians
alike. We condemn the positioning of gunmen within or near
civilian dwellings. The TIDF often responds to such gunfire with
heavy caliber weapons, sometimes resulting in deaths and injuries
to innocent Palestinians. An IDF officer told us at the Ministry
of Defense on March 23, 2001 that, "When shooting comes from
a building we respond, and sometimes there are innocent people in
the building." Obviously, innocent people are injured and
killed during exchanges of this nature. We urge that such
provocations cease and that the IDF exercise maximum restraint in
its responses if they do occur. Inappropriate or excessive uses of
force often lead to escalation.
We are aware of IDF sensitivities
about these subjects. More than once we were asked:
"What about Palestinian rules
of engagement? What about a Palestinian code of ethics for their
military personnel?" These are valid questions.
On the Palestinian side there are
disturbing ambiguities in the basic areas of responsibility and
accountability. The lack of control exercised by the PA over its
own security personnel and armed elements affiliated with the PA
leadership is very troubling. We urge the PA to take all necessary
steps to establish a clear and unchallenged chain of command for
armed personnel operating under its authority. We recommend that
the PA institute and enforce effective standards of conduct and
accountability, both within the uniformed ranks and between the
police and the civilian political leadership to which it reports.
Incitement: In their
submissions and briefings to the Committee, both sides expressed
concerns about hateful language and images emanating from the
other, citing numerous examples of hostile sectarian and ethnic
rhetoric in the Palestinian and Israeli media, in school curricula
and in statements by religious leaders, politicians and others.
We call on the parties to renew
their formal commitments to foster mutual understanding and
tolerance and to abstain from incitement and hostile propaganda.
We condemn hate language and incitement in all its forms. We
suggest that the parties be particularly cautious about using
words in a manner that suggests collective responsibility.
Economic and Social Impact of
Violence: Further restrictions on the movement of people and
goods have been imposed by Israel on the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip. These closures take three forms: those which restrict
movement between the Palestinian areas and Israel; those
(including curfews) which restrict movement within the Palestinian
areas; and those which restrict movement from the Palestinian
areas to foreign countries. These measures have disrupted the
lives of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians; they have
increased Palestinian unemployment to an estimated 40 percent. in
part by preventing some 140,000 Palestinians from working in
Israel; and have stripped away about one-third of the Palestinian
gross domestic product. Moreover, the transfer of tax and customs
duty revenues owed to the PA by Israel has been suspended, leading
to a serious fiscal crisis in the PA.
Of particular concern to the PA
has been the destruction by Israeli security forces and settlers
of tens of thousands of olive and fruit trees and other
agricultural property. The closures have had other adverse
effects, such as preventing civilians from access to urgent
medical treatment and preventing students from attending school.
The GOI maintains that these
measures were taken in order to protect Israeli citizens from
terrorism. Palestinians characterize these measures as
"collective punishment." The GOI denies the allegation:
Israel has not taken measures
that have had an economic impact simply for the sake of taking
such measures or for reasons of harming the Palestinian economy.
The measures have been taken for reasons of security. Thus, for
example. the closure of the Palestinian territories was taken in
order to prevent, or at least minimize the risks of, terrorist
attacks ... The Palestinian leadership has made no attempt to
control this activity and bring it to an end.[40]
Moreover, the GOI points out that
violence in the last quarter of 2000 cost the Israeli economy $1.2
billion (USD), and that the loss continues at a rate of
approximately $150 million (USD) per month.[41]
We acknowledge Israel’s security
concerns. We believe, however, that the GOI should lift closures,
transfer to the PA all revenues owed, and permit Palestinians who
have been employed in Israel to return to their jobs. Closure
policies play into the hands of extremists seeking to expand their
constituencies and thereby contribute to escalation. The PA should
resume cooperation with Israeli security agencies to ensure that
Palestinian workers employed within Israel are fully vetted and
free of connections to terrorists and terrorist organizations.
International development
assistance has from the start been an integral part of the peace
process, with an aim to strengthen the socio-economic foundations
for peace. This assistance today is more important than ever. We
urge the international community to sustain the development agenda
of the peace process.
Holy Places: It is
particularly regrettable that places such as the Temple
Mount/Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem, Joseph’s Tomb in Nablus, and
Rachel’s Tomb in Bethlehem have been the scenes of violence,
death and injury. These are places of peace, prayer and reflection
which must be accessible to all believers.
Places deemed holy by Muslims,
Jews, and Christians merit respect, protection and preservation.
Agreements previously reached by the parties regarding holy places
must be upheld. The GOI and the PA should create a joint
initiative to defuse the sectarian aspect of their political
dispute by preserving and protecting such places. Efforts to
develop inter-faith dialogue should be encouraged.
International Force: One of
the most controversial subjects raised during our inquiry was the
issue of deploying an international force to the Palestinian
areas. The PA is strongly in favor of having such a force to
protect Palestinian civilians and their property from the IDF and
from settlers. The GOI is just as adamantly opposed to an
"international protection force," believing that it
would prove unresponsive to Israeli security concerns and
interfere with bilateral negotiations to settle the conflict.
We believe that to be effective
such a force would need the support of both parties. We note that
international forces deployed in this region have been or are in a
position to fulfil their mandates and make a positive contribution
only when they were deployed with the consent of all of the
parties involved.
During our visit to Hebron we were
briefed by personnel of the Temporary International Presence in
Hebron (TIPH), a presence to which both parties have agreed. The
TIPH is charged with observing an explosive situation and writing
reports on their observations. If the parties agree, as a
confidence-building measure, to draw upon TIPH personnel to help
them manage other friction points, we hope that TIPH contributors
could accommodate such a request.
Cross-Community Initiatives:
Many described to us the near absolute loss of trust. It was all
the more inspiring, therefore, to find groups (such as the Parent’s
Circle and the
Economic Cooperation Foundation)
dedicated to cross-community understanding in spite of all that
has happened. We commend them and their important work.
Regrettably, most of the work of
this nature has stopped during the current conflict. To help
rebuild confidence, the GOI and PA should jointly endorse and
support the work of Israeli and Palestinian non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) already involved in confidence building
through initiatives linking both sides. It is important that the
PA and GOI support cross-community organizations and initiatives,
including the provision of humanitarian assistance to Palestinian
villages by Israeli NGOs. Providing travel permits for
participants is essential. Cooperation between the humanitarian
organizations and the military/security services of the parties
should be encouraged and institutionalized.
Such programs can help build,
albeit slowly, constituencies for peace among Palestinians and
Israelis and can provide safety nets during times of turbulence.
Organizations involved in this work are vital for translating good
intentions into positive actions.
Resume
negotiations
Israeli leaders do not wish to be
perceived as "rewarding violence." Palestinian leaders
do not wish to be perceived as "rewarding occupation."
We appreciate the political constraints on leaders of both sides.
Nevertheless, if the cycle of violence is to be broken and the
search for peace resumed, there needs to be a new bilateral
relationship incorporating both security cooperation and
negotiations.
We cannot prescribe to the parties
how best to pursue their political objectives. Yet the
construction of a new bilateral relationship solidifying and
transcending an agreed cessation of violence requires intelligent
risk-taking. It requires, in the first instance, that each party
again be willing to regard the other as a partner. Partnership,
in turn, requires at this juncture something more than was agreed
in the Declaration of Principles and in subsequent agreements.
Instead of declaring the peace process to be "dead," the
parties should determine how they will conclude
their common journey along their
agreed "road map!’ a journey which began in Madrid and
continued in spite of problems — until very recently.
To define a starting point is for
the parties to decide. Both parties have stated that they remain
committed to their mutual agreements and undertakings. It is time
to explore further implementation. The parties should declare
their intention to meet on this basis, in order to resume full and
meaningful negotiations, in the spirit of their undertakings at
Sharm el-Sheikh in 1999 and 2000.
Neither side will be able to
achieve its principal objectives unilaterally or without political
risk. We know how hard it is for leaders to act — especially if
the action can be characterized by political opponents as a
concession — without getting something in return. The PA must
— as it has at previous critical junctures take steps to
reassure Israel on security matters. The GOI must — as it has in
the past — take steps to reassure the PA on political matters.
Israelis and Palestinians should avoid, in their own actions and
attitudes, giving extremists, common criminals and revenge seekers
the final say in defining their joint future. This will not be
easy if deadly incidents occur in spite of effective cooperation.
Notwithstanding the daunting difficulties, the very foundation of
the trust required to re-establish a functioning partnership
consists of each side making such strategic reassurances to the
other.
Recommendations
The GOI and the PA must act
swiftly and decisively to halt the violence. Their immediate
objectives then should be to rebuild confidence and resume
negotiations. What we are asking is not easy. Palestinians and
Israelis - not just their leaders, but two publics at large - have
lost confidence in one another. We are asking political leaders to
do, for the sake of their people, the politically difficult: to
lead without knowing how many will follow.
During this mission our aim has
been to fulfil the mandate agreed at Sharm el-Sheikh. We value the
support given our work by the participants at the summit, and we
commend the parties for their cooperation. Our principal
recommendation is that they recommit themselves to the Sharm
el-Sheikh spirit, and that they implement the decisions made there
in 1999 and 2000. We believe that the summit participants will
support bold action by the parties to achieve these objectives.
END THE VIOLENCE
· The GOI and the PA should
reaffirm their commitment to existing agreements and undertakings
and should immediately implement an unconditional cessation of
violence.
Anything less than a complete
effort by both parties to end the violence will render the effort
itself ineffective, and will likely be interpreted by the other
side as evidence of hostile intent.
· The GOI and PA should
immediately resume security cooperation.
Effective bilateral cooperation
aimed at preventing violence will encourage the resumption of
negotiations. We are particularly concerned that, absent
effective, transparent security cooperation, terrorism and other
acts of violence will continue and may be seen as officially
sanctioned whether they are or not. The parties should consider
widening the scope of security cooperation to reflect the
priorities of both communities and to seek acceptance for these
efforts from those communities.
We acknowledge the PA’s position
that security cooperation presents a political difficulty absent a
suitable political context, i.e., the relaxation of stringent
Israeli security measures combined with ongoing, fruitful
negotiations. We also acknowledge the PA’s fear that, with
security cooperation in hand., the GOI may not be disposed to deal
forthrightly with Palestinian political concerns. We believe that
security cooperation cannot long be sustained if meaningful
negotiations are unreasonably deferred, if security measures
"on the ground" are seen as hostile, or if steps are
taken that are perceived as provocative or as prejudicing the
outcome of negotiations.
REBUILD CONFIDENCE
· The PA and GOI should work
together to establish a meaningful "cooling off period"
and implement additional confidence building measures, some of
which were proposed in the October 2000 Sharm el-Sheikh Statement
and some of which were offered by the U.S. on January 7, 2001 in
Cairo.
· The PA and GOI should resume
their efforts to identify, condemn and discourage incitement in
all its forms.
· The PA should make clear
through concrete action to Palestinians and Israelis alike that
terrorism is reprehensible and unacceptable, and that the PA will
make a 100 percent effort to prevent terrorist operations and to
punish perpetrators. This effort should include immediate steps to
apprehend and incarcerate terrorists operating within the PA’s
jurisdiction.
· The GOI should freeze all
settlement activity, including the "natural growth" of
existing settlements.
The kind of security cooperation
desired by the GOI cannot for long co-exist with settlement
activity described very recently by the European Union as causing
"great concern" and by the U.S. as
"provocative."
0 The GOI should give careful
consideration to whether settlements which are focal points for
substantial friction are valuable bargaining chips for future
negotiations. or provocations likely to preclude the onset of
productive talks.
0 The GOI may wish to make it
clear to the PA that a future peace would pose no threat to the
territorial contiguity of a Palestinian State to be established
in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
· The IDF should consider
withdrawing to positions held before September 28, 2000 which will
reduce the number of friction points and the potential for violent
confrontations.
· The GOI should ensure that the
IDF adopt and enforce policies and procedures encouraging
non-lethal responses to unarmed demonstrators, with a view to
minimizing casualties and friction between the two communities.
The IDF should:
0 Re-institute, as a matter of
course, military police investigations into Palestinian deaths
resulting from IDF actions in the Palestinian territories in
incidents not involving terrorism. The IDF should abandon the
blanket characterization of the current uprising as "an
armed conflict short of war," which fails to discriminate
between terrorism and protest.
0 Adopt tactics of crowd-control
that minimize the potential for deaths and casualties, including
the withdrawal of metal-cored rubber rounds from general use.
0 Ensure that experienced,
seasoned personnel are present for duty at all times at known
friction points.
0 Ensure that the stated values
and standard operating procedures of the IDF effectively instill
the duty of caring for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip as well as Israelis living there, consistent with The
Ethical Code of The IDF.
· The GOI should lift closures,
transfer to the PA all tax revenues owed, and permit Palestinians
who had been employed in Israel to return to their jobs; and
should ensure that security forces and settlers refrain from the
destruction of homes and roads, as well as trees and other
agricultural property in Palestinian areas. We acknowledge the GOI’s
position that actions of this nature have been taken for security
reasons. Nevertheless, their economic effects will persist for
years.
· The PA should renew cooperation
with Israeli security agencies to ensure, to the maximum extent
possible, that Palestinian workers employed within Israel are
fully vetted and free of connections to organizations and
individuals engaged in terrorism.
· The PA should prevent gunmen
from using Palestinian populated areas to fire upon Israeli
populated areas and IDF positions. This tactic places civilians on
both sides at unnecessary risk.
· The GOI and IDF should adopt
and enforce policies and procedures designed to ensure that the
response to any gunfire emanating from Palestinian populated areas
minimizes the danger to the lives and property of Palestinian
civilians, bearing in mind that it is probably the objective of
gunmen to elicit an excessive IDF response.
· The GOI should take all
necessary steps to prevent acts of violence by settlers.
· The parties should abide by the
provisions of the Wye River Agreement prohibiting illegal weapons.
· The PA should take all
necessary steps to establish a clear and unchallenged chain of
command for armed personnel operating under its authority.
· The PA should institute and
enforce effective standards of conduct and accountability, both
within the uniformed ranks and between the police and the civilian
political leadership to which it reports.
· The PA and GOI should consider
a joint undertaking to preserve and protect holy places sacred to
the traditions of Muslims, Jews, and Christians. An initiative of
this nature might help to reverse a disturbing trend: the
increasing use of religious themes to encourage and justify
violence.
· The GOI and PA should jointly
endorse and support the work of Palestinian and Israeli
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) involved in cross-community
initiatives linking the two peoples. It is important that these
activities, including the provision of humanitarian aid to
Palestinian villages by Israeli NGOs, receive the full backing of
both parties.
RESUME NEGOTIATIONS
· We reiterate our belief that a
100 percent effort to stop the violence, an immediate resumption
of security cooperation and an exchange of confidence building
measures are all important for the resumption of negotiations. Yet
none of these steps will long be sustained absent a return to
serious negotiations.
It is not within our mandate to
prescribe the venue, the basis or the agenda of negotiations.
However, in order to provide an effective political context for
practical cooperation between the parties, negotiations must not
be unreasonably deferred and they must, in our view, manifest a
spirit of compromise, reconciliation and partnership,
notwithstanding the events of the past seven months.
· In the spirit of the Sharm
el-Sheikh agreements and understandings of 1999 and 2000, we
recommend that the parties meet to reaffirm their commitment to
signed agreements and mutual understandings, and take
corresponding action. This should be the basis for resuming full
and meaningful negotiations.
The parties are at a crossroads.
If they do not return to the negotiating table, they face the
prospect of fighting it out for years on end, with many of their
citizens leaving for distant shores to live their lives and raise
their children. We pray they make the right choice. That means
stopping the violence now. Israelis and Palestinians have to live,
work, and prosper together. History and geography have destined
them to be neighbors. That cannot be changed. Only when their
actions are guided by this awareness will they be able to develop
the vision and reality of peace and shared prosperity.
Suleyman Demirel
9th President of the Republic of Turkey
Thorbjoern Jagland
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway
George J. Mitchell, Chairman
Former Member and Majority Leader of the United States
Senate
Warren B. Rudman
Former Member of the United States Senate
Javier Solana
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security
Policy, European Union
Footnotes
1 A copy of the statement is
attached.
2 Copies of the President’s
letters are attached.
3 When informed of the planned
visit, Ambassador Dennis Ross (President Clinton’s Middle East
Envoy) said that he told Israeli Minister of Interior Shlomo
Ben-Ami, "I can think of a lot of bad ideas, but I can’t
think of a worse one." See Jane Perlez, "US Envoy
Recalls the Day Pandora’s Box Wouldn’t Shut," The New
York Times, January 29, 2001.
4 U.S. Department of State, Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2000 (Israel), Bureau
of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, February 2001, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rlsi/hrrpt/2000/nea/index.
5 Government of Israel, First
Statement. 28 December 2000 (hereafter "GOI. First
Statement"), ¶187. B’Tselem (The Israeli Information
Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories) reported that
70 police were injured. See Events on the Temple Mount - 29
September 2000: Interim Report, http://www.btselem.org/files/site/Violent
Events/Temple_Mount_2000 eng.as
6 Disturbances also occurred
within Israel’s Arab community, resulting in thirteen deaths.
These events do not fall within the mandate of this Committee and
are the subject of an official GOI inquiry.
7 GOI. First Statement, ¶118.
8 Id., ¶110. According to the
GOI, the Palestinian Minister of Posts and Telecommunications
declared at a rally in Lebanon in March 2001 that the
confrontation with Israel had been planned following the Camp
David Summit. See Government of Israel, Second Statement, 20
March 2001 (hereafter, "GOI, Second Statement"), ¶2.
The PA provided the Committee a translation of a letter from the
Minister, dated March 12. 2001. in which the Minister denied
saying that the intifada was planned, and that his statement in
Lebanon was misquoted and taken out of context. We were told by an
Israeli Defense Force (IDF) intelligence officer that while the
declaration itself was not definitive, it represented an
"open-source" version of what was known to the IDF
through "other means"; knowledge and means not shared by
the IDF with the Committee.
9 Palestine Liberation
Organization. Preliminary Submission of the Palestine
Liberation Organization to the International Commission of
Inquiry, December 8, 2000, p. 10. Note: submissions to the
Committee from the Palestinian side were made by the PLO.
10 Palestine Liberation
Organization. A Crisis of Faith: Second Submission 0/the
Palestine Liberation Organization to the Sharm El-Sheikh
Fact-Finding Committee, December 30, 2000 (hereafter
"PLO, Second Submission"), p. 16.
11 See GOI, First Statement. ¶286.
12 Palestine Liberation
Organization, Third Submission of the Palestine Liberation
Organization to the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, April
3, 2001 (hereafter "PLO, Third Submission"), p. 51.
13 GOI. Second Statement, ¶4.
14 GOI, First Statement, ¶19.
15 PLO, Third Submission, p.
25.
16 Id., pp. 46-50.
17 Id., pp. 27-28
18 PLO, Second Submission, p.
14.
19 Id., pp. 14-15.
20 GOI. Second Statement, ¶82.
21 GOI, First
Statement, ¶99.
22 GOI, Second Statement, ¶
19, referring to the Exchange
of Notes Between the Prime Minister of Israel and the Chairman of
the PLO, 9-10 September 1993.
23 Id.,¶21.
24 Testimony before the United
States House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, 102nd
Congress, May 22. 1991.
25 On March 21, 1980, Secretary of
State Cyrus Vance, speaking on behalf of the Carter
Administration, stated: "U.S. policy toward the establishment
of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories is unequivocal
and has long been a matter of public record. We consider it to be
contrary to international law and an impediment to the successful
conclusion of the Middle East peace process."
On September 1, 1982, President
Ronald Reagan announced what came to be known as The Reagan Plan
for the Middle East, stating that: "[T]he immediate adoption
of a settlements freeze by Israel, more than any other action,
could create the confidence needed for wider participation in
these talks. Further settlement activity is in no way necessary
for the security of Israel and only diminishes the confidence of
the Arabs that a final outcome can be freely and fairly
negotiated."
On December 16, 1996, at a press
conference. President Bill Clinton stated: "It just stands to
reason that anything that preempts the outcome [of the
negotiations] ... cannot be helpful in making peace. I don’t
think anything should be done that would be seen as preempting the
outcome." Asked if he viewed the settlements as an obstacle
to peace, President Clinton replied, "Absolutely.
Absolutely."
On April 5, 2001, a U.S. State
Department spokesman, speaking for the current administration,
stated: "Continuing settlement activity does risk inflaming
an already volatile situation in the region"; he described
that activity as "provocative."
26 There are 400 settlers in the
"H2" sector of central Hebron. and 6.000 in the Kiryat
Arba settlement on the eastern edge of the city. See "An
Introduction to the City of Hebron," published by the
Temporary International Presence in Hebron, http://www.tiph.org
27 Central Intelligence Agency. The
World Factbook 2000, http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gz.html
28 Ha'aretz, English
Language Edition, April 10. 2001, p. 5.
29 GOI, First Statement, ¶286.
30 Id., ¶189.
31 B'Tselem, Illusions of
Restraint. Human Rig/its Violations During the Events in the
Occupied Territories, 29 September-2 December 2000, December
2000, p. 4.
32 GOI First Statement, ¶306.
"The stated policy of the IDF is that whenever a Palestinian
in the Occupied Territories dies at the hands of a soldier, an
investigation is to be made by the Department of Military Police
Investigations (MPI), except in cases defined as ‘hostile
terrorist activity'." See B’Tselem, Illusions of
Restraint, p. 24. See also, Alex Fishman, "The Intifada,
the IDF and Investigations," Yediot Aharonot (in
English, Richard Bell Press, 1996, Ltd.), January 19, 2001.
33 GOI, Second Statement. ¶69-80.
34 PLO, Third Submission, p.
69.
35 Id., p. 60.
36 GOI, Second Statement, ¶78.
37 GOI. First Statement, ¶305.
38 Israel Defense Forces, The
Ethical Code of the Israel Defense Forces. http://www.idf.il/english/doctrine/doctrine.stm
39 See, e.g., U.S. Department of
State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2000 (Occupied
Territories), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/nea/index.
See also, B’Tselem, Illusions of Restraint, pp. 15-16,
reporting on the alleged practice of separating rubber bullets
into individual rounds, as opposed to firing them properly in a
bound cluster of three. Separation increases range and lethality.
40 GOI, Second Statement, ¶92.
41 Id., ¶89. |