Introduction
This EU non-paper has been
prepared by the EU Special Representative to the Middle East
Process, Ambassador Moratinos, and his team after consultations
with the Israeli and Palestinian sides, present at Taba in
January 2001. Although the paper has no official status, it has
been acknowledged by the parties as being a relatively fair
description of the outcome of the negotiations on the permanent
status issues at Taba. It draws attention to the extensive work
which has been undertaken on all permanent status issues like
territory, Jerusalem, refugees and security in order to find
ways to come to joint positions. At the same time it shows that
there are serious gaps and differences between the two sides,
which will have to be overcome in future negotiations. From that
point of view, the paper reveals the challenging task ahead in
terms of policy determination and legal work, but it also shows
that both sides have traveled a long way to accommodate the
views of the other side and that solutions are possible.
1.
Territory
The two sides agreed that in
accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 242, the June
4 1967 lines would be the basis for the borders between Israel
and the state of Palestine.
1.1 West Bank
For the first time both sides
presented their own maps over the West Bank. The maps served as
a basis for the discussion on territory and settlements. The
Israeli side presented two maps, and the Palestinian side
engaged on this basis. The Palestinian side presented some
illustrative maps detailing its understanding of Israeli
interests in the West Bank.
The negotiations tackled the
various aspects of territory, which could include some of the
settlements and how the needs of each party could be
accommodated. The Clinton parameters served as a loose basis for
the discussion, but differences of interpretations regarding the
scope and meaning of the parameters emerged. The Palestinian
side stated that it had accepted the Clinton proposals but with
reservations.
The Israeli side stated that the
Clinton proposals provide for annexation of settlement blocs.
The Palestinian side did not agree that the parameters included
blocs, and did not accept proposals to annex blocs. The
Palestinian side stated that blocs would cause significant harm
to the Palestinian interests and rights, particularly to the
Palestinians residing in areas Israel seeks to annex.
The Israeli side maintained that
it is entitled to contiguity between and among their
settlements. The Palestinian side stated that Palestinian needs
take priority over settlements. The Israeli maps included plans
for future development of Israeli settlements in the West Bank.
The Palestinian side did not agree to the principle of allowing
further development of settlements in the West Bank. Any growth
must occur inside Israel.
The Palestinian side maintained
that since Israel has needs in Palestinian territory, it is
responsible for proposing the necessary border modifications.
The Palestinian side reiterated that such proposals must not
adversely affect the Palestinian needs and interests.
The Israeli side stated that it
did not need to maintain settlements in the Jordan Valley for
security purposes, and its proposed maps reflected this
position.
The Israeli maps were
principally based on a demographic concept of settlements blocs
that would incorporate approximately 80 percent on the settlers.
The Israeli side sketched a map presenting a 6 percent
annexation, the outer limit of the Clinton proposal. The
Palestinian illustrative map presented 3.1 percent in the
context of a land swap.
Both sides accepted the
principle of land swap but the proportionality of the swap
remained under discussion. Both sides agreed that Israeli and
Palestinian sovereign areas will have respective sovereign
contiguity. The Israeli side wished to count "assets"
such as Israelis "safe passage/corridor" proposal as
being part of the land swap, even though the proposal would not
give Palestine sovereignty over these "assets". The
Israeli side adhered to a maximum 3 percent land swap as per
Clinton proposal.
The Palestinian maps had a
similar conceptual point of reference stressing the importance
of a non-annexation of any Palestinian villages and the
contiguity of the West Bank and Jerusalem. They were predicated
on the principle of a land swap that would be equitable in size
and value and in areas adjacent to the border with Palestine,
and in the same vicinity as the annexed by Israel. The
Palestinian side further maintained that land not under
Palestinian sovereignty such as the Israeli proposal regarding a
"safe passage/corridor" as well as economic interests
are not included in the calculation of the swap.
The Palestinian side maintained
that the "No-Man's-Land" (Latrun area) is part of the
West Bank. The Israelis did not agree.
The Israeli side requested an
additional 2 percent of land under a lease arrangement to which
the Palestinians responded that the subject of lease can only be
discussed after the establishment of a Palestinian state and the
transfer of land to Palestinian sovereignty.
1.2 Gaza Strip
Neither side presented any maps
over the Gaza Strip. In was implied that the Gaza Strip will be
under total Palestinian sovereignty, but details have still to
be worked out. All settlements will be evacuated. The
Palestinian side claimed it could be arranged in 6 months, a
timetable not agreed by the Israeli side.
1.3 Safe passage/corridor from
Gaza to the West Bank
Both sides agreed that there is
going to be a safe passage from the north of Gaza (Beit Hanun)
to the Hebron district, and that the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip must be territorially linked. The nature of the regime
governing the territorial link and sovereignty over it was not
agreed.
2.
Jerusalem
2.1 Sovereignty
Both sides accepted in principle
the Clinton suggestion of having a Palestinian sovereignty over
Arab neighborhoods and an Israeli sovereignty over Jewish
neighborhoods. The Palestinian side affirmed that it was ready
to discuss Israeli request to have sovereignty over those Jewish
settlements in East Jerusalem that were constructed after 1967,
but not Jebal Abu Ghneim and Ras al-Amud. The Palestinian side
rejected Israeli sovereignty over settlements in the Jerusalem
Metropolitan Area, namely of Ma'ale Adumim and Givat Ze'ev.
The Palestinian side understood
that Israel was ready to accept Palestinian sovereignty over the
Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, including part of
Jerusalem's Old City. The Israeli side understood that the
Palestinians were ready to accept Israeli sovereignty over the
Jewish Quarter of the Old City and part of the American Quarter.
The Palestinian side understood
that the Israeli side accepted to discuss Palestinian property
claims in West Jerusalem.
2.2 Open City
Both sides favored the idea of
an Open City. The Israeli side suggested the establishment of an
open city whose geographical scope encompasses the Old City of
Jerusalem plus an area defined as the Holy Basin or Historical
Basin.
The Palestinian side was in
favor of an open city provided that continuity and contiguity
were preserved. The Palestinians rejected the Israeli proposal
regarding the geographic scope of an open city and asserted that
the open city is only acceptable if its geographical scope
encompasses the full municipal borders of both East and West
Jerusalem.
The Israeli side raised the idea
of establishing a mechanism of daily coordination and different
models were suggested for municipal coordination and cooperation
(dealing with infrastructure, roads, electricity, sewage, waste
removal etc). Such arrangements could be formulated in a future
detailed agreement. It proposed a "soft border regime"
within Jerusalem between Al-Quds and Yerushalaim that affords
them "soft border" privileges. Furthermore the Israeli
side proposed a number of special arrangements for Palestinian
and Israeli residents of the Open City to guarantee that the
Open City arrangement neither adversely affect their daily lives
nor compromise each party sovereignty over its section of the
Open City.
2.3 Capital for two states
The Israeli side accepted that
the City of Jerusalem would be the capital of the two states:
Yerushalaim, capital of Israel and Al-Quds, capital of the state
of Palestine. The Palestinian side expressed its only concern,
namely that East Jerusalem is the capital of the state of
Palestine.
2.4 Holy/Historical Basin and
the Old City
There was an attempt to develop
an alternative concept that would relate to the Old City and its
surroundings, and the Israeli side put forward several
alternative models for discussion, for example, setting up a
mechanism for close coordination and cooperation in the Old
City. The idea of a special police force regime was discussed
but not agreed upon.
The Israeli side expressed its
interest and raised its concern regarding the area
conceptualized as the Holy Basin (which includes the Jewish
Cemetery on the Mount of Olives, the City of David and Kivron
Valley). The Palestinian side confirmed that it was willing to
take into account Israeli interests and concerns provided that
these places remain under Palestinian sovereignty. Another
option for the Holy Basin, suggested informally by the Israeli
side, was to create a special regime or to suggest some form of
internationalization for the entire area or a joint regime with
special cooperation and coordination. The Palestinian side did
not agree to pursue any of these ideas, although the discussion
could continue.
2.5 Holy Sites: Western Wall
and the Wailing Wall
Both parties have accepted the
principle of respective control over each side's respective holy
sites (religious control and management). According to this
principle, Israel's sovereignty over the Western Wall would be
recognized although there remained a dispute regarding the
delineation of the area covered by the Western Wall and
especially the link to what is referred to in Clinton's ideas as
the space sacred to Judaism of which it is part.
The Palestinian side
acknowledged that Israel has requested to establish an
affiliation to the holy parts of the Western Wall, but
maintained that the question of the Wailing Wall and/or Western
Wall has not been resolved. It maintained the importance of
distinguishing between the Western Wall and the Wailing Wall
segment thereof, recognized in the Islamic faith as the Buraq
Wall.
2.6 Haram al-Sharif/Temple
Mount
Both sides agreed that the
question of Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount has not been resolved.
However, both sides were close to accepting Clinton's ideas
regarding Palestinian sovereignty over Haram al-Sharif
notwithstanding Palestinian and Israeli reservations.
Both sides noted progress on
practical arrangements regarding evacuations, building and
public order in the area of the compound. An informal suggestion
was raised that for an agreed period such as three years, Haram
al-Sharif/Temple Mount would be under international sovereignty
of the P5 plus Morocco (or other Islamic presence), whereby the
Palestinians would be the "Guardian/Custodians" during
this period. At the end of this period, either the parties would
agree on a new solution or agree to extend the existing
arrangement. In the absence of an agreement, the parties would
return to implement the Clinton formulation. Neither party
accepted or rejected the suggestion.
3.
Refugees
Non-papers were exchanged, which
were regarded as a good basis for the talks. Both sides stated
that the issue of the Palestinian refugees is central to the
Israeli-Palestinian relations and that a comprehensive and just
solution is essential to creating a lasting and morally
scrupulous peace. Both sides agreed to adopt the principles and
references with could facilitate the adoption of an agreement.
Both sides suggested, as a
basis, that the parties should agree that a just settlement of
the refugee problem in accordance with the UN Security Council
Resolution 242 must lead to the implementation of UN General
Assembly Resolution 194.
3.1 Narrative
The Israeli side put forward a
suggested joint narrative for the tragedy of the Palestinian
refugees. The Palestinian side discussed the proposed narrative
and there was much progress, although no agreement was reached
in an attempt to develop and historical narrative in the general
text.
3.2 Return, repatriation and
relocation and rehabilitation
Both sides engaged in a
discussion of the practicalities of resolving the refugee issue.
The Palestinian side reiterated that the Palestinian refugees
should have the right of return to their homes in accordance
with the interpretation of UNGAR 194. The Israeli side expressed
its understanding that the wish to return as per wording of
UNGAR 194 shall be implemented within the framework of one of
the following programs:
A. Return and repatriation
-
to Israel
-
to Israel swapped territory
-
to the Palestine state.
B. Rehabilitation and relocation
-
Rehabilitation in host
country.
-
Relocation to third
country.
Preference in all these programs
shall be accorded to the Palestinian refugee population in
Lebanon. The Palestinian side stressed that the above shall be
subject to the individual free choice of the refugees, and shall
not prejudice their right to their homes in accordance with its
interpretation of UNGAR 194.
The Israeli side, informally,
suggested a three-track 15-year absorption program, which was
discussed but not agreed upon. The first track referred to the
absorption to Israel. No numbers were agreed upon, but with a
non-paper referring to 25,000 in the first three years of this
program (40,000 in the first five years of this program did not
appear in the non-paper but was raised verbally). The second
track referred to the absorption of Palestinian refugees into
the Israeli territory, that shall be transferred to Palestinian
sovereignty, and the third track referring to the absorption of
refugees in the context of family reunification scheme.
The Palestinian side did not
present a number, but stated that the negotiations could not
start without an Israeli opening position. It maintained that
Israel's acceptance of the return of refugees should not
prejudice existing programs within Israel such as family
reunification.
3.3 Compensation
Both sides agreed to the
establishment of an International Commission and an
International Fund as a mechanism for dealing with compensation
in all its aspects. Both sides agreed that "small-sum"
compensation shall be paid to the refugees in the
"fast-track" procedure, claims of compensation for
property losses below certain amount shall be subject to
"fast-track" procedures.
There was also progress on
Israeli compensation for material losses, land and assets
expropriated, including agreement on a payment from an Israeli
lump sum or proper amount to be agreed upon that would feed into
the International Fund. According to the Israeli side the
calculation of this payment would be based on a macro-economic
survey to evaluate the assets in order to reach a fair value.
The Palestinian side, however, said that this sum would be
calculated on the records of the UNCCP, the Custodian for
Absentee Property and other relevant data with a multiplier to
reach a fair value.
3.4 UNRWA
Both sides agreed that UNRWA
should be phased out in accordance with an agreed timetable of
five years, as a targeted period. The Palestinian side added a
possible adjustment of that period to make sure that this will
be subject to the implementation of the other aspects of the
agreement dealing with refugees, and with termination of
Palestinian refugee status in the various locations.
3.5 Former Jewish refugees
The Israeli side requested that
the issue of compensation to former Jewish refugees from Arab
countries be recognized, while accepting that it was not a
Palestinian responsibility or a bilateral issue. The Palestinian
side maintained that this is not a subject for a bilateral
Palestinian-Israeli agreement.
3.6 Restitution
The Palestinian side raised the
issue of restitution of refugee property. The Israeli side
rejected this.
3.7 End of claims
The issue of the end of claims
was discussed, and it was suggested that the implementation of
the agreement shall constitute a complete and final
implementation of UNGAR 194 and therefore ends all claims.
4.
Security
4.1 Early warning stations
The Israeli side requested to
have 3 early warning stations on Palestinian territory. The
Palestinian side was prepared to accept the continued operations
of early warning stations but subject to certain conditions. The
exact mechanism has therefore to be detailed in further
negotiations.
4.2 Military capability of the
state of Palestine
The Israeli side maintained that
the state of Palestine would be non-militarized as per the
Clinton proposals. The Palestinian side was prepared to accept
limitation on its acquisition of arms, and be defined as a state
with limited arms. The two sides have not yet agreed on the
scope of arms limitations, but have begun exploring different
options. Both sides agree that this issue has not been
concluded.
4.3 Air space control
The two sides recognized that
the state of Palestine would have sovereignty over its airspace.
The Israeli side agreed to accept and honor all of Palestine
civil aviation rights according to international regulations,
but sought a unified air control system under overriding Israel
control. In addition, Israel requested access to Palestinian
airspace for military operations and training.
The Palestinian side was
interested in exploring models for broad cooperation and
coordination in the civil aviation sphere, but unwilling to cede
overriding control to Israel. As for Israeli military operations
and training in Palestinian airspace, the Palestinian side
rejected this request as inconsistent with the neutrality of the
state of Palestine, saying that it cannot grant Israel these
privileges while denying them to its Arab neighbors.
4.4 Time table for withdrawal
from the West Bank and Jordan Valley
Based on the Clinton proposal,
the Israeli side agreed to a withdrawal from the West Bank over
a 36-month period with an additional 36 months for the Jordan
Valley in conjunction with an international force, maintaining
that a distinction should be made between withdrawal in the
Jordan Valley and elsewhere.
The Palestinian side rejected a
36-month withdrawal process from the West Bank expressing
concern that a lengthy process would exacerbate
Palestinian-Israeli tensions. The Palestinian side proposed an
18 months withdrawal under the supervision of international
forces. As to the Jordan Valley the Palestinian side was
prepared to consider the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces for
an additional 10-month period. Although the Palestinian side was
ready to consider the presence of international forces in the
West Bank for a longer period, it refused to accept the ongoing
presence of Israeli forces.
4.5 Emergency deployment (or
emergency locations)
The Israeli side requested to
maintain and operate five emergency locations on Palestinian
territory (in the Jordan Valley) with the Palestinian response
allowing for maximum of two emergency locations conditional on a
time limit for the dismantling. In addition, the Palestinian
side considered that these two emergency locations be run by
international presence and not by the Israelis. Informally, the
Israeli side expressed willingness to explore ways that a
multinational presence could provide a vehicle for addressing
the parties' respective concerns.
The Palestinian side declined to
agree to the deployment of Israeli armed forces on Palestinian
territory during emergency situations, but was prepared to
consider ways in which international forces might be used in
that capacity, particularly within the context of regional
security cooperation efforts.
4.6 Security cooperation and
fighting terror
Both sides were prepared to
commit themselves to promoting security cooperation and fighting
terror.
4.7 Borders and international
crossings
The Palestinian side was
confident that Palestinian sovereignty over borders and
international crossing points would be recognized in the
agreement. The two sides had, however, not yet resolved this
issue including the question of monitoring and verification at
Palestine's international borders (Israeli or international
presence).
4.8 Electromagnetic sphere
The Israeli side recognized that
the state of Palestine would have sovereignty over the
electromagnetic sphere, and acknowledged that it would not seek
to constrain Palestinian commercial use of the sphere, but
sought control over it for security purposes.
The Palestinian side sought full
sovereign rights over the electromagnetic sphere, but was
prepared to accommodate reasonable Israeli needs within a
cooperative framework in accordance with international rules and
regulations.
Dispute
over Ma'aleh Adumim
The importance of Israel's
recognition of the June 4, 1967 border is that since 1967 (and
even today), Israel's official position has been that UN
Security Council Resolution 242 mandates withdrawal from
"territories" conquered in the Six Day War. The Arab
position, in contrast, is that the resolution requires
withdrawal from "the territories." Israel's official
refusal to recognize the June 4, 1967 borders is currently an
obstacle to Foreign Minister Shimon Peres in his efforts to
reach an agreement with the chairman of the Palestinian
Legislative Council, Ahmed Qureia (Abu Ala). There is no
Palestinian confirmation of Peres' claim that the Palestinians
have accepted the formulation that a final-status agreement will
be based on Resolution 242.
Israel agreed to recognize the
June 4, 1967 border as the basis for the border between Israel
and Palestine after the Palestinians agreed in principle to
discuss territorial swaps in the West Bank, as proposed by
Clinton, that would enable Israel to annex parts of the West
Bank adjacent to the Green Line (but not parts of Gaza). The
maps presented by the Palestinians at Taba gave Israel 3.1
percent of the West Bank. That is less than the lower limit
proposed in the Clinton plan (under which the Palestinians would
receive 94 to 96 percent of the West Bank). Israel demanded 6
percent - the upper boundary of the Clinton plan - plus an
additional 2 percent in the context of a leasing agreement. The
Palestinians also rejected Israel's demand that the "no
man's land" around Latrun not be considered part of the
West Bank.
According to the document,
Israel gave up all the Jordan Valley settlements, focusing
instead on its security interests in that area. The dispute
centered around the large stretch of territory between Ma'aleh
Adumim and Givat Ze'ev, which contains both a fairly large
Palestinian population and East Jerusalem's most important land
reserves. The Palestinians retracted their earlier readiness to
include these two settlements in the settlement blocs to be
annexed to Israel after realizing that Israel also insisted on
annexing the large tract that joins them - which would mean that
Palestinian citizens would suddenly find themselves in sovereign
Israeli territory. Barak instructed his chief negotiator, Gilad
Sher, to tell the Palestinians that the map presented by then
foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami, which reduced the area of the
settlement bloc (including the Ma'aleh Adumim-Givat Ze'ev tract)
to only 5 percent of the West Bank, had no validity.
Another dispute that remained
unresolved stemmed from Israel's refusal to accept the
Palestinian demand for a 1:1 ratio between the area of the West
Bank annexed to Israel and the parts of Israel that would be
given to the Palestinians in exchange. Israel proposed a ratio
of 1:2, in its favor. In addition, the Palestinians rejected
Israel's proposal that the Halutza Dunes in the Negev, the area
of the "safe passage" between the West Bank and Gaza,
and the part of Ashdod Port that would be set aside for
Palestinian use all be considered part of the land swap. They
insisted that the land they received be contiguous with either
the West Bank or Gaza, and that it not include any land that was
merely set aside for their use, over which they would not have
sovereignty. (Akiva Eldar)
How
long is the Western Wall?
The Clinton proposal paved the
way for understandings in Jerusalem, but it also created the
principal dispute between the two parties.
An agreement was reached that
East Jerusalem, which would be called Al-Quds, would be the
capital of Palestine. Understandings were also reached regarding
a division of East Jerusalem's neighborhoods such that Jewish
neighborhoods would remain under Israeli sovereignty (other than
Har Homa, which the first Jewish families are just moving into
now, and Ras al-Amud), while Arab neighborhoods would be
transferred to Palestinian sovereignty. In addition, it was
agreed that parts of the Old City - the Muslim Quarter, the n
Quarter and part of the Armenian Quarter - would be to the
Palestinians.
But the Clinton proposal did not
help the parties to draw mutually accepted borders between the
Open City - to which both sides agreed - and the surrounding
Palestinian areas, on one side, and Israeli areas, on the other.
The Open City is territory that citizens of both countries can
enter without passing through any checkpoints. The Palestinians
wanted it to encompass all of Jerusalem, while the Israelis
wanted it limited to the Old City only.
And the Clinton proposal
complicated negotiations on the most sensitive issue: the
Western Wall. Clinton had referred to "the holy parts"
of the Wall, thereby creating an opening for the Palestinian
claim that only the exposed part of the Wall (the Wailing Wall)
is considered holy to the Jews, and therefore only this part
should be left under Israeli sovereignty. Palestinians claimed
the Western Wall tunnels were part of Haram al-Sharif (the
Temple Mount).
Since the Taba talks ended, many
meetings and seminars have taken place in an effort to close the
gaps, attended by politicians and experts from both sides and
from other countries as well.
Symbols
of sovereignty
Israel insisted that it retain
sovereignty over the "safe passage" between Gaza and
the West Bank, with the Palestinians receiving only usage rights
to the land. With respect to air space, however, Israel adopted
a more generous approach to the sovereignty issue. Nevertheless,
it demanded rights to the use of Palestinian air space,
including for air force training exercises.
The document reveals that the
Palestinians expressed a willingness to accept the principle of
limitations on their armaments and even took Israel's security
needs into account (they agreed to three early warning stations
and two "emergency locations," compared to the five
"emergency locations" Israel had sought in addition to
the early warning stations).
But in all matters relating to
the symbols of sovereignty, the Palestinians took a harder line.
They therefore insisted that an international force man the
"emergency locations," rather than an Israeli one. And
the issue of control over Palestine's international border
remained unresolved for the same reason: the question of who
would man the border control posts.
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