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Towards the end of 2004, the Guardian
newspaper published a series of articles imagining the
world in 2020. In
this extract, Brian Whitaker looks at the future of the
Middle East. The original article is here.
What's the worst that could happen?
The US will blame Iranian interference for
the turmoil in Iraq and will launch military strikes against
the Tehran regime. Resistance to the US will stiffen in Iran
and among Shia Muslims across the region: Shia rebellions
could break out in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. Anarchy
in Iraq will give Kurds the excuse they need to declare
independence and foment a Kurdish uprising in Syria.
The "war on terror" will destroy
al-Qaida as an organisation but it will not dampen Islamist
militancy. Its greatest effect will be to spawn hundreds of
small autonomous groups that prove impossible to monitor.
The Yemeni elections of 2009 will prove to
be the last in the Arab world as governments backtrack on
democracy, blaming the deteriorating security situation. The
EU will deal with that same problem by approving a Middle East
stability pact that lifts all restrictions on weapon sales to
regimes that are deemed to be combating terrorism.
The threat of Islamist terror will
continue to spread beyond the Arab world. London will face its
gravest threat when an Islamist group threatens to explode a
dirty nuclear device unless Britain stops supporting
"Arab lackeys of Zionism and Crusaderism". There
will be no progress towards peace with Israel, so the
Palestinians will abandon their claim for a separate state and
demand equal rights with Israeli citizens.
By 2015, the UN will have accepted a plan
to divide the whole of historic Palestine into a series of
Jewish and Arab cantons, but it will not end the conflict. By
2020, Nato forces sent to implement the plan will still be
struggling to impose peace in the face of stiff resistance
from extremists on both sides.
What's the best that could happen?
The Arab-Israeli conflict will end by 2008
with the creation of a viable Palestinian state, and a peace
treaty between Israel and Syria. All the Arab states, plus
Iran, will then recognise Israel and exchange ambassadors.
Talks can begin on ridding the Middle East of nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons, and by 2012 UN inspectors
will be able to declare the region a WMD-free zone.
Peace with Israel would remove one of the
main driving forces behind Islamic militancy in the region,
which would in turn lead to a decline in terrorism. Political
reform throughout the region would also follow peace, since
Arab leaders would no longer be able to blame Israel for their
countries' problems.
Iraq will avert civil war and stay in one
piece - but only just. Amid the chaos left by its elected
civilian government, the return to military rule later this
decade will be greeted with widespread relief. By 2020, the
Iraqi regime will still be promising elections "next year
or as soon as the situation permits".
Elsewhere, the strategy of gradual but
steady reform is largely successful. By 2020, Saudi Arabia and
the Gulf states will have become constitutional monarchies,
while Yemen, Egypt and Syria will have all held elections that
- for the first time - result in changes of government. In
Africa, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia will be readying
themselves to join the EU, probably by 2030. Libya, which
could be the Mediterranean's fastest-growing tourist
destination by 2020, will remain politically eccentric: all
government decisions will be made by citizens voting on the
net.
What's likely to happen?
How will Iraq be faring in 2020? It will
be a toss-up between rule by Saddam Lite (authoritarianism
with American blessing) and the fragmentation of the state.
The underlying conflicts over religion and ethnicity will take
years to play out - probably through violence, unless a strong
national leader emerges. Continued instability in Iraq will
harm all its neighbours.
But that does not mean the region will
have been dragged into continual conflict. By 2020 there will
be a new generation of Arabs who have known satellite TV and
the internet all their lives; the significance of that should
not be underestimated. So far, globalised media has achieved
three things in the Middle East: it has engaged ordinary Arabs
in international politics in a way that was impossible before;
it has given them a view of western lifestyles that some covet
and others reject; and it has given them a sense of common
Muslim/Arab identity that cuts across borders and the
nationalism of individual states.
The belief that Arabs and Muslims are
victims of American and Israeli designs is almost universal in
the Middle East, as is the feeling that the current leaders
are powerless to do anything about it. One response - the
dominant one at present - is Islamist militancy, but there are
others, especially among the urban young, who want to be like
the rest of the world. Among religious believers, too, there
are many who privately question the confrontational,
backward-looking interpretations of Islamists.
There is a chance that, by 2020, the
fundamentalist trend will have peaked and that new, more
progressive interpretations of Islam will have begun to
emerge. The idea that Arab/Muslim societies can survive as
islands of cultural authenticity or religious purity in a
globalised world is nothing but pure fantasy. Today, Saudi
censors go through every imported newspaper, obliterating
"undesirable" material while millions of Saudi
citizens are able to watch whatever takes their fancy on
satellite television.
Moves towards a form of Islam that is more
compatible with modern life will also be reflected in social
and political changes. The need here is not for cosmetic
democracy but for ideas of tolerance and openness to take
hold, for accountability and transparency in public life, and
for political parties based on policies rather than tribal,
ethnic or religious allegiances.
It's a tall order, but it will have to
happen sometime. The two factors most likely to hold it back
are American policies towards the region and continued
conflict with Israel. It is difficult to imagine that Israeli
voters, at some point before 2020, will not weary of the
strategy pursued by their present government and decide that
there has to be a better way.
Whether American voters will reach the
same conclusion is more doubtful. The old, confrontational
cold war themes play well with American voters when reapplied
to the Arab and Muslim world, but don't really serve American
interests. The best thing the US can do for the Middle East
over the next 16 years is stop prescribing solutions and ask:
"Is there anything we can do to help?" It should
also not be too offended when the reply is "Yes. Please
go away."
Brian Whitaker is the Guardian's Middle
East editor
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