Kuwait: the battle for accountability

Mussallam al-Barrak, a prominent opposition figure in Kuwait, has been released on bail of 10,000 dinars ($35,500) after thousands of protesters marched on the prison where he was being held and police responded with teargas and smoke bombs.

Barrack was arrested last Monday on charges of "undermining the status of the emir". In a speech on 15 October he had reportedlychallenged the emir, saying:

"We will not allow you, your highness, to take Kuwait into the abyss of autocracy … We no longer fear your prisons and your riot batons."

Barrack could face up to five years in jail if convicted. Three other former MPs are on bail, awaiting trial on similar charges.

His release yesterday may cool the political temperature a bit, but it doesn’t address the underlying issue – growing demands across the Arab region for accountable government. 

Kuwait’s emir, like other Arab autocrats, wields executive power (along with other members of his family) while claiming protection from criticism. Article 54 of the Kuwaiti constitution states that “his person is immune and inviolable”.

Unlike other Arab states in the Gulf, though, Kuwait also has a feisty parliament which causes endless trouble for government ministers (many of whom are relatives of the emir). The character of these battles is often reminiscent of the long struggle by the English parliament, from the 17th century onwards, to curb royal power.

Last month the emir dissolved parliament and most opposition groups are boycotting the elections scheduled for 1 December. They are objecting to a change in the electoral law which they see as gerrymandering – an attempt to prevent opposition candidates winning a majority of seats.

So, where is Kuwait heading? The latest unrest has brought a plethora of articles discussing its prospects (see list below). There is widespread acknowledgement that Kuwait – unlike the earlier “Arab Spring” countries – does have the possibility of transforming gradually into a democratic constitutional monarchy, but only if the ruling family recognise before it’s too late that the old order is changing.

Rami Khouri writes:

The critical new element … is the willingness of more than a handful of citizens to publicly challenge the regime and even the ruler by name. 

Also problematic for the Kuwaiti Sabah family is the convergence of several different opposition groups that did not formerly share a common agenda, including youth activists, Islamists, nationalists, anti-corruption groups, progressive forces seeking higher human rights standards, and ordinary citizens who want their voices to be more equitably reflected in the parliament.

Such demands for greater accountability of the ruling elite to their fellow citizens are partly enhanced by the current uprisings across the Arab world, and partly rooted in local grievances that have festered for years in some GCC countries.

When demonstrators first demanded limited constitutional reforms in Bahrain last year, Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries sent in a small military force to make it clear that there would be no adjustment to the power structure in that island state. 

We will soon discover if Kuwait follows suit. Or, the emir of Kuwait may realise that meeting his own citizens’ limited and reasonable calls for political reform is a better route to stability and national consensus than the autocratic manipulation and recurring dismissal of parliament that Kuwaiti rulers have used for decades.

Mary Ann Tétreault adds:

Although some observers might hope for a “real” revolution as a result of the Arab uprisings, Kuwaitis might be better advised to continue their less dramatic, nonviolent pressure to push their reluctant rulers toward constitutional monarchy. 

Yet this strategy is more difficult to pull off today than in the past, thanks to the frequent resort to abuse by security forces and the mobilisation of thousands of angry young men who are no moreLegos to be snapped in place by their “betters” than their elders proved to be. If their dignity continues to be assailed on the streets and in police stations, they might well retaliate in kind.

A continuation of showdowns where the legitimate concerns of the opposition are ignored or belittled has already been shown to be risky. As Kuwaiti activists have noted, allowing a bad situation to deteriorate has its own perils. Should the regime hang back, it could be pushed into reacting rather than leading, ratcheting the conflict to more dangerous levels as each side responds to the last provocation from the other. This scenario would not be good for Kuwait.


Essential reading on Kuwait

Kuwait’s moment of truth (PDF) 
A collection of articles from the Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS)

Kuwait: testing the limits 
Jane Kinninmont, Chatham House (plus briefing paper from last August)

Looking for revolution in Kuwait 
Mary Ann Tétreault, MERIP

Kuwait's historic citizen agitation is worth watching 
Rami Khouri, Agence Global

Kuwait’s protests and the Arab Spring: old roots, new shoots 
Talal al-Rashoud, Egypt Independent

A boiling kettle: Kuwait's escalating political crisis 
Fahed al-Sumait, Jadaliyya 

Posted by Brian Whitaker, 2 November 2012.