by Mohammed al-MaitamiAssociate Professor of
Economics, Sana'a University
Visiting Scholar, University of California, Berkeley
IT IS probably necessary to
begin by restating the most basic principle of macroeconomics which says that the
political, social and military fate of any nation depends greatly upon its economic
success. Today there is no area of economics more vital to a nation's success than its
macroeconomic equilibrium and macroeconomic performance. It is also necessary to restate the most basic tenet of the
institutional economics, which says that a functioning national market cannot exist
without a modern and strong state - without effective legal, administrative, and
regulatory institutions, maintained by the state.
We all have seen the overall deterioration in all aspects
of economic and social life before implementation of the Economic Reform Program (ERP).
The rate of real GDP growth was minus 0.2%, core inflation 75%, budget deficit 17% of GDP,
account balance minus 12% of GDP, GDP per capita $265, unemployment 25%, population below
the poverty line 21%, dramatic fluctuation of Yemen currency from 30 R/D to 140-160 R/D.
Since 1995 the Yemeni government began to implement a
large-scale program of reform. The program was formulated in cooperation with the IMF and
the World Bank and it is considered a liberal program aimed at making the market the
dominant regulator of the economy.
Unfortunately, the outcome of this reform is not
encouraging even though 1995 and 1996 were nominally successful years for the program. Any
shocks have reversed previous optimistic expectations and revealed the underlying
weaknesses of the program. The ERP program has put the cart before the horse.
Of course, there are objective and subjective determinants
of the current situation. In terms of the objective determinants, we may include the
economic backwardness of the country, scarcity of human capital, capital and technology.
Also we could include the international economic situation, particularly the present Asian
economic crisis, which directly effects the Yemeni economy. For example, oil revenue has
decreased to roughly 30% of 1997's level and the budget deficit has risen this year to 13%
because 95% of Yemeni exports are oil products, and 76% of Yemeni exports go to southwest
Asian countries.
In the subjective factors we initially include the absence
of a modern and strong state. Lawlessness, corruption and bribery are widespread in Yemeni
institutions and this poses a major obstacle to any corrective program and more generally
to any development program in Yemen.
All economic and social indicators point to the impeding
of the Economic Reform Program, in spite of the achieved successes in the fields of
monetary and fiscal reform in 1995 and 1996. Even those successes have dissipated in the
years of 1997 and 1998 as a result of first external shock.
Let us look in brief at the main economic indicators,
which were the subject of the reformative process: real GDP growth, the rate of inflation,
budget deficit, national account balance, the coefficient of investment. What do these
indicators show us?
-
Core inflation fell from 75% in 1994 to 20%, 10% and 5% in
1995, 1996 and 1997 respectively, but it rose again to 55% in 1998.
-
The budget deficit as percentage of GDP was reduced from
17% in 1994 to 6%, 4%, and 2% 1995, 1996 and 1997 respectively. Currently it is rising
again to 12%.
-
The deficit in the national account balance fell from
-11.6% in 1994 to -10,1%, 3,5%. -1,5% in 1995,1996, and 1997 respectively, but it is
rising again to -10.0% in 1998.
There are in my view two major factors standing behind the
impeding of the ERP: First, the fragility of the Yemeni state and administrative anarchy.
Second, theoretical weaknesses in the design of the ERP. I am not going to focus my
presentation on the first factor. There are possibly others who will address this factor.
I'd prefer to concentrate a little bit on the second factor. No doubt that without reforms
the Yemeni people would be in far worse condition. There is also no doubt, that our people
have faced far greater hardship than the current hardship resulting from the
implementation of the reform program. These are facts with which it is difficult to argue.
At the beginning of reformative process there were some
positive results which we have previously mentioned. Those achievements were realized
initially with financial support from abroad. But the main goals of growth and sustainable
development (real GDP in material sectors, Coefficient of investment, unemployment) remain
static. The question of investment has not made any significant progress. Investment is a
principle condition for growth and the lack of investment in Yemen has been due to the
lack of an appropriate environment for investments. The FIAS report for Yemen of June 1997
stated that "
constrained public budget, low income level, decentralized
population and difficult physical environment; under-developed legal system and weak
institutional capacity; under-developed local capital markets; and (most critically)
Yemen's high political risk rating, as well as....(the fact that) the state, the
government of Yemen is still viewed as weak, unreliable and lacking credibility."
At the first external shock these achievements
disappeared, because of lack of cohesion of the program. The architects of the economic
reform program assumed that the problems of the Yemeni economy consisted primarily of
government deficits, negative balance of payments, sharp fluctuations in the value of the
Yemeni Rial and the existence of an inefficient and unproductive public sector.
Based upon these assumptions the economic reform program
anticipated that simply relieving the pressure on the balance of payments, reducing the
government deficit through cutting expenditure and cutting government subsidies, making
social services cost effective and privatizing the public sector would achieve domestic
accord and general economic equilibrium. The program assumes that simply freeing market
forces from government regulation and closing inefficient public sector businesses will
allow these market forces to mobilize and establish the proper levels of investment,
production, consumption, importation and exports in light of current resource endowments.
The program ignores that the deeper roots of the economic crisis which are not restricted
to financial and monetary policy, but rather these are merely symptoms on the surface of
more fundamental and ongoing contradictions and difficulties in the material production
and administrative-political management.
The question arises today: is it possible for the market
to operate effectively in the absence of the state or even in its presence, but in a weak
and fragile condition? The answer to this question comes from the World Bank itself in the
statements made in the report of the World Bank in its yearly meeting held in Hong Kong on
23-26 September, 1997: "In the absence of an effective state it is impossible to
produce any economic or social progress... and without protection from theft and violence
and repressive behavior by the state and without a fair judiciary which is able to enforce
its rulings, it is difficult for markets to grow and develop."
The final address by James Wolfensohn, President of the
World Bank Group, to the Board of Governors of the World Bank Group, at the Joint Annual
Discussion on 6-8 October, 1998, confirms our belief that any economic reforms and
measures "... if they do not fight corruption and put in place good governance, if
they do not introduce social safety nets, if they not have the social and political
consensus for reform, if they do not bring their people with them, their development is
endangered and will not last."
Prepared for
delivery at the annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, Chicago, USA,
December 1998. |