The fate of Abu al-Hassan
To execute or not?
Yemeni authorities face a dilemma in deciding what to do with Abu al-Hassan, convicted
killer, kidnapper and self-styled commander of the "Islamic Army"
4 August, 1999
ONE
YEAR - to the day - since President Salih issued a decree introducing the death penalty
for hostage taking, an appeal court has upheld the sentences against two convicted
kidnappers. But there is still scepticism in Yemen as to whether the sentences will
actually be carried out.
Since last August there have been nine serious kidnapping
incidents involving foreign captives, and an unknown number of others in which Yemenis
have been taken hostage. So far, despite the presidential decree, nobody has been executed
and in some cases the kidnappers appear to have gone totally unpunished.
The "Islamic Army"
kidnapping, however, was by far the most serious. Sixteen Western tourists
were seized in Abyan province on December 28 last year and four of them were killed during
a rescue attempt by security forces. Previous kidnaps - at least over the last decade -
had all been bloodless.
As a result of this kidnap, 14 men were put on trial (11
of them in their absence), and three were eventually sentenced to death - including Abu
al-Hassan al-Mihdar, the 28-year-old self-styled commander of the "Islamic Army of
Aden-Abyan".
Abu al-Hassan's sentence has now been confirmed, along
with that of another Yemeni, Abdullah Muhsin Salih al-Junaidi ("Abu Hadhifa").
The third man, a Tunisian teacher who claimed he only acted as interpreter for the
kidnappers, had his death sentence commuted to eight years' imprisonment.
The appeal court's ruling was largely predictable, but
what will happen next is not.
The Yemeni government may at least feel obliged to make an
example of the Abu al-Hassan as the ringleader. It needs to show the world it is taking a
firm stand against terrorism and, if there are no executions in this case - the most
serious kidnapping case to date - its authority will be diminished. Abu al-Hassan is a
charismatic figure, highly respected by his followers, and might - if not executed - be
capable of embarrassing the government further. He has high-level contacts and during the
kidnap he called several of them on his satellite phone - including, according to one
independent witness, President Salih's half-brother, Ali Muhsin. The bill for the phone,
which would confirm all the numbers he called, has failed to materialise.
Whether the government will take that course depends
partly on its assessment of the risk of a backlash from Abu al-Hassan's tribal and
religious supporters. The Islamic Army has already threatened to assassinate the Interior
Minister as a reprisal if sentence is carried out. Within hours of the appeal verdict,
four people died and dozens were injured in a bomb blast in Sana'a. Although the
government has denied a political motive, the timing of the explosion must give strong
grounds for suspicion.
In general, the government's record is one of caution in
cases with a political, tribal or religious dimension: all the recent executions, so far
as can be ascertained, have been for straightforward criminal murders.
After Abu al-Hassan's appeal, the next stage is that any
execution must be approved by the president - and this gives the government some room for
manoeuvre, or at least delay. There is, for example, the case of Yemen's most famous
ex-prisoner, Mansour Rajih, a poet and political writer who was kept for 15 years on death
row awaiting presidential confirmation of his execution. He was eventually released in
February 1998. From the government's standpoint, continued imprisonment under the threat
of execution might be the best option in Abu al-Hassan's case. It would, in effect, turn
Abu al-Hassan into a hostage whose life would be spared so long as his supporters behaved
themselves.
The other possibility is that relatives of the dead
tourists could get the authorities off the hook by requesting clemency and/or accepting
blood money, as they are entitled to do in murder cases under Islamic law. However, it
appears from first reports of the appeal court's ruling that blood money might be
acceptable in addition to execution rather than instead of it. The reason seems to
be that the death sentences apply to the act of kidnapping as well as to the murder
charges.
Despite these uncertainties, because of the high-profile
nature of the case Yemen Gateway's view is that Abu al-Hassan is more likely to be
executed than spared.
[Editor's update: abu al-Hassan was
eventually executed on 17 October 1999. See list of executions
in Yemen] |