Gunfight in Abyan

A reconstruction of the events that led to the deaths of four tourists held hostage in Abyan, and discusses the questions that still need to be answered

Text last updated 8 January 1999

THE ABDUCTION of 16 tourists - and the subsequent deaths of four of them - has left a trail of political havoc as great as any small bunch of guerrillas could ever hope to achieve.

First reports suggested that this was just another tribal kidnapping, of the kind that Yemen has seen so many times before. The hostages (12 Britons, two Australians and two Americans) would be well cared-for and, probably after protracted negotiations, would be released unharmed - as had always happened in the past.

Within a few hours, however, the tone of the reports had changed, suggesting that this kidnapping was different, and the tourists were hostages of Islamic Jihad. Meanwhile, the Yemeni authorities assured the British ambassador they were seeking a peaceful solution. But that is not how it turned out.

The shoot-out

THE HOSTAGES were driven northwards about 10km from the main road to an area of  rocks and scrubland. On the way they were seen by local tribesmen who recognised some of the kidnappers. Traders from a village nearby sold them bottled water and bread. That night, they ate around a campfire then slept in the open.

Early on the second day (December 29) an elderly tribal leader, Hathemi Aishal, who was acting as a go-between, brought drinks and biscuits. But he was told not to come back, or he would be killed. About two hours later, government troops approached. A battle ensued, with the kidnappers shielding themselves behind hostages as they fired at the army.

How and why the shoot-out started is still a mystery. Initial Yemeni claims that the troops opened fire only after the kidnappers had begun to kill the hostages, are not supported by the hostages' own accounts. But at least one of the hostages has also said it was impossible to tell who fired first.

More recent Yemeni statements have back-tracked slightly, suggesting that rather than actually starting to kill the hostages, the kidnappers had threatened to do so. The Interior Minister, General Hussein Arab (right), now says that the kidnappers refused to negotiate. "If their demands were not met within one hour, they said they would decapitate them [the hostages]".

There seem to be two possible explanations for why the shooting started. Either the security forces took a calculated decision that a rescue attempt - with all the attendant risks - was the only viable option, or the situation somehow got out of hand, possibly when one side or the other panicked.

Surrounding the kidnappers with troops appears to be a normal practice in other Yemen kidnappings - presumably to prevent the hostages being moved. It would not necessarily indicate an intention to attack. The Yemeni authorities almost certainly knew quite a lot about the kidnappers but so far there is no independent evidence as to what they knew or believed about the kidnappers' intentions. They may well have had information which persuaded them that a rescue attempt was imperative, but if so, we have yet to learn precisely what it was.

A number of journalists covering the story in Yemen, as well as some military pundits, have concluded that the rescue was "bungled". The Yemenis, on the other hand, can point to dozens of earlier kidnappings which they have handled successfully, without any casualties among the hostages. Although most of the survivors have been non-committal in public, the Australian survivor, Catherine Spence, issued a written statement on January 5 defending the army's conduct:

"Had different action been taken I cannot begin to guess whether the result would have been 20 dead or 20 living hostages … Statements made later by our drivers confirm that the terrorists were shouting to the army that they intended to shoot us.

"They [the army] did not begin their 'assault' until after they had been spotted by the terrorists who opened fire on them. I have no dispute with the Yemeni army's statement that once the shooting began they believed they had no choice but to act as quickly as possible … Blame, if blame must be assigned, can lie only with those who took us hostage." The statement added that Ms Spence was aware of previous kidnappings in Yemen and the tour group had a military escort in the Marib area.

There are also several puzzling questions about the kidnappers' behaviour. If they simply intended to kill the hostages, why did they not do so at the first opportunity? If they weren't intending to kill them, what were they going to do? Did they intend to stay in the spot where they camped overnight? If not, where were they heading?

The accounts suggest they were unprepared for a long siege in the open: there was talk on the fatal morning of going to a market to buy vegetables. The accounts of their kindly behaviour towards the captives do not necessarily indicate harmless intentions: it may have been a way of maintaining control over them.

The diplomatic row

SHORTLY after the shoot-out, the press attache at the Yemeni embassy in London phoned news organisations to tell them the hostages had been rescued. Some of the kidnappers had been killed and the remainder arrested, but unfortunately, three of the hostages had also died [a fourth died later from injuries].

Presented in this way, it suggested that the Yemenis - far from regarding the military operation as a disaster - considered it reasonably successful in the circumstances. Given that violent death in Yemen is by no means uncommon, that view might even have been accepted if the victims had been Yemenis and not foreigners.

The shock in Britain was undoubtedly made worse by the earlier observations in the press and on television that kidnappers in Yemen tended to be amiable rogues who meant no harm to their hostages. But the British government was also annoyed at the apparently off-hand way it had been treated. It appeared that the British ambassador in Sana'a had not been kept properly informed and that the Yemeni authorities had gone back on previous assurances that they would seek a peaceful solution.

One of the fundamental problems on the diplomatic front is the cultural gap between the governments of western countries (such as Britain) and Yemen. In the west, official information is precisely recorded, analysed and then released in a fairly disciplined manner. In Yemen, rumour and rhetoric tend to get in the way of facts. As journalists and others who visit the country rapidly discover, reliable facts are hard to find. Everyone claims to "know", but what they know can be entirely different from what the next person knows.

When the ambassador, Victor Henderson, met the Interior Minister in the hope of finding out precisely what had happened, the meeting proved curt, short and uninformative. The Yemeni ambassador to London, Dr Hussein al-Amri, was then summoned to the Foreign Office twice in the space of two days for what, in undiplomatic language, amounted to a stern talking-to.

This took British-Yemeni relations into a sensitive area, impinging on Yemen's sovereignty and right to control its own affairs, against Britain's entitlement to protection for its citizens. The outcome was that Yemen agreed to let British and American investigators into the country, but relations took another turn for the worse on January 2 when it emerged that the Yemenis had been aware of a threat to British interests in Yemen, and yet had not informed the British authorities.

Again, the exact nature of this threat is not known for certain. Some reports have suggested there was a specific threat to kidnap Britons, but it may not have been as clear as that. The threat seems to have become known to the Yemeni authorities after a number of people - seven of them now said to be Britons - were arrested in Aden on December 23. The initial report (Agence France Presse, December 31), which was attributed to the Interior Minister, said that weapons had been found in an Islamic Jihad vehicle in Aden and thatthe occupants were preparing to attack the British consulate, a UN office and the homes of American officers working to clear mines.

Early in January, however, a different version emerged when security officials gave details of a "bomb factory" which was allegedly discovered in Aden on December 23. The story reported in The Times (January 5) and the Yemeni paper, al-Ayyam, is that two men, Malik Mohsen Fadil (described as a Yemeni) and Hamza Ali Said (described as a Pakistani) arrived at al-Wafa hotel in the Crater district of Aden on December 9. They claimed to have come from London and produced old-style British passports which looked new and were initially thought to be faked. After 10 days they were joined in the hotel by Ahmed Sarmad (also known as Muhsin Galen), described an Iranian, who had a similar British passport. The three men left the hotel but checked in again at 2.30 am on December 23. Two hours later, police arrived and, according to The Times, found the men assembling bombs. The men are said to have told police that their leader was Abu Hassan, who was later arrested for the kidnapping. They allegedly had a list of targets which included the Anglican church in Aden, the Moevenpick Hotel, the Royal Hotel (used by US troops working on mine-clearance) and the Ras Morbat Clinic (which was founded by the British).

More arrests apparently followed, because on January 6, the Interior Minister claimed that in total seven Britons were under arrest [see running story].

The first casualty of the diplomatic row was Yemen's application to join the British Commonwealth, which was originally submitted in 1997. On January 3, the junior Foreign Office minister, Tony Lloyd, said it would be rejected because Yemen "does not meet the entry criteria on good governance". The following day, Yemen said it would withdraw the application - adding that it had been encouraged to apply by the previous Conservative government.

Yemeni-British relations deteriorated further on January 5 when arguments broke out over the role of British investigators. The issue is particularly sensitive because Britain is the former colonial power in south Yemen.

Abd al-Majid Zindani, one of the most outspoken figures in the opposition Islah party told al-Hayat newspaper: "We refuse any interference by foreigners in our legal system, whether they are from Britain, the United States or anywhere else ... It is an attack on our sovereignty." He continued: "If we open this door to foreigners they will push it wider open and could send us observers to monitor our administration and finances."

Later, Agence France Presse quoted the Interior Minister, General Hussein Arab, as saying that the British and American investigators were "not participating" either directly or indirectly in the inquiry into the deaths of the hostages. "The people from the FBI and Scotland Yard are only here to get the results of the inquiry by the Yemeni security services and to shed light on the crime."

On January 6, The Times reported that local security officials in Aden had told two of the four detectives from Scotland Yard's anti-terrorist branch to leave the city on the next available flight. However, it appeared that they had not been asked to leave the country.

At this stage, British and Yemeni authorities seem to have realised that the row was getting out of hand. The dispute involving the detectives was rapidly smoothed-over as a "bureaucratic hitch" and Britain insisted that it had not changed its views on Yemen's Commonwealth application. Publicly at least, everyone was co-operating.

Who were the kidnappers?

AT LEAST 19 men took part in the kidnapping. Three were arrested and two were killed. Those mentioned so far in news reports are:

• "Abu Hassan", 28, said to be the leader. Real name: Zain al-Abdin abu-Bakr al-Mihdar. Fought with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. Arrested.

• Ali al-Khadr al-Haj, 25. Taxi driver from Kokab village, about 2km from where the shoot-out took place. Killed.

• Saad Muhammad Ali Atif. Arrested.

• Ahmed Muhammad Ali Atif. Brother of Saad. Arrested.

• "Osama al-Masri". Egyptian terrorist known and wanted by the authorities in Cairo. The name is an alias. Killed.

• Four Algerians. Took part but escaped, according to the Yemeni newspaper, al-Usbu'a (31.12.98).

• Two Somalis. Also took part but escaped, according to the Yemeni newspaper, al-Usbu'a (31.12.98).

What did the kidnappers want?

THE FURORE between the British and Yemeni governments and the personal tragedies among the hostages have distracted attention from the kidnappers themselves. Very little is known for certain about their demands because most of the published information has come indirectly through third parties, including the Yemeni authorities.

There have been repeated assertions that they were seeking the release of a number of prisoners. Initially, the name of one Islamic Jihad prisoner, Sheikh Salih Haidara al-Atawi, was repeatedly mentioned, but it is understood there were others - and possibly some who did not belong to Jihad. More recently, the Yemeni authorities have emphasised that the British passport-holders arrested in Aden on December 23 were included on the list. Demands for the release of prisoners are common in ordinary tribal kidnappings, and it may eventually turn out that a relatively small local issue was at the root of this one.

However, the kidnappers did mention the American and British bombing of Iraq to their hostages - though it is not clear what importance should be attached to this. As a result, two wildly divergent views of the kidnapping have emerged. One sees it mainly as reprisal for the confrontation with Iraq, probably orchestrated by Osama bin Laden. The other attributes it mainly to local Yemeni issues, in particular the authorities' attempts to subdue Jihad and its associates.

Although some of the kidnappers are believed to be members of the local al-Fadli tribe, one of those killed has been identified as an Egyptian who was wanted for terrorism by the Egyptians in Cairo. This is one indication that the kidnapping may not have been a simple local affair. A statement in the name of the "Aden-Abyan Islamic Army" claimed responsibility for seizing the tourists and said the action was partly aimed at freeing Islamic Jihad members under arrest in Yemen, but also at ending "Western aggression against Iraq". Last August the same group issued a statement announcing its support for bin Laden declaring "total war" on American interests in Yemen.

American military involvement in Yemen has been particularly controversial during the past year - and not only among the more extreme Islamists. In the space of a few months there have been three joint military exercises - the first ever between the two countries. There were also seven visits by senior military delegations - the most recent when General Anthony Zinni, head of US Central Command, met President Salih on December 12 - plus several courtesy visits by US warships to Yemeni ports.

Officially, the Americans are helping to clear mines left behind in the south after the 1994 war. However, there have been persistent rumours - denied by both sides - that the US wants to establish a military base in Yemen. Various locations have been suggested, including Socotra island and the Red Sea port of Mukha.

Islamic Jihad and Bin Laden

THE GROUP responsible for the Yemen kidnapping has long-standing links with Osama bin Laden, the millionaire terrorist wanted by the US in connection with the embassy bombings last summer.

In many ways, bin Laden is a convenient villain to blame - so much so that if he did not already exist, someone similar would surely have to be invented. It suits governments everywhere to blame sinister outside forces, rather than admit that local terrorism may have largely local causes. It suits the West to blame one elusive man rather than confront the real - and often difficult - issues in its relationship with Islam. And it suits the terrorists themselves to exaggerate their importance by claiming international links which may in reality be slender or non-existent.

Bin Laden's connection with Yemen, however, is special. His family came from Aden but most of them fled to Saudi Arabia in 1967 when the British left and the Marxists took over. Osama was a teenager at the time. The connection with Yemen resumed in the early 1990s - long before Osama became an international celebrity.

Islamic Jihad began in Yemen in a small way with a mixture of religious zealots, unemployed warriors and tribesmen. The "Islamic Army" that claimed responsibility for last week's kidnappings does not exist, according to the Yemeni authorities. In a formal sense, they are probably right, but the people behind it are real enough: members of Islamic Jihad or a faction within it.

Despite the religious connotations of the name "Jihad", it has never been entirely clear what the organisation's primary was aim is or, indeed, whether it has one. At one level Jihad could be regarded as part of a world-wide Islamic struggle which, in its early stages had a marked anti-Soviet emphasis which later found its Yemeni parallel in waging war on the Yemeni Socialist Party. But, as far as some of its supporters during the early 1990s were concerned, that merely provided a moral cloak for what were essentially parochial interests and personal grievances. Any or all of its diverse elements may well have considered themselves the "real" Jihad, each trying to make use of the others through a tactical alliance. The confusion of purposes is highlighted by the fact that some of those involved also had links to a 1979 terrorist campaign in south Yemen which was organised and funded by the American CIA, with assistance from Britain and Saudi Arabia.

Jihad first appeared in Yemen in the early 1990s when the country became a popular haven for veterans of the Afghan war. The "Arab Afghans" (as they are known) were Muslim volunteers who had fought against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, alongside bin Laden.

After the Soviet withdrawal, the "Afghans" formed a loose alliance with various southern Yemenis who had grievances against the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP), the Marxists who ruled the south until 1990.

The most prominent among these was Sheikh Tariq al-Fadli (right). Before the Marxist take-over an estimated 50% of all southern exports had passed through the Fadli family's businesses. They controlled one of the big cotton plantations outside Aden, plus numerous jinns. More importantly, they also controlled the water supply. Very soon after the establishment of Marxist rule the Fadlis moved to Saudi Arabia.

Following unification of north and south Yemen in 1990, however, Sheikh Tariq - the son of a former sultan - returned to Yemen to claim his inheritance. For what may have been purely opportunist reasons, he allied himself with the "Afghans" and became a leading light in Jihad.

The bin Ladens were another Yemeni family driven out by the Marxists. They came originally from Aden but moved to Saudi Arabia, where they prospered. Today there are about 50 of them - Saudi citizens - with interests mainly in construction. They are considered one of the wealthiest non-royal families in the kingdom, and recently won a huge contract to refurbish Aden airport.

During the Afghan war of the late 1980s, Osama bin Laden - in common with many other Saudi businessmen - saw a religious duty to support the Islamic rebels financially against Moscow's puppet regime. He could afford to be more generous than most, and he also became more deeply involved than most. Not only did he pay for weapons and what, by his own account, were thousands of Muslim volunteers from the Middle East and North Africa to join the mujahideen, he went there himself and took part in the fighting.

Using the resources of his construction business, he blasted new guerrilla trails across the mountains and tunnelled into the rock to create underground hospitals and arms dumps. Meanwhile bin Ladin's relations with the Saudi authorities had become strained and in 1989 they confiscated his passport. He was later disowned by his family and stripped of his Saudi citizenship.

Meanwhile, newly-unified Yemen was in political turmoil. The two former ruling parties of north and south - the General People's Congress and the YSP (which by then had abandoned Marxism) - were trying to govern as a coalition but could agree on very little. Jihad began a wave of attacks on YSP targets, partly because they regarded the party as godless, but also because some of them wanted revenge for the way their families had been treated.

Northern elements in the government made only half-hearted attempts to stop Jihad. They had little reason to do so, since at that stage they benefited politically from its activities, but in any case their security forces were probably inadequate for the task.

They did, however, come to the conclusion that Osama bin Laden was funding Jihad, and in 1993 applied unsuccessfully for his extradition from Khartoum. During the same period, other governments accused bin Laden of funding Islamic struggles in countries as far apart as Albania, Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, Romania, Russia, Syria, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and the United States.

In 1994 war broke out between the former regimes of north and south Yemen, with the south attempting to secede. Tariq al-Fadli and his Jihad supporters rallied to the cause of the northern president, Ali Abdullah Salih, and helped to secure his victory. Although a whole army brigade had tried - and failed - to arrest Fadli before the war, afterwards he was rehabilitated, joining the president's party and becoming an appointed member of the upper house of parliament, the Consultative Council. This might be construed as rewarding terrorism, but it followed a common Yemeni practice of incorporating troublemakers into the system in order to control them.

After the 1994 war and the collapse of the Socialist Party in the south, the government in Sana'a was anxious to see the emergence of a new southern leadership which would help to maintain social control. Allowing tribalism to be revived was one solution. As "sultan" of Lower Abyan, Fadli would be expected to exercise his authority over tribesmen in one of the most troublesome areas. Fadli in turn, according to Yemeni sources, attempted to incorporate and control the troublemakers in his territory. Among these was Salih Haidara al-Atawi, who was made Sheikh of al-Husn ("a very revolutionary area", according to one source).

After the 1994 war, Islamic Jihad split. About 60 per cent of its members left, including Fadli. The remainder dispersed into three smaller groups, based in the provinces of Marib, Abyan and al-Jawf. It was the Abyan group - said to have about 200 members - which carried out Monday's attack.

The camp at Huttat

TWO  starkly opposed views of the kidnapping have emerged in Yemen. One links it strongly to Bin Laden and sees it as a reprisal for the American and British bombing of Iraq last December. The other sees it essentially as a local quarrel between Jihad and the authorities. According to this view, the kidnapping occurred after plans to integrate Jihad into the Yemeni army collapsed.

The idea of absorbing terrorists into the armed forces might seem odd, but the idea was to control them by incorporating them into the system. It would not be the first time that has happened in Yemen.

Jihad has a military-Islamic training camp at Huttat in the Maraqisha mountains, 35 km from the Abyan coast. In many ways this is similar to the bin Laden camp bombed by the Americans in Afghanistan. It is said to have instructors from various countries and to be "virtually impregnable". Last May, Yemeni police and troops used heavy artillery and helicopter gunships to attack the camp after complaints from tribal and community leaders - with little effect.

After the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania last summer, which were blamed on Bin Laden's organisation, Yemen came under further pressure from the Americans to close the camp at Huttat, and has been attempting to do so. It has also been quietly expelling suspected "Afghans" and refusing admission to Arab passport-holders who do not arrive directly from their own country.

Eventually, a solution was proposed which involved disbanding the camp and integrating Jihad into the armed forces. In November, according to the Yemeni newspaper al-Umma, Jihad issued a list of 28 demands in return for evacuating the camp. These included provision of basic services such as water and electricity in the surrounding area. More controversially, according to the paper, they also demanded that Arab veterans of the Afghan war should be granted political asylum. This would have been difficult for the government to accept because many are wanted for terrorist crimes. A visit to Huttat by an assistant of Bin Laden early in December (also reported by  al-Umma) coincided with discussions about its future.

Unofficial sources in Yemen say an agreement was reached to vacate the camp and integrate Jihad into the army. However, the agreement broke down, culminating in an armed clash with security forces on December 18 during which Sheikh Atawi, described as the group's leader, was arrested. Tariq al-Fadli (apparently in his capacity as Atawi's sultan rather than as a former member of Jihad) intervened unsuccessfully on his behalf. Atawi's release was the kidnappers' principal demand, and this has led some Yemeni sources to argue that the kidnapping was essentially a local affair, resulting from a dispute between Jihad and the government. An anonymous source quoted by Agence France Presse said: "The agreement between the group and the government was not honoured and that led to the kidnapping. It was nothing to do with Iraq, it was about local politics."

But not all the evidence fits such a simple explanation. According to a British newspaper, the Sunday Telegraph, American intelligence officers who have gone to Yemen to investigate the shoot-out, believe the tourists were kidnapped as "direct retribution" for US and British air attacks on Iraq.

There is little doubt that the Huttat camp serves more than just the local Islamists and has international links.

One of the kidnappers who died in the December 29 shoot-out was identified by Yemeni officials as "Osama al-Masri", an Egyptian. The name is an alias, but Egyptian authorities say they know the man and he is a wanted Islamic extremist. The Yemeni newspaper al-Usbu'a (31.12.98) claimed that four Algerians and two Somalis also took part in the kidnapping. The kidnappers were well-equipped, and although rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons are easy to obtain in Yemen, they also had a laptop computer and satellite telephone, which implies substantial funding - possibly from outside.

One of the suspects arrested in connection with the Nairobi bombing had a Yemeni passport, though the authorities in Sana'a denied he was of Yemeni nationality and said his passport was forged. There have also been reports that Yemenis were among those killed when the US struck back at bin Laden's camp in Afghanistan.

The shoot-out with the kidnappers on December 29 occurred on the anniversary of one of Jihad's most famous exploits: the Aden hotel bombings of 1992 which killed an Austrian tourist and a hotel worker, as well as injuring two Jihad members. The attacks, in which Tariq al-Fadli was implicated, were thought to be a protest at the presence of US military in Aden to help with the Somali relief operation, or perhaps to the sale of alcohol and westernisation in the city's two leading hotels. Six people were arrested but later escaped from jail.

What next?

WITH the benefit of hindsight, Yemen now stands accused of doing both too little and too much. Too little to warn about the risks to tourists, and too much in confronting the kidnappers with force. The diplomatic wreckage may take years to clear up.

One of the immediate effects on Yemen will be economic. The tourism industry - which in 1997 earned $69 million - can expect a huge setback as travel companies remove Yemen from their brochures. Although tourism accounts for only about 3.5% of Yemen's total annual budget, over the last four years it has been one of the most promising growth areas.

If it turns out that the kidnapping was nothing more than a local quarrel between Jihad and the Yemeni government, the consequences for tourism may be less severe, but the government, and the Interior Minister in particular, would be in even more trouble with Britain over their handling of the affair. However, there is a belief in Yemen that the arrests in Aden may neutralise the worst effects and put Britain on the spot if the nationality of the suspects is confirmed as British.

On the other hand, if British and American investigations reveal that Jihad is not than just a local problem and that its international links are real and strong, the security forces' tough approach towards the kidnappers will appear more excusable. But in that case the Yemeni authorities will come under enormous pressure from the West to eradicate Jihad. That, again, will raise issues of sovereignty. The more the Yemeni government tries to please the West by suppressing Jihad, the more it risks an internal backlash - not just from extremists, but from ordinary Yemenis who dislike the West telling them what to do.

Finally, what if it turns out that the kidnapping was indeed a "direct retribution" for the bombing of Iraq? If the quarrel with Saddam continues, could British or American "soft targets" such as tourists find themselves under attack elsewhere? And what would that do for British and American strategy in the region?