A couple of useful articles about Yemen in the September issue of The Majalla. In the first, Professor Fawaz Gerges of the London School of Economics discusses Yemen's summer of discontent. He writes:

What is alarming about the growing brazenness and activism of [al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula] is its linkage to Yemen’s deepening social and political crises, cleavages and stagnant state institutions. For example, AQAP is manipulating and leveraging its tribal connections in the south to gain a foothold in the rising separatist movement there. This strategy comes at a critical time. A secessionist movement in the south has gained momentum, with a sizable segment of southern public opinion demanding a divorce from the forced union imposed by the north in the early 1990s.

What the al-Qaeda branch has tried to do is to submerge and embed itself in these raging local conflicts, particularly in the south, mainly in the Shabwa and adjacent Abyan provinces, and to position itself as the spearhead of opposition and armed resistance to the central government in Sana’a. For example, just a few days ago, government forces battled the opposition and al-Qaeda elements to regain control over the city of Loudar [or Lawdar] in Abyan province, leaving dozens dead from both camps and forcing thousands of people from their homes.

The Majalla also has an interview with the Yemeni-Swiss scholar, Elham Manea, who makes some pertinent points about  the Houthi conflict, the baneful influence of religious "scientific institutes" and the weakness of the Yemeni state:

The tribal sector has always complicated the Yemeni context and the problem has to do with the fact that Yemen has a weak state. This has led to a situation in which you have areas that are pockets of tribal rule. The central government had no authority over these areas. The tribal factor is a problem, but one can try at least to use the tribal system in an advantageous way. However, I do believe that it will not be possible to create a strong state in Yemen without breaking the tribal institutions as independent from the state. Yemen needs a coherent policy towards the tribal system.

On the Houthi conflict:

Until today, I would say that the government has not been part of the solution. In addition to the weak capacity of the state, if you look at the way the conflict started you realize that the Yemeni leadership supported the Houthis in the past before they rebelled against the government. The government did this as part of their own politics of survival. The Yemeni leadership was trying to weaken the Islah Party, an Islamic party that presented a strong opposition to the government at the time. In attempting to weaken the Islah Party by supporting a counter Zaydi group, the government’s policies backfired. 

Today when you look at the issue of the Houthis in the Saada region you realize that those who were supporting the Houthis before were tribes that did not necessarily share the same sectarian belief of the Houthis. But they supported them as a response to the heavy-handed policies of the army and their own perception that the government had not delivered services to their region.

On the "institutes":

In my opinion Yemen has lost a whole generation because of the type of education that was provided through what were called “scientific institutes.” These institutes were religious institutes preaching a salafi and wahhabi interpretation, which is extremist and pro jihad. We lost this generation also because this type of school came within a context when North and South Yemen were competing against each other. At the same time, North Yemen and Saudi Arabia were trying to combat the communist ideology of the South of Yemen. So now we have a generation that is more or less formed by the extremist ideology of wahhabism. I personally wouldn’t be surprised to see that there is a significant portion of young people who might be sympathetic to the message of Bin Laden.

These institutions were closed after 9/11, which was a good step. Nevertheless, what is very surprising is the example of a university like al-Imam. This university is led by Zindani, a well-known Salafia sheikh with connections to Osama bin Laden. He has been known for being sympathetic to Bin Laden’s message, yet the university is allowed to work freely and without any government supervision. I would be surprised if this university taught its students a message of tolerance. This is why I say that until today the government has not acted in a manner that corresponds to its words. If you are really serious about combating extremism in Yemen then you should address the root of the problem.

Posted by Brian Whitaker, 1 September 2010.