With a new government sworn in and relative calm returning to the streets in Yemen, this seems an appropriate moment to take stock.

On Sunday, the Yemen Observer reported that sandbags and soil barriers were being removed as armed tribesmen, troops and armored vehicles withdrawn from parts of the capital, Sanaa. This, the paper said, is in line with a plan to make the military and security situation "as normal as it was before January 2011" when large-scale protests against President Saleh's rule first erupted.

Restoring the pre-January status quo (without Saleh as president, of course) is what the GCC's "transition" proposal is really about, and the rest of the international community seems happy to play along with it. Yemenis have gone through almost a year of mayhem – for what, exactly?

So far, all they have got is Saleh's signature formally handing his powers to Vice-President Hadi, while members of Saleh's family continue to hold key positions in the security apparatus. Meanwhile, Saleh – who officially retains his title for the time being – is doing his best to act presidentially. On Friday, it was Saleh rather than Hadi who sent the customary annual cable to King Hamad, congratulating him in Bahrain's national day. A day later, Hadi sent his own cable to Bahrain – not to the king but to the crown prince.

Even if Saleh is finally eased out of the presidency in February, when his successor is due to be elected, he and his family will still be around to haunt the political scene. There also appears to be a private understanding that Saleh and his cronies will not be prosecuted – at least while they remain in Yemen.

This makes Yemen's starting point a lot messier than in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, where Ben Ali, Mubarak and Gaddafi were all removed from the scene before a transition got under way. In Tunisia and Egypt, the presidential parties were also dismantled; in Yemen, Saleh's General People's Congress party remains in government, temporarily sharing power on a 50-50 basis with a collection of opposition parties. 

Secondly, there are doubts about Hadi's ability to hold the country together. "Will he be able to direct military and security institutions in a coordinated, constructive way?" the Yemen Times asks. It's an important question, especially since other contenders for power (and their armed supporters) are likely to continue jostling for position.

Nor is Hadi's authority and legitimacy going to be enhanced if the presidential election in February turns out to be a shoe-in. Currently there is talk of Hadi being the only candidate – though that is forbidden by the constitution.

The power-sharing government replicates an earlier experiment in 1990 following the unification of north and south Yemen. It didn't work then – war broke out four years later after a long series of quarrels – and there's no reason to suppose it will work better this time.

Yemen at present faces so many basic problems – jobs, security, water and electricity supplies, etc – that the real need is for ministers to bury their political differences for the time being and get on with solving them. It's very difficult to see that happening, especially without a concerted effort to tackle the underlying systemic problems of privilege and corruption.

In the unlikely event that ministers do manage to work as a team, that still means the next phase, as the Yemen Times puts it, "will be one of ministers and not parliamentarians". 

As in other Arab countries, a shift towards parliamentary government, and away from autocratic government by presidents, kings and ministers, is the key to political development. One of the major flaws in the GCC plan is that it doesn't provide for parliamentary elections in February along with those for the presidency.

The current parliament (dominated by Saleh's GPC) was elected in 2003. It is illegitimate and also probably unrepresentative of public opinion in Yemen today. The elections due in 2009 were postponed for two years, and then postponed again earlier this year.

"This is dangerous," the Yemen Times continues, "as it means there is no mechanism given to the people by which they can participate in the shaping of their future – outside of political parties, that is. This also means that the independent youth and any other groups in society have no one to truly represent them and respond to their needs."

Nevertheless, that is probably how the monarchs of the GCC, who now hold Yemen's fate in their hands, would like it to be. They don't allow their own people more of a voice than is absolutely necessary, so why should they behave any differently in Yemen?

So it's change, but no change. The usual suspects are in charge, even if some of them now come from opposition parties that have no more credibility than Saleh's own party. The only notable concession to change is the inclusion of three women in minor ministerial posts. It's a tokenistic gesture of course, but three is the largest number of female ministers in Yemen's recent history.

With heavy external backing, it's conceivable that this will result in what – by Yemeni standards – passes for a semblance of order. But even if it does, how long can it last? It really doesn't address the pent-up frustrations that brought protesters out on to the streets in the first place.

Posted by Brian Whitaker, 19 December 2011