IRI pre-election assessment, January 1993

by the International Republican Institute

Executive summary 

1. Introduction

2. The Unification Process and 1993 Elections

3. Political Parties

4. Political Analysis of the Election Process

5. Synopsis of the Electoral Law and Electoral Administration

6. Conclusions for 1993 National Elections

7. Conclusions for Democratic Development in Yemen

4. Political Analysis of the Election Process

Many factors contribute to the inordinate complexity of Yemen's electoral politics. From the explosion of indistinct political parties to Yemen's non-democratic history, from the effects of traditional tribal relationships on political developments to the varied roles religion is playing in society and politics, the political landscape changes rapidly and in unexpected ways. However, the defining aspect of the process which has given rise to its unique, idiosyncratic nature is the parallel and inextricably linked process of unification. The movement for unity preceded and created the movement for democracy, virtually as a side effect. In this light, the democratization process and the election itself must be viewed in terms of its impact on the unification process before being assessed in its own right.

The tension between the unification process and the democratic political process is derived from the need for a stable environment during the very difficult transition from two independent, highly disparate, and often confrontational countries to a single unified nation after several hundred years of separation. This process of political and social integration depends heavily on emphasizing the common or shared elements of the two societies and deemphasizing the historical hostility between them. By encouraging exchanges between the North and South and dissolving obstacles to freedom of movement between the former countries, the unification process has attempted to integrate the countries socially and culturally as much as politically. The spirit of cooperation and achievement which came with the unity agreement was stressed in order to build the stability needed to overcome the problems which unification would bring. Issues such as a common currency, integrating the military and security networks, and the differing roles of women were certain to cause tensions. Thus, the most important factor to the success of the process became the collective goodwill and sentiment for unity which provided the stability needed for the process to maintain momentum. The competitive nature of an open democratic process is inherently divisive and chaotic. As parties and candidates openly argue, accuse each other of not acting in the best interest of the nation, and the prospect looms of some groups losing while others win, the democratic process threatens to break apart the unity which has been built.

Citizens in Yemen, when asked about their impressions of democracy, indicated that it seemed wasteful and confusing overall (Why should one hundred people decide the same thing that one person could in one-tenth the time?) and that it demonstrated weakness (One person can act decisively; one hundred must deliberate. It is easier to respect decisive action than deliberation.) The divisiveness of an open, competitive political process, particularly at this time when unity is the paramount concern in Yemen, is clearly a threatening prospect.

In addition, the political and administrative merger of the two governments has been achieved through a negotiated arrangement in which the two former governments share equally in the responsibilities of government during the 30-month transitional period. The governments, both of whom are accustomed to a monopoly on power, agreed to become partners in government in the name of unity. The only way to legitimize the unified government over the long term was to turn, as much of the world was turning in 1989, to a democratically elected government. However, the full implications of moving to a democratic system, which guarantees neither of the former ruling parties a certain role, is only now apparent as the first election approaches. The unification has been achieved to this point because there have been two well-established and relatively stable institutions which have been able to decide issues conclusively without a great deal of external consultation or interference. The view of these two institutions, the GPC/YAR and the YSP/PDRY respectively, that the best, if not only, way to continue the unification process is under their guidance is perhaps natural. To introduce the uncertainty of an election and the upheaval of a bitter campaign at this point seems an apparent threat to the entire process. This perspective is particularly ominous when one or both of the former ruling parties faces a drastic change in its relative power, such as the YSP does in the upcoming election.

These are concerns, not only of the ruling parties, but of virtually all of the parties in the election process. Several of the newly-formed parties voiced a consistent concern that the potential for a radical realignment of power in any direction was a direct threat to the unification process and as such, not in the interest of any of the parties. As the parties prepare themselves for the election, this underlying fear of destabilizing the country and the unification process has introduced an element of not wanting to be too successful in the election for fear of damaging the overall process.

Because of the recent and extensive experience with the unification process as a negotiation process, there is a great deal of support for some degree of negotiation as a part of Yemen's election process. Negotiation and the formation of coalitions for elections is a common element in most democratic systems, particularly those in their early stages. In Yemen, the degree of negotiation is currently taking a variety of forms ranging from informal arrangements to deciding upon the actual makeup of the post-election legislature or government.

The variety of options is extensive, but generally there are four common primary options:

1. A completely open, free, and fair election without any coalitions formed. Following the election, one or several parties form the government and the remaining parties comprise the opposition. This option is naturally the most unpredictable and inclined to the turmoil of the election process.

2. A partially-negotiated election in which a variety of formal and informal coalitions are formed to contest the election. This option would temper the divisiveness of the campaign to some degree, depending upon the actual alignment of the parties and would also decrease the election's uncertainty depending upon the perceived strength of the leading coalition. In that many of the parties are exploring coalition possibilities, this is currently the most likely election scenario.

3. A fully-negotiated election in which most, if not all, of the parties agree to form a "Unity" coalition. This would turn the actual election day into a virtual referendum on the coalition "slate" without any organized opposition. This option gives everyone a piece of the election without having to engage in a divisive, dangerous campaign. Many smaller parties are in favor of this idea because it will tend to over-represent parties which probably would not have otherwise won seats. Depending on the negotiated allotment of seats, the GPC and the Islah would probably be under-represented compared to an open or coalition election. This is the most improbable scenario due to the difficulty of negotiating an arrangement acceptable to all or most of the parties and its likely under-representation of the most popular parties.

4. A negotiated post-election government with an open or coalition-based election. In such a scenario, the major parties (GPC, YSP, Islah) would determine the allotment of the Council of Ministers regardless of the elected proportions in the House of Representatives, assuming that they collectively won a majority of the seats. This would significantly decrease the uncertainty in the election, while allowing the parties to openly contest the election. It would give the parties and the electorate confidence in the future of the unification process and allow the society to experience a competitive political process without fearing a disastrous outcome. This scenario favors the YSP because it would probably give the YSP a greater share in the government than its popular support would dictate. This scenario depends on the ability of the GPC, YSP, and Islah to agree on a specific power-sharing formula prior to the election.

As indicated above, the most likely scenario will be some form of coalition-building designed to decrease the chaos and uncertainty of the campaign as well as insure the stability and continuation of the unification process (#2 above). Because the GPC is seen as the most powerful of the major parties, its role will be critical in any coalition arrangement. The GPC must make several essential political calculations to determine its approach to the election. Can the GPC alone win a majority of the seats in House of Representatives? Because of its role in continuing the unification process, what level of power must be achieved by the YSP? What level of popular support is enjoyed by the Islah and what demands will be made by it in a coalition which gives it a role in government? The relationship between the GPC and YSP will be determined by the degree to which the unification process will bear disruption of their current relationship. It is likely that the role of the YSP will decrease due to its relatively weak grassroots support, however if the continuation of the unification process is still dependent on the participation of the YSP (which it may not be), the YSP must retain a role in the government. This will necessitate either a pre- or post-election coalition arrangement. The relationship between the GPC and Islah will be determined by two factors: the level of grassroots support for Islah, all of which comes at the expense of the GPC, and the personal relationships among the party leaderships. It is likely that arrangements between the GPC and Islah will remain informal, though intimate. This allows the needed degree of flexibility in policy decisions, appointments, and local political arrangements.

The remainder of the parties are currently prepared to play their role as the "opposition", though it is not at all united and remains barely loyal. Many of the smaller parties will probably win seats in the House, provided they choose their core constituencies to avoid strong opposition from the larger parties and allocate resources to a relatively limited number of races. Any coordination with other smaller parties or informal arrangements with the GPC and Islah on a seat-by-seat basis will be highly effective in establishing a presence. One of the greatest dangers to the smaller parties' potential successes will be splitting the non-GPC vote among several parties, thus allowing the Islah or even the GPC to win the seat.

In that the election will be first-past-the-post in relatively small constituencies of less than 30,000 voters, the politics will be extremely localized and based wholly on personalities and local tribal or familial affiliations. This denigrates the effectiveness of nationally-based or ideologically-based parties except insofar as they are able to recruit local figures and obtain the support of local and tribal leaders. It is worth reiterating here that the Islah's grassroots network, which draws its support from local religious leaders and is organized around the mosque, is generally considered the best in the country precisely because its greatest strength is in its local organizational ability, a factor which will be decisive in this election. In addition, the larger parties may be surprised at the effectiveness of some of the small personality-based parties which are able to concentrate their efforts and capitalize on local grassroots support.

One additional factor which will be interesting to observe in the election will be the effectiveness and popularity of the parties and candidates which represent the growing middle class in Yemen. Parties such as the Republican Party and the members of the Private Sector Bloc are participating in the election based upon specific policy positions which they advocate, most of which center around pro-business economic reforms. While their candidacies will be issue-based to a greater degree than many others, they also represent modernization and a new class in the urban areas where the electorate may be more educated and supportive of their candidacies. Their campaigns may also be among the most sophisticated in the election and thus indicative of future directions of campaigning in Yemen and the potential effectiveness of issue-based candidacies.

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