The investigation
IN THE
EARLY stages of the investigation, the Yemeni authorities rounded
up some 60 people for questioning. Most of those detained were
associated with the Jihad organisation, and this seems to have
been mainly a trawl for information.
However, on October 16, the police
found bomb-making equipment at a flat in Aden which was rented by
two men who had been missing since the attack on the USS Cole
[Associated Press, 18 October].
The landlord said he had rented
the flat for a month to at least one non-Yemeni Arab with a Gulf
accent. One tenant had given the landlord forged identification.
In a yard near the flat the tenants had parked a fibreglass boat
which was now missing [al-Ayyam, 17 October].
According to President Salih
[al-Jazeera television, 17 October], a 12-year-old Yemeni boy told
the authorities that a man with spectacles and a beard gave him money to
watch his car near the port on the day of the bombing. The man
then went to the sea in a rubber boat he had carried on top of the
car, and did not return. Police had then traced the man back to
the flat. Yemeni officials said the missing
men had arrived in Yemen four days before the attack.
(The type of boat used for the
attack is unclear. Initial reports spoke only of an inflatable,
though a fibreglass boat has been mentioned several times during
the investigation.)
On October 19, Yemeni security
officials disclosed that documents which they believed originated
in Hadhramaut had been found at the flat. A vehicle believed to
have been used by the attackers also contained documents from
Hadhramaut. Investigators were sent to Hadhramaut and to Saudi
Arabia. The owner of a welding shop, who had done welding for the
suspects, was also questioned [Associated Press].
On October 23, investigators said
they had had found several names on fake identity cards and on
documents in homes and cars. One of these was Abdullah Ahmed
Khaled al-Musawah, apparently a resident of Lahej province, though
it was doubtful if that was the man’s real name.
The address on "Musawah's" card
turned out to be bogus, and the director of the civil registration
office in Lahij, which had issued several of the cards that were
found, was detained for questioning, along with a number of his
clerks [ABC News]. A later report [AP, 6 November] said that some
of the officials in Lahij were Jihad supporters and had provided
the suspected bombers with government cars for use inside Aden and
between Aden and Lahij.
Meanwhile, several more houses
around Aden were searched. At one, the suspects had built a
corrugated wall to block the view of neighbours, who had been
complaining about constant work on the boat. On the day of the
bombing, neighbours saw the boat leaving the house, towed by a
Nissan four-wheel drive truck.
Between November 4 and November 6,
a further four men living in Aden were arrested. They were said to
have been tracked down through phone records, which showed that
the suspected bombers had been in contact with them [AP, 6
November].
On November 6, Associated Press
reported that the two main suspects took their boat for a test
ride in Aden harbour a month before the bombing. A fisherman who
helped them take the boat down into the water was being treated as
an accomplice.
By November 7, investigators were
still holding 46 people, mostly Yemenis. They included five
officials from Lahij and Sayoun (Hadhramaut province) who were
thought to have had some contact with the bombers during March.
Four of those detained in Aden had been traced by phone records.
Nobody had been formally charged. According to a Yemeni official,
the authorities were still seeking four or five suspects who had
been identified by witnesses and other suspects as being linked to
the blast. [Reuters and CNN, 7 November]
Based on descriptions given by
fishermen, landlords and the 12-year-old boy, Yemeni artists
produced sketches of the two suspected bombers. Associated Press
said these would be sent to Egypt and Saudi Arabia to be checked
against photographs of Arab veterans of the Afghan war. The
suspects were said to be well built; one had a beard and wore
glasses.
The authorities had also
identified four houses in Aden which were believed to have been
used by the suspected bombers [Reuters, 7 November]. On November
10, the Yemen Observer reported that the bombers had rented a
house in Hedjuff (between the Tawahi and Ma’alla districts of
Aden) which they had used for planting explosives in the boat. It
was not clear if this house was a new discovery or one of the four
mentioned earlier.
A search of the sea bed in the
area of the bombing was completed on November 10. The debris
recovered was sent to the US for analysis, along with a car
believed to have been used by the bombers.
On November 11, "Yemeni
sources close to the investigation" told Associated Press
that more than one of the suspects being questioned - supporters
of Jihad and other Islamist groups - had admitted involvement in
previous failed attempts to attack American interests in Yemen.
There were believed to have been
at least three previous attempts:
-
In the first week of November,
1999, they had planned to attack a convoy of US military
personnel heading to Yemen's National Center for the Removal
of Land Mines. This was foiled when Yemeni security forces
discovered explosives about a mile from the hotel where the
Americans were staying. Suspects questioned in connection with
the Cole bombing were said to have known details of the route
taken by the Americans to and from the centre.
-
A second attempt allegedly
targeted the Royal Hotel in Aden, where most of the 30
American servicemen were staying. (No details of this have
been given.)
-
A third attack, on 3 January,
2000, was intended to blow up the American destroyer, USS
Sullivans, as it refuelled in Aden. This was called off when
the weight of explosives made the bombers’ boat unseaworthy.
One of the suspects being
questioned told investigators that the attack on USS Cole was
masterminded by an Arab man - a veteran of the Afghan war - who
telephoned the bombers from the United Arab Emirates, and provided
their instructions and finances.
The suspect said he had bought the
boat used for the attack in the UAE. He had also bought a video
camera to record the attack, but became nervous and left Aden on
October 11 - the day before the bombing. The suspect further
claimed that the group worked in small cells of two or three
people, and many of those involved did not know each other [AP, 12
November].
In contrast to this, Asharq
Al-Awsat quoted Rifai Ahmed Taha, a former leader of the Egyptian
al-Gamma’at al-Islamiyya, as saying that the boat used in the
attack was locally made and powered by an engine cannibalised from
a farm tractor. The entire operation, he said, had cost between
$5,000 and $10,000.
By mid-November, Yemeni
investigators were confident that they had identified one of the
two suicide bombers. He was named as Abd al-Muhsin al-Taifi, a
Yemeni national, possibly with Saudi connections, who was wanted
for questioning about the 1998 bombing of the American embassy in
Nairobi (Washington Post, 17 November; Yemen Times, 20 November).
Shortly afterwards, the police
sent files on six suspected
accomplices to Yemen’s public
prosecutor, with a view to trial early in January 2001. The
prosecutor - probably as a result of American pressure (see below)
- promptly returned them to the police for further investigation
(Yemen Times, 11 December).
Reports
suggested that only two or three of the six would be tried and that
the others (officials who helped to provide false identity
documents) would give evidence as witnesses. Four more suspects -
who may have fled the country - were still being sought. On
December 11, the Yemen Times noted that a total of about 35 people
were still being held in by the Political Security department
connection with the investigation.
One man still being
sought was named as Mohammed Omar Al-Harazi, from Haraz (east of
Sana'a). Harazi is regarded as the main mastermind and financier
of the bombers. According to the Yemen Times (11 December), he was
living in the UAE and used to visit Aden, although he disappeared
four days before the bombing.
The investigation took a further
twist in December with reports that the US wanted to extradite
Raed Hijazi, a former Boston taxi driver, for trial in connection
with the Cole bombing. Hijazi, an American citizen of Palestinian
origin, had been handed over from Syria to Jordan, where he had
been sentenced to death in his absence (WCVB, AP, 6 December). On
December 9, Yemeni investigators flew to Jordan to make further
inquiries.
AT FIRST, Yemen’s efforts to
track down the Cole bombers won praise from the US. President Ali
Abdullah Salih, recognising the potential for damage to relations,
appeared quickly in Aden, visiting the injured in hospital. A
couple of days later, the government-run newspaper, al-Thawra,
showed the president chairing a security committee and
interviewing officials in his shirt-sleeves.
However, collaboration between the
Yemeni and American rapidly became problematic. FBI detectives
were not allowed to take part in Yemeni interrogations, though
they were given transcripts (sometimes badly translated) and
allowed to suggest further questions. The Americans were seeking to attend
the interrogations, even if they did not take part in them.
Yemen, while recognising that it
must co-operate to some extent for the sake of its relations with
the US, insisted on maintaining its independence and sovereignty
in a case which had occurred within its own jurisdiction.
These disputes resulted in a phone
call from President Bill Clinton to President Salih. On November
6, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said: "We got
good cooperation during the first phase. ... We're in discussions
with them [the Yemenis] on the modalities of how we will cooperate
further in the future ... We do need more cooperation, further
cooperation in the next phases of the investigation, and ... those
discussions continue".
Yemen reportedly offered to
provide the US with all its information from the inquiry if the US
reciprocates - which the Americans refused to do.
By early November, the American
investigators had now left their hotel in Aden, following a bomb
threat, and were based offshore. This meant they had to travel to
Aden by helicopter, and there were reports that one helicopter
flight was refused permission to land - apparently for
bureaucratic reasons.
The Yemenis meanwhile handed over
a video from a surveillance camera in the port area, but the
recording seems to have started after the attack, and the
Americans said it had been edited. They also supplied a video from
another camera, which turned out to have been pointing in the
wrong direction.
These difficulties appeared to be
resolved by the end of November, when both sides signed an
agreement on procedure (New York Times, Reuters, 29 November). A
State Department official said the deal met "the need of both
sides in terms of being able to conduct their investigations in a
manner that is consistent with their legal principles." This
allowed FBI investigators to attend interviews with witnesses and
suspects, and to submit written questions. The FBI was also been
given access to documents and allowed to take physical evidence
for analysis.
However, the Americans still had
concerns about Yemeni plans to put the suspects on trial early in
January. The US urged less haste, on the grounds that more time
was needed to complete investigations and prepare for a fair and
credible trial.
It also urged the Yemenis to
ensure that the defendants would have no grounds to complain about
procedural irregularities, torture, or anything else what might
damage the trial’s credibility. One reason why the Americans
insisted on attending interrogations was to enable FBI officers to
give evidence, if necessary, that statements had not been
extracted through torture.
In 1999, the trial of 10 young men
from Britain who were accused of plotting to cause explosions in
Aden was marred by allegations from some of the defendants that
they had been tortured and sexually abused.
The Americans also indicated that
they wanted as much evidence as possible to be handled in a way
which made it admissible in US courts, as well as those in Yemen.
(This may indicate that the Americans are contemplating bringing
further charges against the suspects in the US, or that they
believe some of the evidence might be useful in other terrorism
cases in the future.)
However, President Ali Abdullah
Salih made clear that he would not allow the extradition of Yemeni
suspects for trial in the United States, on the grounds that this
is forbidden by the constitution (Washington Post, 10 December).
In an incident which may or may
not be connected with the Cole explosion, Yemen dismissed
its naval chief, Brigadier Ahmed Abdulla al-Hassani, shortly after
an inspection of the Hodeidah base by President
Salih. One news agency report (AP, 2 December) said Hassani had
absented himself from duty for two months before the Cole
explosion, complaining of endemic corruption at the Defence
Ministry. He returned to work after the bombing but persisted in
accusing the ministry of indifference towards the country’s
small navy.
The Yemen Times, on the other
hand, said political observers viewed his sacking optimistically,
because the Cole incident had "disclosed the state of
indifference and sense of irresponsibility of Yemeni military
officers". Immediately after the bombing, al-Hassani had
ruled out terrorism and suggested the explosion might have been
the result of a technical failure on the warship, the paper said.
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