IRI pre-election assessment, January 1993
by the International Republican Institute
1. Introduction
2. The Unification Process and 1993 Elections
4. Political Analysis of the Election Process
5. Synopsis of the Electoral Law and Electoral Administration
6. Conclusions for 1993 National Elections
7. Conclusions for Democratic Development in Yemen
3. Political parties
The most apparent and immediate result of the recent political liberalization which followed the unification agreement has been the explosion in the number and activity of political parties in Yemen. Despite the existence of a "screening committee", established in the Law Governing Political Parties, which is designed to limit the registration of parties to groups that are viable, nationwide representative political organizations, over forty parties are currently registered. The screening committee has not exercised its regulatory power out of a fear of being accused of bias or suppressing particular political movements. Most observers and members of the parties themselves are looking to the upcoming first round of elections to reduce the number of parties.
Yemen's political parties can be generally divided into four categories: 1) The current ruling parties; 2) Parties based primarily on Islam; 3) Parties based on historical or ideological movements; and 4) Parties based around particular individuals, families, or tribes. A few parties cross these artificial categories, but for descriptive and analytical purposes these groupings are generally valid. Most of the currently registered parties fall into the last category of personality-based parties, thus explaining the large number of parties and the non-viability of many of the current parties. [This also demonstrates one of the defining characteristics of politics in Yemen to date - the traditional, highly-localized and personal nature of political power in Yemen.]
Out of the registered parties, approximately eleven parties are considered viable as coherent political organizations. These include virtually all the parties in the first three categories and they are the parties represented on the Supreme Electoral Commission (SEC). They are the General People's Congress (GPC), the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP), the Islah, Hakh, the Federation of Popular Yemeni Forces, the League of Yemeni Sons, the Baathist Party-Iraq, the Democratic Nasserite Party, the Nasserite Corrective Party, the Nasserite Popular Unification Organization, and the Democratic September 26th Revolution. In that these parties were selected for the SEC because they formed quickly and each had some historical organizational coherence, their listing here does not indicate the level of their grassroots support or popularity. In addition, two more recently formed groups, the Yemeni Republican Party and the Private Sector Bloc, appear to have reasonable coherence as parties and could be included in this category of parties. By consensus, the three most important of the parties are the General People's Congress, the Yemen Socialist Party, and the Islah. The GPC and YSP are the former ruling parties of the North and South respectively, while the Islah is the largest Islamicist party.
The General People's Congress (GPC)
In that prior to unification, political parties were illegal in North Yemen, the GPC originally served as the primary consultative body in North Yemen, though it held virtually no actual power. It was then, and is now, made up of local leaders representing the 128 administrative districts. The GPC was formed as a political party at the time of unification incorporating the entire network of local mayors, officials, and civil servants. Because of the highly fractious administrative and political structure and the local power of tribal leaders and their control over jobs and the economy, the GPC was made up of a large number and wide variety of individuals each primarily interested in their own welfare and without coherent collective interests, structure, or discipline. As a political party, this has continued to be true.
While the lack of internal organization and coherence hinders the effectiveness of the GPC as a party, it characterizes the way in which the government of North Yemen has had to deal with the fractional nature of the tribal system. In short, it demonstrates how Yemen has traditionally been governed through complex and extensive coalition-building by the central government. The high degree of autonomy demanded by local authorities has essentially forced the central authorities to maintain a constant dialogue with local leaders. At the same time, the local leaders have developed an informal role and de facto responsibility in national policy-making on various issues including taxation, public works, and international border disputes. This regular practice of consultation, though not to be mistaken for popular participation, has established a decentralized process of governance which directly reflects Yemen's socio-political landscape. In that the GPC incorporates this process internally, the distinctly organic organization of the party could be seen and used as a strength.
Another strength of the GPC comes from the popularity of its members at the local level. Since the members of the GPC are actually the network of local leaders and officials, they have long-established themselves as the source of jobs and favors in their communities. Contrary to the reputation built by officials in many other one-party states, the GPC members are generally seen as effective local community leaders whose first priority has always been to the benefit of the local population. They are seen as protectors of local interests instead of the representatives of the central authorities. This will be a strength in their electoral popularity, but will continue to erode the cohesiveness and discipline of the party.
Because it was recently the only legal political organization, the GPC has suffered the most from the creation of new parties. Virtually all of the small personality-based parties are split off from the GPC and will probably return to it if they are unsuccessful in the election. However, the party which most deeply has affected the GPC's political base is the Islah, which is also based in the tribal constituencies of the North. In drawing upon the conservative Islamic affiliation of the tribes, the party has attracted many of the tribal leaders which had been members of the GPC. Also, in areas where the local leader has remained with the GPC, the Islah has been able to divide the loyalties of the populace between their religious leaders and their community leaders. Naturally this is a very difficult dilemma for an average citizen and has led to a great deal of Islah-GPC coalition-building at the local level.
Another way that the GPC has counteracted the effect of losing voters because of the proliferation of parties has been to actively set up new parties, thus adding to the confusion of the political landscape. The more chaotic the political process, the more likely a voter will select a well-known, well-established candidate from the GPC. In addition, this tactic plays into the traditional attitude that a one-party government, along the lines of the GPC before unification, projects strength, while the chaos of debate and the political process demonstrates weakness. [This attitude was confirmed in informal discussions with citizens in a rural area which was visited.]
It is unclear to what degree the GPC is comfortable with the idea of losing or sharing power. Many members of the GPC disagree with the new process of democratic elections because it conceptually (if not in reality) threatens their personal grip on power. It is possible that this predilection against the process could lead to the temptation to unfairly influence the election, but this currently appears highly unlikely. Nonetheless, the GPC is clearly the strongest party in Yemen today due to its position as the incumbent and its strong political base in the North. President Ali Abdullah Saleh of the GPC remains very popular and the local tribal leaders are likely to continue their general support of him and the GPC. Also, the GPC's administrative control of the electoral process will likely give it the structural advantage of incumbency.
The Yemen Socialist Party (YSP)
The Yemen Socialist Party (YSP), the former ruling party in South Yemen, was formed in 1978 as a Marxist-Leninist political party styled after and supported by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In 1989 following the cessation of economic aid from the Soviet Union and the disintegration of communist control in Eastern Europe, the YSP announced a wholesale change in policies including political liberalization and free-market economic reforms. At the same time, the end of their close relationship with the Soviet Union cleared away one of the remaining obstacles to unification with the North.
Due to its history as a communist political party, the YSP enjoys the benefits and handicaps of many former communist parties entering competitive democratic elections. Commonly considered the best organized party in Yemen, the YSP has an experienced, well-disciplined cadre of activists in the South. These activists, many of whom were trained in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, have a relatively sophisticated understanding of organizational principles and political communications or propaganda. This understanding of the basic capabilities of a political party may give it an initial advantage in its development as a competitive political party. It should, however, be noted that despite its level of organization, the YSP has no experience within a competitive electoral system. Thus, much of its advantage in this regard may have been offset by the fundamental changes in the "rules of the game".
The YSP also maintains significant support within and control over the military in the former South Yemen. This has been, and will be, an important bargaining chip for the YSP in the unification process and election politics, guaranteeing it a substantial role in the post-election situation regardless of its popular support. The tight control over the PDRY military has been diminished slightly since the merger of the Northern and Southern militaries, but the impression of control which remains is enough to insure the YSP a role as a primary political force. The YSP also maintains its control over the administrative structure and resources of the former PDRY, a fact which could be used to its advantage in the electoral process.
However, the handicaps associated with its history currently outweigh its benefits. The YSP has lost a great deal of its active membership since abdicating its monopoly on power. This, in turn, hurts its organizational strength and discipline as well as diminishes the importance of the prior training which its activists received. Its past actions as a repressive military regime failed to engender loyalty from the citizens and even YSP members in the South. Given the opportunity, the people of the former PDRY have looked for alternatives to the YSP, despite its recent policy reforms. Considering the relatively small population base in the South (roughly one-third that of the North) and its declining popularity, the YSP is estimated to have very little national grassroots support.
Perhaps the most critical weakness of the YSP has been its difficulty in defining and expressing its new ideological basis. Since abandoning the clarity of Marxist dogma and policies, the YSP has failed to articulate a clear set of principles. It has declared its support for the creation of a free market economy and has implemented policies of economic reform and liberalization, but it has not established or energetically promoted an ideology to replace Marxism-Leninism. The YSP appears to be drifting without a sense of goals or purpose beyond the unification process itself and this has become an important obstacle to its growth and redefinition as a political party.
Islah
The Islah, translated as "Reform", was created as a party following the legalization of opposition political movements at unification. It is the most important of the new political parties and the most popular Islamicist party. The Islah built its popularity and organization on the pre-existing network of Islamic clerics and religious schools. The central role of the mosque in communities has provided the Islah with a highly effective means of organizing and gathering nationwide support at the grassroots level.
The Islah is composed three separate internal movements, each with their own political objectives and differing views on many issues. They are: a purely tribal element, the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin), and the Ikhwan Wahhabi or Salafine movement. The tribal element consists of the grouping of northern sheikhs led by Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar, who support the Islah out of tribal interests and their religious beliefs as "simple good Muslims". This line of the Islah is generally not radical in policy beliefs or methodology, but is conservative in social and family issues owing to its traditional tribal roots rather than ideological or theological tenets. The Ikhwan represents the moderate religiously-motivated group of activists who support the protection of Yemen's Islamic character and institutionalization of Islamic law (Shari'ah) as the sole source of all legislation and the social basis for society. In methodology, the Ikhwan supports peaceful negotiation and working through the establishment to effect changes. Though it is difficult to gauge precisely at this point, the views of the Ikhwan do not seem to be in direct contradiction with the development of a multiparty democratic system, though the Ikhwan would likely support the restriction of individual human rights, particularly in the case of women and non-Muslims.
The most conservative, even radical, element of the Islah is Ikhwan Wahhabi or Salafine movement, who are directly associated with the Wahhabi sect of Islam based in Saudi Arabia. This powerful sect advocates very strict interpretation of Islamic law and the establishment of unified Yemen as a pure Islamic state in which the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam is the only guiding principle. The core beliefs of the Ikhwan Wahhabi do not allow pluralism or competitive multiparty democracy because such a system allows and promotes views differing from their own and this is seen as heretical to Islam. It is reasonable to assume that if the Ikhwan Wahhabi element were to gain significant political power, it would advocate the abrogation of the democratic system and severe restrictions on individual rights. One of the primary means of organization, recruitment, and expansion has been through the establishment of a network of schools funded and staffed by the movement. These schools serve rural communities by providing basic and intermediate education, a valuable commodity in Yemen where adult illiteracy averages above 60 percent. The Ikhwan Wahhabi element of the Islah is relatively weak and currently not in control of the party as a whole. However, given the dedication, activism, and zealousness within the movement, it is seen as a potential danger in the political process.
The Islah is closely affiliated with the GPC in the North due to tribal affiliations among their leadership and the extensive overlap in their base constituencies and grassroots support. The tribal sheikhs, caught between their traditional relationship with and patronage from the GPC and their conservative Islamic beliefs, tend to choose individuals or solutions acceptable to both the GPC and the Islah, instead of choosing between them. In many cases, the alternative would be a division or confrontation between local tribal leaders and local clerics - a potentially highly disruptive situation. At the party leadership level, a high degree of informal consultation and mutually-acceptable solutions are common. Because of the tribal relationships and the local political dynamics, it is difficult to determine relative or actual strengths of the two parties.
[The following is a very brief description of several of the other political parties. All of the parties are not described and the amount of information on each party varies considerably due to the limited amount of time the survey team was available in Yemen. The inclusion, sequence, and detail of information should not be considered indicative of relative strength, viability, or popular support.]
Hesb al'Hakh (Party of Truth) - Hakh is the second largest purely Islamic-based political party in Yemen. Based almost exclusively in the Zaidi sect of Islam, Hakh is considered a primary alternative to Islah as an Islamicist party. The party is highly supportive of democratic development, ostensibly owing to the Zaidi school's emphasis on consultation and theological support for revolution against an "unjust ruler". Hakh is generally a moderate Islamic political movement with a modest network of support among Zaidi clerics and adherents. The party is considered to be loosely affiliated or associated with the YSP.
Baathist Party-Iraq and Baathist Party-Syria - The two wings of the Baathist Party are represented in Yemen, with the Iraqi wing being much more active and popular. Both parties support the international socialist revolutionary Baathist movement of the 1960s. Yemen has a good historical relationship with Iraq demonstrated by their close economic relationship prior to the 1990 United Nations trade embargo imposed in response to Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Significant support for Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was demonstrated in the months that followed, thus drawing the outrage of Arab neighbors and the international community at large. The Baathist Party-Iraq maintains modest support and is closely associated with the GPC.
Nasserite Parties - There are at least five separate Nasserite parties in Yemen, with three represented on the Supreme Electoral Commission. The Democratic Nasserite Party (DNP), the Nasserite Corrective Party (NCP), the Nasserite Popular Unification Organization (NPUO) all claim the mantle of the international Arab Nationalist movement which began in earnest with Gamal Abdul Nasser in the 1950s. The DNP and the NCP are reputedly closely affiliated, if not creations of, the GPC and YSP respectively. Their popularity stems from the traditional political popularity of the Arab Nationalist movement which has remained strong in Yemen, even over the last fifteen years while it has declined in vigor elsewhere in the Arab world. The NPUO is generally considered the most independent and most popular of the Nasserite parties.
Federation of Popular Yemeni Forces (FPYF) - FPF is a historically-based party with roots in the al-Wasir family, a prominent family in Yemen with several historical rulers, the most recent being Abdullah ibn Ahmed al-Wasir, who ruled briefly in 1948. The support of the FPF is highly localized and suffered from the ban on independent political activity which was only lifted following unification.
