"The fate of the Arab world’s two most important states lies in the hands of ageing autocrats," The Economist says, referring to Egypt (where there is renewed speculation about the health of 82-year-old President Mubarak) and Saudi Arabia (whose ruler, King Abdullah, is in his mid-eighties). "The grim reaper," The Economist adds, "will bring change in both places soon."

Arab gerontocracy is also one of the issues discussed by Kal in 
the latest of a series of essays for The Moor Next Door blog. "The political class in the Arab republics is often dominated by the elderly," he writes – and suggests a number of reasons:

1. Authority and leadership is often reserved for elders in Arab society and most others; 

2. Elite power is maintained by excluding political rivals and novices or those otherwise lacking in "experience" managing complex and fragile institutions; 

3. States are authoritarian and so membership in the political class as a whole and in the ruling clique changes hands infrequently over long periods of time; 

4. Rulers make enemies and are suspicious of newcomers and ambitious or clever youth; 

5. Youth have limited access to (and sometimes interest in) leadership and governing institutions; 

6. In states with professional and politicised militaries it takes time to advance to positions of seniority.

It's not just the Arab republics, though; the same could be said of several of the monarchies too. But I don't particularly buy the idea that this has much to do with respect for elders or the dismissal of youth, per se.

There are plenty of Arab leaders who came to power when they were young or relatively young: Gaddafi at 27, Ali Abdullah Salih at 35, Bashar al-Asad at 34, Abdullah II at 37, and Nasser was only 34 at the time of the Egyptian revolution.

The point is not really the age of the rulers themselves but the longevity of their regimes – and this is where the other factors come into play: the entrenchment of ruling cliques and the elimination of potential challengers. So the real question is not how soon the elderly will die. It is how long the survival strategies developed by the regimes, and which have proved resilient over many years, will continue to hold.

Probably, these strategies also contain the germs of their own destruction, and Kal points to a couple of interesting possibilities:

The geriatric elite holds skill and agency close to its chests and prevents newcomers from having anything but secondary say. Thus, rather than tutelage and a constantly replenishing leadership class, the outcome is more like political gangrene.

We have seen this to some extent in Algeria where, as the number of old-time regime stalwarts dwindles, there is in-fighting and jockeying for position. 

Arab regimes have also clung to power by possession and controlling information – especially information about their opponents and potential rivals. The question here is whether they make the transition from low-tech information control to high-tech. Kal continues:

A ruler immersed in a high-tech security apparatus wants already active network technologies to spread among his people if only for surveillance purposes. At the same time, he is frightened that this might allow his enemies to meet, organise and conspire against him. His natural disposition is to reserve the most advanced technologies for himself and his inner circles. Yet the world is not so easily micro-managed today ...

The Economist also looks to possible mechanisms for change and suggests (rightly, I think) that we should not put too much faith in elections:

Elections, though vital in the end, are not an early panacea. What the Arabs need most, in a hurry, is the rule of law, independent courts, freeish media, women’s and workers’ rights, a market that is not confined to the ruler’s friends, and a professional civil service and education system that are not in hock to the government, whether under a king or a republic. In other words, they need to nurture civil society and robust institutions. The first task of a new Saudi king should be to enact a proper criminal code.

In the Arab lexicon, the concept of justice means more than democracy. In the end, you cannot have the first without the second. But the systems that now prevail in the Arab world provide for neither.