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3. Parliamentary Campaigns and Elections

The Supreme Election Committee (SEC) decided on the exact boundaries of constituencies, based on the population census estimate of December 1992, which puts the population at 14,256,724. Considering administrative and tribal borders, the SEC come up with 301 constituencies, each to accommodate an average of 47,365 inhabitants, allowing for a variation of plus or minus 5 per cent [18]. To ease polling, geographic proximity, population density, and availability of centrally located public buildings are again taken into consideration to choose election centres. Finally 2017 election centres were identified for all 301 constituencies [19].

On January 21, 1993, electoral registration started and lasted for thirty days. The SEC organised this task as shown in (Table 3), and these rosters are to be updated every two years.

Table 3: Voter Registration

Type of Committee	Number	No. of Personnel
Supervising Committees	18	54
Main Committees	301	903
Sub-Committees (male)	1716	5148
Sub-Committees (female)	2017	6051
Total	4052	12156

The elections had been handled under supervision of the SEC by the field polling committees, as shown in (Table 4).

Table 4: Committees Conducted the Parliamentary Elections

Year	Main Cttees	Sub-Cttee Male	Sub-Cttee Female	Total	No. Personnel
1993	301	1,420	1,541	7,262	21,786
1997	337	9,586	3,927	13,850	41,532

The statistics from the voting rosters in (Table 5) show that of those who are eligible to vote, only 43 per cent were registered. Within the 18 governorates the percentage varied from 30 per cent in al-Mahrah to 60 per cent in Aden. There was also extreme refrainment among women; only 15 per cent of eligible women were registered. Registration figures for women also show variation: in some conservative provinces, such as al-Jawf, as few as 1 per cent while in more progressive urban areas like Aden the figure was 41 per cent [20]. High rates of illiteracy, the culture, religion, the new practices of democracy in Yemen, and people's distrust of the regime's democratic orientation all diminished the registered numbers.

Table 5: Rosters

NA: Data are not available

However, as (Table 5) suggests there was an improvement in registration between the two elections, up to 66.4 per cent. This indicates a positive change in people's attitudes towards democracy, but the irony is the declining number of those who actually cast their votes, from 84 to 61 per cent. This is possibly because some parties had boycotted the 1997 election. The 1994 war also contributed in portraying the system as biased to a narrow segment in the society. In addition, people felt frustrated seeing the system tilted to one dominant party.

For the same reasons, number of candidates decreased, partisans, independents, women, and men, as shown in (Table 6).

Table 6: Candidates for Parliament

Election	Partisans	Independents	Total	Male	Female
1993	1,025	1,945	2,970	2,929	41
1997	643	1,399	2,042	2,019	23

The Opposition parties had been complaining that there were serious problems in the voter registration process. Issues raised included allegations of using mobile voter registration in a manner that disadvantaged localities with strong support for the opposition; multiple registrations; registration of underage persons; and moving military forces in order to register them in certain constituencies to shift election results. These allegations were repeated over the two elections as well as in the presidential election in 1999.

The high number of independent candidates reflects the fragmentation of the political party system. Local notables usually were unrivalled and some of them enlisted in order to negotiate a rewarding withdrawal [21].

The big parties also contributed to this, hoping the distribution of votes among independents would benefit their candidates, who were supported by activists and enjoyed proximity to power. The GPC looked for persons well rooted in their communities, with party affiliation taking second place. Therefore, tribal leaders, big merchants, and high officials represented its main candidates. The YSP counted mainly on its disciplined cadre regardless of their origins. The candidates of the Islah were represented by tribal notables in the rural areas and Islamic activists in the cities. Al-Haqq and the League of the Sons of Yemen were both represented by the Sayyid and prestigious families. The nationalist parties were represented mainly by professionals and activists, though in some cases nominated social notables.

The party system and electoral struggle hardly helped the candidates representing new modernising trends or marginalised segments in Yemeni society. This entails under-representation of workers, peasants, and the more humble strata of the society. Representation of these groups decreased in the 1997 election due to the YSP boycott. The notables prevailed: great tribal figures, big entrepreneurs, new aristocracy in the south, Islamic activists, and clerics and professionals strongly linked to the ruling GPC. With only two women elected in each Parliament, the two Parliaments reflect the political and social powers, but not the composition of the society.

Most of parties drew up programmes and presented them on radio and TV twice. Recent researches on party election manifestos offer a good means of gauging the general tendency of party programmes and to whom parties appeal. The method followed in these studies counts the percentage of sentences a party devotes to each category in its manifesto. This provides a measure of party emphasis on the issue domain represented by that category [22]. This method is designed to measure change in issue content over time across parties and nations. With only two parliamentary elections in Yemen, this method cannot give reliable result. There will have to be several consecutive elections before it is possible to measure change over time.

To overcome this obstacle, adding to manifestos the party Charters and political parlance would help bring into focus the general tendencies and changes since 1990. The GPC's manifesto for the 1993 election consists of its constant principles calling for adherence to the 1962 and 1967 revolutions, Islam, and patriotism. It also appeals to people to preserve unity and democracy [23]. Conversely, the 1997 manifesto ignores the constant principles and appeals for political and economic liberalisation [24]. The GPC's parlance rests on images of the President at groundbreaking and ribbon-cutting ceremonies of private and public construction projects, which heavily aggrandises the President's achievements and his medial attitudes. Loose organisation, lack of ideology, and being in power for a long time all have tempered the GPC's political discourse, making it inclined toward compromises, though its practices are probably different. Since the 1994 war, unity and legitimacy have dominated the GPC's discourse.

By contrast, the YSP had a relatively more coherent ideology and wider popularity, but deeply fragmented leadership. It adopted a social-democratic line and presented itself as the party of law and order and modernisation. Its manifesto's priorities were to establish order and security, stand against corruption and to improve free services to the poor [25]. The YSP boycotted the 1997 election call for guarantees for conducting free and fair elections [26]. After the 1994 war, the YSP literature and political discourse concentrated on political reform, reconciliation, and democratic institutionalisation. It also moved to the middle in terms of the market economy and tempered its attitudes towards Islam [27].

The Islah party presented itself in 1993 as a conservative party of Islamic and traditional values. Its programme focused on the idea that Islam should again regulate social, economic, and political activities. Its main slogan was 'The Qura'n and the Sunna supersede the constitution and the law'. Its manifesto did not mention democracy or a multiparty system; instead, it appealed for consultative democracy or al-shura, which is an Islamic concept [28].

Although the Islah repeated Islamic rhetoric in the 1997 election, it presented a longest detailed manifesto in an attempt to refute frequent accusations that Islamists are based merely on vague and ambiguous slogans. The manifesto had detailed sector after sector, all measures mixed between liberal and Islamic social aspects. It also paid a great deal of attention to foreign affairs, especially to relations with Saudi Arabia and Sudan, and to Palestinian rights [29]. The Islah, however, shows pragmatism. It has benefited from its proximity with the GPC. It exploits authority advantages without burdening its responsibilities. Thus, its political discourse is characterised by a combination of Islamic rhetoric and advocation of traditional values, taking care not to transgress certain limits that affect the supra-partisan strategic coalition between the Islah leader Shaykh al-Ahmar and the President (the leader of the GPC).

The other party manifestos presented variations on the same key themes: support of democracy and unity; strengthening the Judiciary; economic development; denunciation of corruption; and improving regional relationships [30]. In the election of 1997, these small parties modified their manifestos in accordance with domestic political and economic changes. The Ba'ath was the only one to concentrate on supporting Iraq excessively and this accounted for most of its manifesto in rhetoric style. The Popular Unionist Nasserite Organisation's manifesto was very concise. In addition to the YSP, the League of the Sons of Yemen, the Union of Popular Forces, and the Yemeni Unionist Gathering boycotted the 1997 election for the same reasons that the YSP did.

4. General Characteristics of Party Manifestos

In general, party manifestos featured the following characteristics. The first is the clear impact of the world-wide orientation towards democratisation and market economic policies. With regard to democracy, all manifestos supported this orientation. However, the GPC and the Islah (in 1993 and 1997) and the YSP (in 1993) did so rhetorically and, only paid lip service to consolidating this path; meanwhile the other small parties combined that with suggested measures to limit executive dominance over other authorities. The parties, on the other hand, differed in their responses to the adoption of the market economy, which was followed in 1995 by economic structural adjustment and privatisation. The GPC is the only party that supported this scheme enthusiastically. Other ideologue parties, the Islamists (Islah, al-Haqq, and Union of Popular Forces), the leftists (YSP), and the nationalists (Ba'ath and Nasserites) called for selective economic liberalisation, providing protection to some sectors, and establishment of a social security net to alleviate the heavy impact of economic transformation. The Islamic parties have been driven by their credo of Islamic social justice and forbidding monopoly. The leftist and nationalist parties have appealed to their electorates, most of whom would most be affected by economic liberalisation. Also it seems difficult for them to completely go along with a trend in favour what they had long appealed against.

The second characteristic is the domination of the unity issue in all of the manifestos. Yet, the parties have different definitions of the word 'unity' for different ends. There is a clear dichotomy between the ruling parties and others. Opposition parties including Islamists and nationalists, have used unity in populist discourse. Islamists appealed for unity to remove atheists (YSP) in order to create an Islamic expandable model. Nationalists, by contrast, presented Yemeni unity as ushering for pan-Arab unity and view themselves as vanguards. On the other hand, ruling parties (GPC and YSP) used unity for domestic politics to mobilise people against each other in their struggle for power. The GPC embraced unity per se, therefore, secession is not acceptable and all attached problems are to be resolved later. The YSP perceived unity as a mean of prosperity and stability that requires further institutional settings; failure to create such settings makes unity meaningless.

This perception drove the YSP to declare a recession in 1994. The most important point here is that the two different approaches of the two ruling parties are in essence aimed at consolidating one party's power and weakening the other in a zero-sum struggle. The GPC victory in the civil war of 1994 put unity and legitimacy at the top of the GPC's manifesto and political discourse.

The third characteristic is the parties' external relations, especially with Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Libya, and Sudan. Again there is a clear dichotomy between those in power and others. The opposition is free from restrictions imposed by inter-state interests and diplomatic protocol. The Ba'ath devoted considerable space in its manifesto to supporting Iraq; the Nasserite parties did so for Libya; al-Haqq and the Union of Popular Forces did the same for Iran; and the Islah party for Sudan and Saudi Arabia. All these parties mobilised street demonstrations accordingly. In comparison, the GPC and the YSP, as ruling parties, were bound by realism. They balanced between the need of the state for regional financial aid and international political support on the one hand, and the momentum on the street toward hostility against the US and the GCC on the other hand.

The fourth characteristic is proximity from power, which divides parties into centre and periphery and is reflected in the party manifestos. It has been observed that as a party close to the centre as its manifesto and discourse are tempered, with maintaining a margin to express different attitudes. For example, there are two opposition coalitions, the first, the National Opposition Council (NOC) is close to the government and consists of ten tamed parties. The second, the genuine opposition, consists of four parties and is called the Supreme Co-ordination Council for opposition (SCC). The Islah and the League of the Sons of Yemen are affiliated to neither of these two blocs, although the Islah is leans toward the former and the League toward the latter. The discourse of the NOC concentrates mainly on policy issues, while that of the SCC concentrates mainly on constitutional and institutional ones.

The fifth characteristic is the influence of the elite and factions that deviate manifestos from popular demands and create ideological leapfrogging. The struggle for power is reflected in these manifestos by the domination of constitutional aspects in the 1993 election and institutional ones in the 1997 election. Factions within a party also had their impact; for example, the Islah manifesto mobilised support for two conflicting regimes simultaneously, Sudan and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, manifestos were full of aggrandisement of leaders and party history at the expense of issues and policies. Ideological rhetoric of political competition among parties indicates primarily an elite orientation rather than a concern for popular demands. This, however, mirrors the political behaviour of the Yemeni electorate. The strong networks of kinship and patron-client relationships, and the impurely democratic institutional framework of the Yemeni party system, have characterised the fluid transitional political, social, and economic structure.

5. Election Participation and Voting Behaviour

Several factors contribute to the degree of election participation. According to Michael Rush, electoral turnout varies according to education, occupation, gender, age, religion, ethnicity, residence, and the surrounding environment [31]. There are two categories to look at. The first is the number of actual votes cast in relation to number of those who are eligible to vote see Table 5. The participation goes down to 36.14 per cent and 40.5 per cent for the 1993 and 1997 parliamentary elections respectively. Level of education, conservative religious and traditional habits, new democratic procedures, and absenteeism outside the country contribute to this. The other category is the actual votes cast in relation to those who have registered on the electoral rosters see Table 5. The participation here was a relatively high 84 per cent in 1993 and 61 per cent in 1997.

Both categories, however, suggest declining political participation. In the first category, the increase in number of eligible voters between the two elections is 10 per cent, while the increase in participation is only 4.4 per cent; therefore, participation in 1993 (36.14%) is higher than in 1997 (40.5%). The other category shows a straightforward decline from 84 per cent to 61 per cent.

On the one hand, the high participation in 1993 is probably explained by the fact that a turning point was occurring. In the light of the political environment of the time, characterised by a struggle between two different approaches led by the two main parties, the people participated in the hope of contributing to their favourite trend. People were also motivated by widespread political discussion in public meetings and the media that exaggerated positive expectations. On the other hand, the declining participation in 1997 reflects the alienation of part of the electorate as a result of the 1994 war. The boycotting of the election by four parties also contributed to this. Finally, the relative regression in democratic practices by the GPC has decreased hopes and expectations, leading some to refrain from participation.

The interesting observation is that participation in rural areas, in particular for men, was higher than in urban areas. In the 1993 election the average turnout in the countryside reached 88 per cent, against 81 per cent in the cities. In the 1997 election it was 64 per cent in the countryside and 58 per cent in the cities [32]. In Yemen's traditional society this shows a strong sense of identity amongst the people in rural areas, stronger than amongst their counterparts in urban areas. The rurals usually resist any change that may strike and threaten their identity and existing social arrangements.

Electoral behaviour in Yemen is anchored in the social structure. Unlike the well-established democracies, which have seen the decline of electoral cleavage on politics and the rise of issue voting. Borrowing Knusten and Scarbrough's tri-dimentional definition on electoral cleavage, incorporates socio-structural (demography), normative (value), and organisational (party) elements [33]. It seems that demographic identity predominated in the 1993 election. The distribution of seats was in accordance with the pre-unification geographical division. The GPC won 117 seats in the north and only 3 seats in the south. The YSP won 41 seats in the south and only 15 seats in the north, and the Islah won 62 seats, all in the north. Structural (demographic) cleavage, however, was not purely the electoral preference, as the 1993 election is widely believed to had been distorted by two factors. The first is that both the GPC and the YSP had used mobile military camps to alter the results in some constituencies. The second factor is that there were several indications of a possible agreement between the two parties to direct the election to what they saw as a stable division of power [34].

In the 1997 election the structural (demographic) cleavage decreased to its minimal level and normative (value) cleavage predominated. The defeat of the YSP in the war deflected electoral preferences. A relaxation in the power struggle after the war allowed the electorate to re-arrange their preferences according to values, traditions, and patrimonial relationships. The Islah party, which did not win a single seat in the south in 1993, won 14 seats in 1997 in the south and 39 in the north. By contrast, in 1997 the GPC won 160 seats in the north and 27 in the south. Value reference evokes group solidarity and thus it is more effective in Yemen to sustain party loyalty than organisational loyalty. This explains why the greatest support for Islah came from rural-tribal areas and the urban-based Islamist faction made only a minor contribution to its performance. Therefore, it can be said tentatively that the high level of electoral volatility and the weak embodiment of political parties in the system go together with a relatively strong correlation between values and party choice in Yemen.

Finally, it is important to note that the elections in Yemen are controlled by the dominant parties: in 1993 by both the YSP and the GPC, and in 1997 by the GPC. Domination means a semi-competitive election in which the ruling party uses all the advantages of the including state resources to influence electoral behaviour.

Conclusion

The transition to democracy in Yemen has been a process created from above to produce a sort of democracy. The same rulers remain in control and maintain their socio-bureaucratic patronage networks, which have restricted the development of democracy by reproducing the characteristics of the old regime.

Among the real problems that threaten democracy are poverty and scarcity of resources. The state becomes the main source of wealth and power; therefore, competition for authority has to be zero-sum, decreasing the possibility of resolving political disputes through systematic institutional processes. By the same token, culture is one of the main factors that have affected democracy through affecting party systems and electoral behaviour. Scholars like Robert Dahl, George Kennan, and Bernard Lewis emphasise the importance of culture in establishing a sustainable democracy. Culture, however, is a factor that changes with changing the industrial economic base and political development. Culture is not stagnant, including religion. In a favourable political and economic environment the culture is modified and changed gradually by adopting new forms and codes compatible to the surrounding environment.

The Yemeni party and electoral system to a large extent reflects its external environment. The external variables largely determine its capacities. The legal framework of the electoral system shows its shortcoming in representation and has been distorted by using power unconstitutionally and the selectivity when implementing the democratic norms. The informal Yemeni political structure contributes into this to a large extent, which has great influence on the outcomes and shape Yemen's political activities.

On the other hand, the party system is suffering from paternalism. The government applies paternalism on parties, and parties' leaderships apply the same on their followers. This is not only cultural but also structural, parties need a massive re-organisation for their structures, policies, and to secure an independent funding.

Footnotes

1. In this regard it does not differ from General Election Law No. 41/1992.

2. Robinson, Chris, 'Voting Behavior and Electoral Systems' (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1998), pp. 63 and 65.

3. Interview with Sultan al-Barakani, leader of the GPC's parliamentary bloc, London, August 24, 1999.

4. Interview with Abdul-Rahman al-Jifri, Head of the RAY (League of the Sons of Yemen) party and President of the National Front for Opposition, London, July 10, 1999.

5. These figures are before considering the swing of the independent MPs to affiliate with political parties.

6. Two GPC candidates won their seats in the Parliament in the 1997 election by 23 per cent of the vote in constituencies number 143 and 212.

7. The Islah party, founded in 1991, is an exceptional case. It is organized along tribal and religious lines and had a well-established organization (Muslim Brethren) within the GPC during the pre-unification era. It also benefits from huge financial affluence provided by Saudis and is protected by influential tribal figures. Its financial capabilities and religious and tribal appeal all provide the Islah a broad electorate.

8. Toka, Gabor, 'Party Appeals and Voter Loyalty in New Democracies' in Richard Hofferbert (ed.), 'Parties and Democracy' (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), p. 168.

9. Ibid., p. 168.

10. Paradoxically, most of the political parties in Yemen have internal regulatory by-laws, which address the relationships between a party and its MPs. Sanctions mentioned in these by-laws vary from blame to expulsion from the party. Most of the MPs said they do not know whether there are sanctions or not, and have there sanctions they will be ineffective.

11. Interview with Ahmed al-Kuhlani, a GPC MP and the rapporteur of the Standing Committee for Public Services, Sana'a, December 17, 1998.

12. Interview with Sultan al-Barakani, leader of the GPC's parliamentary bloc, London, August 24, 1999.

13. Michels, Robert, 'Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy' (Dover, 1959 [1911] ), p. 418. Quoted in Michael Rush, 'Politics and Society: An Introduction to Political Sociology' (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), p. 62.

14. Von Beyme, Klaus, 'Political Parties in Western Democracies' (Aldershot: Gower, 1985), p. 320. For comparison see also Maurice Duverger, 'Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State' (London: Methuen, 1964 [1951]), pp. 182-90.

15. Gibson, Rachel and Robert Harmel, 'Party Families and Domestic Performance: Extraparliamentary vs. Parliamentary Group Power' in Richard Hofferbert (ed.), 'Parties and Democracy', ibid., p. 227.

16. Janda, Kenneth and Tyler Colman, 'Effects of party organization on Performance during the 'Golden Age' of Parties', in Richard Hofferbert (ed.), 'Parties and Democracy' ibid., p. 210.

17. Interview with Abdul-Aziz al-Saqqaf, member of the Consultative Council and Chief Editor of Yemen Times, Sana'a, December 20, 1998.

18. The SEC 'Final Report of Technical Committee for the 1993 parliamentary Elections' Sana'a, 1993.

19. General Election Law No. 27/1996, Article 11.

20. The SEC 'Final Report...' ibid., p. 17.

21. Detalle, Renaud, 'The Yemeni Elections Up Close' Middle East Report, No. 185, Vol. 23, no. 6 (1993), pp. 8-12, p. 8.

22. Budge, I., D. Robertson, and D. Hearl (eds.), 'Ideology, Strategy, and Party Change: Spatial Analysis of Post-War Election Programs in Nineteen Democracies' (London: Cambridge University Press, 1987), quoted in Ali Carkoglue, 'The Turkish Party System in Transition: Party Performance and Agenda Change' in Richard Hofferbert (ed.), 'Parties and Democracy' ibid., p. 132.

23. Al-Alimi, Rashad and Ahmed al-Bishari, 'Al-Baramij al-Intikhabiyya li-l-Ahzab wa-l-Tanzimat al-Siyasiyyah fi-l-Jumhuriyyah al-Yamaniyyah: Dirasah Muqaranah [Party Manifestos in Yemen: A Comparative Study]' (Sana'a: al-Thawabit, 1993), p. 9.

24. The GPC, 'Al-Barnamaj al-Intikhabi [The Electoral Manifesto]' (Sana'a: The GPC, 1997).

25. Al-Alimin and al-Bishari, 'Al-Baramij al-Intikhabiyya.....' ibid., pp. 15-20.

26. The YSP, 'Bayan al-Dawrah 34 al-Istithnaiyyah li-l-Lijnah al-Markaziyyah [The Declaration of the 34 Extraordinary Session of the Central Committee]' Sana'a, March 3-1, 1997.

27. The YSP, 'Al-Tagrir al-Siyasi wa-Mashrou'i al-Barnamaj al-Siyasi ['The Political Report' and 'A Proposal of Political Programme']'. Both documents were submitted to and approved by the Fourth General Congress, the first round, Sana'a, November 28-30, 1998.

28. Al-Alimi and al-Bishari, 'al-Baramij al-Intikhabiyya.....' ibid., pp. 25-31.

29. The Islah, 'Al-Barnamaj al-Intikhabi [The Electoral Manifesto]' Sana'a, 1997.

30. For details on these manifestos see Ahmed al-Bishari and Rashad al-Alimi, 'al-Baramij al-Intikhabiyyah li-l-Ahzab wa-l-Tanziymat al-Siyasiyyah al-Yamaniyyah li-Intikhabat 1997 [Party Manifestos for the 1997 Parliamentary Election]', (Sana'a: al-Thawabit, 1998).

31. Rush, Michael, 'Politics and Society: An Introduction to Political Sociology' (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), p. 117.

32. See the SEC, 'Final Report of the Technical Committee for the 1993 Parliamentary Election' Sana'a, 1993, p. 25; the SEC, 'The Report of Technical Committee for the 1997 Parliamentary Election' Sana'a, 1997, p. 38; and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), 'The 1997 Parliamentary Election in Yemen' Washington, DC. 1997, appendix 17.

33. Knusten, O. and E. Scarbrough, 'Cleavage Politics' in J. Van Deth and E. Scarbrough (eds.), 'The Impact of Values' (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 492-523.

34. Kostiner, Joseph, 'Yemen: the Tortuous Quest for Unity, 1990-94' (London: The International Institute of International Affairs, 1996), p. 56.