An e-book by Brian Whitaker exploring theunification of north and south Yemen in 1990, and its aftermath
Notes: Chapter 1
1. This was settled in 2000 by the Treaty of Jeddah. See: http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/pol/int5.htm
2. The eastern border with Oman, agreed in 1992, is further west than some interpretations of “traditional Yemen” would place it, while in the north, two areas considered ethnically Yemeni were ceded to Saudi Arabia under the Treaty of Ta’if in 1934.
3. In the original French: “Une quantité considérable de peuple qui habite une certaine étendue de pays, renfermé dans de certaines limites, et qui obéit au même gouvernement.” Encyclopédie, vol 11, p 35, Paris, 1751-1765. Quoted by Keane, John: Nations, nationalism and the European citizen, Research paper No.2, Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster, London, 1993.
4. Seton-Watson, Hugh: Nations and States – an inquiry into the origins of nations and the politics of nationalism, London, 1977, p5.
5. Anderson, Benedict: Imagined Communities, Verso, London 1993.
6. Keane, John: Nations, nationalism and the European citizen, Research Paper No.2, Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster, London, 1993 (p5).
7. Connor, Walker, “A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group is a ….”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, volume 1, number 4, October 1978, p. 379.
8. Republic of Yemen Radio, Sana’a, 0947 GMT, 22 May 1990 (BBC Monitoring Service).
9. The descendants of Himyar are generally associated with Yemen south of Sana’a, while most of the tribes to the north trace their descent through Kahlan. For details of Yemeni genealogy see Dresch, Paul: Tribes, Government and History in Yemen Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, p5.
10. The Qur’an XXXIV, 14-15 (The Sura of Sheba). A J Arberry translation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1964.
11. Hitti, Philip K: History of the Arabs, Macmillan, London, 10th edition, 1985, pp 64-65.
12. Ibid.
13. Dresch, op cit, p7.
14. Author’s interview with David Warburton, Director of the American Institute for Yemeni Studies, Sana’a. March, 1994.
15. The Qur’an III, 103-105 (The House of Imran). A J Arberry translation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1964.
16. Mansfield, Peter: The Arabs, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 3rd edition 1985. pp 462-469.
17. Ibid, p 464.
18. Author’s interview, December 1991.
19. ’Ashmawy, Ibrahim al-: Al-wahda al-Yamaniyya, Sana’a, 1991.
20. See, for example, the YAR oil minister’s statement on Aden Radio, 7 April, 1988 and President Salih’s speech in Ta’izz on YAR radio, 17 April, 1988 (BBC Monitoring Service).
21. Oxford English Dictionary.
22. Migdal, Joel S: Strong states and weak societies. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1988, p 19, citing Weber, Max: The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, ed. Talcott Parsons, Free Press, New York, 1964, p 156.
23. Migdal, op cit, pp 17-18.
24. Manea, Elham M: Yemen, the tribe and the state. (http://www.al-bab.com/soc/manea.htm). Paper presented to the International Colloquium on Islam and Social Change at the University of Lausanne on 10-11 October 1996. Later translated into French and published as "La tribu et l'Etat au Yémen" in Mondher Kilani (ed): Islam et changement social, pp 205-218. Lausanne: Editions Payot.
25. Manea, Elham M: op. cit.
26. Halliday, Fred: Revolution and foreign policy – the case of South Yemen 1967-1987. Cambridge University Press, 1990, chapter 4.
27. Braun, Ursula: Prospects for Yemeni unity, in Pridham B R (ed): Contemporary Yemen – politics and historical background, Croom Helm, 1984. p 263.
28. Halliday, op cit, pp 136-139.
29. Ibid.
30. Dunbar, Charles: The unification of Yemen: process, politics and prospects, Middle East Journal 46, No 3 (Summer 1992).
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Author’s interview with Abd al-Qadir Bagammal, 25 April, 1997.
34. Graz, Liesl: South Yemen waits for unity, Middle East International, 16 March, 1990.
35. Author’s interview with Mohammed Ahmed Ali Al-Khoubati, Chairman, Yemen Ports Authority, December 1991.
36. Author’s interview with western diplomat in Aden, December 1991.
37. Author’s interviews with Mohammed Hussein Alhaj, Executive Director, Aden Refinery Company, December 1991and March 1994.
38. Ibid.
39. Author’s interview with western diplomat in Aden, December 1991.
40. Burrowes, Robert D: Oil Strike and Leadership Struggle in South Yemen: 1986 and Beyond, Middle East Journal, 43, 3 (Summer 1989).
41. MEED, February 20, 1988, p. 36.
42. Burrowes, op cit.
43. Dunbar, op cit.
44. Author’s interview with Abd al-Qadir Bagammal, 25 April, 1997.
45. Burrowes, op cit.
46. Ibid.
47. Whitaker, Brian: Rumblings from a distant outbreak of democracy, The Guardian, 4 January, 1992.
48. Annual report of the World Bank, quoted by ITAR-TASS news agency, Moscow, 18 December, 1992 (BBC Monitoring Service).
49. Hall, Siobhan: Yemen: the politics of unity, Contemporary Strategic Issues in the Arab Gulf, Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies, London (1991).
50. Burrowes, op cit.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. MEED, November 8, 1986, p. 39.
55. Burrowes, op cit.
56. Ibid.
Notes: Chapter 2
1. Burrowes, Robert D: Oil Strike and Leadership Struggle in South Yemen: 1986 and Beyond, Middle East Journal, 43, 3 (Summer 1989).
2. Keesings, 30 September 1988. The YAR exported its first oil from the Ma’rib field in December 1987.
3. Associated Press, 25 April, 1988.
4. Sana’a Home Service, 1200 GMT, 17 April, 1988 (BBC Monitoring Service).
5. Ibid.
6. Burrowes, op cit.
7. Sana’a Home Service, 1830 GMT, 4 May 1988 (BBC Monitoring Service).
8. Ibid. The roads were Qa’tabah to Dali’; Tawr al-Bahah to Mafalis; Mukayras to Bayda; and Bayhan to Harib.
9. Burrowes, op cit.
10. Author’s interview with Abd al-Qadir Ba-Gammal, 25 April 1997.
11. Burrowes, op cit.
12. Text of communiqué, broadcast on Aden home service, 1915 GMT, 1 June 1989 (BBC Monitoring Service).
13. al-Kuhali, Jarallah ’Umar: The Dialectics of Unity and Democracy, YSP discussion paper, undated.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Text of communiqué, broadcast on Aden home service, 1915 GMT, 1 June 1989 (BBC Monitoring Service).
17. Aden home service, 1800 GMT, 21 Jun 89 (BBC Monitoring Service). The “tangible steps” al-Baid proposed in this speech were: (1) Unifying and co-ordinating economic development plans, drawing up joint development programmes and participating in industrial, agricultural, tourist and other investments. (2) A unified policy on matters of sovereignty and defence. (3) Withdrawal of military forces from the north-south border areas. (4) Merging the “mass organisations” (trade unions, etc) on a democratic basis. (5) Joint steps to provide “a more exemplary atmosphere” for practising democracy and to safeguard basic freedoms and human rights.
18. Abu Talib, Hassan: al-Wahda al-Yamaniyya – Dirasaat fi ’amiliyyaat al-tahawwul min al-tashtir ’illa al-wahda, Markaz Dirasaat al-Wahda al-Arabiyya, Beirut, 1994.
19. PDRY Radio, Aden 2030 GMT 10 November 1989 (BBC Monitoring Service).
20. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Radio, Amman 1200 GMT, 23 November, 1989 (BBC Monitoring Service).
21. Associated Press, 30 November, 1989.
22. YAR Radio, San’a 1700 GMT 19 November, 1989 (BBC Monitoring Service).
23. Dunbar, op cit.
24. YAR Radio, San’a 1700 GMT, 29 November, 1989 (BBC Monitoring Service).
25. PDRY Radio, Aden 1500 GMT, 29 November, 1989 (BBC Monitoring Service).
26. YAR Radio, San’a 1200 GMT, 2 December, 1989 (BBC Monitoring Service).
27. For example, author’s interview with Salim Salih Mohammed, October, 1994.
28. Author’s interview with southern (non-YSP) political analyst.
29. Author’s interview with Salim Salih Mohammed, October, 1994.
30. PDRY Radio, 2030 GMT 18 November 1989 (BBC Monitoring Service).
31. BBC Monitoring Service, 30 March 1990 (ME/0723 i).
32. Agence France Presse, 15 April, 1990.
33. Associated Press, 1 May, 1990.
34. BBC Monitoring Service, 14 May, 1990.
35. Ibid.
36. Associated Press, 15 April, 1990.
37. Associated Press, 31 March and 16 April, 1990.
38. Author’s interview, May 1995.
39. Told to the author by an Egyptian journalist who interviewed al-Baid.
40. Author’s interview with Abd al-Qader Bagammal, 25 April, 1997.
41. Associated Press, 2 May, 1990. The decisive – and extremely private – conversation is said to have taken place in a car, halted in a road tunnel which Adenis later referred to as the “tunnel of love”.
Notes: Chapter 3
1. Burrowes, Robert D: Prelude to Unification – The Yemen Arab Republic, 1962-1990. International Journal of Middle East Studies 23 (4), 1991, pp 483-506.
2. Ibid
3. Constitution of the YAR, Article 37.
4. Constitution of the YAR, Article 38.
5. Constitution of the PDRY, 1978. Article 3.
6. Hudson, Michael C: Arab politics – the search for legitimacy, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1977, p 361.
7. Ismael, Tareq Y and Ismael, Jacqueline S: PDR Yemen: Politics, Economics and Society. London: Frances Pinter, 1986.
8. Ibid
9. Ibid
10. Ibid
11. Ibid
12. Ibid
13. Woodward, Bob: CIA man’s secret plot in Yemen. The Guardian, 5 December 1986.
14. Aden home service 1915 GMT, 1 June, 1989 (BBC Monitoring Service).
15. When President al-Sha’bi stepped down.
16. Aden home service 1800 GMT, 21 June, 1989 (BBC Monitoring Service).
17. See Hudson, Michael C: After the Gulf War: Prospects for democratisation in the Arab world. Middle East Journal 45 (3), Summer 1991.
18. The Economist, February 3, 1990.
19. Hudson, op cit.
20. Hudson, op cit.
21. Burrowes, Robert D: The Yemen Arab Republic: The Politics of Development, 1962-1986, Westview Press, Boulder, Co., 1987, p 141, and Carapico, Sheila: Autonomy and Secondhand Oil Dependency of the Yemen Arab Republic, Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol 10, No 2, 1988 p 209.
22. Nevers, Renée de: Democratisation and ethnic conflict, Survival, Vol 35, No 2, Summer 1993, pp 31-48.
23. Huntington, Samuel: The third wave: democratisation in the late twentieth century. O K Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, pp 109-163.
24 This in turn was followed by southern attempts to replace the government in Sana’a with one much closer to the National Front.
25. Cairo agreement, 1972. Article 2.
26. Cairo agreement, 1972. Article 9.
27. The founding members were the Arab Nationalists’ Movement, the Tribes’ Formation, the Nasserite Front, the Clandestine Organisation of Free Officers and Soldiers, the Yafa’i Reform Front, the Patriotic Front and the Revolutionary Organisation of the Free People of Occupied South Yemen. They were joined later by the Organisation of the Revolutionary Vanguard in Aden, the Oganisation of Mahrah Youth and the Youth Organisation of South Yemen. (Ismael, op cit, pp 24-25).
28. Interestingly, when the NF merged with two other southern groups, the Popular Democratic Union and the Vanguard Party, in 1975, its new name, the Unified Political Organisation of the National Front, echoed the words of the Tripoli agreement, consciously or unconsciously implying a claim to the political leadership of a united Yemen. See Ismael, op cit, p 37.
29. Gause, F Gregory III: “Yemeni unity: past and future”, Middle East Journal 42, No 1 (Winter 1988).
30. Tripoli Agreement, 1974, Article 6.
31. Tripoli Agreement, 1974, Article 4.
32. See Gause, op cit.
33. Cairo agreement, 1972. Article 3 (a)
34. Cairo agreement, 1972. Article 3 (b)
35. Sana’a radio, 1830 GMT, 4 May, 1988 (BBC Monitoring Service).
36. BBC Monitoring Service, 19 December, 1989. A similar description was given by Iryani, BBC Monitoring Service, 2 November, 1989.
37. Abu Talib, Hassan: al-Wahda al-Yamaniyya – Dirasaat fi ’amiliyyaat al-tahawwul min al-tashtir ’illa al-wahda, Markaz Dirasaat al-Wahda al-Arabiyya, Beirut, 1994, p 195.
38. PDRY Radio, 1630 GMT, 11 December 1989 (BBC Monitoring Service).
39. Associated Press, 30 November, 1989.
40 The southern military were controlled by the YSP and the northern forces by the President Salih, mainly through placing members of his extended family in key positions.
Notes: Chapter 4
1. Sana’a Agreement, 1988.
2. YAR Radio, San’a 1200 GMT 4 May 1990 (BBC Monitoring Service) (ME/0755 A/7)
3. Ibid.
4. PDRY Radio, Aden 2030 GMT, 11 May, 1990 (BBC Monitoring Service).
5. YAR Radio, San’a 1200 GMT 4 May 1990 (BBC Monitoring Service) (ME/0755 A/7)
6. YAR Radio, San’a 1200 GMT 12 May 1990 (BBC Monitoring Service).
7. YAR Radio, San’a 1200 GMT 13 May 1990 (BBC Monitoring Service) (ME/0765 A/6).
8. 1990 Constitution, article 127.
9. PDRY Radio, Aden 2030 GMT 15 May 1990 (BBC Monitoring Service).
10. PDRY Radio, Aden, 1900 GMT 20 May 1990 (BBC Monitoring Service).
11. Associated Press, 20 May, 1990.
12. 1990 Constitution, article 130.
13. Statement by presidential council, 22 April, 1991. (Included in Yemen Times translation of constitution.)
14. Proclamation of DRY, 21 May, 1994.
15. Author’s interview, March 1994.
16. It is worth recalling that Britain joined the European Community without a referendum. Several years later, voters approved Britain’s membership. The difficulties that can arise from this type of referendums were seen in Germany on May 5, 1996, when two federal states, Berlin and Brandenburg, voted on unification – Berlin in favour, Brandenburg against.
17. Aden Agreement, clause 1b.
18. See http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/unity/unif6.htm
19. Sana’a Accord, articles 8 and 10.
20. Sana’a Accord: “Proclamation of the Republic of Yemen and arrangements for the transitional period”, article 3.
21. Foreword to The Constitution of the Republic of Yemen (English translation), Yemen Times, Sana’a, 1991.
22. In view of the long-standing border dispute with Saudi Arabia, this might also be considered a hostage to fortune, since it implies that no compromise can be made.
23. See also Chapter 8. Article 3 was amended in 1994 to make the Sharia the source of all legislation.
24. YAR constitution, article 75; unified constitution, article 85.
25. This was an agreed number, not specified in the constitution.
26. The old southern parliament was the Supreme People’s Council (Majlis al-Sha’b al-’Ula).
27. 1990 Constitution, article 40.
28. 1971 Constitution, article 70.
29. 1990 Constitution, article 79.
30. 1990 Constitution, article 45.
31. 1990 Constitution, article 53.
32. 1990 Constitution, article 63.
33. 1990 Constitution, article 64.
34. 1971 Constitution, article 71.
35. 1990 Constitution, article 102.
36. 1990 Constitution, article 105.
37. 1990 Constitution, article 111.
38. 1990 Constitution, article 117.
39. 1971 Constitution, article 110.
40. 1971 Constitution, Article 73.
41. 1971 Constitution, Article 76.
42. 1971 Constitution, Article 74.
43. 1971 Constitution, Article 76.
44. ISMAEL, Tareq Y and Jacqueline S: PDR Yemen – Politics, Economics and Society (Frances Pinter, London, 1986), pp 44-45.
45. 1990 Constitution, article 83.
46. 1990 Constitution, article 93.
47. 1971 Constitution, article 74.
48. 1971 Constitution, article 73.
49. 1971 Constitution, article 94.
50. 1971 Constitution, article 93.
51. 1971 Constitution, article 87.
52. YAR constitution, article 88; unified constitution, article 95.
Notes: Chapter 5
1. Constitution of the Republic of Yemen (1990), Article 39.
2. Law No 66 (1991) Governing Parties and Political Organisations. Article 2.
3. The word “party” had been regularly used in the south before unification, whereas the north had avoided it (see chapter 3). For a while after unification, the northern GPC continued to regard itself as a “political organisation” rather than a party. This probably explains why the two terms were used interchangeably in the law. However, the problem with the law’s definition was that it appeared to assume that any “political organisation” must necessarily be seeking to achieve power and should therefore be considered a party.
4. Law No 66, Article 3.
5. al-Bishari, Ahmed Ali (editor of al-Thawabit journal) in preface to Manea, op cit.
6. Law No 66, Article 8.
7. Ibid. Article 3.
8. Ibid. Article 10.
9. Ibid. Article 11.
10. Ibid. Article 17 (d).
11. Ibid. Article 8 (vii).
12. Ibid. Article 8 (vii).
13. Ibid. Article 33.
14. Ibid. Article 8 (ix).
15. Ibid. Article 8 (iv).
16. Ibid. Article 9 (b).
17. Ibid. Article 14 (b).
18. On the basis of the 1993 election results, the GPC would have been entitled to 36% of the total, the YSP to 25%, Islah to 23%, and five other parties to 3% each.
19. Law No 66, Article 17.
20. Ibid, Article 14.
21. Ibid. Article 13.
22. Ibid. Article 34.
23. Anonymous article, “Will the opposition political parties stay in business?”, Yemen Times, 19 February, 1996.
24. Ibid. Article 13.
25. Middle East Watch, Vol 4, Issue 10, November 1992. (Human Rights Watch, New York).
26. Manea, op cit. p 253.
27. Dresch, Paul and Haykel, Bernard: Stereotypes and political styles – Islamists and tribesfolk in Yemen. International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol 27, No 4, November 1995.
28. Author’s interview, December 1991.
29. Author’s interview, November 1992.
30. Dresch and Haykel, op cit.
31. Dresch and Haykel, op cit.
32. Author’s interview, November 1992.
33. Resolutions from “The Conference of Unity and Peace,” in San’a’ from 27 to 30 December 1992. Cited by Dresch and Haykel, op cit.
34. Author’s interview, November 1992.
35. Author’s interview with David Warburton, Director of American Institute of Yemeni Studies, Sana’a, March 1994.
36. Quoted by Dresch and Haykel, op cit.
37. Dresch and Haykel, op cit.
38. Fares al-Saqqaf, deputy director of information for Islah, interviewed by Yemen Times, 8 July, 1992.
39. Dresch and Haykel, op cit. See also Mundy, Martha: Domestic government – kinship, community and polity in north Yemen, Tauris, London, 1995.
40. Dresch and Haykel, op cit, citing al-Nur, August 1992, p18.
Notes: Chapter 6
1. Murphy, Caryle: Unified Yemen: Arabia’s Surprise Democracy, Washington Post, 29 July 1992.
2. Ibid.
3. Numbers of copies printed were notified to the Ministry of Information. In Britain, a national newspaper, using computerised distribution lists, would expect between 5% and 10% of copies to be returned unsold. With less sophisticated systems and smaller circulations, a much higher the wastage rate would be expected.
4. Law No 25, 1990.
5. Article 3.
6. Article 16.
7. Article 14.
8. Article 15.
9. Article 13.
10. Article 17.
11. Article 18.
12. Article 50. The wording specifically refers to “this law” – which could mean that article which infringed other laws must nevertheless be published.
13. Ibid.
14. Articles 60-63.
15. Article 67.
16. Article 64.
17. Article 4.
18. Ibid.
19. Article 5.
20. Article 6.
21. Article 103.
22. Middle East Watch, op cit.
23. Article 112.
24. Middle East Watch, op cit.
25 . These observations apply specifically to newspapers and other printed material. There are practical reasons for licensing terrestrial broadcasters in order to allocate frequencies in ways that avoid interference between stations.
26. Article 7.
27. Article 8.
28. Articles 27 and 28.
29. Article 29.
30. Article 31.
31. Articles 76-77.
32. Articles 82-83.
33. Article 91.
34. Article 33.
35. Articles 34-37.
36. Article 40.
37. Article 46.
38. Articles 51 and 110.
39. Articles 53 and 54.
40. Article 69.
41. Articles 104-107.
42. Article 108.
43. Article 52.
44. Abd al-Aziz al-Saqqaf, of the Yemen Times, quoted in Middle East Watch, op cit.
45. Middle East Watch, op cit.
46. Abd al-Aziz al-Saqqaf, of the Yemen Times, quoted in Middle East Watch, op cit.
47. Author’s interview, December 1991.
48. Article 17.
49. BBC Monitoring Service, 20 November, 1991.
50. Middle East Watch, op cit.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Author’s interview with Dr Nasir al-Mutairi, December 1991.
54. Ibid.
55. Middle East Watch, op cit.
56. Author’s interview, December 1991.
57. The reconciliation between Salih and al-Baid in November 1992, for example, was undoubtedly the the most important news of the day. Al-Thawra reported it briefly towards the bottom of its front page.
58. Middle East Watch, op cit.
Notes: Chapter 7
1. Author’s interview, December 1991.
2. Katz, Mark N: ‘Yemeni unity and Saudi security.’ Middle East Policy, Vol 1, Issue 1, 1992.
3. Whitaker, Brian: Getting dug in to Sheba’s terraces, The Guardian, 24 January, 1992.
4. Katz, op cit.
5. Halliday, Fred: Arabs in Exile: Yemeni Migrants in Urban Britain, I B Tauris, London, 1992, p 122.
6. Hear, Nicholas van: The impact of the mass return of Yemenis from Saudi Arabia in 1990, British Yemeni Society lecture, 24 April, 1995. See also: Hear, Nicholas van: The socio-economic impact of the involuntary mass return to Yemen in 1990, Journal of Refugee Studies, No 7, 1994.
7. Dunbar, op cit.
8. Katz, op cit.
9. Katz, op cit.
10. The fact that Sa’ada had the highest female turnout in the country suggests the story may be true.
11. Katz, op cit.
12. Whitaker, Brian: Anguish in the land of Sheba, The Guardian, 2 January, 1992.
13. “BP halts Yemeni drilling due to Saudi border dispute”, Dow Jones News Wire, 19 May, 1992. Atlantic Richfield said it had seen the Saudi letter but had not received one directly.
14. The Aden refinery was obliged to switch from processing Iraqi oil to Yemeni oil, even though it was not capable of refining the Yemeni type efficiently.
15. The status of the treaty at this stage was not entirely clear. It was supposed to be renewed every 20 years. This happened in 1954 but Schofield tentatively suggests that it lapsed 20 years later. Whether or not this was so, Yemeni leaders continued to talk as if the treaty were operative. In 1990, for example, the Yemeni foreign minister noted in a newspaper interview that the treaty was renewable every 20 years – implying that it was still in force and would shortly be due for renewal. Sixty lunar years from May 1934 would mean a renewal date in October/November 1992. See: Schofield, Richard: Border disputes in the Gulf region (chapter in Nonneman: Europe and the Middle East, Federal Trust, London, 1992) and Al-Quds al-Arabi, London, 24 October, 1990 in US Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Near East and South Asia, 30 October, 1990, p 19.
16. See, for example, Agence France Presse, 8 October, 1990, and Reuter, 3 June, 1992.
17. Associated Press, 9 October, 1990.
18. BBC Monitoring Service, 16 April, 1991.
19. Agence France Presse, 24 May, 1992.
20. Reuter, 3 June, 1992.
21. Lackner, Helen: PDR Yemen - Outpost of Socialist Development in Arabia. London: Ithaca, 1995. p52.
22. Interview with Abd al-Karim al-Iryani, Yemeni foreign minister, December 1992.
23. Associated Press, 25 August, 1990
24. Agence France Presse, 8 October, 1990.
25. Katz, op cit.
26. Yemeni government statistics.
27. Whitaker, Brian: Anguish in the land of Sheba, The Guardian, 2 January, 1992.
28. Whitaker, Brian: Pawns of Gulf war live forgotten in Yemen camps, The Guardian, 7 January, 1993.
29. Katz, op cit.
30. Whitaker, Brian: Anguish in the land of Sheba. The Guardian, 2 January, 1992
31. Hear, op cit.
Notes: Chapter 8
1. International Who’s Who. Accurate biographical information about Yemeni politicians is scanty; no particular effort is made at an official level to provide it – a common practice in the Arab world, where such information tends to be considered unimportant.
2. Abu Talib, op cit.
3. The armies, currencies and airlines were eventually unified after the 1994 war.
4. The 1993 elections saw the YSP relegated to third position behind the GPC and Islah. Forty-four of the 56 seats the YSP won were in the south, and seven of the others were in Ta’izz and Ibb – northern areas which have a traditional affinity with the south.
5. Halliday, Fred: Election takes Yemen to the crossroads, The Guardian, 6 October, 1992.
6. The Constitution of the Republic of Yemen, annexe in translation published by Yemen Times, Sana’a, 1991, p 36.
7. Ibid.
8. Article 3.
9. MENA, 1455 GMT, 12 May, 1991 (BBC Monitoring Service).
10. MENA, 1650 GMT, 12 May, 1991 (BBC Monitoring Service).
11. Halliday, Fred: Election takes Yemen to the crossroads, The Guardian, 6 October, 1992.
12. Ibid.
13. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI): Promoting participation in Yemen’s 1993 elections. NDI, Washington, 1994. pp 154-5.
14. NDI, op cit, p 56.
15. During a visit to Sana’a in 1991 I stayed in a cheap hotel frequented by Yemenis. Sitting in the TV room one evening, where some 8-10 Yemeni men were squatting on cushions, I noticed that all of them were carrying firearms of various kinds. In Aden in the early 1990s, the Rock hotel had a notice saying that all weapons must be deposited at the reception desk. The tendency to play with weapons could be disconcerting at times: in Hodeida I was invited to someone’s house where, after a few glasses of bootleg whisky, one man took out his pistol and amused himself by pointing it at his friend’s head and clicking the trigger.
16. See Abd al-Mohsen, Assem: “Gun-ridden Yemen to enforce ban in cities”, Reuter, 24 August, 1994.
17. Ibid.
18. Associated Press, 29 July, 1993.
19. Reuter, 17 February, 1993. The MP was never brought to trial but a settlement was negotiated with families of the victims.
20. One particularly noticeable form of crime was car theft, often where drivers were forced to abandon their vehicles at gunpoint.
21. Fisk, Robert: Anti-Soviet warrior puts his army on the road to peace, The Independent, 6 December, 1993.
22. Gordon Waterfield’s book, Sultans of Aden (reprinted by Stacey International in 2002), gives a potted history of the Fadli family.
23. “Ruling parties in Yemen again study possibility of merger”, al-Hayat, 6 January, 1993. The “regime” referred to was presumbly that of Yemen rather than Bosnia.
24. This is the view of Eric Watkins, among many others. Fadli’s subsequent behaviour is consistent with this interpretation.
25. For example, the six people arrested for the Aden hotel bombings all escaped from jail.
26. “Ruling parties in Yemen again study possibility of merger”, al-Hayat, 6 January, 1993.
27. Dresch, op cit.
28. Ibid.
29. Yemeni Republic Radio, San’a 2000 gmt 9 Jan 93 (BBC Monitoring Service ME/1580 A/11 – 11 January 1993)
30. Dresch, op cit.
31. Woodward, Bob: CIA man’s secret plot in Yemen. The Guardian, 5 December 1986.
32. ‘Abu Hamza and the Supporters of Shariah.’ http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/hamza/hamza1.htm
33. Evidence at the trial of Silker Maier-Witt. Associated Press, 28 August, 1991.
34. Evidence from Czech archives. BBC Monitoring Service, 18 August, 1994.
35. BBC Monitoring Service, 8 December, 1993.
36. Law on Political Parties and Organisations, Article 10.
37. al-Sharq al-Awsat, 27 November, 1993.
38. Ibid.
39. His first public comment was on 23 September (al-Sharq al-Awsat, 24 September, 1992).
40. News of the boycott was not made public at the time. Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 24 September, 1992: “Baid stipulates four conditions for his return and Attas signals resignation of government”.
41. Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 24 September, 1992, and 30 November, 1993.
42. Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 30 November, 1993.
43. Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 26 September, 1992: “Predictions of al-Baid’s return today.”
44. Some of those who had been invited a few weeks earlier had their invitations mysteriously withdrawn at the last minute.
45. See, for example, al-Hayat, 27 September, 1992: “Baid boycotts celebrations for anniversary of Yemeni revolution in Sana’a”.
46. Ibid.
Notes: Chapter 9
1. Kuwait had earlier held competitive elections among a limited electorate.
2. Constitution of Yemen, Article 4.
3. This official estimate was about 40% of the population according to the census taken a year later. The low figure for eligible voters is explained by the high proportion of Yemenis aged under 18.
4. The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs was established in 1983 “to promote, maintain and strengthen democratic institutions in new and emerging democracies.” It has links with the US Democratic Party.
5. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI): Promoting participation in Yemen’s 1993 elections. NDI, Washington, 1994. p 42.
6. Author’s interview with Abd al-Aziz al-Saqqaf, publisher of Yemen Times, 7 Nov, 1992.
7. This assumes that the official estimate of eligible male voters was correct; conceivably it was not.
8. NDI op cit, p 32.
9. Author’s interview with David Warburton, Director of the American Institute for Yemeni Studies, Sana’a. March, 1994.
10. NDI op cit, p 44.
11. NDI op cit, p 43.
12. General Elections Law, Article 5.
13. NDI op cit, pp 41-42.
14. Ibid, p 46.
15. Ibid, p 47.
16. Ibid, p 47.
17. Ibid, p 42.
18. Ibid, p 48. The NDI said it heard of three cases in Ta’izz where a husband divorced his wive for registering to vote without his permission.
19. Detalle, Renaud: The Yemeni elections close up, Middle East Report, November-December, 1993.
20. Manea, op cit; Detalle, Renaud (The Yemeni elections up close, Middle East Report, November-December 1993) gives slightly different figures: 3,530 candidates, including 2,263 independents. Candidates were not officially allowed to withdraw during the last week before the ballot, which may account for the discrepancy.
21. Author’s interview with Abd al-Aziz al-Saqqaf, November 1992.
22. Carapico, Sheila: Elections and mass politics in Yemen, Middle East Report, November-December 1993.
23. NDI op cit, p 38.
24. Ibid, p 50.
25. Ibid, p 50.
26. Ibid, p 38.
27. Warburton, David: A campaign rally in Sana’a, Middle East Report, November-December 1993.
28. NDI op cit, p 49.
29. Detalle, op cit.
30. Ibid.
31. Author’s interview with David Warburton, Director of the American Institute for Yemeni Studies, Sana’a. March, 1994.
32. Author’s interview with political figure in Ta’izz, March, 1994.
33. Yemen Times, 21-30 April, 1993.
34. Detalle, op cit. Mukalla is the capital of Hadramaut province, the southern area which has the strongest religious tradition, and also links with Saudi Arabia.
35. After the election, the Islah leader, Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar, became parliamentary speaker rather than seeking a ministerial post – a role which he developed very effectively.
36. The problem was largely overcome in the 1997 election, when party symbols were used to help illiterate voters. Ballot papers were printed with the names and electoral symbols of all nominated candidates and those of candidates who withdrew were crossed out by officials with a felt-tip pen.
37. Author’s interview with David Warburton, Director of the American Institute for Yemeni Studies, Sana’a. March, 1994.
38. Detalle, op cit.
39. Author’s interview with Eric Watkins.
40. Author’s interview with David Warburton, Director of the American Institute for Yemeni Studies, Sana’a. March, 1994.
41. Author’s interview with member of British observer team.
42. NDI op cit, p 20-21.
43. Ibid, p 34
44. Ibid, p 19.
45. Ibid, p 26.
46. “The High Commission [SEC] reviewed … the requests for local and international monitoring teams, and accepted them in principle. The regulations, conditions and rules for this process will be organised in accordance with the activity of the Commission and in coordination with the recognised and organised political parties.” Article in The Elections, February 14, 1993, quoted by NDI, op cit, p 80.
47. NDI op cit, pp 117-118.
48. Ibid, p 23.
49. Ibid, pp 120-132. Statements and correspondence with NDI. This tactic is known in Yemen as “cloning” (see chapter 5).
50. Ibid, p 28-29.
51. Ibid, p 30-31.
52. Carapico.
53. YSP press conference, April 30, 1993; SEC press conference, May 1, 1993. Cited by Carapico, op cit.
54. Detalle, op cit.
55. Ibid.
56. Yemeni Republic Radio, San’a 0430 GMT, 29 April, 1993 (BBC Monitoring Service).
57. Pugh, Deborah: Voters forsake old guard in first election. The Guardian, 24 April, 1993.
58. NDI op cit, p 141.
Notes: Chapter 10
1. Al-Hayat, 10 March 1993: “Yemen: union of socialists and GPC to wait for choice of one name from three”.
2. The likely outcome in the north is more difficult to predict because of the large number of votes cast in 1993 for minority candidates.
3. Unlike his southern colleagues, Jarallah Umar was a northern socialist accustomed to being in opposition.
4. Islah faced a similar choice after the 1997 election and decided to go into opposition.
5. Told to the author by his associates.
6. The Qatari News Agency reported that he intended to reject the post. See Reuter, 31 May 1993.
7. Abu Shawarib’s party issued a statement saying that he would serve in a personal capacity because of his prominence in Yemen, while the party itself would lead the opposition in parliament. (Reuter, 30 May 1993.)
8. Associated Press, Reuter and Yemen Republic Radio, 10 June 1993.
9. 1990 Constitution, articles 88 and 91.
10. Article 89.
11. Ibid.
12. Yemen Times No. 20 (May 23-29, 1993).
13. Article 91.
14. Reuter, 11 October, 1993.
15. Reuter, 13 October, 1994.
16. Reuter, 15 October, 1993.
17. Yemeni Republic Radio, 1200 GMT, 16 October, 1993 (BBC Monitoring Service).
18. Reuter, 16 October, 1993.
19. See: http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/pol/eighteen_points.htm
20. Northern and southern banknotes were still valid and in circulation. In Aden, for example, it was possible to pay a shopkeeper in northern riyals and receive change in southern dinars (after some difficult calculations using the exchange rate 1:26).
21. Makin, Patrick: Marital breakdown, The Middle East, No 235, June 1994.
22. This overlooked the fact that the north’s natural gas reserves, estimated to be worth $30 billion, were probably more valuable than the south’s oil. See Makin, op cit.
Notes: Chapter 11
1. Preamble to Document of Pledge and Accord. Yemen Times translation, with author’s revisions.
2. Ever since unification the prime minister had been a member of the YSP, as a quid pro quo for the GPC holding the presidency. Although prime minister Attas had nominally chosen his cabinets, the ultimate choice had rested with Salih.
3. Sana’a radio, 2000 GMT, 13 January, 1994 (BBC Monitoring Service).
4. Radio Monte Carlo, 1200 GMT, 9 January, 1994 (BBC Monitoring Service). The attacker was reportedly arrested.
5. Author’s interview with Eric Watkins.
6. Reuter, 17 January, 1994.
7. MENA news agency, Cairo, 1915 GMT, 6 February, 1994 (BBC Monitoring Service).
8. Sana’a radio, 2000 GMT, 8 February, 1994 (BBC Monitoring Service).
9. MENA news agency, Cairo, 1915 GMT 6 February, 1994 (BBC Monitoring Service).
10. Yemeni Republic Radio, Sana’a, in Arabic 2000 GMT, 8 February, 1994 (BBC Monitoring Service).
11. Ibid.
12. Radio Monte Carlo – Middle East, Paris, in Arabic 0500 GMT 16 February, 1994 (BBC Monitoring Service).
13. Reuter, 18 January, 1994.
14. Ibid.
15. AFP, 15 January, 1994.
16. AFP, 19 January, 1994.
17. AFP, 19 January, 1994.
18. Reuter, 20 January, 1994.
19. MBC television, 22 January, 1994 (BBC Monitoring Service).
20. Radio Monte Carlo, 1200 GMT, 31 January, 1994 (BBC Monitoring Service).
21. Reuter, 8 February, 1994.
22. Reuter, 3 February, 1994.
23. They had been stationed there as part of the exchange of forces at the time of unification.
24. Reuter, 17 February, 1994.
25. MENA news agency, Cairo, in Arabic 0845 GMT, 19 February, 1994 (BBC Monitoring Service).
26. Syrian Arab Republic Radio, Damascus, in Arabic 1215 GMT, 19 February, 1994 (BBC Monitoring Service).
27. Interview with southern (non-YSP) source.
28. Yemeni Republic Radio, Sana’a, in Arabic 1200 GMT, 20 February, 1994 (BBC Monitoring Service).
29. Reuter, 19 February, 1994.
30. Jordanian TV, Amman, in Arabic 1515 GMT, 20 February, 1994 (BBC Monitoring Service).
31. Ibid.
32. Reuter, 26 February, 1994. Al-Baid’s deputy, Salim Salih Muhammad, left for Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.
33. Yemeni Republic Radio, Sana’a, in Arabic 1205, GMT 23 February, 1994 (BBC Monitoring Service).
34. Reuter, 21 February, 1994.
35. Ibid.
36. Yemeni Republic Radio, San’a, in Arabic 1205 GMT, 23 February, 1994 (BBC Monitoring Service).
37. Reuter, 22 February, 1994.
38. Ibid.
39. Reuter, 24 February, 1994.
40. Reuter, 8 November, 1994.
41. Makin, Patrick: Yemen, now a military crisis. Middle East International, 4 March 1994.
42. Reuter, 23 February, 1994.
43. Reuter, 26 February, 1994.
44. Agence France Presse, 26 February, 1994.
45. The committee was headed by the deputy chief of staff, Colonel Ali Muhammad Salah, and comprised representatives of the ruling coalition, together with the US and French military attaches and Omani and Jordanian officials.
46. Reuter, 25 February, 1994.
47. Ibid.
48. Yemeni Republic Radio, San’a, in Arabic 2000 GMT, 24 February, 1994 (ME/1931 MED/2 (2)) (BBC Monitoring Service).
49. Yemeni Republic Radio, San’a, in Arabic 2000 GMT, 24 February, 1994; Yemeni Republic Radio, San’a, in Arabic 1700 GMT 24 February, 1994 (BBC Monitoring Service).
50. Radio Monte Carlo – Middle East, Paris, in Arabic 0500 GMT, 7 March, 1994 (BBC Monitoring Service).
51. Author’s interview with Abd al-Kader al-Guneid, March 1994.
52. Associated Press, 4 April, 1994.
53. Reuter, 4 April, 1994.
54. See, for example, Reuter, 9, 11, 22, 26 April, 1994.
55. Wakh news agency, Manama, in Arabic 1300 GMT 4 April, 1994 (BBC Monitoring Service).
56. Yemeni Republic Radio, Sana’a, in Arabic 2000 GMT 27 March, 1994 (BBC Monitoring Service).
57. Reuter, 6 April, 1994.
58. Ibid.
59. Yemeni Republic Radio Sana’a, in Arabic 2000 GMT 7 April, 1994 (BBC Monitoring Service).
60. Yemeni Republic Radio, Aden, in Arabic 1500 GMT 8 April, 1994 (ME/1967 MED/16 (31)) (BBC Monitoring Service)
61. Aden radio, 9 April, 1994 (ME/1966 MED/7 (23) and MED/8 (24)) (BBC Monitoring Service).
62. Associated Press, 7 April, 1994.
63. Yemeni Republic Radio, San’a, in Arabic 0430 GMT 7 April, 1994 (BBC Monitoring Service).
64. Yemeni Republic Radio, Aden, in Arabic 1500 GMT 8 April, 1994 (ME/1967 MED/16 (31)) (BBC Monitoring Service).
65. Aden radio, 9 April, 1994 (ME/1966 MED/7 (23) and MED/8 (24)) (BBC Monitoring Service).
66. Yemeni Republic Radio, San’a, in Arabic 1700 GMT 9 April, 1994 (BBC Monitoring Service).
67. Reuter, 12 April, 1994.
Notes: Chapter 12
1. Reuter, 21 and 22 April, 1994.
2. Reuter and Associated Press, 27 April, 1994.
3. Reuter, 30 April, 1994.
4. Lance, Brigadier Martin: British Yemeni Society lecture, 17 April, 1996.
5. Reuter, 30 April, 1994.
6. Reuter, 28 April, 1994.
7. al-Harb al-Yemenia (a collection of contemporaneous reports published in al-Sharq al-Awsat), Saudi Distribution Co, Jeddah, 1995.
8. Reuter, 4 May, 1995.
9. Author’s interview in 1995. If correct, this would suggest that the battle of Amran was a pre-emptive strike by the north.
10. Two government ministers disclosed this in off-the-record conversations during the war, one of them giving considerable detail. Although they cannot be considered impartial sources, no attempt seems to have been made to use the story during the war for propaganda purposes – suggesting that it was substantially true and they were genuinely concerned about it.
11. A northern minister outlined this to the author in March 1994 – some six weeks before the war. The plan included (a) securing the north, (b) thrusting south to the coast to drive a wedge between Aden and the eastern provinces and (c) taking Aden.
12. Some accounts suggest the south began re-arming as early as August 1993.
13. The question of who was fighting whom raises some terminological problems. “The north” means forces controlled by the GPC and its Islah allies, plus some southern elements. “The south” meant forces controlled by the YSP until the proclamation of the separate state, when other political elements were included.
14. Reuter, 6 May, 1994. North Yemen troops advance on Aden – statement
15. Reuter, 7 May, 1994. Southerners seen as better fighters in Yemen’s war
16. Reuter, 6 May, 1994. Yemeni rivals fight but sure win is unlikely
17. Reuter, 7 May, 1994. Southerners seen as better fighters in Yemen’s war
18. Reuter, 6 May, 1994. Yemeni rivals fight but sure win is unlikely
19. Reuter, 7 May, 1994. Westerners prepare to flee Yemen’s civil war
20. Reuter, 7 May, 1994. Southerners seen as better fighters in Yemen’s war
21. Ibid.
22. Reuter, 10 May, 1994. Yemen seems set for war of attrition
23. Reuter, 7 May, 1994. Southerners seen as better fighters in Yemen’s war
24. Lance, op cit.
25. Katz, Mark: Five external powers and the Yemeni civil war. Chapter in Suwaidi, Jamal S al-: The Yemeni war of 1994 – causes and consequences, Saqi, London, 1995.
26. Whitaker, Brian: North Yemen offensive goes on despite ceasefire pledge, The Guardian, 18 June, 1994.
27. Associated Press, 15 June, 1994.
28. Whitaker, Brian: Crisis over the border, Middle East International, 29 January, 1995.
Notes: Chapter 13
1. Democratic Republic of Yemen Radio, Aden, 1400 GMT, 24 May 1994 (BBC Monitoring Service).
2. Reuter, May 21, 1994.
3. Whitaker, Brian: North Yemen tightens the noose on Aden, Middle East Internatinal, 24 June 1994.
4. Yemeni Republic Radio, Sana’a: “unscheduled announcement” at 1526 GMT, 24 May, 1994. (BBC Monitoring Service).
5. Yemeni Republic Radio, San’a, 1700 GMT, 22 May 1994 (BBC Monitoring Service).
6. Democratic Republic of Yemen Radio, Aden, 0330 gmt 22 May, 1994. (BBC Monitoring Service)
7. With remarkable foresight, he sold his house in the most affluent suburb of Sana’a six months before the war.
8. Agence France Presse, 22 May 1994.
9. Yemeni Republic Radio, Sana’a: “unscheduled announcement” at 1526 GMT, 24 May, 1994. (BBC Monitoring Service).
10. Democratic Republic of Yemen Radio, Aden, 1400 GMT, 2 June 1994 (BBC Monitoring Service).
11. Whitaker, Brian: Leaders row as bombs hit Aden, The Guardian, 22 June, 1994.
12. Reuter, 14 June, 1994. By-lined article, “Aden tries to prevent fall from within” by William Maclean.
13. Whitaker, Brian: South Yemen leader “may be abroad”, The Guardian, 30 June, 1994.
14. Reuter, 14 June, 1994. By-lined article, “Aden tries to prevent fall from within” by William Maclean.
15. Author’s off-the-record interview with northern minister.
16. Yemeni Republic Radio, San’a, 1200 GMT, 31 May, 1994 (BBC Monitoring Service).
17. Reuter, 1 June, 1994.
18. The Middle East and North Africa 1995, Europa, London, 1994.
19. Reuter, 2 June 1994.
20. Agence France Presse, 5 June, 1994. The official media in these countries routinely used language which implied recognition of the separatist state.
21. Yemeni Republic Radio, San’a, 0430 GMT, 6 June, 1994 (BBC Monitoring Service).
22. He is also referred to as “Lakhdar Brahimi” in some news reports.
23. Reuter, 20 June, 1994.
24. Reuter, 20 Jun, 1994. Yemen’s south urges U.N. to help end war
25. Reuter, 20 Jun, 1994. North bombs Aden, U.N. truce peace bids fail
26. Reuter, 24 Jun, 1994. U.S. says Yemen attacks will bring U.N. action
27. Reuter, 14 June, 1994. By-lined article, “Aden tries to prevent fall from within” by William Maclean.
28. Ibid.
29. Reuter, 28 Jun, 1994. UN Council stalled on observer force for Yemen
30. Reuter, 28 Jun, 1994. N.Yemen says Arabs, world weep ‘‘crocodile tears’’
31. Katz, op cit.
32. Reuter, 28 Jun, 1994. UN Council stalled on observer force for Yemen
33. Reuter, 26 Jun, 1994. Eight Arab states seek rescheduled talks in July
34. Reuter, 29 June, 1994.
35. Al-Sharq, Jul 1995.
36. Reuter, 22 Jun, 1994. Shells hit Aden, south raids north oilfield
37. Ibid.
38. Reuter, 2 July, 1994.
39. Reuter, 29 June, 1994.
40. Whitaker, Brian: North tightens the noose on Aden, Middle East International, 24 June 1994.
41. Author’s interview with northern minister, June 1994.
42. Whitaker, Brian: The south is beaten, Middle East International, 9 July, 1994.
43. Whitaker, Brian: Rebel Yemeni state ready to fall, The Guardian, 6 July, 1994.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Reuter, 4 July, 1994. Yemen war focus of Gulf, Egypt, Syria talks
47. Reuter, 6 July, 1994. Arabs won’t recognise S. Yemen now – diplomats
48. Ibid.
49. Reuter, 6 July, 1994. Yemen’s civil war foes negotiating Aden surrender
50. Whitaker, Brian: Yemeni war ends as rebel leaders flee, The Guardian, 8 July, 1994.
51. Reuter, 8 July, 1994.
Notes: Chapter 14
1. Interview with Abd al-Aziz Abd al-Ghani, Yemen Times, 13 March, 1994.
2. They were eventually tried – somewhat half-heartedly – in their absence. See: Whitaker, Brian: “Harmless retribution.” Middle East International, 10 April 1998. http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/artic/mei31.htm
3. Whitaker, Brian: Political engineering, Middle East International, 21 October, 1994.
4. Whitaker, Brian: Explosion in Aden, Middle East International, 9 June 1995.
5. Whitaker, Brian: “National Opposition Front”, Middle East International, 7 October, 1994.
6. Whitaker Brian: To the Security Council, Middle East International, 1 March, 1996.
7. See: Dunbar, Charles: Internal politics in Yemen – recovery or regression? Chapter in Suwaidi, Jamal S al-: The Yemeni war of 1994 – causes and consequences, Saqi, London, 1995.
8 . Mowj, meaning “a wave” in Arabic, was an acronym derived by reversing the initials of the organisation’s Arabic name, al-Jabhat al-Wataniyya lil Mu’arida.
9. Whitaker, Brian: “National Opposition Front.” Middle East International, 7 October, 1994.
10. Whitaker, Brian: “The Yemeni-Saudi border treaty”, 1 July 2000. http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/pol/border000629.htm
11. Whitaker, Brian: “Avoiding elections.” Middle East International, 1 September, 2000. http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/artic/mei66.htm
12. Whitaker, Brian: “Magnanimous gesture”. Middle East International, 30 May, 2003
13. Whitaker, Brian: Seeking stability, Middle East International, 9 September, 1994.
14. Whitaker, Brian: National Opposition Front, Middle East International, 7 October, 1994
15. Ibid.
16. Whitaker, Brian: Seeking stability, Middle East International, 9 September, 1994
17. Results were not declared in two constituencies because of voting problems.
18. Whitaker, Brian: “Salih and his shadow.” Middle East International, 30 July, 1999. http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/artic/mei52.htm
19. For Sha’abi’s biographical details and electoral programme, see Yemen Times, 20 September, 1999. http://www.yementimes.com/99/iss38/najeeb.htm
20. Whitaker, Brian: “Salih's hollow poll win.” Middle East International, 1 October, 1999. http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/artic/mei56.htm
21. Whitaker, Brian: “Avoiding elections.” Middle East International, 1 September, 2000. http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/artic/mei66.htm
22. “Statement of the NDI pre-election delegation to Yemen’s April 2001 parliamentary election.” NDI, 6 August, 2000. http://www.ndi.org/files/1142_ye_preelect.pdf
23 Whitaker, Brian: “Democratisation derailed.” Middle East International, 26 November, 1999. http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/artic/mei58.htm
24. Whitaker, Brian: “Elections marred.” Middle East International,9 March, 2001. http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/artic/mei74.htm
25. Whitaker, Brian: “Salih wins again.” Middle East International,2 May, 2003. http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/artic/mei92.htm
26. Whitaker, Brian: “President is ‘fed up’.” Middle East International,22 July 2005. http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/artic/mei110.htm
27. “Yemen postpones parliamentary elections to 2011.” ElectionGuide, 26 February 2009. http://www.electionguide.org/country-news.php?ID=237#anchor_4038. See also Sallam, Mohammed bin: “Parliament amends election law.” Yemen Times, 30 April 2009. http://yementimes.com/article.shtml?i=1255&p=local&a=4
28. The Sana’a Declaration, 1999. http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/sanaa.htm. For a short account by one of the attendees, see: Lush, Julian: “Emerging Democracies Forum”. http://www.al-bab.com/bys/articles/lush99.htm
29. Whitaker, Brian: “De,ocratic dressing.” Middle East International, 23 January 2004. http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/artic/mei97.htm
30. The Sana’a Declaration, 2004. http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/reform/sanaa2004.htm
31. Yemenis usually describe Ali Muhsin as the president’s half-brother or cousin. According to a report by the International Crisis Group in 2009, this is incorrect, though both men come from the same village. They can, however, be regarded as kin, through their shared membership of the Sanhan tribe. See: “Yemen: Defusing the Saada time bomb.” International Crisis Group, Middle East Report 86, 27 May 2009, p15.
32. Hill, Ginny: “Yemen: Fear of Failure”. Chatham House Briefing Paper, November 2008. http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/12576_bp1108yemen.pdf
33. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4350&print=1
34. A border agreement with Oman was signed in 1992. The Yemeni-Saudi border dispute ended in 2000 with the Treaty of Jeddah, and a dispute with Eritrea over the Hunaish islands in the Red Sea which began with armed clashes was settled by international arbitration in 2004.
35. For the early stages of the rebellion, see: Whitaker, Brian: “Conflict in Saada”. Middle East International, 9 July 2004. http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/artic/mei102.htm. For a more up-to-date assessment, see: “Yemen: Defusing the Saada time bomb.” International Crisis Group, op cit.
36. “Fissiparous tendencies as unrest flares in south?” IRIN, 13 May 2009. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=84359
37. “Civil war fears as Yemen celebrates unity.” BBC website, 21 May 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/country_profiles/8062225.stm
38. International Crisis Group, op cit.
