This is a guest post by L Carl Brown, emeritus professor of history at Princeton University.
 

Although mathematically challenged I have long been intrigued by the possibilities of clarifying foreign policy conundrums by a selective use of games theory. Consider the present debate concerning what to do about the radical Islamic State in large areas of northern Iraq and Syria. Can this deadly serious situation be illuminated by reducing it to a game with its distinctive rules?

It is a multi-player game with at least two great powers (the US and Russia) and some half-dozen regional powers (Iraq, Syria, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel) and a few non-state actors some organized, others not (Kurds, the PLO, Christians, Yazidis). An important regional player and the largest Arab state, Egypt, is somewhat sidelined by domestic troubles, but it too cannot be counted out. And given that the would-be Islamic Caliphate presumes to speak for all Muslims the larger Muslim world beyond the Middle East may have some play as well.

No one power is able to control the game, but the US is deemed by both friends and foes to be the major player. The purpose of the game is to create an effective resistance to the Islamic State, and the many players agree ONLY on this goal. Given their mutual animosities (e.g. Iran-Saudi Arabia, Israel-Arabs, Sunni-Shi`a, not to forget the US and Russia) most of the players resist being explicitly lined up in a formal or even informal “coalition of the willing”.

Moreover, many (perhaps most) of the players will be happy enough to “let Uncle Sam do it”. If they see this taking place they are very likely to make for the sidelines. In other words, when the threat perception is reduced the common interest holding together this very awkward grouping is weakened.

Accordingly, it would seem that the best way for the US to play this game would be not just to lead from behind but not even try to “lead”. The US can best play the game by adopting a reactive policy of responding to the initiatives of the diverse other players who are not and cannot become a team. The US should abandon any thought of “winning ” some sort of American-led victory.

The ongoing US humanitarian mission to rescue beleaguered Yazidis from the Islamic State can and should be treated as a separate issue, but to play the game effectively it must not be followed by anything smacking of unilateral US mission creep.

Yet, in a raucous democracy such as ours – with today’s mix of liberal internationalists, neo-cons, weary isolationists on the Right and the Left plus the usual partisans seizing on any issue to fault whatever administration is in power – will such an under-the-radar strategy have a chance? Surely it will help to understand and heed the distinctive rules governing this particular game.