After a year's withdrawal from the political scene, Coionel Qadhafi's second-eldest son, Saif al-Islam, made a triumphant return to the spotlight in August last year with the homecoming of convicted Lockerbie bomber Abdelbaset al-Megrahi. Two months later, he was appointed "Coordinator of Social and Popular Committees" – a deceptively unassuming title which gave him "authority to oversee the parliament, government and security".

Parallel with this, another of the Leader's seven sons, Mutassim, appeared to fall out of favour. Mutassim was blamed for mis-managing the annual Revolution Day celebrations and for various mistakes during the Leader's visit to New York (where he failed to get permission to pitch the Leader's bedouin tent).

These ups and downs, and their political implications – especially for Libya's future leadership – were discussed in a couple of secret memos (now published by Wikileaks) from the US embassy in Tripoli in November and December last year.

Referring to various attempts by the two brothers to upstage each other, the November memo says:

Contacts suggest that although Mutassim is not as skilled in public relations as his older brother Saif, he wields significant power from behind the scenes. As National Security Advisor (NSA), Mutassim directs at least some of Libya's national security policy decisions, including purchases of equipment, and he reportedly plays on issues regarding the military purse. 

Contacts also report that younger brother Khamis al-Qadhafi, Commander of the 32nd "Khamis" Brigade (widely known to be the most well-trained and well-equipped force in the Libyan military), is closer to Mutassim than to Saif ... Mutassim's role as NSA and his reported closeness to Khamis would give Mutassim access to some of the most important military and security elements of the regime. Nevertheless, the ultimate authority over the regime's security apparatus remains in question.

The result of this was confusion – among Libyans as well as the Americans. The embassy note cites a report that "the Minister-equivalent of Defense, Major General Abu Baker Younis Jaber, recently called on his officers to swear allegiance to Saif in his new post, making it unclear whether the military establishment will report to Mutassim or Saif – or both – in the future".

A second embassy note, from December last year, says Saif al-Islam's staff "has shown an increased interest in bilateral military and security issues, particularly requests linked to Captain Khamis al-Qadhafi, including purchases of helicopters and "Tiger" vehicle components, and M113 refurbishment". 

It continues: "This increased attention may be reflective of Saif's broader plans to consolidate military and security issues within his expanding 'General Coordinator' portfolio. Saif's staff declined to comment on any future division of responsibility between Saif al-Islam and Mutassim al-Qadhafi in these areas."

When US embassy staff asked whether Saif would be the person to deal with on military and security issues in future, there was "a long pause" before they were told that "the embassy should continue to track military-related issues through Mutassim's office and to copy information to Saif's office from now on."

A comment at the end of the note says this "suggests that Saif is beginning to insert himself into the political-military and security spheres":

The discussion of Khamis' requests in particular may indicate that Saif is trying to curry favour with his little brother. Given the fact that the "Khamis Brigade" is considered the best-equipped and most capable of defending the regime, it seems only natural that anyone intent on assuming power would try to align himself with Khamis.

However, the memo speculates that "Saif's interest in these issues is still informal and perhaps not fully vetted within the Libyan government".

A comment in the November memo considers these manoeuvrings in the context of a struggle for succession:

As Libya undergoes this latest round of Qadhafi's political restructuring, without a constitution or clarified succession plan, burgeoning sibling rivalry among Qadhafi's progeny is near inevitable. Qadhafi has placed his sons (daughter Aisha is considered by some shrewder and smarter than her brothers but does not seem to be playing a visible role in the succession struggle) on a succession high wire act, perpetually thrown off balance, in what might be a calculated effort by the aging leader to prevent any one of them from authoritatively gaining the prize. It is also difficult to precisely gauge Mutassim's depth of ambition for the leadership role since those around him do not freely engage on the topic.

The rivalry is likely to play out publicly over the next few months in a continued realignment of political and business interests, as reformists ("Saif backers") and conservatives ("Mutassim backers") continue to vie for the elder Qadhafi's attention. Mutassim appears to believe that progress in the US relationship could prove key to keeping him in the game if he does indeed aspire to play a crucial role in the post-Leader era. 

Whichever of the Qadhafi children wins the "prize," there is a high level of anxiety among our Libyan contacts, given the potential for chaos in the absence of the traditionally "guiding hand" of the Leader and given the absence of viable state institutions to insure stability. 

They see a best possible outcome as a division of the spoils, with Saif handling the domestic side of the house and Mutassim handling the security and possible foreign relations part. A second possibility is a "trinity," whereby Saif would be the political face of the regime, Mutassim the national security face, and Khamis the military/security face.

Since the memos were written, these internal tussles have continued. Last month, for instance, Saif's Oea newspaper was 
suppressed on the orders of the prime minister and 20 or more journalists working for Said's publishing company were 
briefly arrested.

Posted by Brian Whitaker, 6 Dec 2010.