Chaos and the Arab state

Following on from my talk at SOAS last week about the "crunch points" in Arab society, a reader asks:

How do you explain the apparent contradiction between the authoritarian nature of all of these societies and the apparent (often shocking) lack of order and discipline, and an almost chronic inability to organise and plan? I thought authoritarianism should at least in theory teach people discipline and order.

There's clearly a paradox here and it's a big subject, but I'll offer a few suggestions. Readers are welcome to chip in with other explanations.

I think there are several factors at work, including: the weakness of the state, a lack of transparency and public debate, favouritism (which relates to a lack of commitment to equal rights), and widespread corruption.

The weak state: Though Arab regimes may may establish large armies and security forces and employ vast bureaucracies, their ability to effect change and influence the behaviour of their citizens is far more limited than it looks. As Nazih Ayubi noted in his ground-breaking book, Over-stating the Arab State:

Their capabilities for law enforcing are much weaker than their ability to enact laws, their implementation capabilities are much weaker than their ability to issue development plans. (page 447)

Possession of arbitrary powers and the absence of constitutional restraints is of little use, Ayubi argued, if the regime’s will cannot be translated into a sound political or social reality.

Where survival of the regime becomes the chief priority of government it is hardly surprising that the power of the state should be directed towards controlling dissent, and that this should be the area where state power is deployed most forcefully and effectively. 

In areas where regime survival is not at stake the picture is somewhat different: the same “control mentality” exists in the form of laws, decrees and regulations but in a far more tokenistic way since the regime often lacks the capacity, and sometimes the inclination, to enforce them.

One illustration is the contrasting attitudes towards enforcing laws that serve the public good – environmental protection, health and safety, etc – and those that serve the good of the regime. 

Another factor in state weakness is the lack of delegation in decision-making. Too many decisions have to be referred to the top. This clogs up the system; people get fed up waiting and seek out ways to circumvent the bureaucracy.

Lack of transparency: There is a contrast here between the Arab countries and most European countries. EU citizens, for example, enjoy more freedom than those in Arab countries and yet in many ways the regulation of their lives is far more extensive. Everyday activities such as work and business practices are subject to a multiplicity of rules that simply do not exist in most Arab countries.

Despite this extra burden of regulation, compliance in the EU countries is higher. High levels of compliance depend not just on the existence of laws but on perceptions of their legitimacy and public acceptance of the rationale behind them. 

That requires a culture of public scrutiny and debate where interested parties and the media can express their views freely (it helps too, of course, if the ultimate decision rests with a properly-elected body). Where there is general acceptance of a law, enforcement becomes a last resort rather than the first line of defence. 

In Arab countries, on the other hand, laws tend to be handed down from on high by diktat and the lack of critical scrutiny before they are approved often results in vague or ambiguous language that makes them more difficult to implement. With less debate, there is less opportunity for the public to be persuaded of the rationale behind new laws – a difficulty which is compounded by the general perception of government as a creator of obstacles rather than a facilitator and a partner with society in solving problems. 

Favouritism, privilege, inequality: One major problem here is the belief among people of a certain status that the rules don't really apply to them: "I'm important, I'm in a hurry – how dare you stop me for speeding." It surfaces in many ways, for example when some prominent person accused of a crime is allowed to flee the country in order to avoid arrest, or when some minor indignity is involved such as a security check.

There are also the demands of kinship, the duty to help relatives and return favours, which undermine efforts to apply principles of equality, and especially equality of opportunity. It's difficult to have orderly procedures when queue-jumping is the norm.

Corruption: This undermines the system in much the same way as social privilege but is based around money. It operates at many levels but let's return to the question of compliance with the law. As mentioned earlier, compliance in European countries is usually secured without enforcement, though compliance is encouraged by the threat of enforcement and the knowledge that defiance is likely to be futile (unless there's some kind of organised mass resistance, in which case the law may end up being changed). This all hinges on an independent judiciary and a recognition by the public that the police, the courts and enforcement officials cannot be influenced by bribery or pulling rank – conditions which don't often exist in the Arab countries.

Planning: I disagree slightly with the questioner about a lack of planning in Arab countries, but it depends what sort of planning. Arab governments are quite fond of their development plans, even if they have trouble implementing them. 

Where I think a lack of planning does show up is when things go wrong. Communal violence is one example (Kurds in Syria, Christians in Egypt, etc). There is very little effort to investigate the causes and take steps to prevent a recurrence. This probably relates to the lack of transparency: it's easier (and more conforting) to deny that a problem exists and blame a few troublemakers that to allow an open public debate.