No apologies for returning once again to the topic of Mohamed ElBaradei. A week after the former IAEA chief arrived in Cairo as a possible presidential candidate, Egyptian politics has become more interesting than at any time since the 1952 revolution.

I have said before that opposition parties – not just the regimes – should carry some of the blame for the dire state of Arab politics. Of course, their room to manouevre is constrained by the regimes but a large part of the problem is their defeatist attitude. Far too often, they regard themselves as permanent opposition rather than potential alternative governments.

What Egypt has now, in the shape of ElBaradei, is a heavyweight figure that opposition parties can rally around (if they so choose), along with all those who are tired of the old system (including the opposition parties and the way they have traditionally behaved). There is also, for once, the prospect of a clear vision of where they want to go – starting with fair elections, a less oppressive state and a system where the people tell the politicians what to do, not the other way round. These are all areas where a consensus can be built across the political spectrum.

Over the last few days, ElBaradei has been busy trying to consolidate his support base. On Tuesday, he met a broad group of opposition representatives who decided to form a "National Assembly for Change" and reportedly agreed on the need "to ensure the integrity of the upcoming elections and a new constitution for Egypt". Even the Muslim Brotherhood attended, though it said its involvement “does not mean that we support for Dr ElBaradei as a candidate for president.” On Wednesday, 
he met "young advocates for change" – Facebook activists and several members of the 6 April movement. 

The Mubarak regime has gradually been losing control of the political discourse and ElBaradei's arrival on the scene seems likely to speed up that process dramatically. The talk, now, is not just of change but achievable change. 

Whether that makes ElBaradei the next president of Egypt is a different matter, though. We don't even know if he'll be allowed to stand. And the regime – through the army, its patronage networks, its control of large sections of the media, its ability to manipulate elections, and so on – still has a hugely powerful machine on its side. Change will really only happen when that starts to crumble.

Yesterday Baheyya, the queen of Egyptian bloggers, broke a long silence to give her view of the situation:

At this point, it’s hard to see how ElBaradei can even run in the elections, much less have a real chance at winning. But I think he’s doing more than launching a symbolic campaign. He’s raising the costs of electoral engineering for the Mubarak regime, making 2010 and 2011 the toughest polls yet in Mubarak’s tenure. What’s more, ElBaradei’s entry comes at a time when the regime is at its weakest. Mubarak is fast fading, his son is flailing, the bureaucracy is riven with unbelievable corruption and civil servant protests, and all social classes are literally fed up and can’t stand the Mubaraks anymore. None of this means that ElBaradei is going to displace the system, but it does mean that the regime will have to work harder than it ever has to weather the electoral cycle.

The whole post is worth reading, but she concludes:

Perhaps the scariest thing for Mubarak, wife, and son is that ElBaradei’s social democratic centrism, liberalism, and personal air of gravitas is rapidly forming him a constituency inside and outside Egypt. Like any dictator, the purpose of Mubarak’s existence is to snuff out the bottom-up formation of constituencies around rival groups or individuals. So far, Mubarak has succeeded in blocking or containing the growth of constituencies around challengers. Because elections are the time when constituency-building happens, they’ve always constituted an annoying but ultimately manageable nuisance for him. When the Ikhwan’s constituency-building threatened the parliamentary majority of Mubarak’s party in 2005, state violence was at the ready to strike at both voters and candidates. When Ayman Nour’s unexpected constituency-building in 2005 threatened to embarrass Mubarak, he mobilised his media and legal machine to smear Nour and put him safely behind bars. These tried and true tactics won’t work with ElBaradei. I’m going to enjoy sitting back and watching how the Mubaraks deal with this wildcard.

I hope the US will sit back too and let this thing play out. There would be nothing worse than having ElBaradei regarded as Washington's candidate. But, just a few days ago, the influential blogger, Andrew Sullivan, seemed eager for the US to weigh in when he wrote:

This is could turn into a slo-mo Arab version of the Iranian democracy protests – and unlike in Iran, the US can actually have an impact here.

Please! No. Don't mess it up.

Posted by Brian Whitaker, 26 February 2010.