Sectarian violence in Egypt

Few countries are immune to the possibility of communal violence, but they differ in how they deal with it and what steps they take in the aftermath to prevent a recurrence.

A new report by the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights looks at the growing problem of sectarian violence in Egypt and finds that the government has no long-term strategy: "Viewing such incidents purely as an issue of security, it seeks only to impose order and calm on the affected area," the EIPR says

When violence does break out, the first reaction of many officials is to deny that it has any sectarian basis:

"Nothing is more indicative of this than statements made by the governor of Minya to al-Watani al-Youm, the mouthpiece of the ruling National Democratic Party, on 24 November 2009. Speaking to the paper, he denied any instances of sectarian violence in his governorate, which is, in fact, the site of the largest percentage of cases in Egypt."

The report continues: 

"In the period under review, the state viewed sectarian violence as purely an issue of security. As such, it wholly failed to deal with the problem, viewing it as a series of isolated events in the absence of any comprehensive understanding of its causes, manifestations or solutions. It falls to the Ministry of Interior, specifically the State Security Investigations, to deal with each incident ... As for the remainder of state ministries, they normally distance themselves from sectarian violence and tension, as if it has nothing to do with them."

While security forces seem constantly at the ready to clamp down on anti-Mubarak demonstrations, "in cases of sectarian violence, the police are unable and sometimes unwilling to intervene to protect the homes and property of Copts, particularly in attacks that take the form of collective retribution and involve large numbers of Muslims," the report says. 

"In some cases this may be due to the fact that the assailants outnumber security forces, making the latter fearful of engaging them and risking losses in their own ranks.

"A clear example of the inability or unwillingness to engage is seen in the violence that took place in Dayrout in the Assyout governorate on 24 October 2009. In that case, the violence began at 10:30 am and security forces refrained from intervening until 3 pm, leaving Muslims free for five hours to attack five churches and numerous pharmacies and shops."

In the aftermath of sectarian violence, the usual approach is to impose "reconciliation" – which in practice means dropping charges against the perpetrators and forcing victims to withdraw complaints against them.

"Of the crimes of sectarian violence documented by the EIPR over the last two years in Minya, exactly zero have been referred to trial. Virtually the same situation obtains in all other governorates that were the scene of violence. In the very few cases that are brought before the courts, investigators have not done sufficient work to identify the perpetrators; in addition, proper legal procedures are not followed and insufficient evidence is presented to the court. The result is acquittal."

This, the report says, has "made impunity the rule in these crimes".

"In short, assailants feel a sense of victory twice: once when they are able to carry out their criminal assaults against a weaker party and again when the state stands beside them and protects them from any punishment for their actions. 

"By the same token, this impunity leaves victims feeling like strangers and second-class citizens in their own country. First they are attacked simply because they are Christians and then the state does not bring them justice; it does not even stand by as a neutral party, but chooses to stand with the assailants against them."

Posted by Brian Whitaker, 16 April 2010.