Writing for Comment Is Free yesterday, I suggested that events in Tunisia could herald the rise of a new post-Islamist politics in the Middle East – a politics where religious movements are not automatically seen as the main threat to hidebound Arab regimes.

Tom Pfeiffer, a Reuters correspondent in Cairo makes a similar point when he writes:

"The absence of Islamist slogans from Tunisia's pro-democracy revolt punches a hole in the argument of many Arab autocrats that they are the bulwark stopping religious radicals sweeping to power."

Not only that. It punches a hole in the standard necon/clash-of-civilisations narrative too. Pfeiffer continues that it also "looks embarrassing for the western governments that spent decades justifying their support for Ben Ali – and other secular-minded Arab world strongmen – by suggesting the alternative was Iran-style Islamic revolution".

The article quotes Amel Boubekeur, a North Africa specialist in Paris, as saying: "The lesson from what's happening in Tunisia is that [Arab leaders] won't be able to hide any more behind the Islamist threat argument." 

Meanwhile, Egyptian political analyst Nabil Abdel Fatah says Islamists were "not able to carry the concerns and longings of the vast majority of Tunisian people, especially the middle class which has chosen freedom and justice".

One of the first effects of this is that economics – and especially youth unemployment – has suddenly shot to the top of the Arab regimes' agenda. According to a recent report from the International Labour Organisation, 50 million jobs need to be created over the next 10 years across the region to "stabilise employment".

"The Arab soul is broken by poverty, unemployment and general recession," Amr Moussa, secretary-general of the Arab League told the league's economic summit meeting in Egypt yesterday. "The Tunisian revolution is not far from us," he warned. "The Arab citizen [has] entered an unprecedented state of anger and frustration."

The richer Arab countries are now dipping into their pockets to create a special fund to "provide job opportunities for young Arab people in order to empower them to participate fully in their societies." Al-Jazeera has more details.

At $2 billion, the proposed fund is not particularly large and throwing money at the problem is never going to be much of a solution. It won't work unless there is also sweeping political change. Empowering young (and older) people "to participate fully in their societies" has to become more than rhetoric.

Much as Arab leaders may try, economic progress can't be separated from political change, because many of the barriers to (non-oil) development and job creation – as we have seen in Tunisia – come from the regimes themselves.

First, there is the paternalistic idea that the regimes always know best. They don't welcome input from the rest of society, and they bristle if people try. They will have to become a lot more transparent and start taking people into their confidence.

Secondly, there is the patrimonial system where regime insiders "own" the economy (or the most lucrative parts of it) and use their political connections to drive out newcomers or demand a cut from from – which is no way to encourage investment.

Thirdly, we have the archaic attitudes to freedom of information in many countries (internet censorship and the like) which limit the possibilities for development in the IT sector.

Finally, if and when new jobs are created, there's still the question of who gets them. This is where people with qualifications have to wrestle with the old problems of wasta and nepotism. In Tunisia, that seems to have been almost as big a grievance as the lack of jobs itself.

The customary Arab solution, of course, is simply to take people on to the government payroll and not bother too much about whether they turn up at the office or do any work. But in these straitened times, even that option is looking less and less viable.