What is the connection between the global financial crisis that began in 2007 and the current wave of Arab uprisings? Directly, there's not much connection but both can be considered as examples of the Black Swan Theory in action.

A black swan is big and out of the ordinary, and the theory named after it concerns the disproportionately big impact of rare and largely unforeseen events.

The originator of the theory – Lebanese-born Nassim Nicholas Taleb – created a stir in the United States with his warnings about the financial crisis. Now, he has written an article for Foreign Affairs (together with Mark Blyth of Brown University) applying his theory to the Middle East. Most of the article is behind a paywall, but here is a quote from it:

"What the world is witnessing in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya is simply what happens when highly constrained systems explode.

"Complex systems that have artificially suppressed volatility tend to become extremely fragile, while at the same time exhibiting no visible risks. In fact, they tend to be too calm and exhibit minimal variability as silent risks accumulate beneath the surface. 

"Although the stated intention of political leaders and economic policymakers is to stabilise the system by inhibiting fluctuations, the result tends to be the opposite. These artificially constrained systems become prone to 'Black Swans' – that is, they become extremely vulnerable to large-scale events that lie far from the statistical norm and were largely unpredictable to a given set of observers.

"Such environments eventually experience massive blowups, catching everyone off-guard and undoing years of stability or, in some cases, ending up far worse than they were in their initial volatile state. Indeed, the longer it takes for the blowup to occur, the worse the resulting harm in both economic and political systems."

This is exactly what is happening in the Middle East today. To borrow a phrase from the banking crisis, Arab regimes have been too big to fail. In the interests of stability, social order, etc, they have been operating "artificially constrained systems" where problems are ignored or swept aside rather than being confronted openly. The appearance on the surface is one of calm while grievances accumulate beneath the surface until – much to their surprise – everything suddenly explodes. 

Over many decades, American policy in the region has functioned in much the same way, fearful of relatively minor changes that might upset the status quo but now paying the price in a massive upheaval.

Taleb's point is that suppressing volatility in the hope of preventing chaos may seem like a good idea at the time but in the long run it only makes things worse. Instead of a series of small and relatively harmless tremors as the system adjusts, you end up with a cataclysmic earthquake.

Taleb's list of 10 principles for avoiding "black swan" events was devised mainly with financial systems in mind, but it would be interesting to see it adapted to Middle East politics. The first one says: "What is fragile should break early while it is still small."

What are the chances that remaining Arab regimes can learn from the Black Swan Theory and adjust their behaviour accordingly? On the whole, I think they are slim. "Reform" is not really the issue here. What they need in order to survive is a totally new approach to government and a shift away from their control-hungry mentality. In other words, they have to stop being authoritarian and autocratic – and I seriously doubt that any of them are capable of that.