The future of tyranny (2)

Following my blog post yesterday, I received this comment from an Arab journalist (who asked not to be identified because of relatives living in Saudi Arabia):

I certainly agree with your cautious and calculated approach to the Arab Spring, especially your description that "it is a gradual awakening which began long before the events of Sid Bouzid". 

I am writing to contextualise Fandy's argument within the Saudi campaign against Arab Revolutions (except Syria's, for now). At every possible event and platform, the Saudis have someone to articulate every demoralising cultural argument out there.

Fandy's scepticism relates more to the Saudi stance; he has been a long-time defender of Saudi politics in Washington. He led the scathing Saudi attack on Heikal, "accused him of arrogance and going beyond the limits of political politesse for attacking the 'Arab peace initiative' launched under Saudi sponsorship in March 2007 and describing Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak – a close Saudi ally – of 'living in a world of fantasy'." 

Most recently, Fandy defended the Saudi royal family against American criticism, even went so far as to say that the "pledge of allegiance" [to king and crown prince] is "a clear popular referendum".

It is not only Fandy. This is a trend in the Saudi-owned and run media outlets. Of course, there is a long way ahead, we have to face our structural problems and mini-Mubaraks, as you mentioned; but the forces of change's biggest challenge stems from the intentionally pessimistic and demoralising dictators in the Arab media, especially in the dominating pan-Arab (either Saudi or Qatari owned/sponsored). 

From supporting Salafis (who waved Saudi flags in Cairo) in Tunisia and Egypt, to financing sectarian propaganda in Syria, to offering Saleh a lifeline through time-buying initiatives and subsidies in Yemen, Saudi Arabia is proving to be the leading enemy of change in the Arab world.

Some further explanation seems to be in order here, especially since one or two readers have got the idea that I was agreeing with Fandy. I wasn't – at least not entirely. I thought he had made some valid observations about the Arab Spring but I disagreed with the conclusions he drew from them and tried, at the end of the post, to explain why I thought he was wrong.

It's clear that Saudi Arabia is rapidly emerging as the main counter-revolutionary force in the region and it's also easy to see how Fandy's article might serve the kingdom's political agenda. But I think it would be unwise to dismiss his arguments simply because of their provenance. 

Almost every day I come across remarks, somewhere on the internet, suggesting that the Arab Spring will turn out to be little more than a reshuffling of tyrants. There are also plenty of other articles taking a gloomy view of the situation – for example Hussein Agha and Robert Malley on The Arab Counterrevolution in the New York Review of Books.

The fears they raise are not without foundation. Look, for instance, at the behaviour of Egypt's military council since the fall of Mubarak, or the way Yemen's protesters have been sidelined by tribal/military conflict.

It's no good ignoring these setbacks. They have to be acknowledged and confronted. But the fact the Arab Spring is not moving forward steadily and smoothly on all fronts is no reason to pronounce it a failure. We have to take a long view and, as I've said before, in the long run change is inevitable.