After a decade of seeking to expand the private sector, Arab Gulf monarchies have swung into reverse and are now promoting a culture of economic dependency on the state in the hope of buying off political opposition, Suliman al-Atiqi writes in an article for the Sada website.

This development has been apparent for some time and was especially noticeable as Arab uprisings spread during the early months of 2011 (the Saudi king suddenly found some spare billions in his pockets and Kuwait gave cash handouts of $3,600 to every citizen) but Atiqi's article provides some startling figures relating to employment.

• In Qatar, for example, only 1.5% work in the private sector. According to the Oxford Business Group, this is a decline from 4% twenty years ago due to the availability of "plush government jobs".

• In Oman, during a nine-month period in 2011, private sector employment fell by 4% to 170,000 (out of an estimated population of 2.5 million). At the same time, employment of expatriates (a group that don't cause trouble and can be thrown out of the country if they do) increased by 10%.

• In Kuwait, the government provided 17,000 new jobs in the public sector in 2011 – double the figure for 2010 and more than at any time in the previous 10 years.

Atiqi makes the economic argument that this is damaging the private sector:

"The adopted responses to the uprisings of 2011 have only reinforced the culture of state-dependency and the general impression that GCC citizens are better off in the public sector. This will make it more difficult for private companies to entice and retain talented citizens as employees ..."

It seems to me, though, that the main issue here is not the respective merits of the public sector versus the private sector – at least, not in the sense that they are discussed in most other countries. It's about maintaining an archaic patrimonial system through economic subjugation.

Given the lack of any clear distinction between "the state" and the ruling family, or between the state's coffers and the rulers' coffers, we might also question whether the Gulf countries have a public sector at all in the usual meaning of the term. It might be more accurate to regard the ruler (aka "the state") as the country's largest private employer.

This is very reminiscent of a situation in the west during the industrial revolution when whole towns could become economically dependent on a single factory-owner – except that in the Gulf it happens on a national scale.

For the most part, economic subjugation to the rulers of Gulf states does not equate with poverty or hardship but it does buy allegiance. It usually brings affluence and an undemanding job, plus an understanding that it can all be summarily taken away if employees fail to behave themselves politically (and in the absence of a substantial private sector they are unlikely to find an alternative employer). In effect, the state is offering them golden handcuffs.

There are similar practices in the poorer Arab countries, and for the same reasons, though they generally have less money to splash around. In Syria, for example, it was estimated before the uprising that as many as half the country's inhabitants depended to some extent on government pay cheques – and that is probably one of the reasons why the Assad regime has managed to cling on for so long. 

So far, buying allegiance through government jobs has proved a reliable way for Gulf regimes to protect themselves but that doesn't necessarily mean it can be relied upon in the future. It only works so long as people are easily intimidated and fearful of stepping out of line.

Even in the Gulf, the Arab Spring is making people more assertive and rebellious, and once they start to act collectively the regimes have problems. Atiqi describes what happened in Kuwait in 2011:

"Thousands of public-sector employees — emboldened by the uprisings — went on strike to demand higher wages and more benefits. By February 2011, the government had already announced salary increases which ranged from 70%-100% for law enforcement personnel (defence and interior) based on rank. 

"When the government announced salary increases up to 66% in September for employees in the oil sector, labour unions (for example, those of Kuwait Airways and customs employees) intensified their efforts and went on strike to demand wage increases while the situation was ripe. 

"The government relented, and by March 2012 it had announced a 25% public sector wage increase — amounting to higher pay for over 80% of the Kuwaiti workforce — as well as 12.5% increases in pensions."

Employing a vast workforce has certainly given Gulf rulers a sense of security, though it may be a false one. A vast workforce also has the potential to organise itself on a vast scale, and who knows where that could lead?