While waiting in a queue to renew my British passport last week, I was struck by an odd thought. How would I feel if, instead of saying that I am British, the passport described me as "Windsorian"?
"Windsor" is the name of our royal family and calling us all Windsorians would be the equivalent of what happens in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi people are called Saudis because they are ruled by the House of Saud.
As far as I'm aware, Saudi Arabia is the only country in the world where people's nationality derives from the ruling family's name, and this raises some interesting questions about their sense of national identity – especially if the monarchy were ever to be overthrown.
In Britain, we tend to view the Windsors in the much same light as other unproductive celebrities: mainly for their entertainment value. But, although the Windsors are almost completely stripped of the power their ancestors once had, they do still sit at the very top of the British state. For that reason they are part – but only a part – of the complex mix of ingredients that makes Britain "British". Equally, though, if the House of Windsor were to disappear overnight, I doubt that many of us would feel significantly less British.
The same cannot be said of Saudi Arabia. Without the House of Saud, Saudis would not be Saudis – it's a logical and linguistic impossibility. Or, to put it another way, we might say that Saudishave to be called Saudis because there is very little, other than rule by the House of Saud, that binds them together as a nation.
Discussing the problem of national identity (or lack of it) in Saudi Arabia, Faisal Abdullah Abulhassan writes:
"The idea of who is 'Saudi' and what it means to be Saudi is not understood even by Saudis themselves. This lack of definition and malleability leads not only to internal socio-political debates, but leaves room for manipulation from not only those outside the societal mainstream, such as by fundamentalist groups, but also by those outside the Kingdom itself.
"Bordered by the Red Sea and Arabian Gulf in the west and east; by the Nafud Desert and Empty Quarter in the north and south; the lack of a national identity of Saudis poses a penetrable fifth border. The formulation of an enduring 'Saudi' national identity is essential to the stability, continuity and unity of the Saudi State."
The solution Abulhassan proposes is a further "institutionalisation" of the Al Saud dynasty "as the basis of an enduring Saudi national identity".
"Individuals are linked to the State in Saudi Arabia vertically through various top-bottom relationships, ending at a prince. Not only has this prevented class structures from emerging as a source of conflict and strife, it has allowed for the indigenous concept of shura, or consultation to develop.
"Princes have direct access to various areas of Saudi society, giving them an opportune and unique role to play in fostering a national identity centered on the monarchy."
Building national identity in this way around a single family is potentially catastrophic and Abulhassan's argument starts to fall apart when he acknowledges that support for the royal family is performance-related:
"The monarchy serves the nation so long as it manages the State well. The Saudi people in turn support the monarchy so long as it delivers."
This begs the question of what happens to a monarchy-based national identity when the royal family fails to deliver.
In an article posted last year on the Jawaz Diblomasy blog, Rahaf al-Sanosi and Eman Bukhari take a very different view from Abulhassan, arguing that the kingdom needs a more inclusive and less elitist sense of identity:
"As a relatively new nation, the Saudi state has relied heavily on traditional forms of governance to promote its legitimacy. The narrative of our formation projects an image of tribal unity and allegiance to the founding figure of the Kingdom; King Abdul Aziz. This image is integral to the collective imagining of our past. As such, our history is dominated by one narrative that has evolved towards defining the Saudi identity, rarely questioned or disputed ...
"Saudi identity continues to be an exclusive identity dominated by one region and one discourse. The state controls who is included and excluded, and how hierarchies are laid out in order to maintain the regime’s stability. What is needed today is a shared identity that brings all the different sub-identities within the regions together, so that a Hejazi can speak with pride about Najd, and a citizen from Qatif can retell the Hejazi culture as if it is part of his/her own.
"The foundation for a cohesive identity is equality."
Another interesting view comes from Abdullah Hamidaddin on the Riyadh Bureau blog:
"There is a proportional relationship between Saudi national identity and the active participation of its citizens in building the Saudi nation. The more I, as a Saudi, feel that I participate in building the nation, the more I have a national identity. The less I feel that I participate in that process, the weaker my national identity becomes."
He continues:
"Things that are not foundational for national identity have been emphasised, and the foundations of national identity have been ignored. The individual in Saudi Arabia does not feel that he is participating in nation building. He does not feel that his will is part of the nation's foundations. Therefore, he cannot accept the idea of a Saudi national identity."
Posted by Brian Whitaker, 3 February 2013.