For Egyptians who oppose the Muslim Brotherhood, the run-off in last year’s presidential election posed an unenviable choice. Much as they might dislike Mohamed Morsi, the Islamist candidate, the key question was whether they disliked him enough to vote for his opponent, Ahmed Shafik.

Shafik, then 71, was widely viewed as the candidate of Egypt’s “deep state”. A former air force commander who had served as Mubarak’s last prime minister, he seemed to represent much of what the revolution had sought to overturn.

Faced with that, and after decades of military or semi-military rule, there was certainly an argument for giving Morsi the benefit of the doubt. Whatever his religious views, he was at least a civilian and a man untainted by the previous regime.

In the event, Morsi won a clear but not overwhelming victory, with 13.2 million votes to Shafik’s 12.3 million. Almost immediately, Shafik left Egypt for the UAE, thus avoiding corruption charges(which of course he says are politically motivated).

Morsi, meanwhile, got off to a reasonably promising start. Addressing Egyptians from a stage in Tahrir Square after his election (something Mubarak would never have done, for fear of assassination), he presented an inclusive vision of his presidency:

“I turn to you all on this historic day, in which I have become president of all Egyptians, equally. Everyone will be afforded due respect, without any privilege, except that rendered by their service to our nation and their respect for the constitution and the law ...

“At this historic juncture, I call upon you the great people of Egypt to strengthen our national unity and close our ranks and stand together. We are all Egyptians. Even though we differ in our views we are all citizens of this country, even if our parties are different. There is no room for the language of confrontation and there is no room to accuse each other.”

Twelve months later, though, that vision has gone and the language of confrontation and accusation is in full flood.
 

The short explanation of what went wrong is that the Brotherhood – like most of the traditional opposition movements – is a product of the old political system, and as much a remnant of it as Mubarak himself. It failed to appreciate that the game has changed and instead continued playing largely by the old rules.

Thus, instead of ushering in a new era of inclusivity and generating a sense of common national purpose to tackle the country’s burgeoning problems – especially on the economic front – the Islamists set about doing what authoritarian regimes usually do when they come to power: consolidating their grip by placing their own people in key positions.

Some of Morsi’s decisions were especially insensitive and even smacked of incompetence. One was his appointment of Adel al-Khayyat as governor of Luxor, a province which depends heavily on tourism. Khayyat belongs to the political wing of Gamaa Islamiyya, which claimed responsibility for the 1997 Luxor massacre in which 58 tourists and four Egyptians were killed. (Following protests, Khayyat later said he would step down.)

In February, Morsi announced dates for parliamentary elections (subsequently rescinded) which partly coincided with the Coptic Easter – triggering complaints that it was a ploy to discourage Christians from voting.

For a more detailed account of how the Brotherhood mis-read Egypt’s political map, see yesterday’s article by Khaled Fahmy: “The seven deadly sins of the Muslim Brotherhood”.

Fahmy, who is professor of history at the American University in Cairo, says the Brotherhood’s first mistake was to think that “running and winning free and fair elections was what the revolution was all about”. 

“When Morsy won with a 52 % of the vote, his group convinced him that this is a sufficient source of legitimacy and that the revolution, now that it has fulfilled its main objective, is over. People should now go back home and mind their business. This was a disastrous reading of the political situation. 

“People did not take to the streets in Jan-Feb 2011 and risk their lives only to have free and fair elections. And they were not willing to go back home just because someone won the presidential elections (no matter who), until they made sure that this person at least appeared to be answering their main demands.”

Morsi, as the Brotherhood never tires of reminding us, is the first Egyptian president to be elected freely and – for the most part – fairly. On that basis he can certainly claim legitimacy and some kind of mandate (even if the exact nature of his mandate is disputed). But legitimacy in the legal sense is not the same as legitimacy in the political sense: the latter is very much determined by the public’s perceptions at any given time.

Linked to that is the idea that electoral politics and democracy are synonymous – which they are not. An article in the Economist last month explained the problem:

“Majoritarianism – the credo of an expanding group of elected but autocratic rulers around the world, which holds that electoral might always makes you right – is not true democracy, even if, on the face of it, the two things look alike.”

The Economist’s article was actually about Turkey, but much of it applies to Egypt too:

“The issue is how the relationship between supporters and opponents is managed. In part this is a matter of rules and institutions to constrain a leader’s power and to allow the aggrieved to find redress ...

“Beyond documents and institutions, the difference between crass majoritarianism and democracy resides in the heads of the mighty. Democrats have a bedrock understanding that the minority (or often majority) who did not vote for them are as much citizens of their country as those who did, and are entitled to a respectful hearing; and that a leader’s job is to deliberate and act in the national interests, not just those of his supporters.”

Of course, it’s a lot easier to see what is wrong than to know how to put it right. After the fall of Mubarak, I assumed – along with many others – that an Islamist phase in Egypt was more or less inevitable but would prove fairly short-lived. Islamist movements would either fade away or abandon most of their religious dogma as the realities of everyday politics came to the fore.

What I didn’t expect, though, was that so many people would turn against the Brotherhood quite so soon.

In a post on Facebook, Egyptian journalist Osama Diab describes the latest turmoil as “a mix of ugliness and beauty, division and solidarity, excitement and exhaustion, and romance and pragmatism”. Referring to the June 30 protests, he writes:

“It is good to see people back on the streets and know that this fluid, unclear, non-ideological, and spontaneous objection to authority and authoritarianism is still alive and kicking. 

“Also, [these have] been the biggest demonstrations to come out against political Islam; bigger than everything we have seen in Iran for example. Political Islam has definitely lost its appeal, among religious and pious Muslims and non-Muslims alike …

“There is an Arabic saying that goes: ‘The occurrence of a disaster is better than waiting for it.’ … It is an exciting time, and again history is in the making. The revolution is back and continuing with its mix of everything ugly and beautiful.”

At the same time, though, I’m not sure that it’s wise to dump Morsi – at least, not yet. If he’s forced out of office now, the Brotherhood will claim to have been robbed by anti-democratic forces – and that will create more problems for the future. But there’s still no sign, even after the Sunday protests, that he’s ready to make the necessary compromises – and for that reason he may have to go. 

The great unknown quantity in all this is of course the Egyptian military. Are the generals merely trying – as their statements suggest – to nudge the politicians towards a solution, or is the country on the brink of an old-style coup?

Many Egyptians are fearful, and with good reason. But – and it’s a very important “but” – the revolution has changed the game for the military as much as it has for the Brotherhood. If the military fail to recognise that, they can expect to pay the price eventually, just as Morsi is doing now.
  

Posted by Brian Whitaker
Tuesday, 2 July 2013