Early days of the Arab Spring: Students at an engineering institute in Tunis arrange themselves to spell out the words "Tunus hurra" (Free Tunisia), January 2011.
Two articles about current trends in the Middle East: one depressing, the other more optimistic.
Writing for Your Middle East, Rana Sabbagh asks: “Can independent journalism and free speech survive in the Arab world?” The lights of free speech, she says, are being steadily extinguished across the Arab world, heralding a new era of ignorance, intolerance and repression.
“An alliance of governments, private media businesses as well as the ordinary public has set itself against dissenting voices which are portrayed increasingly as a threat to state security,” she continues:
“The majority of Arabs – who saw free speech as the only gain from the Arab Spring upheavals – now seem willing to accept the loss of this universal human right, in return for promises of stability and economic prosperity.”
Meanwhile, Ahmed Benchemsi, founder of the Free Arabs website, says “Don’t be fooled by appearances”. He complains that American media and thinktanks have become “transfixed by ISIS-like fanatic groups” and to a lesser extent by the abuses of despotic regimes, while ignoring social trends that point to a more liberal future for the Middle East.
Thus while Sabbagh points to the Sisi regime’s attempts to reassert control over the media in Egypt – 44 of the country’s journalists were detained during the first six months of this year – Benchemsi sees a different side of the picture:
“If we set aside media institutions and music celebrities, seven out of the 10 most followed Twitter accounts in Egypt are those of liberal commentators such as satirists Bassem Youssef and Belal Fadl or the secular politicians Mohamed ElBaradei, Hamdeen Sabahi, and Amr Hamzawy.
“Even in Saudi Arabia, where the alliance between the ruling family and the Wahhabi establishment is more solid than ever, six out of the 10 most watched YouTube channels (telecom and gaming companies aside) are satirical shows produced by rebellious youth groups. By November 2014, the total views for the videos uploaded by these channels were no less than 915 million—with Saudi Arabia having only 30 million inhabitants.
“For those who care to look closer, many other surprising trends are taking over the Arab Internet, such as a surge in atheism via dedicated Facebook pages with tens of thousands of followers – unthinkable just five years ago –and gay rights groups popping up in every online corner.”
Factually speaking, both these pictures are correct; the question is how much weight to attach to each of them.
Setting aside the mayhem in Syria and Iraq, the revolutions of 2011 have now given way to a counter-revolutionary phase. The Gulf monarchies have hunkered down to protect themselves and are also funding the restoration of Mubarak-style rule in Egypt (if not something worse). In terms of governments and state politics, it’s a bleak moment but by no means the end of the road.
In my book, What’s Really Wrong with the Middle East – published in 2009 before the start of the Arab Spring – I argued that transforming the region is about more than toppling dictators and holding free elections, because Arab society is often no less authoritarian than its rulers.
This puts the solution mainly in the hands of Arabs themselves. To escape the prison of their own history, they must embrace not only political change but far-reaching social and cultural change too.
Interviewing ordinary Arabs for the book five years ago, I found an overwhelming sense of despair. They complained about corruption, discrimination and bureaucracy, about the authoritarianism that pervades homes, schools, mosques and workplaces as well as presidential palaces, but most were resigned to the idea that nothing would ever change.
There’s a different spirit today. The events of 2011 demonstrated that change is not impossible, and gave people a sense of empowerment. Despite the counter-revolution, that is going to be difficult to quash because Arab regimes can no longer control public discourse in the way they once did.
It is important not to underestimate this. There is now a substantial body of activists, big enough to ensure that the most flagrant abuses do not go unchallenged, even on issues that were once almost completely taboo – such as gay rights.
Equally, though, we shouldn’t exaggerate it. In Egypt, for example, there is clearly still a large passive majority who prefer stability under the current regime to the uncertainties of change. But Benchemsi points to several background factors which he sees as gradually and “organically” shifting Arab society in a more liberal direction:
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“During the 2002-2012 decade, Arabic was the world’s fastest growing language on the web … In other words, the Internet, with social media at its forefront, is increasingly part of the daily reality of the everyday Arab citizen –and the conversation on it has a strong liberal flavour.”
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“Dramatically decreasing fertility rates (from 6 in 1985 to 2.6 in 2013) are generating smaller-sized families, which has been proven to favour the emergence of individualism (as opposed to communitarianism or tribalism).”
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“Education is steadily growing in MENA (literacy rates went from 58% in 1995 to 70% in 2004).“
There has been much agonising over the fact that on the political front those who brought down the dictators in 2011 ended up opening the door for others to take power. In the circumstances, this was probably inevitable but I’m not sure that it’s particularly regrettable.
The old idea that in order to bring change you need to capture the state seems increasingly outdated, especially in an Arab context. Attempts to deliver radical change from the top are likely to turn repressive unless they have broad social support.
For the time being, it seems better to focus on transforming society, while simultaneously trying to hold governments to account. As society becomes more liberal, the prospects for political change at the top – of a more liberal and sustainable kind – will increase.