How does this sound as a way to end the conflict in Syria?

Step one: The Syrian parliament grants immunity from prosecution to President Assad and his closest associates.

Step two: Assad resigns as Syria's president but remains head of the Baath party, which in turn continues to control the parliament.

Step three: A presidential election is called and Assad's deputy, 73-year-old Farouk al-Sharaa, wins handsomely, since he is the only permitted candidate.

With a different set of characters, that is exactly what happened in Yemen earlier this year when the "international community" (but primarily the US and Saudi Arabia) decided it was time to take charge of the Yemeni revolution. It's also an idea that is now bandied about as a possible "solution" for Syria.

The Arab League first proposed it back in January and last month President Obama suggested it again in discussions with the Russian prime minister.

It's a dreadful idea. For a start, the "Yemeni solution" hasn't succeeded in Yemen – at least, not yet, and there are doubts as to whether it can ever succeed – so why should it work in Syria?

Following President Saleh's resignation, Yemen has embarked on what is supposed to be a two-year transition. Saleh's successor, President Hadi, does not have the political or military muscle to carry it through, so the whole process is basically controlled by the United States.

Meanwhile, Saleh is still there, purged of his crimes and fighting a rearguard action to preserve as much of his regime and its corrupt ways as possible. Mark Katz, who has followed Yemen for years,writes:

"It is true that Saleh stepped down, but much of his regime remains intact. His son is still in command of (partly thanks to American support) the best armed and trained security force in the country. Although the new president has dismissed some of them, Saleh loyalists remain in many key positions. Whether there will be a true political transformation in Yemen, then, remains to be seen."

Now that the revolution has been stopped in its tracks, the success or otherwise of the transition plan depends largely on how hard the US is prepared to push. One risk here, if it pushes too hard, is that Hadi will start to be perceived as a Karzai-type puppet president, thus strengthening the hand of the old regime.

But in any case, political change is not the Americans' top priority in Yemen. They are much more concerned about al-Qaeda (or what they think is al-Qaeda) – as is shown by all the recent drone attacks, combined with ground offensives by the Yemeni military. It has become very clear over the last few months that this is far more important to the Americans than helping the Yemeni people to achieve their rightful aspirations.

Attempts at a managed "transition" in Syria would face similar problems. Persuading Assad to step down, even if that were possible, would be only a token step. It would not address the basic demand of the protesters, which is to rid themselves of his regime and the corrupt, oppressive system that goes with it.

Of course it would be good to halt the bloodshed but the Syrians have to be allowed to determine their own future. The only way to ensure that is by allowing the regime to collapse (as it will do eventually), not by prolonging its existence through a managed "transition".

So long as the Syrian regime shows no interest in negotiating its departure terms, any attempt at a managed "transition" would have to be initiated from outside, and supervised from outside – as in Yemen. In effect, this would take the revolution out of the hands of the Syrian people and internationalise the conflict more than it is internationalised already.

That would probably make things worse rather than better. In Yemen at least, the international players are more or less agreed on what to do (even if some of their motives and goals are questionable). In Syria, on the other hand, there is no such consensus. In the unlikely event that a "transition" plan could be agreed upon, it is difficult to see a favourable outcome for the Syrian people. The US, Europe and the Sunni Arab states would be pushing it in one direction, while Russia, China and Iran would be pushing it in another.

Far from resolving the conflict, Bilaal Saab (in an article for Foreign Policy) suggests this could intensify it:

"How could the United States even be thinking about this exit strategy, which does nothing to address the roots of the uprising or hold anyone accountable for the crackdown? 

"The stakes in Syria are too high to resort to solutions on the cheap, especially when such solutions are more likely to make things worse and lead to the same unintended consequences that top US officials have been warning about: a full-blown civil war that engulfs parts of the Middle East, further Islamist radicalisation of Syrian society that could open new doors for al-Qaeda, and a generally chaotic and violent environment in which chemical weapons – suspected to be held in large quantities by the regime – are either lost, used or both."

Posted by Brian Whitaker, 4 June 2012.