When Moaz al-Khatib, leader of the Syrian National Coalition, offered talks with representatives of the Assad regime his move
infuriated many in the opposition. But it also put Assad on the spot and the Syrian president is now facing diplomatic pressure to respond.
"There has been a very important offer of negotiation by Khatib of the National Coalition," Britain's foreign secretary, William Hague,told reporters during a visit to Lebanon yesterday. "It is important that that offer is responded to with serious negotiations by the Assad regime."
A day earlier, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov had made a similar point, calling on the Syrian government to "take certain steps" to show its readiness for talks.
Assad himself has no particular need for talks at the moment but the lack of a response makes Russian support for his regime more difficult to sustain. His attitude to talks could change, however, if the regime's military position worsens significantly – in which case negotiations might even provide him with a lifeline..
Of course, the absence of formal talks does not mean an absence of contacts or exploratory discussions – there is plenty of manoeuvring behind the scenes. From what has seeped out, though, there are fundamental differences about the purpose of any talks.
As far as the anti-Assad camp is concerned the purpose is political transition – an orderly (insofar as that is possible) dismantling of the regime. The regime, on the other hand, views talks as a means, in extremis, to salvage as much power as it can from the wreckage. In a best-case scenario (for Assad) it might even neuter the armed opposition and give the regime space to start consolidating again.
In that context, it's worth recalling Prof David Lesch's observation a couple of weeks ago that Assad has redefined "victory" to mean not losing.
Assad's stated position is that he intends to complete his current presidential term which ends in 2014. This, incidentally, is similar to the position adopted by ex-President Saleh of Yemen before he was eventually persuaded to resign.
One option currently being explored, according to Asharq Alawsat, is whether Assad would be willing to step "aside" rather than step "down". Stepping aside, apparently, would mean he remains as president but hands over his executive powers to the prime minister.
The "aside-but-not-down" idea comes from two (unnamed) Lebanese politicians who are close to Assad and the same proposal would also reward his sideways move by granting immunity from prosecution.
But even if that were agreed, Assad would not necessarily be out of the spotlight for long. He has consistently refused to say that he won't contest future presidential elections.
Another disputed question is at what point Assad would be expected to step aside (or down): should it be a prelude to negotiations or the culmination of them?
The Syrian National Coalition seems to have ceded some ground on that point. In a draft communique reported by Reuters yesterday it said Assad could not "be a party to any settlement" but did not repeat its earlier insistence that he must go before talks can start.
The problem with all this is that there can be no equitable political solution, and probably no end to the military conflict either, while Assad remains. For political processes to begin inside Syria – fair elections, constitutional changes, etc – there has to be a level field.
That can only be achieved if Assad and his closest associates go completely and the Baath party's hands are removed from the main levers of power. There is really no way of fudging it, though it would be important to avoid the more extreme forms of de-Baathification that the US imposed in post-Saddam Iraq.
The likely course of a Syrian "transition" process which did not exclude Assad and the higher ranks of his regime can be seen, in a milder form, in Yemen.
There, President Saleh was persuaded to step down (rather than aside) but was granted immunity from prosecution and continues to live in Yemen. His patronage network remains largely intact, with some of his relatives still in powerful positions and his party – in the absence of elections – still holding a large majority in parliament.
Saleh is now free to continue meddling and plotting, without the burden of day-to-day government to distract him from that. TheNational Dialogue – on which virtually all hopes for a successful transition are pinned – is once again on hold and the UN is bleating impotently about "interference" in the process.
Posted by Brian Whitaker, 22 February 2013.