In a video posted on Twitter yesterday, British prime minister David Cameron described the Charlie Hebdo march in Paris as inspirational and went on to talk about "tackling the poisonous ideology" behind the murders:

"We have to confront it in our own country, keeping our security strong ... but also taking on this poisonous narrative that is radicalising young minds wherever we find it."

While it's good to see Cameron paying more attention to the ideological problem, the British government is still reluctant to contemplate the foreign policy implications of this – particularly in terms of relations with governments which exacerbate the problem while in other respects remaining friendly towards Britain and also, in many cases, providing a lucrative market for British arms sales.

By far the worst offender in this connection is Saudi Arabia. As Reza Aslan pointed out recently:

"There’s no question that there has been a virus that has spread throughout the Muslim world, a virus of ultra-orthodox puritanism.

"But there’s also no question what the source of this virus is — whether we’re talking about Boko Haram, or ISIS, or al-Qaeda, or the Taliban. All of them have as their source Wahhabism, or the state religion of Saudi Arabia."

British policy towards Saudi Arabia has always been noticeably timid and the Foreign Office – unlike the US State Department – hasn't even bothered to criticise the brutal punishment of Raif Badawi, the activist who was convicted of "insulting" Islam.

Besides Saudi Arabia, though, there are plenty of other "friendly" governments in the Middle East which restrict freedom of thought and expression, especially where religion is concerned, and have laws against apostasy and blasphemy. By doing so, they help to legitimise the idea that people can – and should – be punished for holding and expressing "wrong" beliefs.

These policies and practices are no longer purely an internal matter for the countries that adopt them, because the effects are felt beyond their own borders. How to respond to them is a difficult question, and one that has scarcely been discussed in Britain. There have, however, been a few ideas circulating in the United States.

On Saturday, for example, an editorial in the Washington Post looked at the Badawi case in Saudi Arabia. Noting that expressions of "great concern" from the State Department had failed to prevent Badawi's flogging, it suggested the US should look for "other ways to get results":

"One would be to create a mechanism to fully expose the situation. Some kind of international commission of inquiry, similar to the one that investigated North Korea, would be a good place to start. It could take testimony and build a record about the kingdom’s repression of dissent and the absence of rights for women. Just the discussion would signal to the Saudi leaders that, despite their storied relationship with the United States, abuses of human rights will not be forgotten, or ignored, as they have been for too long."

A more detailed set of proposals came last autumn from Michele Dunne and Frederic Wehrey of the Carnegie Endowment. Recognising that US counterterrorism efforts necessarily involve cooperation with Arab states, the authors were looking for ways to minimise the problems this can cause: 

"Many Arab governments are fuelling the very extremism they purport to fight and looking for cover from the United States for increasingly repressive policies. Washington needs a holistic counterterrorism strategy that ensures its Arab allies do not use US assistance to perpetuate terrorism and that supports those in Arab societies best able to combat radicalisation."

To this end they proposed a series of "guiding principles":

Insist on discussing broad strategies against extremism. US defense officials and diplomats should engage in sustained private conversations with Arab allies about the political, economic, legal, and security steps those governments are taking to address the causes of extremism. US officials should make clear, privately as well as publicly, when they believe such steps are either inadequate or misguided – as in the case of cracking down on peaceful expression and political activity by Islamists or non-Islamists under the guise of counterterrorism ...

Increase scrutiny over assistance that the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency provide to Arab intelligence services and Ministry of Interior forces. Much of the US counterterrorism effort in the Arab world hinges on bilateral cooperation with Arab intelligence and security services ... 

But the same services also collaborate in the repressive government policies that have spawned extremism. They may seek to steer counterterrorism cooperation with the United States against political Islamists or other oppositionists that Washington does not classify as terrorists. Similarly, some of these intelligence services are trying to use radical al-Qaeda-affiliated clerics as counterweights to the Islamic State – which is akin to fighting fire with fire.

Reinvigorate civil society assistance. In an era in which citizens and nonstate actors are gaining power while governments are weakening, civil society organizations have greater potential than in the past to advocate for values such as pluralism, rule of law, and respect for human rights with Arab societies as well as governments. 

US officials have incorrectly interpreted government crackdowns to mean that foreign funding to such groups was a failure, when exactly the opposite was true. Governments targeted nongovernmental organisations because they were successfully mobilising people, particularly the youth, to take part in activities such as journalism, electoral politics, and watchdogging government. 

The United States should rethink its methods and reinvigorate support for these groups, including those with significant involvement from youth or women, which can make a critical difference in resisting radicalisation and the repression that fuels it.

Push back against repression of nongovernmental organisations. The United States should make unambiguous its objections to the increasingly harsh laws, extralegal practices, and intimidation used against civil society organisations that support human or civil rights, particularly in the Gulf states and Egypt. While this may not be enough to stop such government practices altogether, it may curb some excesses and will signal to Arab publics where the United States stands on these issues.

Do not rely primarily on religion-based counterradicalisation programmes. Several Arab states have offered counter-ideology and deradicalisation programmes as a centerpiece of their contribution to the fight against the Islamic State, while semi-independent clerics have sought to demonise the group. 

While these initiatives can be useful, they have limitations and drawbacks. Religion-based programmes often focus on elements of radicals’ discourse that target Arab regimes while leaving in place more intolerant, sectarian, and anti-American aspects. And because many of the clerics delivering these messages are funded by Arab regimes, they lack legitimacy in the eyes of at-risk audiences.

Washington should support these types of initiatives – but cautiously. The United States should not allow regimes to use such programmes as a pretext for avoiding more substantive political and economic reforms. It should insist that these programs be accompanied by reforms that address the root causes of radicalisation.

Further thoughts from readers are welcome, along with links to any discussion papers on this topic.

  
   
Posted by Brian Whitaker
Monday, 12 January 2015